802.1x for home users and guest networks

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Abstract

The vast majority of wireless home networks is secured by pre-shared key authentication models, such as WPA2-PSK, which results in a number of security issues rooted in the wireless protocol itself as well as the environmental conditions of home networks. Apart from the security aspects, a user-based authentication scheme also provides better control over by whom and when the network is accessed rather than which device is connecting to the network. A user-based authentication scheme also allows for a more granular control of the network and its users by enforcing certain restrictions such as access times or account expiration. This thesis implements and discusses a WPA2-Enterprise (WPA2-802.1x EAP) solution for wireless home networks while running all necessary components and services on a single OpenWrt based consumer device. The implemented solution provides administrators of wireless home networks with all the key features needed to administrate this user-based authentication system as well as comfortable ways of distributing credentials to the user or guest.
Abstract

1. Introduction

Nowadays WPA2-PSK (Wi-Fi Protected Access - Pre-Shared Key) is the default wireless security scheme for most home networks. Although WPA2-PSK provides a good basic protection against unwanted access to a private network this authentication model has a series of well known weaknesses which may be exploited rather easily. For example, a connected device or malicious user may sniff the traffic [1][2] of other connected devices or spoof another device MAC address and therefore impersonate said device. Apart from WPA2-PSK’s weaknesses the human factor has to be considered as well. Many home network administrators may most likely choose an easy to guess password and disclose it to a considerable large amount of users such as guests or neighbors without ever changing it. This may become a rather high risk factor to a network if we consider the amount of foreign mobile devices roaming our private and public networks.

This thesis will address the above mentioned security issues by introducing a user-based authentication scheme (using WPA2-Enterprise/WPA2-802.1x) rather than a device based authentication (WPA2-PSK). In addition, one of the main goals of the proposed solution should be ease-of-use, to enable guests to connect to the network with a minimal amount of effort by the administrator of the network and the guest himself. By using WPA2-Enterprise also a more detailed and granular administration will be possible. This may enable the network’s owner/administrator to grant every user individual access rights to portions of the network, facilitate a sort of parental control by limiting access to certain times of day and generate temporary access for guest users. The credentials themselves can then be generated so they expire after a certain amount of time or they are managed by the administrator and revoked if necessary.

1.1. Motivation

The goal of this work is to provide users and administrators of home networks with the possibility of an easy way to secure their wireless network with an 802.1x port-based authentication scheme rather than device-based schemes like WPA2-PSK. This will introduce a more secure wireless home environment with an additional set of features that wouldn’t be possible in a WPA2-Personal (WPA/WPA2-PSK) based network. For example the home network’s administrator will be able to grant individual users access to certain parts of the network as well as a self contained guest network, generate temporary guest users and introduce a sort of parental control by limiting access times of specific users (e.g. access to the internet is only granted between 9AM and 8PM). The
main focus will therefore be on creating an 802.1x/RADIUS authentication solution that is as easy as possible to install, administrate and use by home users and their respective guest users. Further this solution will illustrate approaches to easily distribute user’s credentials to their corresponding devices.

To this end all services needed to realise this 802.1x port-based authentication solution will be run on one consumer router running OpenWrt, instead of being spread across multiple devices and systems like this is usually the case with setups of this kind (see Section 3.2.1.). Also this solution should provide a centralised management interface to control various aspects of the system, which are usually also handled by a series of different standalone software solutions.

1.2. Threat Model and security concerns

WPA-Personal (WPA2-PSK) represents the most popular authentication scheme for home environments due to it’s simpleness in administration and distribution to users. Although it provides a good basic protection against unwanted access to a wireless network there are a series of well known weaknesses which can rather easily be exploited [1][2]. Considering many private wireless networks are in range of multiple households and therefore potentially malicious users this might impose a serious security risk. Also allowing guest users to join your main network might introduce corrupted and malicious devices to the network.

Apart from those concerns the human element is also a huge factor, considering that former guests and potentially neighbours might disclose the wireless password to unwanted users. This becomes even more of an issue due to the fact that most administrators of such networks choose weak passwords (which are easy to guess or crack with dictionary attacks) and rarely change them over time.

1.3. Structure

This work offers an overview of currently existing solutions in the area of home user guest networks as well as technologies used by the proposed and implemented 802.1x solution and also give an outlook on how the current implementation could be improved. These topics will be discussed in the following chapters:

- Chapter “State of the Art”: An overview of currently existing solutions in the sector of wireless guest networks in general and 802.1x port-based authentication solutions in particular.

- Chapter “Employed Technologies and Tools”: This chapter represents a comprehensive
collection of technologies used by the implementation of this project. It discusses OpenWrt, port-based authentication as well as the protocols involved in realising such an authentication scheme. This includes Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), Extensible Authentication Protocol over Lan/Wireless (EAPoL/EAPoW), RADIUS (these represent the foundation of port-based authentication) and a short overview of dynamic VLAN assignment which is used to segment the network accordingly.

■ Chapter “Implementation”: Describes and discusses the necessary steps of configuring the router and operating system to provide the needed infrastructure for hosting the guest network, as well as the configuration of the authentication server (FreeRadius) and all further involved components. Further this chapter discusses the implementation of an user interface, which allows the management of the system’s key features as well as a proposed mobile application as an addition or alternative to the former mentioned user interface.

■ Chapter “Future Work”: Provides an outlook on what could be improved or added to the system’s current implementation.

2. State of the art

Nowadays wireless guest networks are mainly accomplished by segmenting the network via separate SSIDs, which in turn are secured using WPA-Personal (WPA/WPA2-PSK) and potentially be distributed to the guest user using Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS). Figures 1, 2 and 3 show such an example configuration and its possibilities using a ZyXEL NBG6815 wireless router:

Figure 1: ZyXEL SSID based guest networks [3]
**Figure 2:** Zyxel guest network options

**Figure 3:** Zyxel WPS configuration
Depending on manufacturer and device these solutions might offer different feature sets. In the example above the device offers possibilities for activating the guest network for a set amount of time (Figure 1) as well as restricting the SSID’s bandwidth (Figure 2). Further it allows the registration of devices to one specific SSID using WPS (Figure 3).

Other approaches apart WPA2-PSK involve the usage of WPA2-Enterprise (802.1x port-based authentication). Currently existing software projects and solutions in this context can basically be categorised into three classes: Captive Portals, Radius Management and Credential/Certificate Distribution solutions.

**Captive Portals**

Captive Portals are probably the best known of those three categories, since these are solutions most users come into contact with. They are mainly used in public places wherever an open WiFi hotspot is available. These solutions allow the redirection of a connecting HTTP client to a sort of gateway web-page, where users are prompted access conditions, terms of use or simply asked to log-in with a before acquired username and password. Some of the best known Captive portals\(^1\) are probably:

- HotspotSystem,
- WiFiDog and
- CoovaChilli/Chillispot,

since these are available out of the box on devices running DD-WRT and are also part of the OpenWrt repository, they are therefore easy to implement in a home environment.

Contrary to the proposed solution of this thesis, solutions of this kind neither provide the full extent of security provided by a full fledged 802.1x authentication system, nor a simple enough user and/or guest management to accommodate home users, or access to extended features provided by RADIUS. Although some proprietary hotspot solutions like HotspotSystem Basic+\(^2\) or Socialwave\(^3\) provide similar features for guest user support they are still not viable solutions for simple and small home networks.

\(^1\)List of Captive Portals: [https://goo.gl/OyIgbb](https://goo.gl/OyIgbb)

\(^2\)HotspotSystem: [http://www.hotspotsystem.com](http://www.hotspotsystem.com)

\(^3\)Socialwave: [http://www.socialwave.at](http://www.socialwave.at)
RADIUS Management

RADIUS represents the server backend and central point for authenticating and authorising users in an 802.1x secured network. Therefore it would be desirable to manage its features as simple as possible. Management interfaces like FreeRADIUS Dialup Admin[^4], phpRADmin[^5] or daloRADIUS[^6] are foremost created for experienced administrators and simply provide the ability to manage various aspects of a RADIUS server. This can reach from only being able to manage users, accounting (logging) and server preferences (FreeRADIUS Dialup Admin), to providing more advanced features like group management, billing information and more granular access control (daloRADIUS).

Taking into account that solutions of this kind are rather complicated to manage and only provide a fraction of the features that this work wants to offer to a home user, this kind of software is also not a viable choice for the proposed area of application.

Credential/Certificate Distribution

This category of software provides the end-user with an automated configuration of certificates and user credentials for joining and configuring access to 802.1x and WPA2-Enterprise networks. Products like SU1X[^7] or Cloudpath Enrollment System[^8] accomplish this by installing their own deployment tools or mobile apps on the respective clients. Although these solutions offer a rather easy way to access 802.1x networks from a wide range of devices and operating systems, they are mostly proprietary and designed for larger company or educational networks and are simply not designed to run on consumer hardware. Also the fact that a third party application has to be installed to join these networks makes it not applicable for this work’s target audience.

Apart from those three categories of software solutions, there are a few research projects which tried to unify most of the above mentioned aspects and extend them with additional functionality. The paper “A Secure Wireless LAN Access Technique for Home Network” for example suggests the creation of a custom protocol, based on EAP, to transport several authentication methods using passwords which are changed randomly and periodically based on a counter for each authentication method and password[^4]. Some also propose the extension of EAP to support the implementation

[^4]: Dialup Admin: [http://freeradius.org/dialupadmin.html](http://freeradius.org/dialupadmin.html)
[^5]: phpRADmin: [https://sourceforge.net/projects/phpradmin/](https://sourceforge.net/projects/phpradmin/)
[^7]: SU1X: [https://sourceforge.net/projects/su1x/](https://sourceforge.net/projects/su1x/) [https://goo.gl/pyHOxz](https://goo.gl/pyHOxz)
[^8]: Cloudpath ES: [https://goo.gl/PSScVN](https://goo.gl/PSScVN)
of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which is not only applicable for home networks but 802.1x secured wireless networks in general [5]. Finally “A Secure Wireless LAN Access Technique for Home Network” suggests a rather consumer friendly 802.1x authentication method using username and password on a dedicated SSID. This solution involves the use of a captive portal and the execution of an applet (based on SU1X mentioned above) to distribute credentials and enrol new users [6].
3. Employed Technologies and Tools

This part of the thesis will focus on discussing details about the basis technologies and tools used to implement the in Chapter 1.1. proposed 802.1x/RADIUS authentication solution. It represents a comprehensive collection of technologies used by the implementation of this project, which wasn’t found this way in any literature and therefore will be collected and discussed in this chapter. This involves the obvious components such as OpenWrt and Radius as well as the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) which provides the basis of port-based authentication.

3.1. OpenWrt

OpenWrt is a Linux based operating system for embedded devices, usually wireless routers, which is stripped to the bare minimum to realise distribution on a wide range of systems and hardware with a very limited amount of resources regarding CPU speed, memory and disk space (flash memory). Although it is such a minimalistic system it provides the user with full access to the filesystem and an optional package management, which allows a free customization of the system to ones individual needs. Since the project is entirely open-source and heavily community driven OpenWrt, at this point, supports 50 platforms (with the instruction sets AVR32, ARM, CRIS, m68k, MIPS, PowerPC, SPARC, SuperH, Ubicom32, x86, x86-64) and offers over 3500 software packages through the opkg (Open Package Management) package management system. To allow the user an as easy as possible configuration of the system’s most important settings OpenWrt provides the so called UCI system (see section 3.1.4.). This represents the command-line variant of the subsystem, as well as a web user interface (as of Version 8.09) which is based on LuCI, a framework written in Lua. Apart from this OpenWrt also provides an extensive build system to enable developers to easily cross-compile their software, generate cross-compile toolchains and build customized firmware images.

