PREJUDICE AND VIOLENCE
IN INTERRELIGIOUS RELATIONS IN INDONESIA

DOCTORAL THESIS

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I hereby declare under oath that the submitted Dissertation’s thesis has been written solely by me without any outside assistance, information other than provided sources or aids have not been used and those used have been fully documented.

The Dissertation’s thesis here present is identical to the electronically transmitted text document.

Linz, January 2015

Idhamsyah Eka Putra
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This dissertation thesis entitled “Prejudice and Violence in Interreligious Relations in Indonesia” is partially fulfillment of the requirements for doctoral degree in Humanity and Cultural Sciences. Besides, it is hope that the doctoral thesis can give contributions toward social problems, especially problems related to interreligious relations.

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ABSTRACT

The present thesis aims to explain prejudice and violence linked to terrorism in interreligious context in Indonesia. It is divided into two themes. Theme 1 addresses issues related to Islamic terrorism. It consists of two papers. Paper 1 of theme 1 investigates motives and reasons behind the emergence of terrorism activities in Indonesia. Using a qualitative study by conducting focus group discussions and interviews ($N = 40$), terror activities are justified because: (1) Indonesia is seen as being in a state of war; (2) Suicide bombing is believed to be noble; (3) the targets are considered as a representative of evil. Moreover, paper 2 of theme 1 focuses to understand when and how act of terrorism is supported and denounced by Islamic fundamentalists in Indonesia. Using a quantitative research, the result of 309 Muslim participants showed that the relationship between Islamic Fundamentalism and support for terrorism acts was positively significant for Muslims holding low belief in establishing Islam peacefully and high rationalization of violent attack. The findings indicate that Islamic fundamentalism may potentially support violent as well as non-violent acts under certain conditions.

Theme 2 aims to describe the way how people see others in a negative way (i.e. prejudice). It consists of three papers introducing the idea of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice; ingroup meta-prejudice is the way of how group members think that their own group think about an outgroup; outgroup meta-prejudice is the way how an ingroup member thinks that his or her ingroup is viewed by outgroup members. Across three papers, prejudice was found consistently obtained from ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice. Particularly, paper 1 of theme 2 predicted that ingroup meta-prejudice would mediate the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice. The results from majority Sunni Muslim participants ($N = 214$) targeting the Ahmadiyya group (i.e. minority subgroup of Islam) and Christians (i.e. minority outgroup) showed that ingroup meta-prejudice was found to be a strong
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predictor of prejudice through which it mediated the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice. Subsequently, paper 2 of theme 2 investigates the role of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice in mediating the effect of perceived intergroup relationship. Across three samples of Sunni Muslims, Ahmadiyya, and Christians participants ($N = 477$), the result demonstrated that Ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice was found to play a key role in predicting prejudice such that ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice mediated the effect of perceived intergroup relationship on prejudice. Furthermore, paper 3 of theme 2 tested the effect of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice moderated by the conditions of high and low level of ingroup self-evaluation. Across two samples of Christians and Muslims participants ($N = 362$), the result of the research showed that the effect of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice was higher when ingroup self-evaluation was high than when it was low. The findings of all three papers of theme 2 indicates that how group members think of what others are thinking plays a key role in influencing intergroup relations and perceptions.

*Keywords*: Prejudice, Conflict, Identity Construction, Meta-knowledge, Religious Fundamentalism, Violence, Terrorism
1. INTRODUCTION
The present thesis attempts to describe prejudice and violence in interreligious context in Indonesia. The thesis discusses two issues which are divided into 2 specific themes. Theme 1 discusses the phenomenon of the emergence of religious fundamentalism, i.e. Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism. Theme 2 discusses the causal process of prejudice and its expression in interreligious relations. In order to clearly explain background and problems on both themes, I will elaborate the themes into two separate discussions.

1.1. Theme 1: Religious Fundamentalism and Terrorism in Indonesia

In early 2002, the United States Government declared that Southeast Asia is positioned as the second most vulnerable region toward terrorism (Acharya & Acharya, 2007; Tan, 2003). Among Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia is the one that receives major attention from world media, especially after the 2002 Bali Bombing. Speaking of terrorism in Indonesia, at least acts of terrorism by Islamic groups in Indonesia is currently under attention.

Studies regarding Islamic terrorism found several factors which encourage a group to perform terror, both through violence or threats of violence. Several studies found acts of terror can be triggered from failure of the modern global economy in improving the welfare of countries with predominantly Muslim population. Other studies claimed that the rise of terrorism is due to, among others, dominance of national identity on top of Islamic identity, disagreement toward certain political system (i.e. democracy), Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, clash of Islam with other religions, and the power of secular government (see Moghaddam, 2008; Robinson, Crenshaw, & Jenkins, 2006). Those issues are believed to have caused shame and eliminate the feelings of compassion in terrorists (Abdel-Khalek, 2004; Rothschild, Abdollahi, Pyszczynski, 2009). Terrorist groups feel that Muslims must be liberated from these adverse conditions. They believe that attacking in the name of Allah and
religion is an honorable struggle to achieve the welfare of Muslims (Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek, 2009; Venkatraman, 2007).

Several research regarding Islamic terrorist groups and those who supported them, explains that many Palestinian and Lebanese Muslims provide support to groups such as Hamas, Jihad Islam, and Hezbollah. Often, families of the perpetrators of terror also fully support their family members to perform suicide bombings (Kimhi & Even, 2004; Moghaddam, 2006; Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003). Due to this phenomenon, a survey was conducted in 14 countries (including Indonesia) informing of why Muslims support individuals or groups that struggle in the name of Islam although their action cause humanitarian and civil disaster (Fair & Shepherd, 2006). The result explains that the sense of threat by outsiders is a major contribution for these people to support acts of terror. It is from here that a new question arise, namely what kind of threat or sense of threat that triggers someone to join or support terrorist acts?

According to Henry, Sidanius, Levin, and Pratto (2005) and Sidanius, Henry, Pratto, and Levin (2004), there are two possible reasons for acts of terror performed by Islamic groups. First, due to the different values between Islam and the West, or Islam with non-Muslim becomes the stimulus for conflict of values. Second, due to dominance of Western nations over Islamic nations causes inferiority of Islamic countries through which this condition prompted reactions to counter Western dominance over Islam. To some extent, however, empirical data from their findings (i.e. Henry et al., 2005; Sidanius et al., 2004) showed that clash of civilization between Islam and the West (including to non-Muslim) is not the key to acts of terror and attack on the West and Israel, instead it is a counter-dominance project. Acts of terror performed by Islamic terrorist groups are due to their discontent of the Western countries’ dominance over Muslim majority countries. These findings are also supported by studies conducted by Pape and Feldman (2010). For example,
bombing actions in Iraq and Afghanistan becomes widespread and rampant after the US took power. From here, the subsequent question that arise is whether the findings by Henry et al. (2005) and Sidanius et al. (2004) which explains the rise of Islamic terrorism in the Middle East is similar with the rise of Islamic terrorism in Indonesia?

The research of theme 1 mainly aims to study the fundamental factors that cause Islamic acts of terror in Indonesia, considering that the phenomena in Indonesia are different to those occurring in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, or Afghanistan. If the bombings and bombing attempts that occurred in Indonesia are analyzed, those actions occurred based on two conditions, which are due to Western/foreign intervention and the various conflicts between Muslim and Non-Muslim. An example of this can be seen from the Christmas Eve bombing in 2000 which occurred due to Muslim-Christian conflict in Ambon and Poso. On the other hand, the Bali bombing in 2002 is understood due to discontentment with foreign parties, in this case the US and its allies.

In addition to the above explanation, other issues that make the terrorist phenomenon in Indonesia different from those in the Middle East are the social support factors. The family of terrorists in Indonesia often prevented acts of terrorism (Soheh & Zeena, 2009) and the majority of Muslim in Indonesia (as represented by Muslim organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah) condemned such violence. This situation is quite different than perpetrators of terror in the Middle East which are often supported by their families. Due to this problem, two papers have been prepared for this thesis theme which attempt to dig deeper into the root causes of the occurrence of Islamic terrorism in Indonesia; what actually triggers acts of terrorism in Indonesia, and who supports those acts of terrorism?
1.1.1. Overview of Papers in Theme 1

In general, this theme aims to describe elements of violence linked to terrorism engaged in Islamic religious group in Indonesia. Theme 1 addresses two papers, which relate to the ideas of how Islamic “radical” or “fundamentalist” group members think that the acts of terrorism are justified in Indonesia. As there are no clear explanations which can portray the motives and reasons behind the emergence of terrorist activities in Indonesia, focus group discussions and interviews were conducted among the so called Islamist terror activists or what the participants call themself as Jihadist. In short, acts of terror performed by Islamic groups in Indonesia depend on the considerations of whether Indonesia is in a state of war or not. If Indonesia is considered to be in a state of war, then acts of terror is likely to be performed as a consequence of war. After that, a model was developed from the findings of the qualitative study and tested using a quantitative study. Overall, the findings of the quantitative study supports the findings from the qualitative study through which Islamic fundamentalist will only support acts of terrorism in a certain condition.

*Paper 1 of Theme 1: Basic Concepts and Reasons Behind the Emergence of Religious Terror Activities in Indonesia: An inside View*

Paper 1 concentrates on understanding the fundamental concepts and reasons behind the emergence of religious terror activities in Indonesia based on information gathered from the Islamist ‘activist’. By doing focus group discussions and interviews ($N = 40$), the study revealed that there are at least three social conditions which trigger terror actions by Islamic groups in Indonesia. First, it is a series of conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims throughout the world. Second, it is believed that the political systems being implemented in Indonesia have failed. Third, it is believed that Muslims in Indonesia are politically and economically deprived.
**Paper 2 of Theme 1: Can Islamic Fundamentalism Relate to Non-violent Support? The Role of Certain Conditions in Moderating the Effect of Islamic Fundamentalism on Supporting Acts of Terrorism**

Paper 2 extends the findings of paper 1 by testing the idea that the effect of Islamic fundamentalism on supporting act of terrorism is conditional on the strength of the interviewees’ religious belief. The result of 309 Muslim participants showed that the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and support for terrorism acts was positively significant for Muslims holding low belief in establishing Islam peacefully and high level of rationalization of violent attack. In this regard, the findings indicate that violent act which is associated with terrorism may be conducted only when it is ‘morally’ justified and considered relevant.

### 1.2. Theme 2: Meta-prejudice and Prejudice in Religious Groups in Indonesia

After World War II, research on prejudice has become a central theme for social researchers, especially in social psychology. It is because prejudice is claimed as the culprit of discrimination, intergroup conflict, and violence. In psychological literature, the causes behind social phenomena such as prejudice (and including discrimination, oppression, and social conflict) can be analyzed using many different theories. Previous studies suggest that these phenomena can appear due to frustration (Berkowitz, 1972), relative deprivation (Davis, 1959), social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001), outgroup threat (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2010), ingroup and outgroup categorization (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1998), and limited resources (Sherif & Sherif, 1953). However, instead of getting a clear description, the efforts by each proponent to justify that the explanation of their theory is better than the others, have made the causes of prejudice become more complex and
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complicated to understand. Thus, even with numerous studies on the causes of prejudice, the explanations are still unclear and vague.

Recently Duckitt (2001) has suggested a solution to the causes of prejudice. According to him, some theories overlap and similar to others in their motivation and worldview explanations. In his study, Duckitt (2001) concluded that there are two distinct pathways that determine the processes of prejudice. These distinct pathways involve different processing of worldview (threat or competitive world), motivational goals (controlling or superior), and ideological belief (conservative or dominance). Duckitt called these processes as the dual process model (DPM) and stated that the DPM can explain both individual and group processes.

On the individual level (see table 1.1.), prejudice may arise from different worldviews such as perceiving a threat or a competitive world; motivational causes such as controlling the social environment or the desire to be superior; and from an ideology such as having authoritarian/conservative or a social dominance ideologies. In addition, according to him, the ideological beliefs of prejudiced people start from two types of distinct socialization and personality. One part of it is from punitive socialization given to persons predicting the conforming personality. This type of socialization and personality is believed to predict authoritarian or conservative ideology mediated by threatening/dangerous worldview and social control/security motives. The other part is from unaffectionate socialization given to persons where it will cause the development of a tough-minded personality. Mediated by competitive jungle worldview and superiority/dominance motive, this type of socialization and personality is believed to predict social dominant ideology.

On the intergroup level (see table 1.2.), on the other hand, prejudice can occur starting from social categorization through ingroup and outgroup separation of good versus bad or superior versus inferior. This distinct categorization characteristic will lead ingroup members
to react toward outgroup members either under the intention to control that is produced from social categorization of good versus bad or under the intention to dominate produced from social categorization of superior versus inferior (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). On the one hand, under the intention to control, ingroup members perceive outgroup members as a threat while under the intention to dominate, ingroup members perceive outgroup members as disdainful.

In proposing his model Duckitt and his colleagues conducted a number of studies (for example Asbrock, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2010; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Jugert & Duckitt, 2009; Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2007; Sibley & Duckitt, 2009). The findings strongly support that DPM can explain the causal processes of prejudice formation in a variety of studies. For example, prejudicing toward gay and lesbian strongly relate to conservative ideological beliefs called right-wing authoritarian’ (RWA) as compared to ideological beliefs of social dominance called social dominant orientation’ (SDO) (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Duckitt, 2001).

Table 1.1. Duckit’s model of two sets of psychological dimensions underlying prejudice with causality from left to right (2001, p. 53)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socialization</th>
<th>Personality</th>
<th>Worldview</th>
<th>Motivational goal</th>
<th>Ideological beliefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punitive vs. Tolerant</td>
<td>Conforming vs.</td>
<td>Threatening/dangerous vs.</td>
<td>Social control/security vs. personal freedom</td>
<td>Authoritarian/conservative vs. Autonomy/openness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Save/secure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffectionate vs.</td>
<td>Tough-minded vs.</td>
<td>Competitive jungle vs.</td>
<td>Superiority and dominance vs. altruistic concern</td>
<td>Social dominance vs. egalitarian-humanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affectionate</td>
<td>Tender-minded</td>
<td>cooperative-harmony</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, prejudicing toward black and women tend to strongly be related to SDO’ pathway compared to RWA’ pathway (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). The findings indicate that when the target of prejudice is perceived as a threat then it strongly relates to the RWA’ pathway, but
when the target of prejudice is perceived as inferior or disdainful then it strongly relates to the
SDO’ pathway.

