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Titel
Collusive collective dominance : with contractual consumer switching costs ; the gap in law enforcement under article 101 TFEU / Markus M. Lindner
VerfasserLindner, Markus Michael
Begutachter / BegutachterinFrancois, Joseph F. ; Landesmann, Michael
ErschienenLinz, Juli 2015
Umfang110 Seiten : Illustrationen
HochschulschriftUniversität Linz, Univ., Dissertation, 2015
Anmerkung
Zusammenfassung in englischer Sprache
SpracheEnglisch
Bibl. ReferenzOeBB
DokumenttypDissertation
Schlagwörter (DE)Artikel 101 AEUV / Artikel 102 AEUV / kollektive Dominanz / kumulative Effekt Doktrin / Airtours Kriterien / Bündeltheorie / Kollusion / vertikale Vereinbarungen
Schlagwörter (EN)article 101 TFEU / article 102 TFEU / collective dominance / cumulative effect doctrine / airtours criteria / collusion / vertical agreements
Schlagwörter (GND)Europäische Union <Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union> / Binnenmarkt / Wettbewerbspolitik / Dominanz / Kollektivismus / Abgestimmtes Verhalten / Vertikale Bindung
URNurn:nbn:at:at-ubl:1-5090 Persistent Identifier (URN)
Zugriffsbeschränkung
 Das Werk ist gemäß den "Hinweisen für BenützerInnen" verfügbar
Dateien
Collusive collective dominance [4.23 mb]
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Zusammenfassung (Deutsch)

Article 101 TFEU is the main addressee to apply collusive collective dominance. Article 101 TFEU prohibits all agreements between firms, decision by associations of firms and concerted practices, which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. The definition of Article 101 TFEU excludes all agreements between firms, which result in collusive prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. The justification to exclude agreements between firms and consumers under Article 101 TFEU is based on the assumption of rational consumers who do not sign agreements that result in collusive prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. The present paper will question this assumption under Article 101 TFEU by showing a collusive collective dominant equilibrium based on contractual vertical restraints between firms and consumers. The result reveals a gap in law enforcement under Article 101 TFEU and recommends an extension of Article 101 TFEU regarding agreements between firms and consumers to cover anticompetitive effects of the whole vertical chain.