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9 As of the release of OpenWrt 12.09 Attitude Adjustment devices with less than 16MB RAM are no longer supported [7].
3.1.1. Architecture

To provide a better understanding of an Embedded Linux System architecture and OpenWrt’s architecture in specific, this section provides an overview of such a system’s primary components. This kind of systems basically consist of the following elements (also refer to Table 1):

- build system
- bootloaders
- “current” mainline Linux Kernel\(^{10}\)
- C Libraries
- userspace (Busybox\(^{11}\), package manager, UCI, . . .)

![Table 1: OpenWrt’s architecture and system components](image)

3.1.2. Build System

OpenWrt’s Build system is a set of Makefiles that allow users to generate both a cross-compilation toolchain and a root filesystem (“firmware images”) for embedded systems \(^{11}\). The goal of the build system is to automate the process of configuring and compiling your own software for different target systems by providing the instruction set architectures of several embedded systems. To

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\(^{10}\)kernel version 3.18.23 in OpenWrt Chaos Calmer 15.05

\(^{11}\)Busybox Website: [https://busybox.net/](https://busybox.net/)
accomplish this OpenWrt provides a Makefile system with its own syntax and therefore differs from the traditional Linux Makefiles\(^\text{12}\). In the context of OpenWrt a Makefile contains meta information about a package, how to compile, where to install binaries and copy files, and several other options \[^{11}\].

The compilation toolchain is a set of tools used to compile code and consists of:

- a compiler (usually \texttt{gcc})
- binary utilities like assembler and linker (usually \texttt{binutils})
- a standard C library (most Linux systems use \texttt{gLibc}, but \texttt{musl-libc} and \texttt{uClibc} are also a possibility)

The buildroot itself provides four directories (\texttt{tools, toolchain, package and target}) to realise the system’s build sequence as follows \[^{11}\]:

\begin{itemize}
\item \texttt{tools}
  \begin{itemize}
  \item automake, autoconf, cmake, …
  \end{itemize}
\item \texttt{toolchain/binutils}
  \begin{itemize}
  \item as (assembler), ld (linker), …
  \end{itemize}
\item \texttt{toolchain/gcc}
  \begin{itemize}
  \item gcc, g++, cpp, …
  \end{itemize}
\item \texttt{target/linux}
  \begin{itemize}
  \item kernel modules
  \end{itemize}
\item \texttt{package}
  \begin{itemize}
  \item core and additional “feed” packages
  \end{itemize}
\item \texttt{target/linux}
  \begin{itemize}
  \item kernel image
  \end{itemize}
\item \texttt{target/linux/image}
  \begin{itemize}
  \item firmware image generation
  \end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

Above mentioned “feed packages” provide the user with the ability to supply his own set of packages using Subversion, Git or directly within the according buildroot directory. By doing so they will already appear as a package when running \texttt{make menuconfig} (Linux Kernel menuconfig). The user may then choose to compile and build them directly into a firmware image or as a separate package for later installation with \texttt{opkg} \[^{12}\].

For further information about installation and usage regarding the build system please refer to the official documentation\[^{13}\].

### 3.1.3. Flash Memory Layout

Since almost all embedded systems or in this case routers don’t have any mass storage, those systems rely on flash memory to store the operating system and additional data. Generally two

\[^{12}\]These Makefiles can still be executed using \texttt{make} but provide additional flags and functionality for the OpenWrt buildroot and toolchain, such as meta data about packages.

\[^{13}\]OpenWrt Build System HowTo: \url{https://wiki.openwrt.org/doc/howto/build}
kinds of flash memory are employed to realise this storage. The typically smaller raw NOR flash (4MB - 16MB used in older routers) and the larger raw NAND flash memories (32MB - 256MB used in newer devices). This raw flash storage isn’t partitioned in the traditional sense, where information about the partitions is stored within the Master Boot Record (MBR), but rather done by the Linux Kernel or the bootloader (for OpenWrt’s generic flash layout see Figure 4). Partitions are simply addressed by offsets within the raw flash, but can also be named to avoid the repeated use of start offsets [13].

![Figure 4: OpenWrt’s generic flash layout](image)

Most newer routers share this generic partition scheme, which slightly differs depending on the U-Boot implementation and System on a Chip (SoC) specific images.

As shown in Figure 4 the partitions are nested and sectioned into four layers:

**Layer 0** describes the raw flash chip which is connected to the SoC [13].

**Layer 1** partitions the flash space into several parts for [13]:

1. one or more partitions for U-Boot depending on implementation (usually u-boot and u-boot-env)
2. an OpenWrt firmware partition
3. optional SoC partitions for specific firmware

**Layer 2** further divides the firmware partition into [13]:

1. kernel space, which contains a twice packed Kernel binary (first with LZMA and then again with gzip to save as much space as possible) that is written directly to the raw flash and not part of any filesystem. This binary is decompressed and loaded into RAM at boot time.
2. the rootfs which contains the filesystem mounted on “/”
Layer 3 again divides rootfs into two partitions [13]:

1. Read only memory partition ("/dev/root") using SquashFS which is mounted into "/rom"

2. Writable rootfs_data partition using JFFS2 which holds space for additional data and changes to existing files mounted into "/overlay"

The entire root filesystem is mounted into "/" and is comprised of "/rom" and "/overlay", which can therefore be ignored and only "/" should be used for changes to the system. The ROM partition mounted in "/rom" contains all basic files depending on the selected packages when building the firmware image. It also provides default configuration files for FailSafe booting [14]. Since this partition is using SquashFS [15] none of the data in this mount point can be deleted or changed in any way. Due to the use of OverlayFS [15] all changes to existing files and additional files which are added to the device after installation are written to the writable JFFS2 partition mounted in "/overlay" which is merged with "/rom" to form the before mentioned "/". Therefore whenever the system is looking for a file, "/overlay" is checked first and only if the file doesn’t exist in this partition it checks in "/rom". This way "/overlay" simply overrides "/rom" and creates the illusion of a writable "/" (see Figure 5) [13].

![OverlayFS construct](image)

Figure 5: OverlayFS construct [16]

When a file is to be deleted that is actually within "/rom" a corresponding entry in "/overlay" is created instead, these entries are so called whiteouts which are symlinks that behave like the file doesn’t exist [13].

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14 Booting the system with a necessary set of default settings to recover from failure.
15 SquashFS is a read only compressed filesystem, which uses LZMA for the compression. Since SquashFS is a read only filesystem, it doesn’t need to align the data, allowing it to pack the files tighter thus taking up significantly less space than JFFS2 (saving 20-30% over a JFFS2 filesystem) [14].
3.1.4. The Unified Configuration Interface (UCI) System

The UCI system is intended to provide a centralized and unified interface for configuring OpenWrt’s basic and most important system settings. Typically these are crucial settings for the functioning of the device such as the main network interface, wireless, remote access, firewall and logging settings. In addition to the basic system settings some third party programs such as samba or the system’s default web server uhttpd have been made compatible with this system to facilitate an easier way of configuring those services. The central configuration is split into several files which are located within “/etc/config”. Each of the files contained in this directory relates to a portion of the system which it configures. OpenWrt offers a variety of comfortable ways to modify these files like the command line utility uci and various APIs (e.g. shell, lua, C), which is how the system’s web interface LuCI parses and alters UCI configuration files [9].

UCI configuration files typically consist of config statements, so called sections, and several option and/or list statements defining the actual values (see example below).

```
1 config 'foo' 'bar'
2   option 'string_var' 'value'
3   option 'boolean_var' '1'
4 list 'collection' 'item_1'
5 list 'collection' 'item_2'
```

Listing 1: UCI configuration file example

- The Statement config 'foo' 'bar' defines a new section of the type 'foo' and the name 'bar'. These sections can be anonymous as well by only providing a type and no identifier. Although the identifier being optional a section’s type is mandatory for processing programs to decide how to handle the enclosed options.

- The lines option 'string_var' 'value' and option 'boolean_var' '1' simply define values within the defined section.

- Statements starting with the keyword list define options with multiple values. Therefore all values of list statements with the same identifier will be merged into a single list of values.
**Command Line Utility (uci)**

The command line utility `uci` provides a simple and comfortable way of parsing and modifying UCI configuration files for developers and scripting purposes. UCI allows several operations to the configuration files by simply addressing the corresponding file, section and option (`uci <command> <config>.<section>.<option>`). After committing any changes to a configuration file the affected service has to be restarted for the changes to take effect.

The following example shows retrieving and setting values to a configuration file:

```bash
//show all wireless interfaces
root@OpenWrt:~# uci show wireless | grep wifi-iface
wireless.@wifi-iface[0]=wifi-iface
wireless.@wifi-iface[0].device='radio0'
wireless.@wifi-iface[0].network='lan'
wireless.@wifi-iface[0].mode='ap'
wireless.@wifi-iface[0].ssid='OpenWrt5Ghz'
wireless.@wifi-iface[0].encryption='none'
wireless.@wifi-iface[1]=wifi-iface
wireless.@wifi-iface[1].device='radio1'
wireless.@wifi-iface[1].network='lan'
wireless.@wifi-iface[1].mode='ap'
wireless.@wifi-iface[1].encryption='psk2'
wireless.@wifi-iface[1].key='some_password'
wireless.@wifi-iface[1].ssid='OpenWrt'

//set ssid of wireless interface 2
root@OpenWrt:~# uci set wireless.@wifi-iface[1].ssid=test
root@OpenWrt:~# uci commit wireless

//restart wireless devices
root@OpenWrt:~# wifi

//retrieve the newly set ssid
root@OpenWrt:~# uci get wireless.@wifi-iface[1].ssid
test
```

Listing 2: UCI example

If there are multiple anonymous rules (e.g. multiple wireless interfaces as shown in Listing 2),
UCI allows them to be referenced in an array-like manner. Whereas [0] returns the first and the usage of [-1] the last one and so on. For a full set of commands please refer to the official uci documentation and the documentation of the corresponding configuration files [9].

### 3.2. Port-Based Authentication - 802.1x

The following sections will give an overview of how an 802.1x port-based authentication system is comprised, which standards and protocols are employed and how all those parts play together. The complexity of such a system is the result of interoperability issues between all the components used and the fact that no single standard defines all of those components. The standards and specifications used by 802.1x are written by two different standardisation organisations, the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) which supplies a standard for EAPoL [17] (Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) who provide the RFCs for EAP [18] (and it’s methods) as well as Radius [19].

In the context of port-based authentication the term “port” has to be understood, which represents a Layer 2 (Data Link Layer) connection to a network. In a wired network this refers to a physical port on a switch as shown in Figure 6. While the physical connection is provided by an Ethernet cable connected to a switch’s Ethernet port (Layer 1: Physical Layer), port-based authentication attempts to verify the identity of the connected device via Layer 2 [20].

![Figure 6: Port-based Authentication via physical link](image)

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Ports and therefore the IEEE standard for EAPoL also apply to wireless networks, but in a wireless LAN the “port” is an association of a client with an access point rather than a physical connection (see Figure 7). Every access point within a wireless network periodically broadcasts a so called 802.11 beacon frame. When a wireless client boots up the surrounding area is scanned for active access points using those beacon frames. The client then tries to associate with an access point which involves a series of 802.11 frame transmissions between the client and the access point [21] as shown in Figure 8.

![Figure 7: Wireless LAN virtual link](image)

![Figure 8: 802.11 association process](image)
After successful connection and authentication to the network, the authentication server grants the device access and certain privileges (depending on his credentials) to the protected network (authorization). Although introducing port-based authentication to a wired or wireless network is a big step towards securing these networks, methods such as data encryption, intrusion detection and access control should still be employed in order to prevent possible attacks against the network. In addition to preventing unauthorized users from accessing the network, a 802.1x port-based authentication system also supports the following features [20]:

- **User location**: Applications can easily track the whereabouts of a user or device based on the switch or access point where the corresponding client was authenticated.

- **Billing and accounting**: Combining port-based authentication with billing and accounting mechanisms enables the implementation of fee-based network access (mostly used by hotel solutions or Internet service providers).

- **Personalized access**: Based on the credentials the system grants the user access to certain parts of the network or applications.