Table 1.2. Duckit’s model of dual dimensions of group stereotypes, attitudes, affect, and
discrimination behavior (2001, p. 86)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Readiness to categorize motivation</th>
<th>Kind of social categorization schema</th>
<th>Stereotype dimension</th>
<th>Attitudinal dimension</th>
<th>Affective dimension</th>
<th>Racism/discrimination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat - control motivated:</td>
<td>Good/decent vs. bad/deviant</td>
<td>Beneficence traits</td>
<td>Disliking vs. liking</td>
<td>Negative: anger, fear, anxiety</td>
<td>Aversive/symbolic/&quot;hot&quot; discrimination</td>
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<td>authoritarian</td>
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<td>Competitive-dominance motivated:</td>
<td>Superior vs. inferior</td>
<td>Competence traits</td>
<td>Disrespect vs. respect</td>
<td>Low positive affect (disdain)</td>
<td>Dominance/traditional/ “cold&quot; discrimination</td>
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<td>social dominance</td>
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Nevertheless, although Duckitt (2001) has provided explanations the process and the
emergence of the root causes of prejudice, other studies showed that the Duckitt’s findings
were inconsistent. An experiment study conducted by Cohrs and Asbrock (2009) revealed
that RWA tended to be powerful in predicting prejudice when an outgroup was manipulated
to be a threat, but the effect of SDO on prejudice occurred not to increase despite an outgroup
was manipulated to be competitive. In contrast, a study from Pettigrew (1958) reported that
authoritarian attached in White South African people demonstrated different levels of
prejudice, indicating that RWA is inconsistent in predicting prejudice. It showed that despite
having no differences in the level of authoritarians, Whites who were born in Africa were
more intolerant of Africans than those who were not born in Africa. At this point, DPM fails
to be the powerful causal model of prejudice.

Furthermore, in my view, Duckitt’ DPM also fails to explain how prejudice is
expressed differently to outgroup members. For example, why would some only discredit an
outgroup member in the form of verbal abuse, while others would vulnerably perform an act of violence eventhough they have the same level of prejudice? Based on this, Duckitt’s findings are still lacking the explanation of how different levels of prejudice’ expressions can emerge from the same level of prejudice.

To this matter, I propose other ways to understand prejudice and its expression. First, I suggest that as social phenomena, prejudice should be understood in the way how individuals as group members perceive intergroup relations and how they think others are thinking. I agree with Reicher’ (2012) notions that prejudice is about negative perceptions and qualities toward a certain outgroup. I, then, assume that to have an understanding on the quality of intergroup relations is considered important. It is worthwhile to understand which group is perceived as the enemy or opponent and which group is perceived as the ally or a friend.

Further, human stands in the crosscutting between the ‘individual’ and the ‘social’. As a person, human has the ability to be independent with a unique/private thought. On the other hand, as social being human is motivated to engage in group/collective identity in order to share and reflect what happen in social. In doing so, my second proposal to understand prejudice is by analyzing the way how ingroup members think their group perceives other groups and how other group sees the ingroup. Previous studies have demonstrated the way how high identification toward group members relates to prejudice (Brown, 1995). Based on social identity perspectives (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, & Turner, 1979), group members are usually encouraged to have similarities, such as similarities in how they think think and act. Usually high identifiers will be easier to align their views with the group' views. Group members which put their group as an important source of pride and self-esteem will thrive to enhance and maintain positive images of their group, thus as a consequence outgroup may be derogated. However, this notion’s weakness is that it neglects the way how group members
think their group is thinking. On the other side, abundant research using social identity theory was only examining the way how individuals’ identification with ingroup negatively perceive the outgroup. It seems that group identification or group membership is an inevitable condition which creates prejudice and ignores the issue of intergroup tolerance.

There is evidence showing that how group members justify outgroups are varied; it can be either positive or negative (see e.g. Billig, 1985). Thus I argue that to have an understanding of what others are thinking is considered important for research in prejudice. On the other hand, there is evidence that thinking what others are thinking can influence individual’s perceptions and behaviors (Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011). For example, the former US President Bush hates “Islamic” Terrorist because he thinks they hate the US. On the other hand, “Radicalist Muslims” hate the US because they think the US hate Muslims. In the case of prejudice I define this mechanism of thinking as meta-prejudice. Further explanation regarding meta-prejudice will be discussed later in the next sections and chapters (i.e. theme 2).

Third, as I consider that seeing prejudice as a process in intergroup relations involving many elements and factors such as memories, emotions, histories, experiences, moral, norms, values, I argue that prejudice should be understood in the context where it is used (see figure 1.1.). In this matter, we can understand why prejudice can be expressed differently. For example, Crandall, Eshleman, and O’Brien’ (2002) study demonstrated that when prejudice, e.g. toward Black is considered normatively acceptable to be explicitly expressed, white individuals tend to support racial prejudice compared to those who consider prejudice as normatively unacceptable. However, the findings also revealed that prejudice will be suppressed when they think of it as unacceptable. In some regards, it is likely that having a status as majority or minority group may influence the expression of prejudice.
Given the explanations above, the present thesis aims to answer:

1. How does prejudice relate to the way group members think about others?

2. How the perceptions about the quality of intergroup relations and self-ingroup evaluation can have roles in influencing prejudice?

Figure 1.1. The complex relation between the prejudiced people and the target of prejudice

1.2.1. Overview of Papers in Theme 2

In general, theme 2 aims to describe the way how people see others in a negative way. The present thesis addresses three papers, which relate to the ideas of how group members think of what others are thinking in understanding prejudice. Two types of thinking process are introduced. First is how group members think that their own group (negatively) think about an outgroup, which is called as ingroup meta-prejudice. Second is how an ingroup member thinks that his or her ingroup is (negatively) viewed by outgroup members, which is called as outgroup meta-prejudice. The development of the ideas was influenced by combinations of social representations and social identity perspectives.
Social representations are understood as a shared knowledge about a social object. In conducting social research, social representation perspectives are concerned with the questions of “where social knowledge is constructed, “who by” and “with whom”” (Duveen & De Rosa, 1992, p. 95). In this way, social knowledge by social representation perspective is understood as less static at which it is socially elaborated (Wagner, 1995), shared, and reconstructed (Elcheroth et al., 2011).

Using social representation perspectives, then, firstly prejudice should be understood in the context where it emerges. It emerges, for example, as an answer to the question of why some group is perceived as a friend or an ally and why some group is perceived as enemy, evil, or bad. It is also used to understand intergroup relations in a certain society or social context. It is believed that “there is a system of social representations defining who is alien to the group, that is, who is not “common” to it and thus setting the limits between “ourselves” and someone other than ourselves” (Jedlowski, 1995, p. 295 in Moscovici & Perez, 1997, p. 27).

Before I discuss further, let me explain the role of social identity perspective as it is considered a useful theory for my research ideas. Social identity is a person’s sense of belonging in which he is identified as a member of the group, is “an ensemble of people who share an identity”. According to Ben-Asher, Wagner, and Orr (2006), collective/social identity is a social core representation, which exists in every group.

In reality, there are multiple representations about a social object. For example, based on Moscovici’ (1961/2008) finding about psychoanalysis in France, it can be seen how two different communities namely religious and communist group represent the practice of psychoanalysis in different categorization. On the one hand, religious (Catholic) group, is likely to relate psychoanalysis to catholic confession, whereas communist group is likely to relate psychoanalysis to American or capitalist propaganda. At this point, it can be known
that when individuals identify as communist living in France, they will likely have negative perceptions on psychoanalysis. Identity is then considered crucial to understanding a particular representation (Howarth, 2014), through which “who by” and “with whom” prejudice is constructed.

Moreover, in the social identity perspective, social categorization is considered crucial to familiarization and differentiation of social objects. In social categorization processes group members recognize which are their own ingroup’s, and which are the outgroup’s representations. As a consequence, group members also recognize the quality of ingroup – outgroup relationships, i.e. whether the relationship is positive or negative.

Given the rationale above, I predict that how individuals as group members perceive intergroup relationship, evaluate their own group, perceive that their own group sees particular outgroups (i.e. ingroup meta-prejudice), and perceive how the outgroup sees the ingroup (i.e. outgroup meta-prejudice) may play a role in research about prejudice.

**Paper 1: The Role of Ingroup and Outgroup Meta-prejudice in Predicting Prejudice and Identity Undermining**

Paper 1 examines the role of ingroup meta-prejudice and outgroup meta-prejudice in predicting prejudice by outgroups among majority Sunni Muslims in Indonesia. Targeting Ahmadiyya as a minority subgroup of Islam and Christians as a minority outgroup, the study found that ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice consistently play a role to predict prejudice. It appears that ingroup meta-prejudice mediates the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice.

**Paper 2: Putting Prejudice in Inter-religious Context: When Meta-prejudice and Majority-Minority Status Play a Role**

Paper 2 presents two investigations. First, in order to further investigate the role of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice, paper 2 tested the effect of perceived
intergroup relationships on prejudice mediated by ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice. The results indicate that across three samples, Majority Sunni Muslims, Minority Ahmadiyya and Christians, ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice are powerful predictors for prejudice. Ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice showed to mediate the effect of perceived intergroup relationship on prejudice. Second, in order to investigate the expression of prejudice in majority and minority religious groups, paper 2 examined the relation between prejudice and social rejection. The results showed that among majority Sunni Muslims and Minority Christian participants, prejudice did significantly correlate with social rejection on all target groups. However, in the case of minority Ahmadiyya participants, prejudice was only associated with social rejection of minority Christians, but not Sunni Muslims. It is assumed that expressing social rejection toward majority Sunni Muslims for Ahmadiyya participants is not relevant in their current situation.

*Paper 3: Taking Seriously Ingroup Self-evaluation and Meta-prejudice in Understanding Prejudice and Friendship Discrimination*

Using ingroup self-evaluation as moderator, paper 3 aims to understand when and how prejudice and friendship discrimination can be strongly predicted by ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice. The research was conducted in the Flores Island, Indonesia, where Christians are the majority and Muslims are the minority. Across two samples (i.e. Christians and Muslims), the study consistently showed that prejudice mediated the effect of ingroup/outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination. The effect of ingroup/outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice was reported to be moderated by high and low level of ingroup self-evaluation. It indicates that the effect of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice is stronger at high level of ingroup self-evaluation than at low level of ingroup self-evaluation.
THEME 1

RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND TERRORISM IN INDONESIA
2. BASIC CONCEPTS AND REASONS BEHIND THE EMERGENCE OF RELIGIOUS TERROR ACTIVITIES IN INDONESIA: AN INSIDE VIEW

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Abstract

This study aims to understand the fundamental concepts and reasons behind the emergence of religious terror activities in Indonesia, providing an 'insider' rather than an 'outsider' view. Data were collected from a total of 40 religious terror activists in Indonesia using a set of focused group discussions and interviews. The reasons they provided for their terror activities were as follows: (1) Indonesia is seen as being in a state of war (thus justifying a defensive attack); (2) Suicide bombing is believed to be noble; (3) The West (as a whole) is targeted as it is considered the invader of Muslim countries and a representative of evil; the Indonesian government is viewed as its corrupt ally.

*Keywords*: Religious, Terrorist, Indonesia, Suicide, Bombing, West, Terrorism, *Jihad*
2.1. Introduction

The threat of terrorism has spread worldwide and become a global issue (Tan, 2003). In Indonesia, after the Bali bombing incident in 2002, the threat of terrorism is strongly linked to the actions of Islamist activists, rather than other groups of activists (e.g. separatists, socialists, communists, criminals, etc; see Golose, 2010; Post, 2007).

A number of studies have analyzed terrorism activities and investigated Islamic groups linked to violence, such as, Jamaah Islamiyah (JI/Islamic Congregation) and Crisis Prevention Committee (KOMPAK /Komite Penanggulangan Krisis; see Barton, 2005; Bruinessen, 2002; Mamoto, 2008; Mobley, 2006; Pavlova, 2006; Sarwono, 2006; Shuja, 2005; Wright-Neville, 2003). These previous studies revealed that Islamist activists affiliated to some Islamic groups do exist in Indonesia. However, the findings do not provide a comprehensive explanation of motives and causes behind the current violent attacks. This study aims to discover the basic concepts and reasons of the Islamist activists in conducting terror actions. It also attempts to explain the logic of these Islamist activists’ actions, providing an insider rather an outsider account of the actions.

2.1.1. Causes of Terrorism

Islamic terrorism is currently under great scrutiny as a result of numerous violent acts that have been perpetrated throughout the globe, including notorious acts of suicide bombing (Bankoff, 2003; Ginges, Hansen & Norenzayan, 2009; Piazza, 2009; Speckhard, 2008). There is a general misconception that Muslims are more violent than other religious groups (e.g., Christian). However, Fischer, Greitemeyer and Kastenmüller (2007) argue that Muslims are no more aggressive, or more supportive of violence than Christians. Moreover, some studies reveal a number of factors contributing to the rise of Islamic terrorism. These include the failure of the modern global economy in bringing prosperity to the Muslim world, the dominance of national identity over Muslim identity, the supremacy of certain political
systems worldwide (e.g., democracy), the Israeli occupation of Palestine, competition perceived between Muslims and non-Muslims, and the secular governments ruling Muslims (see Castells, 2004; Moghaddam, 2008; Robison, Crenshaw & Jenkins, 2006). The conditions have led to the notion that Islam is under threat (see Fair & Shepherd, 2006), provoking feelings of humiliation within Muslims and the loss of compassionate values within individuals (Abdel-Khalek, 2004; Rothschild, Abdollahi & Pyszczynski, 2009). Hence, Islamist activists have become aware of the strong need to fight against perceived injustice, engage in a quest for significance, and endure suffering as part of a noble struggle in the name of God and religion (see Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek, 2009; Venkatraman, 2007).

As opposed to Islamist activists' actions in parts of the Middle East such as Palestine and Lebanon which receive local support (see Kimhi & Even, 2004; Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003), the terror acts of Islamist activists in Indonesia are not supported by major local Muslim organizations like Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama (Nahdlatul Ulama, 2009; Sidik, 2009), and often not even by family members (Soheh & Zeena, 2009). Some data also indicate that the conflicts of Muslims against non-Muslims in Indonesia are localized and often related to ethnic or cultural tensions (Satriyanto, 2007). Hence, further research to identify the fundamental causes of the Indonesian Islamists' actions is needed. Furthermore, in this study, the researchers focus on the reasons the Indonesian Islamist activists give for their actions, rather than perform a causal study in the empirical sense.

2.1.2. A Concept of Indonesian Islamic Terrorism

The development of Islamist terror activists' norms, beliefs, and ideology are rooted in a collective understanding of the Qu'ran verses and as-Sunnah (teachings/practices of the prophet Muhammad) taught in their groups. Giacomini (2008) argues that Islamist terror activists base their actions on the belief that Islamic rules and laws must be applied in all
aspects of life in all countries, especially their own. Venkatraman (2007) explains that according to the convicted terrorists, their actions are justifiable for defensive purposes. Numerous studies on the mental processes of terrorist members have come to a similar conclusion in that the terrorists rationalize their actions; also, they believe that their actions are normal and in accordance with their religious teachings and norms (Lia & Hegghammer, 2004; Post, 2007; Sanadjian, 2006; Toffler, 2006; Wolf & Frankel, 2007).