3.2.1. **Primary Components**

Until now port-based authentication systems were shown from a rather generic perspective, but in fact there are a number of components and protocols found in the 802.1x specifications which are involved in realising such systems. As Figure 9 constitutes, this kind of authentication system primarily consists of supplicants, authenticators and authentication servers.

![Figure 9: 802.1x primary components](image-url)
Supplicant

is a client device that requests access to a network and needs to be authenticated. To be recognized as a valid supplicant the client has to implement 802.1x and a certain EAP-Method (further details on EAP and EAP-Methods can be found in Chapter 3.4.). The communication between supplicant and authentication server is accomplished via EAP as transport protocol and a specific EAP-Method to facilitate the actual authentication mechanism (see Section 3.2.2.3.).

Whereas the supplicant and authenticator are communicating via 802.1x EAPoL which encapsulates the EAP-Method frames as data (see Section 3.2.2.1).

Authenticator

The authenticator is a Layer 2 device, usually a switch or access point. It functions as a “security gate” between the supplicant and the protected network, blocking all traffic except EAPoL encapsulated frames until the authentication process is complete (Figure 10). This device is also responsible for the communication between supplicant and authentication server by taking the EAP-Method data from the EAPoL frames and encapsulating it into RADIUS frames (see Section 3.2.2.2.).

Figure 10: 802.1x port control [22]
As described above the supplicant and authenticator communicate about the authentication, where at some point the authentication server will request credentials from the supplicant. According to the credentials offered by the supplicant the authentication server then either grant or deny the client access to the protected network (see Section 3.2.2). The 802.1x standards and specifications don’t demand any particular type of authentication server, but nearly all solutions use RADIUS.

### 3.2.2. Authentication Process

A typical authentication progression passes through the following steps (also see Figure [11]):

1. **Initialization:** On connection of a new client/supplicant the physical port on the switch is set active and put into an unauthorized state. As long as the port is in this state only 802.1x traffic is allowed and passed on, all other traffic will be dropped.

2. **Initiation:** During this phase the authenticator periodically sends EAP Identity request frames to a multicast MAC address, which the supplicants listen to. Upon receiving said frame the client responds with an EAP Identity response frame which contains an identifier for the supplicant (e.g. User ID). The authenticator then further encapsulates this EAP Identity response frame in a RADIUS Access-Request packet which is forwarded to the authentication server.

   This process can also be initiated by the supplicant with the sending of an EAPoL-Start frame to the corresponding authenticator, which in turn responds with an EAP Identity request frame.

3. **Negotiation:** After receiving former mentioned RADIUS Access-Request packet the authentication server sends a RADIUS Access-Challenge encapsulated reply to the authenticator, which contains an EAP authentication request specifying a certain EAP-Method (e.g. EAP-TLS). The authenticator then encapsulates the EAP authentication request in an EAPoL frame and forwards it to the supplicant, which can now use the specified EAP-Method.

4. **Authentication:** Once the authentication server and supplicant have agreed on an EAP-Method a series of EAP requests and responses are sent between them (relayed by the
authenticator), until the authentication server responds with either EAP-Success or EAP-Failure (encapsulated in the according RADIUS Accept-Access or RADIUS Accept-Reject packet). In case of successful authentication the switch port will be put into an “authorized” state and therefore allow normal traffic. This state persists until an EAP-Logoff message is sent by the supplicant and the port is put back into an “unauthorized” state.

![Diagram of 802.1x authentication process](image)

Figure 11: 802.1x authentication process

The following sections will discuss the communication between every single component (supplicant, authenticator and authentication server) in further detail.

### 3.2.2.1. Communication between Supplicant and Authenticator (802.1x)

The 802.1x standard (EAPoL) only applies to the communication between supplicant and authenticator and therefore is only a part of a 802.1x port-based authentication system, which also makes use of other protocols such as RADIUS. As defined in the 802.1x standard, EAPoL encapsulates EAP frames as data to facilitate the communication between supplicant and authenticator by adding several fields (Version, Type and Length) to EAP. Chapter 3.3. will explain this encapsulation in further detail. Figure 12 shows the communication explained in section 3.2.2. in further detail to illustrate the process and encapsulation of EAP frames.
By sending EAPoL frames of type “0” the involved devices signal that this frame is carrying an EAP frame as data. Whether the recipient is the supplicant or the authenticator the receiving device simply removes the EAPoL header and processes the encapsulated EAP frame according to its type which may be one of the following:

- Request
- Response
- Success
- Failure

Whereby the supplicant can only issue response frames and the authenticator may only perform Request, Success and Failure frames.

If a link between a supplicant and the authenticator becomes active (after initial EAPoL communication is completed), the authenticator sends an EAP Identity Request to the supplicant. At this point only EAP traffic will be forwarded to the protected part of the network (see Figure 11). After confirming the supplicants identity, the supplicant and the authentication server will start communicating based on their negotiated EAP-Method. From here on out the authenticator merely acts as a translator between supplicant and authentication server until the authentication process is complete.
server authorises or rejects the supplicant. This far only the communication involving EAPoL Type “0” frames for carrying EAP data was discussed. For establishing and maintaining the connection between supplicant and authenticator serveral other EAPoL frames outside the scope of EAP are necessary, including the following (as shown in Figure 12):

- EAPoL-Start
- EAPoL-Logoff
- EAPoL-Key
- EAPoL-ADF-Alert

To initiate the EAPoL connection the supplicant sends an EAPoL-Start frame, which causes the authenticator to immediately respond with an EAP Identity request. This has to be done by the supplicant since the authenticator has no means of detecting when the supplicant comes online. As mentioned earlier 802.1x (i.e. EAPoL) applies to Layer 2 in order to prevent the supplicant from connecting to the protected network [20]. To accomplish integration on Layer 2 level, 802.1x takes advantage of access control mechanisms offered by 802.1D, which defines MAC bridges (including Spanning Tree and Bridging) [23]. Since 802.1D is required in all 802 LANs (including Ethernet and Wi-Fi), 802.1x works with any kind of LAN. In addition 802.1x makes use of the addressing reserved for the 802.1D Spanning-Tree Protocol, in particular the group address 01:80:C2:00:00:03 is used to facilitate 802.1x communications\(^\text{17}\). This address is also referred to as 802.1x Port Access Entry (PAE) address. As a consequence all 802 based devices (NICs, switches, access points, . . . ) are equipped to receive and process frames sent to this group address [20].

3.2.2.2. **Communication between Authenticator and Authentication Server (RADIUS)**

The communication between authenticator and authentication server is achieved by using RADIUS (see Figure 11). This involves the following RADIUS frame types:

- Access-Request
- Access-Accept

\(^{17}\)By using a packet sniffer and filtering for the MAC address 01:80:C2:00:00:03 all 802.1x communications can easily be traced.
Access-Reject

Access-Challenge

optional (if Accounting is configured):

Accounting-Request

Accounting-Response

To establish communication the authenticator takes the EAP-Method data from an EAPoL frame (sent by the supplicant), encapsulates it into a RADIUS Access-Request frame and passes it on to the authentication server. Upon receiving an Access-Request the authentication server checks if the authenticator’s IP address and shared secret match the server’s expected values. If those values match, the RADIUS Access-Request will be processed accordingly, if not the server simply remains silent and doesn’t respond in any way. After processing the RADIUS Access-Request the authentication server sends EAP-Method data to the authenticator (encapsulated into a RADIUS Access-Challenge frame), which again the authenticator will relay to the supplicant via EAPoL. According to the outcome of the EAP-Method exchange between supplicant and authentication server, the server transmits the corresponding RADIUS Access-Accept or Access-Reject frame. Which in turn is converted into an EAPoL Success or Failure frame by the authenticator and forwarded to the supplicant.

3.2.2.3. Communication between Supplicant and Authentication Server (EAP-Method)

The communication of supplicant and authentication server realises the actual authentication process. As Figure 13 shows this is accomplished by exchanging EAP-Method data, which contain various elements, such as the supplicants credentials. Depending on the chosen credential type (username/password, encryption keys, . . . ), certain EAP-Method implementations are required, such as:

- MD5 challenge

- One-Time Passwords

Additionally there is a vast variety of proprietary and RFC-based Methods available (e.g. EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, LEAP, EAP-FAST, . . . ). Chapter 3.4 will discuss the most commonly used methods in further detail.
3.3. EAPoL/EAPoW Protocol

The EAPoL protocol provides a Layer 2 communication between a supplicant and an authenticator to prevent the supplicant from connecting to a network protected by a port-based authentication system. As defined in the 802.1x standard [17] EAPoL provides mechanisms to realise EAP communications over LANs. To accomplish this, EAPoL adds additional headers to EAP packets in order to create specialised packet types, which transport these EAP packets as data. Figure 14 illustrates this encapsulation process within an 802.1x port-based authentication system.

The primary objective of 802.1x communications is to transport EAP-Method data, which facilitates the actual authentication process. The by the supplicant and authentication server negotiated EAP-Method defines the actual EAP-Method data. EAP packets (typically Request and Response packets) in turn transport the EAP-Method protocol and data. EAPoL then carries the EAP packets, and 802.3 (Ethernet) or 802.11 (Wi-Fi) frames again transport the EAPoL...
packets [20]. Depending on the corresponding transport protocol we then either talk about:

- EAPoL (Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN) or
- EAPoW (Extensible Authentication Protocol over Wireless)

3.3.1. Packet Structure

As already mentioned in Section 3.2.2.1., EAPoL adds three additional fields to an EAP packet as a header (see Figure 15). These header fields are essential for integrating with LANs and transporting EAP packets. The subsequent sections explain these fields in further detail.

![Figure 15: EAPoL packet structure](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bytes:</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Packet Body</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Version**

The Version field identifies the EAPoL protocol version supported by the EAPoL packet’s sender. The length of this field is one byte and for 802.1x implementations this field always contains the value “0000 0010”\(^ {18} \) (Hex “02”).

**Type**

The Type field, with a length of one byte, describes the type of packet being sent by either the supplicant or authenticator. Table 2 shows the various types and their values. EAPoL doesn’t define any other values at this point which allows for future extension.

---

\(^ {18}\)All values are unsigned.
### Length

The Length field provides two bytes for storing the length of the Packet Body. The value stored in this field represents the length of the payload in number of bytes. For example, a value of “0000 0000 1010 1010” defines a Packet Body field size of 170 bytes. A zero value in this field signals that the according EAPoL packet doesn’t contain any payload, which is the case with EAPoL-Start and Logoff packets. With the length of two bytes, EAPoL could theoretically provide a payload size of 65535 bytes, which is restricted by the limitations of the according link transport protocol, i.e. Ethernet (IEEE 802.3) or Wi-Fi (802.11).

### Packet Body

The Packet Body represents the payload portion of an EAPoL packet. This payload is only present in the following types of EAPoL packet types:

- EAP-Packet
- EAP-Key
- EAP-ASF-Alert

The Packet Body contains exactly one EAP packet if the type is EAP-Packet. For the EAPoL-Key type a single Key Descriptor and in the case of an EAP-ASF-Alert type, exactly one ASF-Alert packet.

### 3.4. Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

The Extensible Authentication Protocol, or EAP, was originally designed for PPP (Point-to-Point Protocol)\(^{[24]}\) to provide an additional authentication phase after the link was established. It
is also a general-purpose authentication protocol which supports a number of authentication methods such as Kerberos, token/smart card, one-time passwords (OTP) and public key authentication [25]. Figure 16 shows a layered structure of other protocols involved with EAP and some of the most commonly used EAP-Methods in the Authentication Layer, including EAP-MD5, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS. For further details about these methods please refer to Section 3.4.3.

3.4.1. Packet Structure

An EAP packet header (as shown in Figure 17) includes the following fields:

- Code
- Identifier
- Length
- Data
The subsequent sections will further describe these field types and their values.