Toffler (2006) provides a general description of Islamist terror activists. Ideologically, they insist on a single interpretation of God's commands, impose systematic emotional and intellectual discipline, and present a nostalgic view of Islam. As a group, Toffler adds, they are relatively small in number and generally recruited from the privileged classes. They build a selective, cohesive, and extroverted band of believers. In order to spread their ideology, Islamist terror activists establish exclusive Islamic schools (pesantren), which focus on teaching male students to pass on respected dogmas down the generations. Teachers and students also persuade others by exemplifying their own successes and fostering courage in upholding their religious beliefs.

Furthermore, Sarwono (2006) provides more specific characteristics of Islamist terror activists in Indonesia: having a strong desire to understand and practice Islam 'properly', responding to the call for jihad (struggle), perceiving that religion and politics are inseparable, enforcing syariah law (the law based on Qu'ran and Sunnah) in Indonesia, and believing that violence and terror acts are in accordance with Islamic teaching. They believe in a 'better life after death' and are willing to sacrifice their lives.

Nasir Abas, a former prominent JI member, supports Sarwono's (2006) claim that Indonesian Islamist terror activists have a strong motive to establish the syariah and an Islamic state in Indonesia. According to Abas (2006), the goal of JI is to overthrow the Indonesian government and establish an Islamic state. However, this motive does not seem to
be coherent with actuality. Terror actions that have occurred in Indonesia have tended to target Western symbols or communities (e.g., Western communities in Bali, the JW Marriott Hotel, the Ritz Carlton Hotel, the Australian Embassy, etc.) and have also victimized innocent local Muslim civilians, rather than powerful representatives of the Indonesian government. Thus the connection between the stated goals and the actions committed is unclear. This is in contrast to the activities of Islamist groups in other regions such as in Palestine, Egypt, and India. Through their actions, the latter have more clearly demonstrated the close relationship between their mission and their chosen targets (Kimhi & Even, 2004; Piazza, 2009).

Based on these recent findings, a further study providing a better explanation is needed to understand the apparent disharmony between the collective purpose declared by Islamist terror activists in Indonesia and the actions they have taken. Thus, the major questions to address in this study are: What are the reasons Indonesian Islamic terror activists provide for taking terrorist actions? What are the basic concepts that could explain these actions? Why do they choose certain kinds of targets?

2.2. Method

2.2.1. Participants

A total of 40 people participated in this research (all male, from mid 20s to late 40s). Twenty eight of the participants were JI members/former members, and the 12 others belonged to KOMPAK. A total of 27 participants were prisoners, while the rest had been released or at least were found in a court of law not to have supported the terrorist actions committed by their fellow group members. The prisoners were located in three different prisons in Jakarta and Tangerang; 4 participants were from the Tangerang Prison, 11 participants were from the Polda Prison, and 12 participants were from the Kelapa Dua Prison.
The 11 participants in Polda Prison were serving more than 20 years or even life sentences, as they were considered to be high ranking (they included an ex-JI leader, an ex-JI military commander, Bali bombing masterminds, the KOMPAK leader in Poso, and senior combatants in Ambon conflict). The participants in the Tangerang Prison were serving 15 to 16 years of jail term after they were convicted for their supporting roles in various acts of terrorism. The participants from Kelapa Dua Prison belonged to KOMPAK who were serving 15 or more year sentences. Finally, the released participants who had played minor roles had served jail sentences of less than 10 years. The categorization of participants in locations on this research was provided by national police and was based on the level of involvement in terror actions and social hierarchy in their groups’ structures.

All of the participants were trained in conflict areas. 20 of them were trained in combat areas outside Indonesia. Sixteen were trained in Afghanistan, while 4 others were trained in Mindanao, Philippines.

2.2.2. Procedure and Material

Data were collected through a series of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), and a single interview. The two-hour FGDs were conducted to probe and discuss issues regarding their general perceptions on Indonesia, the Indonesian government, and Islamic teachings (Quran, Assunah, syariah). FGDs were performed separately in each location as it was not possible to move the inmates; therefore there was no intermixing of participants between locations.

An ustadz (Muslim clerics) or two (in Polda Prison, since the inmates were considered to be high ranked) facilitated each FGD session by taking roles as the moderator(s) of discussion. They also trained the team of researchers to understand the Islamic terminologies and concepts used by the participants, which were mostly in Arabic.
Each FGD session was conducted in the format of traditional Islamic discussion (pengajian) as being performed in all Islamic communities and schools (pesantrens) (the prophet Muhammad is believed to hold the same model of discussion) in order to build trust among all parties involved: the ustaz, the participants and the researchers. A total of twelve FGD sessions were conducted; up to two sessions were used to build rapport (e.g. introducing the researchers and the ustaz, getting to know each of participants, explaining the purposes of the discussion, etc) and the others were for getting information. Only two FGD sessions were held in Kelapa Dua prison due to some unforeseen problems (e.g. time limit, the unavailability of the ustaz, etc).

A list of questions regarding the participants’ views of some Islamic concepts (e.g. jihad, Islamic state, non-Muslims, etc), perceptions toward the Indonesian government, and the reasoning of terror actions committed were provided to each ustaz before the FGD session. This was to facilitate the ustaz in studying the types of information needed, developing some strategies in communicating and interviewing, and preparing himself for any unexpected response which might come out. Based on the information provided by some related parties such as the wardens, police officers, and former terror activists, it was understood that the inmates might easily become suspicious toward the perceived ‘out-group’ and show resistance in answering questions. Thus, the ustaz having effective communication strategies (e.g. mastering a relatively high level of social skills, having a wide range of Islamic knowledge, etc) was a necessity.

Some themes and topics were labelled 'planned stimulations' for the FGD sessions. These topics were formulated by researchers collecting information from experts as well as practitioners who came to know the participants through a brainstorming session. The topics included the following Islamic concepts in Arabic: jihad (struggle), istimata (sacrificing life), da’wah/syiar (Islamic campaign), fa’i (war loot), thoghu (representatives of evil), jihad fi
sabilillah (struggle in the path of God), kafir (infidel), imamah (leadership in Islam), khalifah (caliphate/global leadership in Islam); and other issues including the status of non-Muslims, the Islamic State, the concept of violence, martyrdom, and war in Islam. However, the FGD themes were not strictly adhered to as the participants were given the opportunity to raise their own topics in the opening part of each FGD session. This was necessary to build trust because they were suspicious of any hidden agendas the facilitators and the researchers might have had. Consequently, some themes were removed due to their sensitive nature, while some other unanticipated themes were raised such as Pancasila (Indonesian national ideology), the conductor of the JW Marriott bomb attack, and akhlaqul karimah (noble good deed, manner and attitude).

The diversity in themes across locations was linked to the flow of the opening session in each location. In some sessions, once the facilitator(s) and the participant who was perceived to be the social leader/senior by the other participants had managed to agree on a theme, the others just followed (true to their culture which advocates following the senior or 'leader'); hence the percentage of people mentioning the chosen theme was impossible to obtain. Further, the language of each FGD was informal, and some of the participants even spoke in Arabic although the facilitator(s) asked them to use Indonesian language so they would be understood by all concerned.

All FGD sessions except those held in Polda and Kelapa Dua Prisons were recorded as well as noted. Those not recorded (due to the prisons' existing rules) were documented with notes taken by the researchers. As some participants regretted their actions, the facilitators asked them to provide answers from the perspective of a 'active terrorists'. Overall during the discussions, the inmates were quite open in answering questions.

Another supporting technique in collecting data, the in-depth interview, was applied with one participant. This particular participant was interviewed for his extraordinary
expertise and experiences. He was a bomb maker, suicide bomber recruiter, and tactician. He was trained in Afghanistan and had been involved in a number of prominent attacks in Indonesia.

2.2.3. Analysis

This study used qualitative thematic analysis on conversations documented in each FGD session. These themes included: the causes of terror actions, the status of non-Muslims in Islam, suicide bombing, Indonesia and the Indonesian government, the non-Muslim leader, and the ideal state. The transcribed data were coded and then tabulated in matrices and subsequently analyzed specifically in terms of their similarities and differences.

2.3. Results

2.3.1. Causes of Terror Actions

According to the Islamist terror activists, the main reason for their actions is the conflict that exists between Muslims and non-Muslims at both a national version and international (e.g., Palestine) level. The Indonesian Government is seen to be ignorant of this issue. Thus, they argue that a quick response to help their fellow Muslims is undeniable:

I cannot remain silent when our brothers in Palestine and our brothers in Ambon and Poso are being ‘trampled’ (by non-Muslims), they are representatives of thoglut (evil) [...] The current Indonesian government is very poor. Because we are not living in Poso, we decided to carry out our action here. (In Tangerang, Java) (Participant – Tangerang prison)

Our government is satan (evil). They do not care about Muslims. We stand up for defending Muslims across countries. Muslims are like having one body, if one part of body is hurt, the others will feel. We feel their (Muslims’) pain [...] You do not know how many Muslims died in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan. They are more than the WTC victims, a lot more, but why does the world ignore this? We are asking. Why? People who do not know think that we are sadistic and mean, they should open their eyes and be fair. (Participant – The Released Group)

They also feel insulted by the way they are treated by non-Muslims, and refer to the widespread ‘Christianization’ of nations and what they see as Indonesian's inadequate
response to it. Thus, they feel the need to demonstrate to the world that Muslims are strong enough to cope with obstacles:

> Our actions were not without reasons. We see Indonesia, a country with a Muslim majority was being trampled by the Christian minority. Not only that, they (Christians) are conducting Christianization of the Muslim umah (community). What we did was a response to the action of the Christians. I cannot understand why it is so hard to establish Islamic law when the majority of the (Indonesian) population is Muslim […] It is obvious that terrible conditions here are manifested from our neglect on syariah law, it is because we do not want to implement Islamic law from the beginning of our independence day. (Participant – Kelapa Dua prison)

> It is like we are the ones who are guilty. Wait until they see in detail how Christians do Christianization in a number of places in Indonesia, and how they insult Muslims in their church […] A teacher, a Christian, even ripped the veil from a little girl`s head at school because he hated Muslims. We have some data. Our guys reported this. What do you expect? They (Christians) just see us as lost sheep […] They bribe people to be Christians with bunch of promises, while the people have already been Muslims […] They take advantage of these poor people, giving extra attention so they convert to Christianity […] We are saying this based on data. We observe it, for months. (Participant – The Released Group)

The activists also perceive Indonesia as being in a state of war. Thus, it is considered legitimate to conduct jihad fisabilillah (struggle in the path of God). They stress the importance of implementing syariah law expediently in Indonesia to build strength among Muslims:

> Muslims (in Poso and Ambon) are threatened, humiliated and are under attack, that is why we must carry arms and answer the call for jihad (fisabilillah). It is a physical jihadi, it is compulsory to bear arms. (Participant – Kelapa Dua prison)

> We would not attack for any reason. If non-Muslim had acted calmly, and had cooperated with us, we would not have attacked them. However, should we, as Muslims stand aside and watch our brothers being attacked and trampled? They (non-Muslims) will continue fighting us until we follow their (religious) teaching […] Indonesia is a kafir state because it adopts Pancasila (as national ideology), which is clearly man-made, it is thoglut (evil), Indonesia should implement syariah immediately to reform itself as a strong country. (Participant – Polda prison)

From our standpoint Indonesia is still in a state of war. We have been invaded by the West. Do you not see? Look at our economy, politics, all. Indonesia had its independence merely for five years after the Independence Day, not anymore now, do not you know? We are being occupied, yet we do not realize it […] Hence, to conduct jihad fisabilillah here, by sword, by weapons, is understandable. We can understand why the bombers did their actions. (Participant – The Released Group)
An interview with the first Bali bombing perpetrators reveals some reasons behind their action. They include dissatisfaction towards the Indonesian government, a decrease in morality, and chaotic social conditions in the nation. Further, the participants view the West (the USA and its allies) as infidels and representatives of evil for a number of perceived interventions on Muslim countries. Therefore, they reason, some extreme actions are needed. In the activists’ opinion, *jihad fisabilillah* (struggle in the path of God) is similar to physical war, and it has to be conducted in present-day Indonesia:

The situation in Indonesia is chaotic; there are rampant crime and violence against Muslims by non-Muslims, it means ‘the door to *jihad fisabilillah* is wide open and brightly lit’ [...] *Jihad fisabilillah* is war [...] The purpose of jihad is to protect Muslims, to enforce justice, and to destroy evil. Look at Indonesia now, this is because of the West, America, the true infidels, thoghut (evil), who invade us, our privacy, and support Israel. (Interview – Bali Bomber)

2.3.2. Fundamental Concepts Explaining Terror Actions

*Non-Muslims*

The activists believe that it is forbidden to attack peaceful/harmless non-Muslims. Nonetheless, they question the existence of ‘peaceful non-Muslims’. They are sceptical about the intentions of non-Muslims towards Muslims, as the following statement suggests: ‘... we are asking, are there any non-Muslim wanting to make peace with Muslims?’ (Participant-Tangerang prison). Further, according to the Islamist terror activists, non-Muslims who do not cooperate with Muslims are considered enemies: 'Their (non-Muslims') blood is halal (it is justified to kill non-Muslims). The mutual connection between Muslims and non-Muslims can only exist according to a clear contract between the two:

We do not hate non-Muslims. Some of them are good. But they have to be partnered with us. They cannot support their allies who are against us. In this case, if they attack or act against us, we have to show that Muslims are not weak. [...] We are strong, and we will defend our brothers everywhere across regions. It is now time for us to show them who Muslims are, not just sit around and do nothing while our brothers are tortured. (Participant – The Released Group)
Do not get it wrong, Muhammad was nice to non-Muslims. Which non-Muslims? The ones making peace with Muslims, Muhammad protected them. [...] We do not mind with co-existence. Muhammad practiced it first before anyone else, he gave a good example. [...] Muhammad was the hakam (judge), the leader of all, both Muslims and non-Muslims. [...] There was a clear agreement not to harm each other, and that was when Muhammad served as a leader. See, Islam does not want to attack. We only react to the tortures and unfairness to our Muslim brothers wherever they are. Do not see what we did as an action, it is actually a reaction. (Participant – The Released Group)

Suicide Bombings

Suicide bombings are considered acts of martyrdom. The activists believe in the righteousness of the suicide bombers' actions. One of the statements emphasizes this: 'Maybe they (the suicide bombers) have a different interpretation and understanding of Qu'ran, so we cannot judge that they are wrong' (Participant - Tangerang prison). Moreover, they are happy if they are chosen to be a martyr. This is because the action is considered syahid (holy) and is performed for the glory of Islam.