**Code**

Analog to EAPoL Type fields, the EAP Code field describes a one byte long type of an EAP packet. Table 3 shows the various types and their corresponding values. At this point EAP doesn’t specify the use of any other values, which may be used for future extension. Refer to Section 3.4.2 for descriptions of the packet types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Packet Type</th>
<th>Value (Hex)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EAP-Request</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAP-Response</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAP-Success</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAP-Failure</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAP-Initiate</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAP-Finish</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: EAP Code field values

**Identifier**

The Identifier field (one byte length) facilitates a mechanism to match EAP-Response packets to their corresponding EAP-Requests. If the EAP-Request is sent by the authentication server to the supplicant the identifier value may be set to “0000 1010”, then the supplicant will in turn respond with an EAP-Response packet with it’s identifier set to the same value. Additionally the authenticator uses the same identifier values when forwarding EAP packets. Therefore each
transmission uses a new identifier value.

Length

The two byte long Length field contains the length of the entire EAP packet (including Code, Identifier, Length and Data fields). For example a length value of “0000 1000 0110 1101” indicates a total length of 2157 bytes, resulting in an EAP Data field of the length of 2153 bytes (2157 bytes minus 4 header bytes). Since the EAP Length field describes the length of the entire packet it’s value is equal to the value of the EAPoL Length field, which in comparison only contains the length of its data field.

Data

Just as the EAPoL Data field this field has a variable length and may also be none existent depending on the packet’s type. The value of the Code field (described above) defines how the Data field’s value is to be interpreted.

3.4.2. Packet Types

EAP-Request/Response

Figure 18 illustrates the structure of EAP-Request and EAP-Response packets. Request packets are used by the authenticator to communicate with the supplicant to request the Identity of the supplicant or deliver EAP-Method data (see Figure 11). Response packets on the other hand serve the supplicant’s communication with the authenticator to send EAP-Method data or credentials requested by the authentication server.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bytes:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Identifier</td>
<td>Length</td>
<td>Data (EAP-Method data)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values:
Request “01”
Response “02”

Figure 18: EAP-Request/Response packet format

EAP specifies a set of EAP types to define the structure of EAP-Request and EAP-Response packets. This EAP type dictates what data the EAP packet carries and is represented in the
EAP-Method packet’s Type field (see Section 3.4.3.). Table 4 shows a set of standards-based EAP types which must be supported by all EAP implementations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EAP Type</th>
<th>Value (Decimal)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notification</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAK</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD5-Challenge</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Standards-based EAP types

For a full list of valid type values and their RFC references please refer to Table 7 in Appendix Section 7.1.

**EAP-Success/Failure**

Based on the outcome of the EAP-Method communication between supplicant and authentication server the authenticator may issue either EAP-Success or EAP-Failure packets to the supplicant. Figure 19 shows the packet format for Success and Failure packets. Since those packets simply function as notification packets the Length field in these packets is set to “00” (Data field length is zero bytes) and therefore don’t contain an EAP Data field.

![Figure 19: EAP-Success/Failure packet format](image)

**3.4.3. EAP-Methods**

EAP-Methods communication represents the primary communication mechanism between a supplicant and an authentication server within a 802.1x port-based authentication system. Meaning that the EAP-Method realises the actual authentication process, whereas EAPoL and RADIUS
merely serve the transport of EAP-Method data between the involved parties. The subsequent sections will discuss the packet structure as well as the most commonly used EAP-Method types, such as EAP-MD5, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and PEAP.

3.4.3.1. Packet Structure

All EAP-Method packets consist of a two fields, a Type and Data field (see Figure 20).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bytes</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>EAP Method data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 20: EAP Method packet format

Type

The one byte EAP-Method Type field describes a specific EAP-Method, some of which are defined by RFC 3748 [18] (EAP specification) and have to be implemented by all EAP implementations (see Table 4). Apart from this standards-based EAP Types there are many other types that are proprietary and/or optional (see Table 7). The value of this Type field determines what the encapsulating EAP packet will carry. For example a value of “21” indicates that the EAP-Method data is relevant to EAP-TTLS authentication processes.

Data

The EAP Data field contains the data for the corresponding EAP-Method type, such as credentials or certificates. For instance an EAP Data field of the Identity type (indicated by a value of “1” in the type field, see Tables 4 and 7) would carry credentials to implement an authentication process between supplicant and authenticator.

3.4.3.2. EAP-MD5

EAP-MD5 uses challenge handshake authentication protocol (CHAP) which represents a challenge-response process for the user authentication between supplicant and authentication server. This one-way authentication method allows for a simple authentication through the use of a user and
password, where the password’s MD5 hash is stored by the authentication server. The authentication process is implemented as a three-way handshake between supplicant and authentication server (see Figure 21) after receiving the initial RADIUS Access-Request and EAP Identity exchange between supplicant and authenticator (see Figure 11).

![Figure 21: EAP-MD5 three-way handshake](image)

The authentication server requests the user’s password by sending a RADIUS Access-Challenge to the supplicant, which responds with the password hash using an EAP Authentication response which is further encapsulated into a Radius Access-Request. Upon receiving this request the authentication server either grants or denies the supplicant access to the protected part of the network.

**Finding:** From a security standpoint MD5 is not suitable for public and wireless networks since the password hashes can easily be sniffed, which allows for a derivation of the original password and therefore compromises the network’s security [27]. Also this method doesn’t provide neither server nor mutual authentication and supplicant authentication only via password hash (see Table 5). Therefore this method was deemed as unsuitable for the proposed scenario.

### 3.4.3.3. EAP-TLS

EAP-TLS (Transport Layer Security) provides a mutual authentication (opposing to EAP-MD5 which is only one-way), whereby both the supplicant and authentication server have to prove their identities. For this purpose EAP-TLS uses public key cryptography, which may involve smart cards, key tokens or digital certificates. The following and Figure 22 describe the EAP-TLS authentication process in more detail:
1. The authenticator sends an EAP Identity request packet to the supplicant.

2. In turn the supplicant responds with an EAP Identity response packet which contains the connecting client’s user ID.

3. The authenticator then forwards this identity response to the authentication server by encapsulating it into a RADIUS Access request packet.

4. The server then sends an EAP-TLS start packet to the supplicant, which initiates a TLS Records client-server handshake and certificate exchange.

5. The supplicant responds with EAP-Response packets of the EAP-TLS type, with the data field containing one or more TLS records such as:
   - Client Hello (to initiate handshake)
   - Client certificate (optional)
   - Client Key exchange
   - Change cipher
   - Finished

6. According to the supplicants messages the authentication server sends EAP-Request packets to the client, containing a set of the following TLS records:
   - Server-Hello
   - TLS certificate
   - Client certificate request (optional)
   - Server done
   - Change cipher
   - Finished

7. After the server has sent its last EAP request, the supplicant sends one more EAP-TLS message, which is empty, to signal the end of the handshake.

8. To conclude the handshake the authentication server finally sends an EAP-Success packet. Should any of the steps fail or an error occur, the server would have sent an EAP-Failure packet at the time the problem was detected.
For further information about EAP-TLS and its authentication process please refer to RFC 2716 (PPP EAP TLS Authentication Protocol). Finding: As a consequence of certificate usage on both the supplicants and the authentication server the administrative effort is very high in larger networks, since the certificates have to be deployed on every new device that needs to be integrated into the network. Also for a home network environment, the distribution of certificates for each device and especially guest users represents an unacceptable amount of effort needed by both the administrator and guest user alike to temporary register devices.

3.4.3.4. EAP-TTLS

EAP-Tunneled Transport Layer Security (EAP-TTLS) is similar to EAP-TLS, in the sense that both are certificate-based mutual authentication systems. However EAP-TTLS only requires a certificate on the server side. Supplicants can still be authenticated by using certificates (as with EAP-TLS) but usually authenticate themselves through a password, which greatly reduces the administrative effort needed to manage a port-based authentication system.

EAP-TTLS negotiations are comprised of two phases:

**TLS handshake phase** authenticate the supplicant with the authentication server by using certificates (as described in Section 3.4.3.3.).
TLS tunnel phase authentication of the supplicant using any non-EAP protocol [25].

Finding: Although this method already offers the possibility to authenticate the supplicant with username and password without the need for a client side certificate, it was dismissed due to the fact that EAP-TTLS wasn’t supported natively by Microsoft until Windows 8.1. Devices running Windows XP, Vista, 7 and Windows Phone 8 do not support this authentication method without third-party software [29]. Therefore this method would greatly restrict the range of supported devices. Apart from these compatibility issues EAP-TTLS also has some significant security issues which allow for a number of attacks [30][31].

Further information about EAP-TTLS and it’s versions can be found in RFC 5281 (EAP-TTLSv0)[32] and the Internet draft of EAP-TTLSv1 [33].

3.4.3.5. PEAP

Protected EAP is similar to EAP-TTLS and doesn’t require certificates on the supplicants, only on the authentication server. Same as EAP-TTLS, it also comprised of two phases. In phase one a TLS session is negotiated and established between supplicant and authentication server (as described before). In the second phase (tunnel phase) all EAP messages are encrypted using the key negotiated in phase one. Hence the basic idea of EAP-TTLS and PEAP is identical, with the difference that PEAP is only capable of using EAP protocols (e.g. EAP-MS-CHAP-V2[34]) whereas EAP-TTLS allows the usage of both EAP and non-EAP protocols [25]. When using this authentication method within an wireless LAN, typically the the authentication server will be authenticated by a supplicant based on the servers certificate and a secure TLS tunnel established. The supplicant itself is then authenticated by using username and password, which at this point is protected by the TLS tunnel [25].

Finding: This method will be employed in the implementation portion of this thesis, to provide the user with the capability of authentication via username and password (see Section 4.2.1). PEAP is also supported by all established Microsoft operating systems and therefore offers the widest range of devices access to networks secured by this method.

---

[19]Encapsulates MS-CHAP-V2 within EAP
To conclude this section about EAP and its various methods, Table 5 again provides an overview and comparison of the discussed authentication mechanisms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EAP-MD5</th>
<th>EAP-TLS</th>
<th>EAP-TTLS</th>
<th>PEAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Server authentication</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Public key (certificate)</td>
<td>Public key (certificate)</td>
<td>Public key (certificate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supplicant authentication</strong></td>
<td>Password hash</td>
<td>Public key (certificate or token/smart card)</td>
<td>Certificate, EAP, non-EAP protocols</td>
<td>Certificate or EAP protocols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mutual authentication</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dynamic key delivery</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic protocol architecture</strong></td>
<td>challenge / response</td>
<td>Establish TLS session and validate certificates for both client and server</td>
<td>1. Establish TLS between client and TTLS server</td>
<td>1. Establish TLS between client and server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Exchange attribute - value pairs between client and server</td>
<td>2. Run EAP exchanges over TLS tunnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Server certificate</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Required</td>
<td>Required</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Client certificate</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Required</td>
<td>Optional</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protection of user identity</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, protected by TLS</td>
<td>Yes, protected by TLS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Comparison of authentication mechanisms [25]
3.5. RADIUS

As already discussed in Chapter 3.2., RADIUS protocols present the primary communication mechanism between authenticator and authentication server by transporting EAP-Method data (see Chapter 3.4.) in a certain encrypted format. 802.1x and EAP don’t necessarily require RADIUS as an authentication server, but since RADIUS is the most popular and is also used in the implementation part, this thesis will only focus on RADIUS as an authentication server for the port-based authentication system.

3.5.1. Packet Structure

All RADIUS packets share the same structure, which is made up of the five fields: Code, Identifier Length, Authenticator and RADIUS Attribute (see Figure 23).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bytes:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Identifier</td>
<td>Length</td>
<td>Authenticator</td>
<td>RADIUS Attributes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 23: RADIUS packet structure

The subsequent sections describe those fields and their values in further detail.