No one here would want to carry out suicide bombing, suicide is forbidden in Islam [...] However, if sacrificing one’s life for the benefit of the ummah, such action is the most exalted in the eyes of God. Such action is not suicide bombing, rather, it is ‘syahid bomb’ [...] Whenever they call us to do it, we will do it happily. (Participant – Kelapa Dua prison).

Those who fought and died for the glory of Allah’s Kingdom, they never die, they live on, alongside of Him. This is Allah’s promise. (Participant – Polda prison).

A key component of suicide attacks is being in a state of war. The Islamist activists believe that in a state of war, any kind of physical fights, including suicide bombing, is justified. And, as Indonesia is seen by many of them to be in a state of war any form of physical combat is acceptable. Yet for other activists the state of war in Indonesia is localize (e.g., in Ambon and Poso): 'If I had known that the money was going to be used for bombing in Java, I would have not carried out the robbery' (Participant - Tangerang prison); 'I did not agree on Bali as a target, since the main goal was actually to bomb Poso. However, the leaders insisted that Bali was a legitimate target' (Participant - Polda prison).
There are also some activists who believe that Indonesia is no longer in a state of war, thus bombings are no longer appropriate. They subsequently clarify the point of moral calculation. In this case, if suicide bombings bring more negative impacts (mudhorot) on Islam and several aspects of life, then the actions should not be conducted.

This is not an act of frustration. The suicide bombing is a noble matter, to reach syahid, for God, to the higher goal [...] When there is war here in Indonesia, we must join, to fight! [...] The Muslims who conduct physical fight in battle never be the same with the ones who do not [...] You, ustadz, you should go fight in wars too, in Afghanistan and Iraq where our brothers are tortured by America, not here [...] However, now it is not a moment of war anymore in Indonesia, not like when Ambon conflict occurred, that was a state of war. But we are longing for joining war again, it is in our blood, because it is the highest jihad, jihad fisabilillah, jihad qital [...] We want to die as noble in the eye of God. (Participant – The Released Group)

Indonesian Government

All the activists who participated in the research agreed that the Indonesian government is a representative of thoghut since it does not apply syariah law and stand against Western interests: 'Just because the majority of Indonesians are Muslim, does not make it (Indonesia) a Muslim country. In fact, it is the worst country because of its support for the West' (Participant - the released group); 'Indonesia is a disorderly state and it must be under Islamic Law' (Participant - Polda prison); 'People who run this country are puppets of the West, they adopt Western laws, they spread values and lifestyle that are not in accordance with Islamic teachings' (Participant - Tangerang prison). The activists argue that the government needs to be overthrown by several terror actions and replaced with a regime supporting Islamic rules.

Our guide is Quran, we worship Allah, we follow good leaders, not The President (Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudoyono), because he is thoghut, a representative of evil who support America and its allies [...] Look at Indonesia now, morality is bad. Too many crimes, it is not well-managed. It is chaotic in every aspect of life. Indonesia has to base itself on syariah law, God’s Law, not Pancasila [...] Our ideology Pancasila is not legitimate. The legitimate one is Piagam Jakarta, which consists of Islamic rules. (Participant – The Released Group)
We do not agree on forming a party to be in parliament, they are all corrupted, even the Islamic party. We chose to fight it, not blend in it […] We do not compromise with the current system, because it is so corrupted, we fight against it […] Just give us a moment to rule the country, we assure you that Indonesia will then be excellent. (Participant – The Released Group)

Non-Muslim Leaders

All the activists involved in the research took a stand against non-Muslim leaders. The following statements arose in discussions held in all locations: 'We do not tolerate any non-Muslim leader'; 'A non-Muslim leader will never be an option'; 'Muhammad was a leader and never gave the leadership to non-Muslims'; 'Muslims have to be on the top and protect the rest of people'; 'A non-Muslim leader will never treat people as fair as a Muslim leader'; 'The leader who does not implement Islamic law is not supposed to be followed'.

I know Mr. SBY (Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudoyono) is a smart man, but I will not follow him because his government is not an Islamic government. However, if an Islamic government rules Indonesia, I will follow, even if the president is Mr. Tukul Arwana (Indonesian comedian). (Participant – Polda prison).

Ideal State

There was consensus among all the Islamist activists interviewed that the ideal state must follow the models of Medina and Mecca under the rule of the Prophet Muhammad and Khulafaur Rasyidin (successors of the prophet, The Four Rightly Guided Caliphs). For them, the concept of ideal state depends on how precisely it implements syariah:

We must return to the teaching of the Prophet. He has set an example of the ideal state, under a precise syariah, so why do we have to follow any other model? Do you think there is a better model? (Rhetorical question) (Participant – Polda prison).

The characteristics of an ideal state described as "Baldatun Toyibatun Warobul Gofur," in which the leader of the country is pious, good, honest, and shows concern for the welfare of his people.
No nation is ideal, not Indonesia, not Malaysia, and not even Saudi. Saudi is so corrupted! The kingdom only applies *syariah* (Islamic law) to immigrants. They are hypocrites. They have such a double standard. [...] The closer to ideal one, for me so far, is Afghanistan under Taliban. The atmosphere is so Islamic. (Participant – The Released Group)

All countries are bad, *thoghut* (evil). But at least some are better than Indonesia. Indonesia is the worst! [...] The first one closed to Ideal one is Afghanistan. Iran is alright too, although not as good as Afghanistan. (Participant – The Released Group)

Hmm.. A country which is better I think is Malaysia. At least they have better welfare than us here. They apply *syariah*. Kuwait is good too. (Participant – The Released Group)

We admire Ahmadinejad. He is a good example of Muslim leader. As a president he is pious, humble, and honest. That is how all Muslim leaders are supposed to be. (Participant – The Released Group)

An ideal state is a place where the leader put concern on his people, worries when the people are suffering and hungry. Just like Umar bin Khatab (Muhammad’s subsequent). I would cry if I remember Umar’s life story. He cared about poor people so much. Our leader has to be like him. Not like now in Indonesia. (Participant – The Released Group)

**Bombings and Bombing Targets**

An interview with one of the members of the first Bali bombing in 2002 indicates that the bomb was a response to atrocities committed towards Muslims worldwide by the USA and its allies. Moreover, the bomb was specifically made to target infidels; hence they chose a bar that was frequented by foreigners. The bombing is said to have been planned to take place on 11 September 2002 to celebrate the first anniversary of 9/11 as a show of dissatisfaction towards the USA. The Bali bomber argued that America, as a Super Power state, has the ability to stop the war between Palestine and Israel, yet fails to meet its responsibilities. In addition, the Islamist activists we interviewed stated that the USA overly interferes in Muslim affairs: 'Indonesia is a country with a Muslim majority. The US and its allies, who are non-Muslims, should not interfere with our (national) affairs' (Participant - Kelapa Dua prison). For these reasons, the USA (and its allies) is perceived to be the main common enemy of Muslims internationally and therefore must be fought against:
Based on these problems, we place U.S.A and its allies as the main enemy. Therefore, we are always waiting for the opportunity to fight against Americans, and I will always try to fight back, and fight Americans with every means. (Interview – Bali Bomber)

The Islamist terror activists also target non-Muslims because of their perceived hostility towards Islam: 'They (Christians) hate us, but because they are small in number, they do not show it openly' (Participant - Polda prison); 'Why did they choose our holy day (Ramadan) to attack us if they do not hate us?' (Participant - Polda prison); 'The Christmas Eve bombing in 2000 was carried out as a response to the attacks by Christians against our Muslims brothers and sisters in Ambon and Poso' (Interview - Bali Bomber). Overall, there are several reasons why terror activists have resorted to bombing actions in Indonesia. These are linked to dissatisfaction with the Indonesian government and the state of affairs in Indonesia today (e.g., chaos, high intensity of criminality), abuses by non-Muslims internationally and intervention by the USA and its allies in Muslim affairs:

We have to perform physical combat, because we do not have other tool to fight America and its allies. By bombing, they are afraid of us […] the American civilians are not innocent, because they vote for Bush, and they pay taxes. These taxes are used to support the invasion in Iraq and Afghanistan, thus the civilians are responsible too […] the other western countries such as Australia, England, and so on are not innocent either, because they support America, its foreign policy. So Australians got bombed in Bali. (Participant – The Released Group)

We do not agree on Marriott bombing, yet we understand why the perpetrator did it, because it is Americans’, Marriott is a place where American top decision makers of economic affair like to have breakfast every Friday, they are zolim (torturer), they invade our economy, they are devils, therefore we understand why they are bombed. (Participant – The Released Group)

Listen, it is all collapsing, the system in the world. This is because of the domination of Jew, USA, and its allies. They call us terrorists as propaganda, but who is the actual terrorist? It is them. […] Our government is responsible too, because it does not defend Muslims’ interests. It defends non-Muslims’ instead, which is USA. […] Our current government deserves to be overthrown. They cannot manage the country. They are thoghu (evil). If they can manage the country, the situations would not be as bad as now; it is very chaotic in here. (Participant – The Released Group)
The goals of the bombings, as explained by the activists, are to start a revolution in Indonesia, or at least to warn the Indonesian government related to its performance.

Hopefully, the bombing that we did, will lead Indonesia to a revolution or to establish a holistic implementation of Islamic laws comprehensively. At least, the impact will give lessons to the Indonesian government [...] The government need to be awaken, that it fails to improve prosperity and other important aspects of life. (Participant – Tangerang prison)

There are several outcomes expected from these bombings: to enforce jihad, to induce fear in the enemies of Islam, and establish war against thoghut. Further, the war is expected to distinguish good from evil, so it will be easy to remove infidelity, cruelty, disobedience, and other troubles caused by the enemies of Islam. In this case, jihad will provoke the establishment of syariah in Indonesia, which is believed will solve most crises in the country. Hence, bombing activities are generally viewed positively, as reflected in the following statements: 'Bombings are a must, they are undeniable, because there exist no other tools effective to awaken our government. They are essentially full of truth- fulness' (Participant - Kelapa Dua prison); 'By engaging in acts of bombing, I am carrying out an obligation of jihad in the name of Allah' (Participant - Polda prison); 'Bombing is a way to avenge the actions for enemy of Islam' (Participant - the released group).

2.3.3. Summary of the Results

This study has provided several explanations as to the causes of Islamic terrorism in Indonesia. In the perpetrators' view there are at least three social conditions that trigger the terror actions. First, there is a series of conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims throughout the world. These conflicts are perceived to be a form of abuse and discrimination towards Muslims by non-Muslims. The Islamist terror activists involved in this research stated that solidarity towards their Muslim 'brothers' was one of the reasons for their actions. Second, the activists believe that the political systems being implemented in Indonesia have
failed to bring prosperity to the country; thus the Islamic constitution needs to be applied.

According to them, the current condition in Indonesia results from the government's neglect of God's Law.

Third, there is perceived economic and political deprivation in society. They argue that the Indonesian government takes the side of non-Muslims, rather than the Muslim majority on both an economic and political front. In their opinion, the government needs to implement *syariah* law. The government is perceived to be highly compromised by Western interests, so a fight against them (the Indonesian government and the West) is legitimate.

2.4. Discussion

This study has found that the Islamist activists' interpretation of three main concepts is the most important factor in explaining their criminal actions. These include the state of war, *jihad fisabilillah*, and suicide bombing. The first and most crucial concept is that of a state of war, that is, whether or not Indonesia is in a state of war. We consider this to be the deciding factor that influences the Indonesian Islamist activists in perpetrating acts of violence. If Indonesia is defined as being in a state of war, various acts of violence (such as killing, war looting, hijacking, and so on) are then considered appropriate for jihad to take place. In other studies of Islamist activists around the world, the activists explain that the Qu'ran sanctions waging war on enemies and performing *jihad fisabililah* (see Venkatraman, 2007).

Bretton (1986) also explains that a state of war occurs when legally, sociologically, or politically well-defined entities engage in violent combat against each other. With regard to these concepts, Indonesia can be interpreted as being in a state of war as a result of three factors: abuse and discrimination towards Muslims by non-Muslims in international conflicts, the failure of the Indonesian political system in bringing prosperity to the country, and the economic and political deprivation in Indonesian society. Hence, the Islamist terror actions
RELIGIOUS TERROR ACTIVITIES

seem to be a form of reaction towards the social situations perceived (see also Love, 2009; Post, 2007; Post et al., 2003). The theory of relative deprivation, which argues that social movements and deviance, or even extreme situations such as riot, terrorism and civil wars, arise when people feel deprived of what they perceive as their 'fair share' can also be seen to be supported (see Gurr, 1970; Rose, 1982; Runciman, 1966; Walker & Smith, 2001).

The second concept used by the Indonesian Islamist terror activists to explain their actions is *jihad fisabilillah* (see Imron, 2007). The term *al-jihad fi sabil Allah* or *jihad fisabilillah* is equivalent to the Western notion of *bellum justum* or 'war in the cause of God' (Peters, 2005). It may mean wars against unbelievers, apostates, rebels, highway robbers, or dissenters renouncing the authority of Islam (Khadduri, 1955). The initial aim of *jihad fisabilillah* is the expansion and defence of an Islamic state, instead of converting non-Muslims to Islam by force (Peters, 1977).

The third concept found in the research which explains the emergence of Islamist terror actions is an understanding of suicide bombing. In the Indonesian Islamist activists' opinion, suicide bombings by Islamists to conduct *jihad fisabilillah* are a noble struggle instead of a suicidal action. This is what differentiates the Islamist terror activists from other perpetrators of bombing actions.

Several studies have shown that suicide bombing is not necessarily an exclusive characteristic of Islamist terror activists, but it is also utilized by other groups of terror activists (see Kruglanski et al., 2009; Pape, 2005; Post, 2007). Nevertheless, the Islamists explain their actions as a means to a higher goal, to apply God's Law (see Kruglanski et al., 2009). Thus it is called *syahid* (holy) bombing. Under this label, suicide bombing is considered a heroic act of martyrdom, a selfless sacrifice in the service of God and religion (Post et al., 2003). It is justified in a state of war, to bring about a better situation or to rescue Muslim(s), for instance, in the case of ten non-Muslims' being killed for the sake of one
Muslim (Kimhi & Even, 2004; Post et al., 2003). Kruglanski et al. (2009) (see also Pyszczynski, Solomon & Greenberg, 2003; Rothschild et al., 2009) have argued that the feeling of being threatened and insulted have led to the emergence of terrorism and suicide bombings.

The last issue discussed in this research is related to the Western community (the USA and its allies) as the Islamist terror activists' chosen target. For some analysts, there is a dissonance between the goal (which is to establish an Islamic Nation of Indonesia) and the action (see Sarwono, 2006). In contrast with these Indonesian Islamist activists, Islamist activists in Palestine and Lebanon have demonstrated congruency between their goals and targets (Post et al., 2003). This research explains the disparity. The findings show that the Islamist terror activists believe the West (the USA and its allies) to be the main common enemy of Muslims globally due to their intervention in Muslim affairs internationally and their support for Israel in torturing Palestinians. In this case, their Muslim solidarity is stronger than their national identity. This finding is supported by findings in other research. Several studies indicate that Al-Qaeda states that the USA is the main enemy of Muslims, and one which the ummah must overthrow (see Kruglanski et al., 2009; Post, 2007). Further, destroying the USA is just a means to achieve the ultimate goal of building an Islamic state in Indonesia, which will uphold syariah law. The activists believe that Indonesia must return to the ideal model of Islamic leadership outlined by the prophet Muhammad and his Khulafaur Rasyidin. This notion is supported by Toffler's (2006) finding that the average Islamist terror activist has a very strong sense of nostalgia.

Our findings conclude that terror attacks in Indonesia are not determined by significant losses (Kruglanski et al., 2009), perceived injustice, or social problems (see Staub, 1999), but by whether there is an interpretation of 'state of war'. When a situation is
interpreted as one of a state of war, then the type of attack to be conducted (e.g., suicide bombing or killing) is considered a combatant technique and strategy.
3. CAN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM RELATE TO NON-VIOLENT SUPPORT? 
THE ROLE OF CERTAIN CONDITIONS IN MODERATING THE EFFECT OF 
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM ON SUPPORTING ACTS OF TERRORISM

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Abstract

The present study aims to understand when and how act of terrorism is supported and denounced by Islamic fundamentalists in Indonesia. We predicted that the belief in establishing Islam peacefully and rationalization of violent action would moderate the Islamic fundamentalism-support for acts of terrorism relationship. The result of the research of 309 Muslim participants show that the relationship between Islamic Fundamentalism and support for terrorism acts was positively significant for Muslims holding low belief in establishing Islam peacefully and high rationalization of violent attack. However, the relationship was negatively significant at high level of belief in establishing Islam peacefully and rationalization of violent attack. The findings indicate that Islamic fundamentalism may potentially support violent as well as non-violent acts under some certain conditions.

Keywords: Islamic Fundamentalism, Terrorism, Moral Justification, Peaceful Way
3.1. Introduction

In recent decades, Indonesia has faced tens of bombing incidents as well as terrorist attacks affiliated with Islamic terrorism group. Hundreds have been captured; tens have been shot dead; and few have been executed by Indonesian law enforcement. However, although incidents related to terrorism attacks have seen reduced, terrorism activities still exist and generate sympathizers. Hundreds and even thousands of Muslim mourners escorted terrorists corpses to the grave (Batang, 2013; Wisanggeni, 2010) exemplifying the support on Islamic radical groups in Indonesia.

What stimulates religious people to engage as well as to support terrorism has been a salient question in the social sciences (Bandura, 2004; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Moghaddam, 2006, 2009). Specifically, religious fundamentalism is considered as one of the key predictors in predicting support for terrorism (Pech & Slade, 2006; Taylor & Horgan, 2001). In the frameworks of religious fundamentalist, such acts of terrorism are justified when it is considered in line with the sacred text’s guidance (Venkatraman, 2009) and also considered as a combatant strategy (Putra & Sukabdi, 2013).

Religious fundamentalist groups tend to struggle to establish a nation or society based on God’s law (Muluk, Sumaktoyo, & Ruth, 2013). They believe in the holiness and undeniable truth of God’s rules and law in managing human life, hence man-made law will be considered as false or untrustworthy (Moghaddam, 2008; Putra & Sukabdi, 2013). They believe that state and religion cannot be separated (see Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009).

However, it is important to note that, particularly to Islamic fundamentalism, not all Islamic fundamentalism groups struggling to establish Islamic law will use violence as a tool or a strategy. An example in Indonesia is Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). The group is known as Islamic fundamentalism group struggling to establish Islam using non-violent movements
This is proof that peaceful Islamic fundamentalist does exist. The present study examined the role of Islamic fundamentalism, belief in establishing Islam peacefully, and rationalization of violent attack in predicting support for acts of terrorism legitimized by sacred texts.

3.1.1. Islamic Fundamentalism

In general, religious fundamentalism coins to the understanding that there is no source which can be called as absolute and undeniably true in guiding human living in the world except their religious teachings (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). Hood, Hill, and Williamson (2005) point out that religious fundamentalists tend to see the world based on their sacred texts and treat the sacred texts as inerrant and unchanging. In Islam, however, next to the Quran, Muslims should also hold on to the Hadith (Sunnah), the living example of the Prophet Muhammad, as a guideline and the basis for running their daily life.

For instance, according to Taylor and Horgan (2001), there are five key points that characterize Islamic fundamentalism. First, Quran and Hadith are used as the only fundamental source of guidance. Second, Islam covers all aspects of life. Third, Islam holds clear and precise laws and rules compared to any other religions. Fourth, Prophet Muhammad's method in ruling Medina is the only model for developing a government. Fifth, Islam is the universal religion for mankind.

3.1.2. Rationalization of Violent Act

Studies conducted by Sidanius and colleagues (Henry, Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 2005; Sidanius, Henry, Pratto, & Levin, 2004) demonstrate that terror attacks targeting the United States and its allies in the Middle East are seen as a set of responses by groups who reject their region from being occupied by "the outsiders." This is understood as
antidominance reactions. Nonetheless, in Indonesia, beside antidominance reactions, terrorism attacks can be seen as reactions to the clash of Muslim values with other traditions/values (e.g., Western or Christian values; Putra & Sukabdi, 2013). Serial bombings during Christmas Eve in 2000 is an example. The incidents that had ruined some churches in several cities in Indonesia are seen as a response to Muslim-versus-Christian conflicts in Mollucas and Poso (Putra & Rufaidah, 2010). On the other hand, the Bali bombing in 2002 were discovered to be a response against the United States and its allies' domination over Muslim countries (Putra & Sukabdi, 2013). To this matter, we assume that the underlying aspect of support for acts of terrorism is not about antidominance reaction or about the clash of civilization, but whether the use of violence or acts of terrorism is reasonable or not to be conducted in certain conditions.

3.1.3. The Present Study

The present study is to reveal whether Islamic fundamentalism along with belief in establishing Islam peacefully and rationalization of violent acts plays a role in predicting support for acts of terrorism legitimized by religious teaching. The present study examined the three-way interaction effect of religious fundamentalism, belief in establishing Islam peacefully, and rationalization of violent acts on support for acts of terrorism (which is legitimized by religious teaching or sacred text). We hypothesize that "belief in establishing Islam peacefully and rationalization of violent action moderate the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and support for acts of terrorism."

3.2. Method

3.2.1. Participants

Three hundred and nine Muslims living around Jakarta, Depok, Bogor, Bekasi and Tangerang (JABODETABEK) participated in the study (Male = 140, Female = 169). Their
ages ranged from 14 to 29 ($M = 17.85$). The questionnaire was disseminated to high schools (e.g. SMU 78 Jakarta) and universities (e.g. University of Indonesia) a few months after the Marriot bombing of 2009 in Jakarta. The participation of the research was in exchange of no rewards.

3.2.2. Measures

The study used four measurements with 6-point Likert scales (see appendix for detailed items).

*Islamic fundamentalism.* We developed Islamic fundamentalism scale by modifying religious fundamentalism of Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) and intra-textual fundamentalism scale (Williamson, Hood, Ahmad, Sadiq, & Hill 2010) to fit into the Islamic fundamentalism described by Taylor and Horgan (2001). It consists of 9 items. The scale reported strongly reliable ($\alpha = .753$).

*Support for acts of terrorism.* We developed a scale to measure Muslim participants in dealing with non-normative (i.e. bombing & conducting physical *Jihad*) activities linked to acts of terrorism in Indonesia (believed to be legitimized by *Quran*). The scale consists of 3 items which showed an average reliability ($\alpha = .708$).

*Belief in establishing Islam peacefully.* We measured belief in establishing Islam peacefully as an indicator of wisdom in Islam. We obtained a reliable scale, $\alpha = .737$. Given that we used two items for the scale, this value is considered good.

*Rationalization of violent attack.* We used 1 item to measure rationalization of violent attack (i.e. *It is legalized to combat any element of non-Muslim who does not employ Muslim workers*). As an information, since some previous studies had used 1 item for their measure
3.3. Results

3.3.1. Preliminary Analysis

The mean score for Islamic fundamentalism scale was 4.450 ($SD = .76$). The mean score of support for act of terrorism was 1.507 ($SD = .680$) which was below the midpoint of 3.5. Support for acts of terrorism is treated as a dependent variable (DV), hence, the study is not about the absolute terms of supporting or rejecting terrorism acts, but about investigation of the different levels of Islamic fundamentalists’ intentions (whether they are high or low) in relation to our DV.

The preliminary analysis’ results showed that no sex differences occurred on all key variables. It indicates that gender differences did not play a role in all main variables. Nevertheless, in order to anticipate the effect of gender and age, we decided to include age and gender differences in main analysis as control variables since previous studies demonstrated that men are more prone to aggression and to get involve in terrorism acts on average than women (Moghaddam, 2006). In addition, to avoid the effect of multicollinearity, all predictors were mean centered.

3.3.2. Three-way interaction

In this section we present the results relating our hypothesis in predicting the effect of Islamic fundamentalism on support for acts of terrorism moderated by belief in establishing Islam peacefully and rationalization of violent attack. In this analysis we put together Islamic fundamentalism (i.e. focal predictor/F), belief in establishing Islam peacefully (i.e. first moderator/W), rationalization of violent attack (i.e. second moderator/M), interaction
variable of $F \times W$, the interaction variable of $F \times M$, the interaction variable of $M \times W$, and the interaction variable of $F \times W \times M$ to predict support for acts of terrorism (see table 1).

### Table 3.1. Three-way interaction of moderated regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>$se$</th>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F: IF</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.598</td>
<td>.550</td>
<td>-.062</td>
<td>.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W: BIP</td>
<td>.102</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>-1.840</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M: RVA</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.564</td>
<td>.573</td>
<td>-.036</td>
<td>.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F×W</td>
<td>-.114</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>-2.137</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>-.219</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W×M</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.325</td>
<td>.746</td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F×M</td>
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<td>.028</td>
<td>1.534</td>
<td>.126</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F×W×M</td>
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<td>-4.942</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.195</td>
<td>-.084</td>
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<td>.067</td>
<td>.332</td>
<td>.740</td>
<td>-.109</td>
<td>.154</td>
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<td>.015</td>
<td>-.202</td>
<td>.840</td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>.026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. F = Independent variable/predictor; W = moderator 1; M = Moderator 2; IF = Islamic Fundamentalism; BIP = Belief in establishing Islam with peacefulness; RVA = Rationalization of Violent Attack; SVL = Support for Violent Legitimation.

In general, the regression equation was significant ($R^2 = .207$, $F (9, 298) = 8.639$, $p < .001$). In particular to the variable of $F \times W \times M$, the result demonstrated that this variable significantly predicted support for acts of terrorism ($b = -.140$, $SE = .028$, $p < .001$, $\Delta R^2 = .065$, $CI [-.195, -.084]$). Further, to probe such significant result of the three-way interaction effect, we conducted a slope analysis by controlling the effect of religious fundamentalism on support for violent legitimation under the condition +/- 1 SD of W and M as well as their interaction as suggested by Hayes (2013; Hayes & Matthes, 2008). The result showed that the effect of Islamic fundamentalism on support for acts of terrorism was not significant ($b = .092$, $SE = .075$, $p = .218$, $CI [.239, .055]$) among those with low belief in establishing Islam peacefully (i.e. 1 SD below the mean) under low level condition of rationalization of violent attack (i.e. 1 SD below the mean). However, support for acts of terrorism was
significantly predicted by religious fundamentalism \( (b = .334, SE = .087, p < .001, CI [.164, .505]) \) among those with low belief in establishing Islam with peacefulness (i.e. 1 SD below the mean) under condition high level of rationalization of violent attack (i.e. 1 SD above the mean). Moreover, Islamic fundamentalism was lightly significant in predicting support for acts of terrorism obtained from those with high belief in establishing Islam peacefully under the condition that conducting violence is considered reasonable \( (b = -.163, SE = .079, p < .05, CI [-.318, -.007]) \), and non-significant from those with high belief in establishing Islam peacefully under the condition that conducting violence is considered not reasonable \( (b = -.029, SE = .079, p = .714, CI [-.127, .185]) \). Most of all, the findings support our hypothesis (see figure 3.1.).

![Figure 3.1](image)

*Figure 3.1. Path’s visualization for the effect of Islamic Fundamentalism on Support for Acts of Terrorism moderated by (high and low) Belief in Establishing Islam Peacefully and Rationalization of Violent Attack.*

*Note: Figures in brackets represent scores effects at low level of rationalization of violent attack. Figures in non-brackets represent scores effects at high level of rationalization of violent Attack.  
* \( p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001, ns = non-significant \)*
3.4. Discussion

The findings in this study demonstrate the moderating roles of belief in establishing Islam peacefully and rationalization of violent acts in the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and support for acts of terrorism. We expected that the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and support for acts of terrorism would be more positive among those with low belief in establishing Islam peacefully and high level of rationalization of violent action. As we predicted, the finding provided evidence for our hypothesis.

It shows that the intentions to support acts of terrorism which are legitimized by sacred text may potentially be obtained from Muslims who believe in using violent action in establishing Islam. In our view, this finding is sort of an answer to the question of why such support for terrorism occurred in the context of outgroup occupation and intergroup conflict (Henry et al., 2005; Sidanius et al., 2004). In addition, a violent act that is associated with terrorism may be conducted when it is "morally" justified and considered relevant. In contrast, when the use of a peaceful way is still possible, Islamic fundamentalists may think that an act of terrorism is irrelevant.

3.4.1. Implication for Terrorism Disengagement

The present research has an important implication for counter terrorism efforts. As Quran and Sunnah (Islamic sacred texts) justify the use of violence under certain circumstances, eliminating the idea or even ideology of physical *Jihad Fisabilillah* as the highest form of Jihad in the mind of proviolence Islamic fundamentalists will be considerably unattainable.

We propose two types of intervention in counterterrorism. The first involves using peripheral routes, which focus more on applying positive psychology in developing quality of life (including level of education, socioeconomic, etc.) and increasing internal locus of
control. The technique is delivered by legitimate clerics and by using verses in sacred texts (Quran and Sunnah) concerning areas to be developed. This first type of intervention aims to prevent Islamic fundamentalists from focusing or possibly blaming any outgroup for unwanted social issues.