Code

The one byte RADIUS code field describes the type of the RADIUS packet. Table 6 shows the various packet types and their corresponding values. At which “Accounting” packets are optional and are only sent if accounting is active/configured and “Status” packets are still in an experimental state [19].
### Table 6: RADIUS Code field values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Packet Type</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RADIUS Access-Request</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIUS Access-Accept</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIUS Access-Reject</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIUS Accounting-Request</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIUS Accounting-Response</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIUS Access-Challenge</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status-Server</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status-Client</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reserved</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Identifier**

The RADIUS Identifier field is similar to the EAP Identifier field, which makes it possible to match RADIUS Access-Challenge packets to their corresponding Access-Request packets. The Identifier field of a RADIUS Access-Request packet sent by the authenticator may contain the value “0000 1010”, as a result the authentication server’s corresponding RADIUS Access-Challenge packet also holds this value within it’s Identifier field. In addition the authenticator uses the same field value if the same Access-Request packet has to be retransmitted.

**Length**

The two byte long RADIUS Length field describes the length of the entire RADIUS packet including the fields Code, Identifier, Length, Authenticator and RADIUS Attribute. Just like EAP and EAPoL before, the total possible length of a RADIUS packet is restricted by the link transport protocol, i.e. Ethernet (IEEE 802.3) or Wi-Fi (802.11).

**Authenticator**

The Authenticator field contains a value according to the RADIUS packet type that is being sent, i.e. request (RADIUS Access-Request) or response (RADIUS Access-Accept/Reject, Access-Challenge) packets.
**Authenticator Request**
Contains a random 16 byte string, which is combined with the shared secret configured in the authenticator and authentication server and then put through a MD5 hash to again create a 16 byte value. This value is then XORed with the user’s password. This result is then carried by the RADIUS Access-Request packet within the RADIUS Attribute field (User-Password attribute). Additionally the Request Authenticator value changes if the Identifier field is changed.

**Authenticator Response**
Is part of RADIUS Access-Accept/Reject and Access-Challenge packets. The Response Authenticator field is simply a MD5 hash of the entire corresponding RADIUS Access-Request packet plus the shared secret (see Figure 24).

**Finding:** Taking into account that Access-Requests encrypted using the configured shared secret and the connection is secured by TLS the password can be stored as cleartext on the server side. Further information about user and password storage can be found in Chapter 4.

**Attribute**
The RADIUS Attribute field contains the actual data communicated between the authentication server and authenticator. The RADIUS specification itself [19] and vendor documentation define a vast number of attributes used by RADIUS (see Table 8 in Appendix Section 7.2 and
RFC 2865 [19]). As shown in Figure 25 each Attribute field is again divided into three sub-fields: Type, Length and Value.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bytes:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 25: RADIUS Attribute field structure

**Type**
Defines the type of content transported by the RADIUS Attribute field. As mentioned before RFC 2865 [19] defines a basic set of values for the Type field (see Table 8). Further types of attributes like the “EAP-Message” are defined by RFC 2284 [35] (PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol), which encapsulates EAP packets (and therefore EAP-Method data) sent between authentication server and authenticator.

**Length**
The Length field contains the full length of the RADIUS Attribure field, including the length of the Type, Length and Value sub-fields.

**Value**
Depending on the defined type the Value field may hold different kinds of data types, such as:

- Text (UTF-8 encoded characters)
- String (binary data)
- IP Address (32 bit value)
- Integer (32 bit unsigned value)
- Time (Unix time\(^2\))

For further details about RADIUS protocols please refer to RFC 2865 (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service, RADIUS) [19].

\(^{20}\)Number of seconds since 00:00:00 UTC, January 1, 1970
3.6. Dynamic VLANs

Dynamic VLANs or rather Dynamic VLAN Assignment allows the RADIUS server to dynamically assign a VLAN to a supplicant that requests 802.1x authentication through that server. The corresponding VLANs have to be configured on the RADIUS server via RADIUS attributes as well as on the authenticator (switch) to guarantee successful authentication of a supplicant. The RADIUS server attributes required to accomplish Dynamic VLAN Assignment are defined in RFC 2868 [36] (RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel Protocol Support), of which the following three attributes have to be configured by the authentication server to guarantee a functioning setup:

- **Tunnel-Type**
  - RADIUS Attribute field type “64”. Should be set to VLAN.

- **Tunnel-Medium-Type**
  - RADIUS Attribute field type “65”. Should be set to 802.21.

- **Tunnel-Private-Group-Id**
  - RADIUS Attribute field type “81”. This value will be set to the corresponding VLAN ID or VLAN name.

Apart from letting RADIUS assign users dynamically to networks, the usage of VLANs would also allow the introduction of Quality of Service (QoS) for each VLAN through OpenWrt itself. This can be done by using OpenWrt’s qos scripts. This package only represents one possibility of accomplishing QoS in OpenWrt, although qos scripts is the most comfortable one since it offers direct LuCi support (luci-app-qos) [37].

For more information about the configuration of Dynamic VLANs please refer to the documentation of the specific implementation of the RADIUS server, which in context of this work will be FreeRADIUS[22].

---

21 On FreeRADIUS configurations this value is IEEE-802
4. Implementation

This part of the thesis will focus on the implementation and the configuration within OpenWrt necessary to accommodate the in Section 1.1 proposed solution. Further this chapter discusses several problems encountered during the configuration and implementation as well as their impact on the final result. For this project it was decided to segment the network via VLANs rather than separate SSIDs for the individual networks to provide a more consistent administration and avoid user confusion by offering multiple SSIDs. This solution will therefore benefit from additional features offered by RADIUS as well as the security aspects of VLANs.

4.1. Dynamic VLAN and Guest network configuration in OpenWrt

One of the main features required for this solution is the ability to dynamically assign VLANs to users depending on their credentials. To this end the router operating system had to support dynamic VLAN assignment, which led to some restrictions on the hardware as well as of the software side of things. Although it was technically possible to enable dynamic VLAN support on OpenWrt, it wasn’t natively included until the release of version 15.05 Chaos Claimer. Up to this release modifications to several system files regarding hostapd (authenticator for IEEE 802.11 networks) had to be made to enable this feature, which resulted in having to manually compile firmware images for the users corresponding hardware. For the full set of necessary changes please refer to OpenWrt changesets r43473, r42787, and r41872. Due to the fact that neither a manual compilation of the firmware image nor the installation of a custom image would be a viable solution for the consumer, the minimum requirement of OpenWrt was simply set to version 15.05 to guarantee the easiest and most stable installation and configuration of the system. The configuration necessary to create a working dynamic VLAN and therefore guest network is spread across four different files within /etc/config provided by OpenWrt’s Unified Configuration Interface System (see Section 3.1.4):

- network
- dhcp
- firewall

---

23Changeset r43473: https://dev.openwrt.org/changeset/43473/
24Changeset r42787: https://dev.openwrt.org/changeset/42787/
25Changeset r41872: https://dev.openwrt.org/changeset/41872/
The subsequent sections will describe the purpose of these files as well as the configuration needed to create an initial wireless guest network.

### 4.1.1. Network configuration

OpenWrt’s network configuration can be found in `/etc/config/network`. It provides the ability of defining interface configurations, switch VLANs as well as network routes [9]. In order to generate a working dynamic VLAN environment, two types of sections provided by this file are needed. The switch or rather the switch_vlan subsections allow for partitioning the switch into VLANs and the interface section, which allows us to create logical networks that serve as containers for IP addresses, physical and virtual interfaces, aliases for firewall rules and so on.

The first step towards ensuring a working configuration of this kind is to modify the existing default VLAN (VLAN ID 1) called “lan” to tag the traffic going to the CPU port, which means, changing the default configuration of the corresponding switch_vlan section. This is necessary due to the fact that the virtual switch and therefore all switch ports are connected to the CPU through one physical port (see Figure 26).

![Figure 26: Router and switch structure](image-url)
The default network configuration file regarding this section looks like:

```
1 config switch_vlan
2   option device 'switch0'  #corresponding virtual switch
3   option vlan '1'         #VLAN ID
4   option vid '1'          #VLAN ID (overrides "option vlan")
5   option ports '0 1 2 3 4' #ports to be (un)tagged, disabled
```

To tag the traffic towards the CPU port (in case of the development router this is port 0) this section needs to be changed to:

```
1 config switch_vlan
2   option device 'switch0'  #corresponding virtual switch
3   option vlan '1'         #VLAN ID
4   option vid '1'          #VLAN ID (overrides "option vlan")
5   option ports '0t 1 2 3 4' #ports to be (un)tagged, disabled
```

**NOTE:** This port might already be tagged on some devices and therefore could be skipped if this is the case. On the test router (Zyxel NBG6716) this wasn’t the case and port 0 had to be ‘tagged’.

Next the default interface itself needs to be changed to accommodate the now tagged VLAN traffic, therefore the physical interface (in this case eth0) needs to be converted into a virtual interface, which means changing the interface section with the default alias “lan” from:

```
1 config interface 'lan'
2   option ifname 'eth0'      #physical or virtual interface
3   option force_link '1'    #Specifies whether ip address, route, and optionally gateway are assigned to the interface regardless of the link being active
4
5
6
7
8   option type 'bridge'     #If set to "bridge", a bridge
9
```

26 Zyxel NBG6716
27 The number of the CPU port on the switch can vary between different routers but should usually be port 0.
To a version where the interface represents the corresponding VLAN ID:

```
config interface 'vlan1'
  option ifname 'eth0.1' #physical or virtual interface
  option force_link '1' #Specifies whether ip address, route, and optionally gateway are assigned to the interface regardless of the link being active
  option type 'bridge' #If set to "bridge", a bridge containing the given ifnames is created
  option proto 'static' #Enables static adresses
  option netmask '255.255.255.0' #Netmask
  option ipaddr '192.168.1.1' #IP address
```

Here two important changes have to be made to ensure that the 802.11 authenticator (hostapd) can match the default vlan and attach users to it. First the alias of the interface has to be changed from lan to vlan1 and second the physical interface eth0 is converted into a virtual interface to represent the VLAN ID, in this case eth0.1. Additionally the IP addresses for all VLANs were chosen in a way that the third octet represents the ID of the corresponding VLAN. For example in the case of a VLAN with ID 30, “option ipaddr” would be '192.168.30.1'.

**NOTE:** Due to the fact that the primary network interface was changed from lan to vlan1 the DHCP (/etc/config/dhcp, see Listing 3) as well as the FIREWALL (/etc/config/firewall, see Listing 4) configuration have also be updated accordingly to avoid locking the user out of the router.
config dhcp 'vlan1'
    option interface 'vlan1'  #List of interfaces to listen on, #configured in network
    #configuration
    ...

Listing 3: Default DHCP configuration change

config zone
    option name 'vlan1'    #Unique zone name
    option network 'vlan1' #List of interfaces attached to zone
    ...

config forwarding
    option src 'vlan10'    #Specifies the traffic source zone
    option dest 'wan'     #Specifies the destination zone
    ...

Listing 4: Default Firewall configuration change

Now that the main interface and default VLAN are reconfigured, the guest VLAN and its corresponding virtual interface can be added. Therefore new switch_vlan and interface sections for VLAN ID 10 are added:

config switch_vlan
    option device 'switch0'  #corresponding virtual switch
    option vlan '10'         #VLAN ID
    option vid '10'          #VLAN ID (overrides "option vlan")
    option ports '0t'        #ports to be (un)tagged, disabled
    #(port 0 is tagged, rest disabled)

config interface 'vlan10'
    option ifname 'eth0.10' #physical or virtual interface
    #If set to "bridge", a bridge
    option type 'bridge'    #containing the given ifnames
    #is created
option proto 'static' # Enables static addresses
option ipaddr '192.168.10.1' # IP address
option netmask '255.255.255.0' # Netmask

Listing 5: Guest network configuration

For this guest network only the CPU port (Port 0) is tagged and all other ports are disabled (see Figure 27) to only grant access to the internet and no other portions of the network for this VLAN.