The second involves using a central route, which focuses more on counter-ideology based on careful interpretations of each verse of sacred texts delivered by respected clerics and using sets of two-way conversation with the fundamentalists. Using this particular technique, the facilitator (the clerics) can emphasize the distinctive characteristics of a state of war according to Quran and Sunnah in details using sets of illustrations and case studies as written in Islamic history. Thus, the technique aims to increase fundamentalists' sense as well as ability to differentiate contexts. It also aims to promote the irrelevance of physical holy war in the country (Indonesia), as it is not a conflict area. We argue that the two types of intervention (see Abuza, 2009; Barret & Bokhari, 2009; Boucek, 2009 for comparisons) may work effectively if they involved or were performed by ex-terrorist detainees who have reformed their concept and transformed into "soft fundamentalists," thus taking a role as change agents.

3.4.2. Conclusion

The present study has brought new insight of when and how religious fundamentalists may potentially condone and denounce acts of terrorism. We have provided evidence that Islamic fundamentalism may support acts of terrorism for Muslims who do not believe in establishing Islam peacefully in Indonesia. We see that this study is not only beneficial for Indonesia, but also for other Muslim countries where proviolence Islamic fundamentalist groups develop and strengthen their movement. On the other hand, the finding implies that Islamic fundamentalism may also have the potential to support nonviolent acts under certain conditions; one of the conditions is a belief in establishing Islam peacefully. It is plausible
that there are other conditions that can lead religious fundamentalists to tolerate other religious members. To this matter, future research is needed to strengthen this argument.
THEME 2

META-PREJUDICE AND PREJUDICE IN RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN INDONESIA
4. THE ROLE OF INGROUP AND OUTGROUP META-PREJUDICE IN PREDICTING PREJUDICE AND IDENTITY UNDERMINING

Abstract

The present study aims to understand the role of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice in predicting prejudice and identity undermining. I predicted that ingroup meta-prejudice would mediate the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice and identity undermining either on minority subgroup or minority outgroup. The results from majority Sunni Muslim participants ($N = 214$) targeting Ahmadiyya (i.e. minority subgroup of Islam) and Christians (i.e. minority outgroup) showed that the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice and identity undermining through ingroup meta-prejudice was significant. In general, the findings indicate that what group members think of what others are thinking may play a key role in influencing intergroup relations and perceptions.

*Keywords*: Meta-knowledge, Meta-stereotypes, Prejudice, Social Identity, Intergroup Relations
4.1. Introduction

Recent research has shown that ingroup members' beliefs about how the outgroup negatively sees them may increase negative perceptions and feelings (see, e.g., Owuamalam, Tarant, Farrow, & Zagefka, 2013; Saroglou, Yzerbyt, & Kaschten, 2011; Vorauer, Hunter, Main, & Roy, 2000). For example, members of a White Canadian dominant group were shown to have negative emotions toward Aboriginal Canadians (Vorauer, Main, & O'Connell, 1998) when they thought that the Aboriginal group had negative stereotypes of them. The present study extends this work by proposing another model of belief, that is, how group members believe that their own group sees particular outgroups. Here, I introduce the idea of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice, which are tested as predictors of prejudice and identity undermining.

4.1.1. Prejudice, Meta-prejudice, and Social Identity

I use the term "prejudice" to refer to the belief that an outgroup has negative qualities (see, for comparison, Allport, 1958, and Reicher, 2012) related to evil, threat, and disdain. "Muslims are evil or a threat" is one example. Moreover, I refer to "ingroup meta-prejudice" as referring to how group members believe that their own group sees particular outgroups, and "outgroup meta-prejudice" as referring to what group members think outgroup members think of their own ingroup.

There is evidence describing that individuals have a psychological need to engage with a social group or social identity (see, e.g., Amiot & Sansfacon, 2011, and Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). Social identity (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) is the awareness of being part of a group, in which this group provides norms, values, and even pride. Group members are usually encouraged to have similarities, such as similarities in how
they think and act. Usually high identifiers will be easier to align their views with the group' views. In this regard, it is plausible that ingroup meta-prejudice contributes to prejudice, and this contribution may potentially be stronger than the contribution of an outgroup's meta-prejudice.

According to social identity perspectives (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), group members have intentions to compare their group with other groups. Once an outgroup is considered a rival, ingroup members are imposed to compete with the outgroup members in order to maintain their pride or self-esteem. This is an indication that individuals' perceptions and behavior tend to be influenced by what they think of others. In this aspect, it also seems possible that once ingroup members believe outgroup members have prejudice toward their own ingroup (i.e., outgroup meta-prejudice), this belief may affect ingroup meta-prejudice. Based on this reasoning, Hypothesis 1 is as follows: Outgroup meta-prejudice will influence support for prejudice through ingroup meta-prejudice.

4.1.2. Identity Undermining

One way toward intergroup conflict resolu- tion is through building perceptions that other groups' values may bolster group values and status. In contrast, intergroup conflict may be maintained when each group identifies that the other group's values can undermine ingroup values. For example, in the idea of building a common group, individual subgroup members will oppose group union or support group sep- aration when they think that being affiliated with a superordinate group will undermine their own group (Sindic & Reicher, 2009). According to Sindic and Reicher (2009), the perception of identity undermining by another group is influenced by the perception that the superordi nate group's norms and values are incompatible with the subgroup's values and thus may potentially weaken the subgroup's status (i.e., making them powerless).
In this regard, I propose other predictors of identity undermining. Because individuals are often influenced by how others think, it is likely that ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice might predict identity undermining. Based on this rationale, Hypothesis 2 is as follows: Outgroup metaprejudice will influence support for identity undermining through ingroup meta-prejudice.

4.1.3. The Present Study

Among other group identities, religion can be understood as one of salient and significant identity (Verkuyten, 2007), especially in non-Western societies (Sen, Wagner, & Howarth, 2014). Based on a Pew Research Center (2012) report, more than 80% of the world's population identifies themselves with a religious group. The reason for this is that religion provides believers with moral guidance and an understanding of the world and of life. To this matter, the present study seeks to explore the predictors of prejudice and identity undermining in an interreligious context. Specifically, this study was conducted in Indonesia, where Human Rights Watch (2013) has reported that both interreligious conflict and violence against religious minorities have increased. The samples of participants are limited to majority Sunni Muslims targeting Ahmadiyya group, representing a minority subgroup of Islam, and Christians, representing a minority outgroup.

4.2. Method

4.2.1. Participant and Design

Two hundred and fourteen Muslims living around Jakarta and Bandung participated in the study (Male = 87, Female = 127). Their ages ranged from 17 to 56 years (M = 24.68). Questionnaires (i.e. in Indonesia language) were disseminated to university students (e.g. Universitas Islam Bandung) and non-university students. One subsample (N = 110)
completed questionnaire targeting Ahmadiyya and the other \( N = 104 \) completed a 
questionnaire targeting Christians. No rewards were exchanged for participation in the 
research.

4.2.2. Procedure and Measures

The questionnaire consisted of several parts. The first part of the questionnaire was an 
informed consent to confirm participants' agreement to voluntarily participate in the research. 
For the second part, participants were asked to fill out a Muslim identity scale, which was 
prepared to select identification toward their religious group (see Appendix for detailed 
items). The scale consists of five items; Cronbach's alpha reliability was .748 (corrected item-
total correlations ranged between .386 and .654). Participants who scored less than 3.5 (i.e., 
the midpoint of the scale) were excluded from being used in the main analysis.

On the third part of the questionnaire, participants were asked to indicate their 
judgment with six items of bipolar adjective scale (i.e. threatening – trustworthy, hostile – 
friendly, slothful – industrious, evil – good, stupid – clever, and undignified – dignified) to 
measure prejudice belief. Participants responded to the items related to their perception about 
outgroup (i.e. “you think [outgroup] is”). In the analysis, I would reverse the bipolar adjective 
scale so that high scores corresponded to high negative judgment. The reliability was .919 
(corrected item-total correlations ranged between .657 and .841).

Subsequently following this scale was meta-prejudice scale which consists of two 
measures referring indicators for ingroup meta-prejudice (i.e. “Do you think that in Indonesia 
[ingroup] perceive [outgroup] as”) on one hand and outgroup meta-prejudice (“Do you think 
that in Indonesia [outgroup] perceive [ingroup] as”) on the other. Each measure comprised of 
six bipolar adjective items similar to prejudice belief. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability of 
ingroup meta-prejudice was .941 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .790 and
.863) and outgroup meta-prejudice was .957 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .844 and .898). Combining these six items, a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with PROMAX rotation revealed two factors as expected, accounting for 64.939% of total variance, with the first factor referring to ingroup meta-prejudice and the second factor referring to outgroup meta-prejudice.

Next, participants were given a scale to measure identity undermining modified from Sindic and Reicher (2009). It consists of 4 items, whereas two items were designed to indicate identity undermining related to intergroup relationship and the other two items to indicate identity undermining related to the inclusion of another group. In this case, since Christian is not part of Islamic group, identity undermining toward Christians were only given to items related to intergroup relationship. In targeting Ahmadiyya, the 4 items of identity undermining obtained .812 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .574 and .668) and in targeting Christians, the two items of identity undermining obtained an alpha .924.

4.3. Results

4.3.1. Preliminary Analysis

The inspection of independent t-test showed that no sex differences occurred on all key variables. As seen in table 4.1., intercorrelation of ages among all key variables was found non-significant, except for the correlation between age and ingroup meta-prejudice targeting Ahmadiyya (r = .176, p < .05). Therefore, all data were collapsed across ages and gender.
Table 4.1. *Descriptive statistics and correlations*

<table>
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<th>SD</th>
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<th>5</th>
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<td>Target: Christians</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Outgroup Meta-prejudice</td>
<td>3.358</td>
<td>1.220</td>
<td>.597***</td>
<td>.414***</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.150</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Ingroup Meta-prejudice</td>
<td>3.267</td>
<td>0.991</td>
<td>.641***</td>
<td>.331**</td>
<td>.180</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Prejudice</td>
<td>3.127</td>
<td>0.835</td>
<td></td>
<td>.344***</td>
<td>.030</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Identity Undermining</td>
<td>3.159</td>
<td>1.326</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.020</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>5. Age</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target: Ahmadiyya</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Outgroup Meta-prejudice</td>
<td>4.030</td>
<td>1.238</td>
<td>.641***</td>
<td>.440***</td>
<td>.334**</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Ingroup Meta-prejudice</td>
<td>4.568</td>
<td>0.992</td>
<td>.739***</td>
<td>.481***</td>
<td>.214*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Prejudice</td>
<td>4.380</td>
<td>1.025</td>
<td></td>
<td>.436***</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Identity Undermining</td>
<td>4.801</td>
<td>1.026</td>
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<td>.153</td>
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<td>5. Age</td>
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*Note.* *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

4.3.2. Mediation effect investigations

To examine the role of ingroup meta-prejudice in mediating the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice and identity undermining, the simple mediation procedure (SOBEL) was used, and the data were resampled 5,000 times, as suggested by Hayes and colleagues (Hayes, 2013; Preacher, & Hayes, 2004). In this procedure, outgroup meta-prejudice was specified as an independent variable, ingroup meta-prejudice as a mediator, and prejudice and identity undermining as the dependent variables.
**Figure 4.1.** Mediated regression results by Muslim participants toward Ahmadiyya (A) and Christians (B). Note: Path coefficients are unstandardized estimates; * p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.

In targeting Ahmadiyya (see figure 4.1 A.), the total effects of outgroup meta-prejudice was found to be positive and significant on prejudice ($b = .366$, $SE = .077$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.213, .520]) and identity undermining ($b = .284$, $SE = .083$, $p < .01$, 95% CI [.120, .448]). However, the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice was dropped to be non-significant either on prejudice ($b = -.046$, $SE = .076$, $p = .550$, 95% CI [-.197, .105]) or identity undermining ($b = .034$, $SE = .100$, $p = .737$, 95% CI [-.166, .233]) after ingroup
metaprejudice was put together as predictors. The analysis showed that the indirect effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice \( (b = .495, \text{Boot SE} = .072, Z = 5.827, p < .001, \text{Boot 95\% CI [.287, .572]}) \) and identity undermining \( (b = .250, \text{Boot SE} = .073, Z = 3.484, p < .001, \text{Boot 95\% CI [.111, .398]}) \) through ingroup meta-prejudice was significant.

In targeting Christians (see Figure 4.1 B.), the total effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on identity undermining \( (b = .164, \text{SE} = .112, p = .145, 95\% \text{CI [-.058, .386]}) \) was not significant, whereas the total effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice \( (b = .275, \text{SE} = .064, p < .001, 95\% \text{CI [.148, .402]}) \) was significant. However, the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice turned out to be non-significant after controlling for ingroup meta-prejudice \( (b = .028, \text{SE} = .070, p = .690, 95\% \text{CI [-.111, .167]}) \). Nonetheless, the results showed that the indirect effects of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice \( (b = .247, \text{Boot SE} = .055, Z = 5.511, p < .001, \text{Boot 95\% CI [.151, .369]}) \) and identity undermining \( (b = .259, \text{Boot SE} = .091, Z = 2.952, p < .01, \text{Boot 95\% CI [.085, .446]}) \) through ingroup meta-prejudice were significant. In general, the findings support the hypotheses.

4.4. Discussion

The findings in this study demonstrated the role of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice in predicting prejudice and identity undermining. It showed that ingroup meta-prejudice consistently mediated the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice and identity undermining. In general, the findings provided evidence for the hypotheses.

In the context of prejudice, previous studies have shown that how an ingroup is negatively viewed by an outgroup is associated with prejudice (Vorauer et al., 1998, 2000). Other than that, the present study has shown that how an ingroup is viewed by an outgroup also can contribute to how group members believe that their own group sees particular
outgroups. Moreover, because group members are strongly influenced by ingroup thinking, ingroup meta-prejudice may potentially become a mediator of outgroup meta-prejudice in predicting prejudice. The findings of the present study support this prediction.

Nevertheless, the strength of ingroup and out-group metaprejudice in predicting identity derming indicate that ingroup and outgroup metaprejudice can help to explain elements of negative perceptions and feelings other than prejudice. The present findings also provide a contribution in explaining identity undermining either by other subgroups or outgroups. A previous study demonstrated the role of incompatibility and powerlessness to explain identity un-dermining (Sindic & Reicher, 2009). However, the roles of incompatibility and powerlessness are limited in explaining identity undermining in the context of whether being part of a common group will contribute negative versus positive impacts to group values or group status. Likewise, previous studies have not provided strong evidence for what factors can predict on identity undermining in the context of intergroup relation, that is, the perceptions that building intergroup relations with an outgroup may undermine an ingroup’ values or status. Thus, the present study has fulfilled the absence through which identity undermining by outgroup can be predicted by ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice.

In conclusion, the present study has demonstrated the important role of what group members think others are thinking in intergroup relations. Understanding this mechanism of thinking may help to find the way in developing positive intergroup relations, as well as intersubgroup relations. Therefore, further investigation using meta-prejudice to explain other negative impacts is needed to improve and strengthen the present findings.
5. PUTTING PREJUDICE IN INTER-RELIGIOUS CONTEXT: WHEN META-PREJUDICE AND MAJORITY-MINORITY STATUS PLAY A ROLE

Abstract

Using the lens of intergroup relations, the authors seek to extend the idea of meta-prejudice to study the dynamics of prejudice expression in inter-religious relations. We present three samples of participants ($N = 477$) representing major and minor religious groups in Indonesia in which we investigated the notion that how group members think about ingroup meta-prejudice, which is how their own group think about outgroup, as well as outgroup meta-prejudice, which is how their group is viewed by outgroup members have important roles in predicting prejudice. Across the three samples, prejudice was found consistently and strongly obtained from ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice in which these were shown to mediate the effect of perceived intergroup relationship on prejudice. For majority Sunni Muslims and minority Christian participants, prejudice did significantly relate to social rejection on all target groups. However, in the case of minority Ahmadiyya participants, prejudice was only associated to social rejection targeting minority Christian, but not Sunni Muslims. We assume that expressing social rejection toward majority Sunni Muslims for Ahmadiyya participants is not relevant in their current situation. Moreover, theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

Keywords: Intergroup Relations, Prejudice, Meta-knowledge, Meta-perception, Majority-Minority
5.1. Introduction

The present study seeks to explore the predictors of prejudice and the dynamics of prejudice expression in inter-religious relations. First, in relation to the predictors of prejudice, religious bigotry, attached in religious fundamentalists (Altemeyer, 2010), is considered to play a key role in determining prejudice and hostility against other religious groups. Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan’ (2009) study, however, demonstrated that hatred can also be found in less religious devotees. Instead, Ginges et al. (2009) found that support for suicide attacks were more likely associated to attendance at religious services, than to prayer to god (i.e. an index of religious devotion). To this point, we argue that regardless of the level of a person’s religious devotion, prejudice is likely more about the inter-religious perceptions.

Previous studies have revealed that prejudices will be difficult to reduce when inharmonic intergroup relations exist. In this sense, each group members who perceive the relations between ingroup and outgroup to be in a bad condition may try to preserve their prejudice toward an outgroup and may even increase their prejudice (Bar-Tal & Teichmen, 2005). In Israel, for example, considered because of the protracted conflict between Jews and Palestinians (Bar-Tal & Teichmen, 2005), Jews tend to evaluate Palestinians more negatively than other foreigners. Nevertheless, we propose other consequences of perceived intergroup relationship, namely how group members think that their own group think about an outgroup and how an ingroup member thinks that his or her ingroup is viewed by outgroup members. The latter refers to ingroup meta-prejudice and the former refers to outgroup meta-prejudice (Putra, 2014). We expect that these will mediate the effect of perceived intergroup relationship on prejudice.

Second, in relation to prejudice expression, Allport (1958), in his influential book argued that prejudice can be expressed in different ways. He illustrated that two employers
may dislike Jews to an equal degree, but one may decide to hire Jews while the other may refuse to hire Jews (p.14). Generally speaking, recent studies provide substantial evidence that how people express their prejudice is linked to how they appraise and engage with prevailing social norms, values, and beliefs (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Specifically, Crandall, Eshleman, and O’Briend (2002) study demonstrated that when prejudice, e.g. toward Black, is considered normatively acceptable to be explicitly expressed, white individuals tend to support racial prejudice compared to those who consider prejudice as normatively unacceptable. It shows that prejudice will be suppressed when they think of it as unacceptable. The present study extends this work by addressing the role of majority-minority religious group status in influencing prejudice expression. We suggest that beside the prevailing social norms, how prejudice is expressed can also be influenced by group social status. In this sense, we expect that there will be differences in terms of prejudice expressions in relation to social rejection level.

5.1.1. Prejudice and Meta-prejudice

Allport (1958) pointed out that prejudice contains two essential ingredients; one is an attitude of favour or disfavour, and the other is an overgeneralized belief. “I don’t want to be friends with Chinese” exemplifies prejudice in aspect of attitude, while “Jews are evil” exemplifies prejudice in aspect of belief. With regard to our present study, our definition about prejudice closely linked to aspect of overgeneralized beliefs. In a way, this prejudice belief relates to how group’ qualities are evaluated in a negative way (see for comparison in Putra, 2014; Reicher, 2012).

There are evidences showing that individuals cannot think and create their ideas without references or social representations (Wagner & Hayes, 2005). Individuals are also fully aware of others existence and able to differentiate what s/he and others know. Often, their own group provides these references (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1982). Therefore, it
is plausible that prejudice may be influenced by: (1) the way of how group members think that their own group thinks about an outgroup, and (2) the way how an ingroup member thinks that his or her ingroup is viewed by outgroup members.

It is just recently that Putra (2014) has started to investigate meta-prejudice, that is, ’the way in which group members think of what others are thinking. There are two types of meta-prejudice. First is related to how group members believe that their own group sees (negatively) particular outgroups. This is called as ingroup meta-prejudice. Second is related to what group members think outgroup members think (negatively) of their own ingroup. This is called as outgroup meta-prejudice. In the study, Putra (2014) found that ingroup meta-prejudice mediated the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice. The present study extends this work by placing ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice along with perceived intergroup relationship as predictors of prejudice.

Previous studies have provided evidence that how an ingroup member thinks that his or her ingroup is viewed by outgroup members plays an important role in influencing intergroup relations (e.g. Phelps, Ommundsen, Türken, & Ullerberg, 2013; Vorauer, Main, & Connel, 1998; Vorauer, Hunter, Main, & Roy, 2000). In this matter, we predict that ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice will play a role as mediators of the effect of perceived intergroup relationship on prejudice.

5.1.2. Majority-Minority Group Status and Prejudice Expression

In society, each group obtains status. There are at least two types of group status which usually exist in society; that is as majority and as minority. Often, majority group gains privilege provided by society, thus posit them as the dominant group (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). Consequently, majority members hold less pressure to actualize their behavior and attitude in which their group norms are usually recognized as a “normal” social practice (Wagner, Sen, Permanadeli, & Howarth, 2014). On the other hand, minority group tends to
be marginalized and discriminated by the majority group (Holtz, Dahinden, & Wagner, 2013). Their minority status often brings them to be fully aware of majority perceptions about them (Howarth, 2006; Neel & Shapiro, 2012). Therefore, as part of social phenomena, prejudice belief will be found in majority and minority groups. However, we suggest that what may be different between majority and minority is the expression of their prejudice.

More often than not lower status minority groups are imposed to adhere with societal norms (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008), which force them to be tolerant with others or to act in non-prejudiced ways. Given this consequence, a question arises on whether there is a condition for minority group in which they can express their prejudice. To this matter, Shapiro and Neuberg’ study (2008) provides evidence that minority may also have the potential to endorse discrimination as well as social rejection. It shows that when one minority group meets with another minority group, minority members may imply to endorse discrimination to other outgroup minority members. Shapiro and Neuberg (2008) suggest that, one of the reasons why minority may respond to support social rejection is because of their desire to avoid from becoming target of discrimination by the majority group. Another reason, we assume, is that there is a condition for minority to be able to express their prejudice. Given this argument and considering the context of majority-minority and minority-minority relations, it is possible to predict that the positive relationship between prejudice and social rejection may occur from majority on minority and minority on minority, but not from minority on a majority group.

5.1.3 The Present Study: Religion in Indonesia and Hypotheses

We set our study in the context of inter-religious relations in Indonesia. There are two reasons why we conducted the study in Indonesia. First, in Indonesia, religion is one of the pivotal elements influencing social interaction and life. It is placed as one of Indonesia’s state ideological pillars (Mashuri, Supriyono, Khotimah, Sakdiah, Sukmawati, & Zaduqisti, 2013).
In public schools and universities, courses on religion are compulsory. Second, Human Right Watch (2013) has reported that in Indonesia inter-religious conflict and violence against religious minorities are increasing. Among the three regions of Indonesia, West, Central, and East, the majority religion in West and Central regions is Sunni Muslim, while the majority in the East is Christian. However, based on general population, the majority religion in Indonesia is Sunni Muslim. In places where Sunni Muslim is the majority, Ahmadiyya and Christian groups are among the victims of discrimination and aggressions.

Ahmadiyya is a minority subgroup of Islam across the world in general and in Indonesia in particular. Among other Muslim groups, Ahmadiyya is considered different for several reasons. First, Mirza Gulan Ahmad, the founder of Ahmadiyya, is believed by the Ahmadiyya followers as the savior and the Prophet who does not bring a new religion and sacred text. This belief is different than most other Islamic groups (e.g. Shia and Sunni). Second, Ahmadiyya can only perform congregational prayer (Shalat berjamaah) behind the praying leader (Imam) from their own group. This practice is different to most other Islamic groups where each Muslim can perform congregational praying even if the praying leader is from different school of thoughts. Third, Ahmadiyya uses Quran as their sacred text, however, they exclusively use *Tafsir* (the interpretation) of Quran from Ahmadiyya group’s interpreters (Hanafi, 2011). Nevertheless, Ahmadiyya’s existence has triggered fierce debate within majority Sunni Muslim groups. The debates surround the question of whether Ahmadiyya is still part of Islam or not.

Unlike Ahmadiyya, the existence of Christian (i.e. Catholic and Protestant) in Indonesia is not debated (Syihab, 2013). Along with Islam, Hindu, Buddha, and Confucius, Christian is recognized as one of the important religion. In fact, some important or holy days for Christian are included as National holiday. However, in social life, tensions and frictions between Muslim and Christians often occur. More often, the tensions appeared to be
Triggered by proselytization issue (Bertrand, 2004). In Indonesia, proselytism is considered a sensitive issue, especially in Islam-Christian relations.

Here, based on theoretical and explanations above we develop our general main hypotheses. First (Hypothesis 1), given that perceived intergroup relationship may increase ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice whereas ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice are the strong predictors of prejudice, ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice will mediate the effect of perceived intergroup relationship on prejudice. In doing so, specific indirect effects will be investigated. The first specific indirect effect of perceived intergroup relationship on prejudice is investigated only through ingroup meta-prejudice. The second specific indirect effect perceived intergroup relationship on prejudice is investigated only through outgroup meta-prejudice. In addition, as ingroup meta-prejudice was found to mediate the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice (Putra, 2014), the third specific indirect effect will be examined. This indirect effect of perceived intergroup relationship on prejudice will be investigated first through outgroup meta-prejudice, and then through ingroup meta-prejudice before ending at prejudice. Second (Hypothesis 2), given that minority are forced to be tolerant with the dominant majority group, and despite the high tendency of minority participants to endorse prejudice on majority group than on the other minority group, their endorsement to social rejections will be higher on a minority outgroup than on a majority outgroup. Therefore, there will be an interaction between prejudice and social rejection in a minority group, but not in a majority group.

5.2. Method

5.2.1. Participants and Procedures

In the present study, we limited the samples of participants to majority Sunni Muslims and minority Ahmadiyya and Christians. Ahmadiyya represents minority subgroup of Islam
while Christian represents minority outgroup. The data collecting was mostly disseminated in Java Island, except for a small number of Christian samples disseminated in Riau, in which all of these places represent Muslim as the majority.

We collected data from 245 majority Muslims (i.e. Sunni) participants (151 males and 94 females) between 16 to 58 year olds ($M = 23.97$ years); from 87 Ahmadiyya participants (61 males and 26 females) between 19 and 64 year olds ($M = 30.40$ years); and from 145 Christian participants (i.e. Protestant and Catholic; 54 males and 91 females) between 16 and 57 year olds ($M = 22.5$; 4 did not report their age). In order to analyze using all available data, a method of data imputation by using the expectation-maximization (EM) technique was conducted to each psychological scale which have missing items. Beforehand, MCAR test was performed in order to get information that the missing data are completely at random (Acock, 1997).

By using questionnaire (i.e. in Indonesia language), we invited participants affiliated with a religious group to voluntarily participate in our research introduced as research about inter-religious relations in Indonesia. Later, participants who scored more than 3.5 on a 6-point scale of the religious group identity (i.e. Muslim, Christian, and Ahmadiyya identity) score were selected for the main analysis. Participants who had score less than 3.5 were excluded from main analysis.

The questionnaire consisted of several parts. The first part of the questionnaire was an inform consent with which to confirm participants’ agreement to voluntarily participate in this research. Subsequently, participants were asked to fill scales related to their own group and two outgroups of target prejudice, i.e. intergroup relationship, ingroup meta-prejudice, outgroup meta-prejudice, prejudice, and social rejection. Lastly, participants were asked to fill out some demographic information including gender, age, ethnicity, institution, and activity in religious organizations. Upon finishing, participants were debriefed and thanked.
5.2.2. Measures

All scales were measured based on 6-point scales. Scales were created by averaging the items.

*Prejudice Belief*

We used six items of a prejudice belief bipolar adjective scale developed by Putra (2014). Participants responded to the item related to their perception about outgroup (i.e. “you think [outgroup] is”: threatening – trustworthy, hostile – friendly, slothful – industrious, evil – good, stupid – clever, and undignified – dignified)\(^3\). Here, we reversed the bipolar adjective scale so that high scores corresponded to high negative evaluation. For Muslims participants, prejudice belief obtained a reliability of .933 toward Ahmadiyya and .909 toward Christian. For Christian participants, prejudice belief formed a reliability of .936 to Ahmadiyya and .939 to Muslims. For Ahmadiyya participants, prejudice belief was strongly reliable either to Christians (α = .928) and to Muslims (α = .935).

*Meta-prejudice*

The measures were derived from Putra (2014). In the six items of bipolar adjective scales, similar to prejudice belief, participants were asked to indicate their perceptions of their own group perception about outgroup and outgroup perception about ingroup (i.e. ingroup meta-prejudice = “Do you think that in Indonesia [ingroup] perceive [outgroup] as”; outgroup meta-prejudice = “Do you think that in Indonesia [outgroup] perceive [ingroup] as”). Similar with prejudice belief scale, we also reversed the bipolar adjective scale so that high scores corresponded to high negative evaluation. Related to ingroup meta-prejudice, Muslim participants responded to ingroup meta-prejudice toward Ahmadiyya .910 and Christians .917. Christian participants responded ingroup meta-prejudice toward Muslims .904 and Ahmadiyya .948. Ahmadiyya participants responded to ingroup meta-prejudice toward Muslims .942 and Christians .925. For outgroup meta-prejudice, Muslim participants
obtained reliability Cronbach’s alpha .940 for outgroup-Christians meta-prejudice and .925 for outgroup-Ahmadiyya meta-prejudice. Christian participants obtained reliability .933 to outgroup-Muslims meta-prejudice and .965 to outgroup-Ahmadiyya meta-prejudice. Moreover, Ahmadiyya obtained reliability .911 to outgroup-Muslim meta-prejudice and .890 to outgroup-Christian meta-prejudice.