![VLANs on "switch0" table]

Figure 27: Default and Guest VLANs

**NOTE:** The number of the VLAN can be specified by two parameters, option vlan and option vid (see Listing 5). VID (option vid) is associated with a VLAN and is by default the same as the number of the VLAN (option vlan), but vid can be overridden by vid so, for example VLAN 11 could be renamed to VLAN with ID 20 (see Listing 6) [38].

```
config switch_vlan
  option device 'switch0' # corresponding virtual switch
  option vlan '11' # VLAN ID
  option vid '20' # VLAN ID (overrides "option vlan")
```

Listing 6: Overriding VLAN ID
4.1.2. DHCP configuration

Now that the VLAN and the corresponding interface are configured, the guest network interface can be provided with options from the internal dhcp server. The configuration file responsible for this can be found at /etc/config/dhcp. To provide the before configured virtual interface with dhcp capabilities, a new dhcp section has to be added to the dhcp configuration file. Listing 7 shows an example for the previously configured guest network.

```
1 config dhcp 'vlan10'
2   option interface 'vlan10'  #List of interfaces to listen on
3   option start '50'         #Specifies the offset from the
4       network address
5   option limit '100'        #Specifies the size of the
6       address pool
7   option leasetime '12h'    #Specifies the lease time of
8       addresses handed out to clients
```

Listing 7: DHCP configuration

In this example the value of option interface refers to the alias of the virtual interface created in Listing 5 (config interface 'vlan10'), option start indicates the starting IP address within the IP range provided by the virtual interface (in this case the starting IP would be 192.168.10.50) and option limit '100' restricts the maximum number of clients being permitted to connect to this particular interface or VLAN.

4.1.3. Firewall configuration

To ensure that the now created guest network is routed properly, a so called firewall zone and the appropriate forwarding rule for this zone need to be added to the firewall configuration (/etc/config/firewall). Listing 8 shows the configuration for our example VLAN with ID 10.

```
1 config zone
2   option name 'vlan10'  #Unique zone name
3   option input 'ACCEPT' #policy for incoming zone traffic
4   option output 'ACCEPT' #policy for outgoing zone traffic
5   option forward 'REJECT' #policy for forwarded zone traffic
6   option network 'vlan10' #List of interfaces attached to zone
```

Listing 8: Firewall configuration
This example creates a firewall zone with name `vlan10` and connects it to the interface with the same name which was created before during the network configuration (see Section 4.1.1). Furthermore all traffic from the source network `vlan10` is forwarded to the `wan` firewall zone and therefore to the router’s WAN interface.

### 4.1.4. Wireless configuration

Finally to provide users with the ability to actually access the guest network, new SSIDs have to be created on the according wireless interfaces in OpenWrt’s wireless configuration (`/etc/config/wireless`). Listing 9 provides an example wireless interface configuration with dynamic VLAN support and WPA2-Enterprise (WPA2-EAP) enabled.

```plaintext
1 config wifi-iface
2    option device 'radio1'
3    option mode 'ap'
4    option ssid 'SomeSSID'
5    option encryption 'wpa2'
6    option auth_server '127.0.0.1'
7    option auth_port '1812'
8    option auth_secret 'testing123'
9    option dynamic_vlan '2'
10   option vlan_tagged_interface 'eth0'
11   option vlan_bridge 'br-vlan'
12   option vlan_naming '0'
```

Listing 9: Wireless configuration

To enable these features a few specific options have to be set in the according wireless interface section. WPA2-Enterprise is configured by setting encryption ‘wpa2’, auth_server ‘127.0.0.1’ (authentication server will be running on the device itself), auth_port ‘1812’ (RADIUS default port) and auth_secret ‘testing123’ (default RADIUS shared secret, this
should be changed accordingly). The configuration regarding WPA2-EAP can also be done via OpenWrt’s own webinterface LuCI. Lastly the actual dynamic VLAN capability needs to be enabled by setting `dynamic_vlan '2'` (value ‘2’ indicates that a VLAN ID is required and authentication is rejected by the RADIUS server if it is not supplied through the according RADIUS attributes, see Sections 3.6 and 4.2.2), `vlan_tagged_interface 'eth0'` (Interface on which the CPU port was tagged, see Section 4.1.1), `vlan_bridge 'br-vlan'` (defines the VLAN Bridge naming scheme) and `vlan_naming '0'` (defines how a vlan id is checked, in this case `vlan<ID>`).

This concludes the basic network and guest network configuration of the router, which now allows the authentication server to be configured and enabled for the corresponding wireless radios and SSIDs.

4.2. Authentication Server configuration using FreeRADIUS

This section of the thesis will cover the basic configuration of the authentication server, in this case FreeRADIUS, as well as the necessary steps to enable features needed to realise the requirements to the final system discussed in Chapter 1.1. Furthermore the configuration of the SQL portion will be discussed as well as the initial population of the FreeRADIUS specific MySQL database. Lastly this section will cover issues encountered with FreeRADIUS specific to OpenWrt.

4.2.1. Basic configuration

The configuration of the FreeRADIUS authentication server is split into five main files:

- **radiusd.conf** handles the configuration of the RADIUS daemon, i.e. the connection to the authentication server itself (listening ports, trusted foreign IP addresses or Ethernet ports), logging and including additional configuration files if needed.

- **eap.conf** provides the ability to configure several EAP-Method types (see Section 3.4.3) for the authentication process as well as the required certificates.

- **clients.conf** governs a list of authenticators which are eligible to communicate with the authentication server.

- **sites/default** contains the default policies for the authentication process. It also provides the ability to enable modules for additional features.
realises the configuration of the SQL module and holds the SQL server’s connection data.

The subsequent sections will illustrate the necessary changes to these files to accomplish a working configuration with MySQL support and the features asked for in Chapter 1.1.

4.2.1.1. radiusd.conf

This represents the server’s main configuration file. Here three sections need to be changed. First the “listen” section needs to be changed to only listen to the localhost for authentication packets. Listing 10 shows the parameters needed to accomplish this.

```
1 listen {
2     # Type of packets to listen for.
3     # Allowed values are:
4     # auth listen for authentication packets
5     # acct listen for accounting packets
6     # proxy IP to use for sending proxied packets
7     # detail Read from the detail file. For examples, see
8     # raddb/sites-available/copy-acct-to-home-server
9     # status listen for Status-Server packets.
10    # For examples,
11    # see raddb/sites-available/status
12    # coa listen for CoA-Request and Disconnect-Request
13    # packets. For examples, see the file
14    # raddb/sites-available/coa
15    #
16    type = auth
17    ipaddr = 127.0.0.1
18    port = 0
19    # interface = br-vlan1
20    interface = lo #optional
21    ...
22 }
```

Listing 10: radiusd.conf listen section

Setting “port = 0” causes the server to listen to it’s default port which is provided by “/etc/services”. Also the parameter “interface = br-vlan1” needs to be made inactive, else the
RADIUS daemon won’t respond to requests. Further due the fact that the RADIUS server is only needed locally it doesn’t need to be bound to any interface at all, but can optionally be bound to the loopback interface (interface = lo).

Secondly the “log” section will be modified to provide more information about the authentication process. This is mainly done to provide this information to the webinterface later on and for debugging purposes (see Listing 11).

```
log {
  ...
  auth = yes
  # rest remains unchanged
  ...
}
```

Listing 11: radiusd.conf log section

Lastly the “modules” section has to be changed so that the eap, sql and any additional modules are loaded (see Listing 12).

```
modules {
  # Modules are initialized ONLY if they are
  # referenced in a processing section, such as authorize, 
  # authenticate, accounting, pre/post-proxy, etc.
  $#INCLUDE ${confdir}/modules/

  # Extensible Authentication Protocol
  # For all EAP related authentications.
  $#INCLUDE eap.conf

  # Include another file that has the SQL-related configuration
  $#INCLUDE sql.conf
  ...
}
```

Listing 12: radiusd.conf modules section
4.2.1.2. eap.conf

As already mentioned this file handles the configuration of the preferred EAP-Method which in this case will be PEAP (see Section 3.4.3.3.). To enable this authentication method a view changes have to be made to the "tls" and "peap" subsections of the eap section. Listing 13 shows the changes for providing the server with the necessary certificate files, which were created beforehand.

```
eap {
  ... 

tls {
    # Configuration Directory
    confdir = /etc/<some directory>/CA
    # Certificates
    certdir = ${confdir}
    # Certificate Authority
    cadir = ${confdir}
    # Private Key data
    private_key_password = <password>
    private_key_file = ${certdir}/server.pem
    # Certificate file
    certificate_file = ${certdir}/server.pem
    # Certificate Authority file
    CA_file = ${cadir}/ca.pem
    # Diffie-Hellman cipher file
    dh_file = ${certdir}/dh
    random_file = ${certdir}/random
    # Certificate Authority path
    CA_path = ${cadir}
    ...
  }
  peap {
    # The tunneled EAP session needs a default
    # EAP type which is separate from the one for
    # the non-tunneled EAP module.
    # MS-CHAPv2 is recommended as this is the
```
To provide the authenticator with the ability to actually communicate with the authentication server, it needs to exist within `clients.conf`. Since in this case the authenticator will be the device itself it is only necessary to configure the client/authenticator labelled “localhost”. Listing 14 shows the required parameters to be set.

```plaintext
client localhost {
  ipaddr = 127.0.0.1
  secret = <shared secret>

  # Older Clients may not include a Message-Authenticator in an
  # Access-Request packet. Therefore to also support older
  # clients this should be set to “no”
  require_message_authenticator = no

  nastype = other
  ...
}
```

Listing 14: client.conf localhost section

After setting these parameters the hostapd process and the wireless interface configured in Section 4.1.4 can finally communicate with the authentication server.
4.2.1.4. Enabling additional modules

Additional FreeRADIUS modules can be enabled in /etc/freeradius2/sites/default by uncommenting the appropriate lines within the authorize section. To facilitate the features described in Section 1.1., namely “Account Expiration” and a “Login Time Restriction”, the modules expiration and logintime have to be installed and activated (see Listing 15).

```
authorize {
  ...
  expiration
  logintime
  ...
}
```

Listing 15: sites/default authorize section

4.2.1.5. SQL configuration

The MySQL configuration for FreeRADIUS is spread across two files, radiusd.conf (already handled in Section 4.2.1.1.) and /etc/freeradius2/sites/default. The second part in “sites/default” concerns the sections authorize, accounting and session (see Listing 16).

```
authorize {
  ...
  # Look in an SQL database. The schema of the database
  # is meant to mirror the "users" file.
  sql
  ...
}

# Accounting. Log the accounting data.
accounting {
  # Log traffic to an SQL database.
  sql
}
```

Listing 16: sites/default authorize and accounting sections
Enabling the sql parameter in the accounting section isn’t necessarily required since Accounting won’t be used but should be enabled nevertheless to avoid possible errors should Accounting be required in the future.

4.2.2. Populating the User database

Now that the authentication server is completely configured, the MySQL database holding the users information can be populated with the initial users, groups and other relevant data. The FreeRADIUS MySQL database consists of the following tables to represent the data which per default would be stored within the "users" file:

- radcheck
- radreply
- radgroupreply
- radusergroup
- radgroupcheck
- radacct
- radpostauth

Out of those seven tables only the first five are used for the purpose of this work. The tables radacct and radpostauth are handling, as the names suggest, Accounting and Post-Authentication RADIUS attributes which aren’t used in this case.
To illustrate how these tables are used and what data they contain, a few groups and users are created. As a first step three different groups with their corresponding RADIUS attributes are inserted into the table radgroupreply, see Listing 17 below.

```
mysql> select * from radgroupreply;
+----+--------------------+-------------------------+----+----------+
| id | groupname | attribute | op | value |
+----+--------------------+-------------------------+----+----------+
| 1 | guest | Tunnel-Type | = | VLAN |
| 2 | guest | Tunnel-Medium-Type | = | IEEE-802 |
| 3 | guest | Tunnel-Private-Group-ID | = | 10 |
| 4 | FullAccess | Tunnel-Type | = | VLAN |
| 5 | FullAccess | Tunnel-Medium-Type | = | IEEE-802 |
| 6 | FullAccess | Tunnel-Private-Group-ID | = | 1 |
| 7 | ParentalControl_1 | Tunnel-Medium-Type | := | IEEE-802 |
| 8 | ParentalControl_1 | Tunnel-Type | := | VLAN |
| 9 | ParentalControl_1 | Tunnel-Private-Group-ID | := | 10 |
+----+--------------------+-------------------------+----+----------+
```

Listing 17: Group definitions

Two of these groups, “FullAccess” and “guest”, will be part of the default installation of this project, whereas “ParentalControl_1” only exists for testing and illustration purposes later on. Each group is defined by three RADIUS attributes, Tunnel-Type, Tunnel-Medium-Type and Tunnel-Private-Group-ID which allow for a dynamic vlan assignment (for further information about these attributes please refer to Section 3.6 and RFC 2868 [36]). These groups are responsible for assigning their respective users the according vlan, i.e. the group “guest” will assign vlan 10 (which was configured in Section 4.1) to all guest users and all “FullAccess” users will be granted access to the default vlan.

Next users are created within the table radcheck, which basically holds the username and all attributes that need to be checked before granting a user access to a network. These attributes include the password, expiration date as well as the login time (see Listing 18).
NOTE: The passwords can be stored as “Cleartext” due to the reasons described in Section 3.5. Further the usage of the “MD5-Password” attribute would prohibit FreeRADIUS from using MsChapv2 or any CHAP authentication for that matter [39].

Finally each of the users created above is assigned to a group within table radusergroup.

In some cases like the in Listing 17 defined group “ParentalControl_1” an additional table is needed, since this group requires a group wide check attribute to realise the login time restriction for it’s users (see Listing 20).

Listing 18: User definitions

Listing 19: User to Group assignment

Listing 20: Group wide attributes
In this example the value “Al0800-2000” indicates a daily access to the groups corresponding network between 08:00 and 20:00. For further information about the Login-Time attribute and its values please refer to the FreeRADIUS documentation[28]. Additionally, if there should be user without any group affiliations, all data that is usually held in radgroupreply needs to be stored on a user instead of group basis, which is done by the table radreply (see Listing 21).

```
mysql> select * from radreply;
+----+----------+-------------------------+----+----------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>id</th>
<th>username</th>
<th>attribute</th>
<th>op</th>
<th>value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>test</td>
<td>Tunnel-Type</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>VLAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>test</td>
<td>Tunnel-Medium-Type</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>IEEE-802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>test</td>
<td>Tunnel-Private-Group-ID</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+----+----------+-------------------------+----+----------+
```

Listing 21: Groupless user’s reply section

**NOTE:** Users without a group are automatically assigned to the guest network (see Section 4.3.1).

4.2.3. Issues with FreeRADIUS on OpenWrt

During the course of the installation and configuration of FreeRADIUS a few issues with the support of SQL came to light. First off FreeRADIUS or rather the sql package needed (freeradius2-mod-sql) to enable SQL support from OpenWrt’s repository is missing all files except the main SQL configuration file mentioned earlier. These missing files have been taken from an installation on a Debian system and will be included within the final OpenWrt package. Further FreeRADIUS2 is missing the support for SQLite, which would have saved resources on the device compared to using a MySQL database (also see section 4.5. for Hard- and Software requirements). This is not an issues specific to OpenWrt but in general. The support of SQLite is now part of FreeRADIUS3 which isn’t part of any official repository yet and therefore not a viable solution for this project, since it would have to be compiled for each platform individually.

---

4.3. Web interface

To finally provide the administrator/owner of a wireless home network with the ability to easily manage the before configured system, a rather simple web based administration interface was implemented. Which allows for creating and managing users, guests and groups, provides an overview of all existing networks/vlans and an authentication and error log. The subsequent sections will elaborate on how the former mentioned functionality is implemented and how to actually operate this web interface.

4.3.1. User management

The user management page provides the administrator with an overview of all existing users and currently active guests as well as their current group affiliation. It also allows for the creation of additional users and guests, as well as the editing, deletion and displaying of detailed information of existing ones (see Figure 28).

Adding a new guest user will result in the creation of a new user affiliated with the group “guest” and an expiration time of four hours from the time of creation. Additionally a QRCode based on this users credentials will be generated to potentially allow an easier distribution of user data to
the guest (for additional information about credential distribution please refer to Section 4.4). The generation of guest credentials is handled by the class "CGenerator" (see Listing 22), which creates a new username starting with "g-" and a suffix based on the current time (e.g. "g-103456", possible collisions are avoided when generating the user) as well as a five character long password starting with a random letter followed by four random digits. These username and password are chosen to be rather short and simple in order to minimise the guests effort when entering his credentials manually (which will be the default case). Additionally since the guests are only valid for four hours and are regularly deleted this shouldn’t impose any security risks.

```php
1 class CGenerator {
  2     private $username;
  3     private $password;
  4
  5     function createGuest() {
  6         $this->username = "g-" . date("Gis");
  7         return $this->username;
  8     }
  9
 10     function generatePasswd() {
 11         $letters = array_merge(range('a', 'z'), range('A', 'Z'));
 12         $this->password = $letters[$this->crand(0, 51)] . $this->crand(1000, 9999);
 13         return $this->password;
 14     }
 15
 16     function createQRCodeFrom($ssid, $uname, $passwd) {
 17         $qrstr = 'TXT:WIFI:S:' . $ssid . ';T:802.1x EAP;U:"' . $uname . ' ;P:"' . $passwd . '-';
 18         exec("qrencode -s 8 -l H -c -m 0 -t SVG -o ./cache/qrcode.svg " . $qrstr . "");
 19     }
 20
 21     function crand($min, $max) {
 22         $range = $max - $min;
 23         if ($range < 1) return $min;
 24         $clog = ceil(log($range, 2));
 25         //number of bytes
```
Further this class offers the generation of a QRCode appropriate to a given SSID (SSID of the 802.1x network) and credentials generated beforehand. This is accomplished by creating a string using the following scheme:

\[ WIFI:S:<\text{SSID}>;T:802.1x\ EAP;U:<\text{USERNAME}>;P:<\text{PASSWORD}>;; \]

The substring WIFI informs the barcode scanner that this string contains network connection data and therefore should communicate with the device network manager to add a new wireless connection with the security setting set to the value described by T (WEP, WPA, 802.1x EAP) within the QRCode string. Based on this string a QRCode is created using the tool “\texttt{qrencode}”, which is provided by OpenWrt’s repository and based on “\texttt{libqrencode}”.

Figure 29 shows the creation of a new user, which allows creating users with a specific group affiliation as well as the two optional parameters “Expiration” and “Access Time”. The expiration can be provided in either hours or days (e.g. 2h or 4d), if left blank the account won’t expire until deleted or revoked by the administrator. Access Time has to be provided in a 24h format and will result in a daily login time restriction within the given timeframe.
**NOTE:** Users with no group affiliation (Group = NONE) are automatically assigned to the guest network by the Web Interface to avoid unwanted access to the main network.

Figure 29: Create user

Additionally this page allows to show a users details, including the actual expiration date and time as well as the QRCode generated for this specific user (see Figure 30).

Figure 30: User details
4.3.2. Group management

Similar to the user management page, the group management provides an overview of all existing groups and their currently configured VLAN, as well as the ability to add further groups and edit and delete existing ones (see Figure 31).

![Administration Panel](image)

**Figure 31: Group management**

Figure 32 shows the group creation interface which allows the adding of additional groups with a specific VLAN configured on the device. Optionally groups, just like users, can be created with an “Access Time” parameter to realise a daily login time restriction on a group basis (e.g. for enforcing a sort of parental control).

![New Group](image)

**Figure 32: Create group**
4.3.3. Network/VLAN overview

The Network/VLAN page simply provides an overview of all existing VLANs, as well as details about physical/virtual interface, IP address and netmask of each VLAN (see Figure 33). Additionally it provides a tutorial for adding further VLANs using OpenWrt’s own web interface LuCI with links to the corresponding locations.

![Figure 33: Network/VLAN overview](image)

The ability to manage VLANs wasn’t implemented here to avoid possible inconsistencies with OpenWrt’s own network configuration. Also the default installation will offer VLANs for most cases. Further a more granular VLAN configuration will require detailed knowledge about the network’s configuration and infrastructure. Therefore implementing this functionality would unnecessarily complicate the interface for the average user.

Additionally this interface includes an error and authentication log to provide an overview of the most recent activity. This is done by simply parsing and filtering FreeRADIUS’s log file (radius.log).
4.3.4. Portability and Modifiability

To guarantee a certain degree of portability and extensibility the entire web interface was written in PHP which should allow for the widest range of compatibility regarding host devices and operating systems and therefore allows for a rather uncomplicated port to other WRT derivatives such as dd-wrt\textsuperscript{29}. The PHP interpreter also provides the least overhead in terms of flash memory, when considering alternatives such as python which provide a similar feature set (also see Section 4.5 for Hard- and Software requirements). To realise a port to dd-wrt the current implementation of the class uci, which handles the communication with OpenWrt’s configuration interface (see Section 3.1.4.), would have to be replaced with an implementation for dd-wrt’s equivalent NVRAM. Due to the fact that NVRAM isn’t as uniform as UCI across different devices and dd-wrt at it’s current state lacks the support for dynamic VLAN assignments, the implementation of this port was defined as out of scope of this thesis. In it’s current state the implementation of the above mentioned uci class (Listing 23) only provides capabilities for retrieving network information using OpenWrt’s command line configuration interface and could easily be extended to accommodate more functionality should this be required in the future.

```php
class uci{

    /*
    * Return array of existing VLAN IDs
    */
    function getVlanIDs(){
        $str = shell_exec('uci show network');
        $pattern = '/\. vid = ([0-9]+) /';
        if (preg_match_all($pattern,$str,$out)){
            $vlans = array_unique($out[1]);
            natsort($vlans);
            return array_values($vlans);
        }
        else return null;
    }

    /*
    * Returns the virtual interface name
    */
```

\textsuperscript{29}http://www.dd-wrt.com/
function getVlanIfaceName($vlanID){
    $str = shell_exec("uci show network");
    $pattern = "/(\w+)/.ifname='eth[0-9]+\" . $vlanID . "/";
    if (preg_match_all($pattern,$str,$out)){
        return $out[1][0];
    }
    else return null;
}

Listing 23: Class uci

Also the connection to the database is handled by a separate class which should make it easy to change to a different database backend, such as SQLite, in the future.

### 4.4. Credential distribution

The implemented solution is not only intended to make it as easy as possible for the administrator of a home network to generate and handle credentials for guest users but also to provide fast and easy ways to distribute them to the guest user. Further it has to be as easy as possible for the guest user to connect to the network to accept a different and maybe more complicated authentication method. Due to the fact that most widespread authentication distribution methods, such as WPS, are incompatible with 802.1x authentication methods and the intention of not having the guest install a third party application (which is the case with some proprietary solutions) to communicate with the system it was decided to have the user enter his credentials manually or provide a QR-Code containing said credentials and network information to deliver them to the target device. Since in many cases users will have to setup the connection and enter their credentials manually (e.g. on none mobile devices or depending on the operating system), the generated credentials have been chosen in a rather short manner (see Section 4.3.1.), which shouldn’t impose any security risks since guest users are in their separate VLAN and are only temporary users with a rather short expiration time of four hours.
4.4.1. Distribution via QR Codes

The distribution of user credentials and network information via QR Codes is meant to further alleviate the process of connecting new users to the network. During the course of the implementation of this feature a few issues arose. First and foremost creating network connections through QR Codes is only possible on Android devices, since other mobile operating systems like iOS or Windows Phone don’t allow third party applications access to the network manager, therefore Bar-/QRCode scanners on these systems will interpret a wifi QRCode pattern (see below) as plain text and display it accordingly.

```
WIFI:S:<SSID>;T:<Network type>;P:<PASSWORD>;;
```

On Android devices the need for “802.1x EAP” as the network type and an additional field for the username (see proposed string below) this led to another set of problems on the client side.

```
WIFI:S:<SSID>;T:802.1x EAP;U:<USERNAME>;P:<PASSWORD>;;
```

Since most QRCode scanners for Android are based on ZXing’s open source barcode scanner project and ZXing’s wifi pattern parser doesn’t support “802.1x EAP” networks the proposed pattern will not work as intended. This is rooted in the fact that the 802.1x support within the Android’s network manager changed between versions 4.0 and 4.3, therefore ZXing won’t implement support for 802.1x networks in favour of supporting a wider range of devices and Android versions.

Considering these issues, it was decided to keep the proposed string in it’s current state but to add a preamble (see Listing 24) so it would be interpreted as text across all platforms until barcode scanners would support the required network type.

```
TXT:WIFI:S:<SSID>;T:802.1x EAP;U:<USERNAME>;P:<PASSWORD>;;
```

Listing 24: Final QRCode string

---

30 Official ZXing project home: [https://github.com/zxing/zxing](https://github.com/zxing/zxing)
4.4.2. Mobile application for administrators

To provide an alternative to the web interface and therefore further ease the process of creating and distributing guest/user credentials this thesis proposes a mobile application for administrators using the implemented solution. Although a mobile application is out of scope of this thesis, a basic version was implemented as a prove of concept and to propose a possible form of communication between the application and the web interface.

Figure 34 shows a proposal of a minimalistic interface allowing the user to generate new guests and add further users to the system, as well as display the created users credentials and corresponding QRCode.

![Minimalistic application interface](image)

Figure 34: Minimalistic application interface

To accomplish a communication with the web interface it was decided to encapsulate the user data into JSON objects and deliver them to the PHP implementation of the web interface via HTTP POST. Listing 25 shows the format of the JSON object as well as the necessary steps to create
a readable string for the PHP implementation on the server side. For reasons of simplification at this point the application only generates HTML output and displays it in a simple WebView (see Figure [34]).

```java
private String postRequest(String httpUrl) {

    /* Create and POST JSON object */
    URL url = new URL(httpUrl);
    JSONObject jo = new JSONObject();
    jo.put("uname", "testusr");
    jo.put("passwd", "atest123");
    jo.put("passwd_conf", "atest123");
    jo.put("group", "FullAccess");
    jo.put("expiration", "10h");
    jo.put("AT_from", "08:00");
    jo.put("AT_to", "16:00");
    String json = jo.toString();

    connection = (HttpURLConnection) url.openConnection();
    connection.setRequestMethod("POST");
    connection.setFixedLengthStreamingMode(json.getBytes().length);
    connection.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8");
    connection.setRequestHeader("X-Requested-With", "XMLHttpRequest");
    connection.connect();

    /* retrieve HTML response and output to WebView */
    ...
}
```

Listing 25: Client side

On the server side (Listing [26]) the JSON string generated by the client is being read and decoded (json_decode) which in turn results in an array of key, value pairs. After decoding, the necessary information is extracted and the usual database operations are performed to create the user.
Subsequently an array (of key, value pairs) with the data relevant to the user is created and again encoded into a JSON string (\texttt{json_encode}) and delivered back to the client.

```php
/* create user data from JSON object */
if ($_SERVER["REQUEST_METHOD"] == "POST"){
    $jsonIn = file_get_contents('php://input');
    $js = json_decode($jsonIn);

    if (check if decoded array is valid){
        $username = $js->'uname';
        $password = $js->'passwd';
        $password_conf = $js->'passwd_conf';
        $group = $js->'group';
        $expiration = $js->'expiration';
        $time_from = $js->'AT_from';
        $time_to = $js->'AT_to';

        /* database operations */
        ...
    }

    /*
    * Responding JSON Object fields:
    *   uname    Username
    *   passwd   Password
    *   group    Groupname
    *   expiration  Expiration Time
    *   AT_from  starting Access Time
    *   AT_to   ending Access Time
    *   error   Error message
    */

    /* create and encode responding JSON string */
    $response['uname'] = $username;
    $response['passwd'] = $password;
    $response['group'] = $group;
    $response['expiration'] = $date;
```
38 $response['AT_from'] = $time_from;
39 $response['AT_to'] = $time_to;
40 $response['error'] = $error_msg;
41
42 echo json_encode($response);

Listing 26: Server side

NOTE: This basic implementation is just to be viewed as a proposal for possible future work.

4.5. Hard- and Software requirements

The implemented solution has a few demands regarding software to be installed from OpenWrt’s repository as well as specific features provided by the operating system itself. The following list provides an overview of the required software to run this implementation:

■ OpenWrt 15.05 or higher
■ FreeRADIUS2
■ MySQL server
■ PHP5
■ Webserver (uhttpd preinstalled by OpenWrt)
■ OpenSSL utilities
■ A full featured 802.1x / WPA / EAP / RADIUS authenticator and Supplicant (wpad)
■ QR-Encoder (qrencode)

A minimum of OpenWrt 15.05 is required due to need of dynamic VLAN assignment support (see Section [4.1]). Having the newest version of the operating system installed as well as some additional software and services, also resulted in a higher demand on the hardware side:

■ OpenWrt 15.05 compatibility
■ 16MB or more flash memory
■ 64MB RAM (current implementation uses about 34MB)
CPU depending on architecture 300 - 400MHz (OpenWrt’s current minimum requirement)

The high demand on RAM results from the system having to run FreeRADIUS and MySQL on the device. Whereas FreeRADIUS requires 6% and MySQL about 9 to 10% of the above mentioned 34MB of RAM (see Figure 35).

![Figure 35: Memory intensive processes](image)

Therefore a switch to SQLite and FreeRADIUS3 might free up enough memory for the system to run on devices with only 32MB of RAM.

5. Future work

While this thesis already implements a rather lightweight and simple to use 802.1x authentication solution there is still room for improvement and additional features in the future. First and foremost an upgrade from FreeRADIUS2 to FreeRADIUS3, as it becomes available in OpenWrt’s software repository, would lower the hardware requirements significantly due to the possibility of introducing SQLite as the database backend. Which in turn may result in the support of a wider range of devices.

Also the current string used to generate the QRCodes should be modified accordingly if future versions of barcode scanners should start to support 802.1x EAP network types.

By adding further FreeRADIUS modules and their attribute support it would also be easily possible to introduce further functionality such as bandwidth restrictions of groups or individual users.\(^{31}\)

Since especially bandwidth might be an issue in home environments with data rates often not exceeding 20 Mbps.

\(^{31}\) [FreeRadius Server How to:](http://itnetwork-infrastructure.blogspot.co.at/2012/01/freeradius-server-how-to-install-part-2.html?m=1)
Further porting the current implementation to other WRT derivatives would be an option as soon as the necessary features (e.g., dynamic VLAN assignment) become available on the target operating systems.
Lastly, since the implementation of the current mobile application is just to be seen as a proposal, implementing a version which covers the full set of features provided by the current web interface would be the biggest enrichment to the implemented solution.

6. Conclusion

This thesis designed and implemented an 802.1x authentication solution for home users which can be installed and run on a consumer router. The solution should provide a very user-friendly and easy to use interface for administrators of home networks as well as uncomplicated ways for guest users to join the implemented wireless guest network. The administration interface offers all necessary key features of a 802.1x authentication system such as user and group management as well as a network overview and some simple logging. Further, an interface for a possible mobile application (for administration and distribution purposes) was proposed which could provide an even more comfortable way of interacting with the system in the future.

The higher complexity and requirements of WPA2-802.1x based authentication models compared to WPA2-PSK, which results in a tradeoff between security and usability, was minimised by a number of factors. Firstly, the use of as many lightweight components as possible to ensure the support of a wide range of devices with limited (hardware) resources. A simple and user-friendly administration interface for quickly generating new temporary guest users and administrating permanent ones. To encourage user acceptance, guest user credentials were chosen to be rather short but still with the length of default passwords (ten to fifteen characters) used for WPA2-PSK secured networks. Provided that generated guest users are only valid for a short period of time this shouldn’t impose a risk to security.

For administrators of wireless home networks who wish to have a more granular control over their network or simply want an increase in security, the provided solution will make it possible to do so with little effort and no additional hardware other than a consumer router.
# Appendix

## 7.1. EAP-Method Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EAP-Method</th>
<th>Value (Decimal)</th>
<th>RFC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>RFC 3748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notification</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>RFC 3748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAK (Response Only)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>RFC 3748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD5-Challenge</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>RFC 3748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTP, One Time Password</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>RFC 2289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFC 3748</td>
<td></td>
<td>RFC 3748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTC, Generic Token Card</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>RFC 3748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocated</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocated</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA Public Key Authentication</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA Public Key Authentication</td>
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<td>KEA</td>
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<td>KEA-VALIDATE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>RFC 5216</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quest Defender Token</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA Security SecurID EAP</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arcot System EAP</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cisco-LEAP</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>EAP-SIM, GSM Subscriber Identity Modules</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>RFC 4186</td>
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<td>SRP-SHA-1 Part 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRP-SHA-1 Part 2</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAP-TTLS, EAP Tunneled TLS Authentication Protocol</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>RFC 5281</td>
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<tr>
<td>Remote Access Service</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAP-AKA, EAP method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>RFC 4187</td>
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<td>EAP-3Com Wireless</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>EAP-Method</td>
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<td>RFC</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
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<td>PEAP, Protected EAP</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>MS-EAP-Authentication (EAP/MS-CHAPv2)</td>
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<td>EAP-MAKE, Mutual Authentication w/Key Exchange</td>
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<td>CRYPTOCard</td>
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<td>PEAPv0/EAP-MSCHAPv2</td>
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<td>DynamID</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rob EAP</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAP-POTP, Protected One Time Password</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>RFC 4793</td>
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<td>MS-Authentication-TLV</td>
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<td>SentriNET</td>
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<td>EAP-Actiontec Wireless</td>
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<td>Cogent Systems Biometrics Authentication EAP</td>
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<td>AirFortress EAP</td>
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<td>EAP-HTTP Digest</td>
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<td>SecureSuite EAP</td>
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<td>DeviceConnect EAP</td>
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<td>EAP-SPEKE</td>
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<td>EAP-MOBAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAP-FAST, EAP Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>RFC 4851</td>
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<td>ZLXEAP, ZoneLabs EAP</td>
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<td>EAP-Link</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAP-PAX, EAP Password Authentication eXchange</td>
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<td>RFC 4746</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAP-PSK, EAP Pre-Shared Authentication and Key Establishment</td>
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<td>RFC 4764</td>
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<td>EAP-SAKE, EAP Shared-secret Authentication and Key Establishment</td>
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<td>RFC 4763</td>
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<td>EAP-Method</td>
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<td>EAP-IKEv2</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>RFC 5106</td>
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<td>EAP-AKA, Improved EAP method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAP-GPSK, EAP Generalized Pre-Shared Key</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>RFC 5433</td>
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<tr>
<td>Available via review by designated expert</td>
<td>52-191</td>
<td>RFC 3748</td>
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<td>Reserved for allocation via standards action</td>
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Table 7: EAP-Method types

### 7.2. RADIUS Attribute Types

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<tr>
<th>RADIUS Attribute Name</th>
<th>Attribute Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>User-Name</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>User-Password</td>
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<td>CHAP-Password</td>
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<td>Service-Type</td>
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Eidesstattliche Erklärung

Ich erkläre an Eides statt, dass ich die vorliegende Masterarbeit selbstständig und ohne fremde Hilfe verfasst, andere als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel nicht benutzt bzw. die wörtlich oder sinngemäß entnommenen Stellen als solche kenntlich gemacht habe. Die vorliegende Masterarbeit ist mit dem elektronisch übermittelten Textdokument identisch.

Linz, ______

____________________

Stefan Neuhuber