**Intergroup Relationship**

We gave participants 3 items of six-point bipolar scales designed to measure ingroup – outgroup relationship (i.e. “Do you think that the relationship between [ingroup] and [outgroup] is”) that included bad – good, inharmonic – harmony, and hostile – friendly relationship. Moreover, to correspond with high negative intergroup relationship, we reversed the scores so that positive intergroup relationships were at the low scores. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability of Muslim participants toward Christian relationship was .918 and toward Ahmadiyya was .936. Christian participants reported .928 to Ahmadiyya and 959 to Muslim. Furthermore, Ahmadiyya participants reported the reliability .955 for Ahmadiyya – Christian relationship and .928 for Ahmadiyya – Muslim relationship.

**Social Rejection**

We developed 4 items social rejection scale after modifying political tolerance (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982). It reflects whether the activities of outgroups are considered tolerable or not (e.g. “If someone from [the outgroup] move to my neighborhood, I will openly accept them (Reverse-scored)” and “It is a problem if members of [the outgroup] perform religious activities in my neighborhood”). The reliability of Muslim participants toward Ahmadiyya was .783 and toward Christian was .732. Christian participant reported reliability Cronbach’s alpha of .722 to Ahmadiyya and .654 to Muslim as target. Ahmadiyya participants obtained reliability .593 on Christian and .601 on Muslim.
5.3. Results

5.3.1. Preliminary Analysis

The results of independent-sample $t$-test showed that there were sex differences in Muslim participants on social rejection toward Christians ($t (228) = -3.756, p < .001$) with men ($M = 2.952, SD = .927$) scoring higher than women ($M = 2.514, SD = .746$) and in Ahmadiyya participants on prejudice toward Christians ($t (84) = 2.066, p < .05; M_{Male}= 1.984, SD = .719, M_{Female}= 2.340, SD = .744$). Nevertheless, in Christian participants we did not find any sex differences to all key variables. Finally, to anticipate the effect of gender, educational level, and age to our mediation analysis, we included those variables as control variables.

5.3.2. Mediation Analysis: Perceived Intergroup Relationship, Meta-prejudice, and Prejudice

The main purpose of this mediation analysis was to investigate the predictors of prejudice. Here, we treated intergroup relationship as predictor (X), outgroup meta-prejudice as first mediator (M1), ingroup meta-prejudice as second mediator (M2), and prejudice as the outcome (Y). In performing mediation Analysis, we used a SPSS PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) as it can provide total, direct, and indirect effect in one step. On the other hand, to get a good or strong standard error and confidence intervals (95%) of indirect effect, we decided to use bootstrapping technique of 5000 times resampling data as suggested by Hayes, Preacher, and Myers (2011). In the following section, we report mediation analyses based on the targeted group: Ahmadiyya as a target for Muslims and Christians: Christians as a target for Muslims and Ahmadiyya: Muslims as a target for Christians and Ahmadiyya.
Figure 5.1. Results of mediation regression analysis

Note. Path coefficients are unstandardized estimates. The analysis controlled for gender (Male = 2, Female = 1), age, and education. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; † p < .10
5.3.3. Ahmadiyya as the Target

A total effect of perceived intergroup relationship on prejudice (see figure 5.1 A. and 1 C.) was found to be positive and significant in Muslim participants \( (b = 370, SE = .058, p < .001, CI [.256, .484]) \) and Christian participants \( (b = 292, SE = .069, p < .001, CI [.156, .428]) \). However, when the effect of perceived intergroup relationship was controlled by ingroup and outgroup meta–prejudice, the effect of perceived intrgroup relationship was dropped to be negatively non-significant in either Muslim participants \( (b = -.114, SE = .072, p = .114, CI [-.256, .028]) \) or Christian participants \( (b = -.106, SE = .067, p = .120, CI [-.239, .028]) \). In extent, the calculation of 5000 resampling data for standard error and (95%) confidence intervals of indirect effect did show significant indirect effect of perceived intergroup relationship on prejudice via ingroup meta-prejudice in Muslim participants \( (b = .431, Boot SE = .067, Boot CI [.311, .570]) \) and in Christian participants \( (b = .184, Boot SE = .059, Boot CI [.087, .329]) \). There was also a significant three causal chains indirect effect where the first perceived intergroup relationship contributed to outgroup meta-prejudice, the second outgroup meta-prejudice contributed to ingroup meta-prejudice, and the third ingroup meta-prejudice contributed to prejudice in Muslim participants \( (b = .061, Boot SE = .023, Boot CI [.024, .113]) \), but not in Christian participants. On the other hand, perceived intergroup relationship on prejudice via outgroup meta-prejudice was found to be marginally significant in Christian participants \( (b = .135, Boot SE = .072, Boot CI [-.003, .275]) \), but not significant in Muslim participants\(^7\).

5.3.4. Christians as the Target

The effect of intergroup relationships on prejudice (see figure 5.1 A. and 1 B.) dropped to non-significant in either Muslim participants \( (b = -.041, SE = .044, p = .432, CI [-.162, .070]) \) or Ahmadiyya participants \( (b = .038, SE = .086, p = .660, CI [-.133, .209]) \) after
controlled by ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice, whereas the total effect of this relationship was found to be significant either in Muslim participants ($b = .406$, $SE = .052$, $p < .001$, $CI [.304, .507]$) or in Ahmadiyya participants ($b = 371$, $SE = .108$, $p < .001$, $CI [.156, .586]$). Moreover, in Muslim participants, the results of indirect effects showed that intergroup relationship significantly predicted prejudice mediated by ingroup meta-prejudice ($b = .268$, $Boot SE = .060$, $Boot CI [.155, .395]$) as well as mediated by outgroup meta-prejudice ($b = .125$, $Boot SE = .041$, $Boot CI [.058, .225]$). Instead, there was also a significant three causal chains of indirect effect where the first perceived intergroup relationship contributed to outgroup meta-prejudice, the second outgroup meta-prejudice contributed to ingroup meta-prejudice, and the third ingroup meta-prejudice contributed to prejudice in Muslim participants ($b = .053$, $Boot SE = .017$, $Boot CI [.027, .096]$). On the other hand, the significant indirect effect in Ahmadiyya participants was only found in the relation between intergroup relationship and prejudice via outgroup meta-prejudice ($b = .233$, $Boot SE = .106$, $Boot CI [.076, .532]$).

5.3.5. Muslims as the Target

The total effect of intergroup relationship on prejudice (see figure 5. 1 B. and C.) was found significant in Ahmadiyya participants ($b = .387$, $SE = .081$, $p < .001$, $CI [.226, .548]$) and in Christian participants ($b = .254$, $SE = .058$, $p < .001$, $CI [.139, .358]$). However, the effect of perceived intergroup relationship turned out to be non-significant after controlled by ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice either in Ahmadiyya participants ($b = .033$, $SE = .067$, $p = .622$, $CI [-.100, .166]$) or in Christian participants ($b = -.048$, $SE = .057$, $p = .409$, $CI [-.161, .066]$). Nevertheless, there were significant indirect effects of perceived intergroup relationship on prejudice through ingroup meta-prejudice in either Ahmadiyya participants ($b = .256$, $Boot SE = .107$, $Boot CI [.079, .517]$) or Christian participants ($b = .144$, $Boot SE = .058$, $Boot CI [.042, .271]$) as well as outgroup meta-prejudice in either Ahmadiyya
participants ($b = .094, \text{Boot SE} = .042, \text{Boot CI} [0.029, 0.197]$) or Christian participants ($b = .101, \text{Boot SE} = .040, \text{Boot CI} [0.024, 0.183]$). There were no three causal chains of indirect effects found in both samples.

Across three samples where each targeted two targets, the findings in mediation analysis indicated that ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice were successful to mediate the effect of perceived intergroup relationship on prejudice. These findings are thus in line with hypothesis 1.

5.3.6. Prejudice Expression

In this section, we performed two-repeated ANOVA in three samples to present how prejudice belief was expressed in terms of the levels of social rejections. We predicted that in minority participants targeting minority and majority outgroup, the level of prejudice would be higher on majority group than on minority group, whereas otherwise the level of social rejections would be higher on minority group than on majority group. On the other hand, on majority groups if a particular minority group scored higher in prejudice than on another minority group, it would score higher in social rejection as well.
Figure 5.2. Results of prejudice and social rejection scored by Muslims, Ahmadiyya, and Christians.
The inspection of two-way ANOVA in Muslim participants (see figure 5.2.) showed that there was a significant interaction between targeted groups and prejudice expression \((F(13.612, .295) = 46.194, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .168)\). It explains that Ahmadiyya as the target was scored higher on prejudice \((M = 3.864, SD = 1.174)\) than on social rejection \((M = 3.657, SD = 1.078)\), whereas on Christian as the target, prejudice \((M = 2.504, SD = .848)\) was scored lower than social rejection \((M = 2.783, SD = .886)\). However, the inspection of paired sample t-test comparing the level of prejudice and social rejection between targeted groups showed that Ahmadiyya was scored higher than to Christians either on prejudice \((t (229) = 16.789, p < .001)\) or on social rejection \((t (229) = 12.342, p < .001)\).

Further, in Ahmadiyya participants, as can be seen in figure 5.2., the result also showed a significant interaction \((F(15.621, .285) = 54.1903, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .392)\). Paired sample t-test was then used to see comparison between prejudice and social rejection. A first paired samples t-test indicated that Muslims \((M = 2.777, SD = 1.023)\) were scored higher than Christians \((M = 2.087, SD = .740)\) in terms of prejudice \((t (85) = 6.061, p < .001)\). In contrast, a second paired samples t-test showed that Christians \((M = 2.093, SD = .670)\) were scored higher than Muslims \((M = 1.932, SD = .622)\) in terms of social rejection \((t (85) = 2.770, p < .01)\). It tells us that even though Ahmadiyya group scored Muslims higher than Christians on prejudice, but since the expression of prejudice toward the Muslim majority group need to be suppressed compared to the expression toward Christian group, they tend to score Muslims lesser than Christians on social rejection.

Nevertheless, as seen in figure 5.2., in Christian participants targeting Muslims and Ahmadiyya, no interaction was found \((F(.167, .265) = .629, p = .429, \eta_p^2 = .005)\). We then checked with paired samples t-test to see the score of prejudice and social rejection between targeted groups. It revealed that Christian participants scored higher to Ahmadis than to Muslims either to prejudice \((t (139) = 5.553, p < .001; M_{Ahmadiyya} = 3.3548, M_{Muslims} = 2.887)\).
or to social rejection \( t (139) = 7.469, p < .001; M_{\text{Ahmadiyya}} = 2.651, M_{\text{Muslims}} = 2.252 \). As we predicted, the minority group would score the majority outgroup higher than the minority outgroup on prejudice, but would score the minority outgroup higher than the minority outgroup on social rejection, the results in Christian participants were unexpected. Regarding these results, we will comment in the discussion.

In addition, post hoc we checked the role of prejudice in predicting social rejection using regression analysis (see table 5.1.). In targeting Christians, prejudice (controlled by outgroup and ingroup meta-prejudice in all samples) significantly predicted social rejection from both Muslim participants \( b = .552, SE = .086, p < .001, CI [.383, .721], R^2 = .224, F (3, 226) = 21.742 \) and Ahmadiyya participants \( b = .398, SE = .146, p < .01, CI [.109, .688], R^2 = .115, F (3, 82) = 3.537 \). In targeting Ahmadiyya, prejudice also successfully and significantly predicted social rejection from both Muslim participants \( b = .604, SE = .060, p < .001, CI [.487, .721], R^2 = .429, F (3, 226) = 56.710 \) and Christian participants \( b = .237, SE = .086, p < .01, CI [.067, .407], R^2 = .298, F (3, 136) = 19.200 \). Finally, in targeting Muslims, social rejection was only significant in predicting Christian participants \( b = .353, SE = .081, p < .001, CI [.193, .513], R^2 = .199, F (3, 136) = 11.281 \), whereas for Ahmadiyya participants, prejudice did not significantly predict social rejection \( b = .031, SE = .112, p = .780, CI [-.191, .254], R^2 = .043, F (3, 82) = 1.230 \).
### Table 5.1. A. The effect of prejudice on social rejection by Muslim participants

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<th>95% CI</th>
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### Table 5.1. B. The effect of prejudice on social rejection by Ahmadiyya participants

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup meta-prejudice</td>
<td>.277</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>3.283</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>.444</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.4. Discussion

The present study tested the predictors and expressions of prejudice in the framework of majority and minority status. In general, perceived intergroup relationship, ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice were found to play a central role in predicting prejudice. Ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice consistently emerged to mediate the effect of perceived intergroup relationship on prejudice. Specifically for minority Ahmadiyya participants, prejudice was scored higher to Muslim than to Christians, whereas in contrast their prejudice expression in social rejection was found to be higher to Christians than to Muslims. Majority Muslims showed consistently to predict social rejection from prejudice.

In dealing with our findings, it is important to understand the fundamental problem which can lead people to become highly prejudiced toward others. What we suggest first is that we need to know people’ perception about the condition of intergroup relations. Elcheroth et al. (2011) illustrated that survey research about intergroup life in Yugoslavia before the out-break of war in 1991 reported that intergroup tensions and hostility were the least frequent in the most multiethnic parts of Yugoslavia, whereas during the outbreak of war these parts had actually become the locations of the most outrageous intergroup violence. Elcheroth et al. (2011) suspected that the survey had neglected a question of knowledge about interethnic group relations in Yugoslavia. This question, however, have been revealed by Elcheroth, Reicher, and Penic (2009) study where it demonstrated that people in Yugoslavia described interethnic relations in Yugoslavia as worse than bad. Based on this finding, Elcheroth et al. (2011) assumed that because people perceive there is a problem about intergroup ethnic in Yugoslavia, therefore the worst event may happen in places where tensions was considered least frequent. Moreover, in relation to prejudice, the present research among majority Sunni Muslims and minority Ahmadiyya and Christians in Indonesia has advanced and supported Elcheroth et al. (2011) idea. In general, across three
groups of samples, perceived intergroup relationship have shown to be a distal predictor of prejudice.

If perceived intergroup relationship revealed to be a distal predictor of prejudice, then what are the proximal predictors of prejudice? As shown in the results of the present study, both ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice are significant factors which play a main role in predicting prejudice. Our findings also highlight that these factors would be developed from perceived intergroup relationship and, in turn, amplify to increase prejudice. Our findings then extend past investigations of meta-knowledge or meta-perception in understanding prejudice. As people have awareness of the way their group thinks about outgroup and the way outgroup members thinks about ingroup members, thus, prejudice is not only influenced by how group members think outgroup members think of their own ingroup (Vorauer et al, 1998; Vorauer et al., 2000), but also by how group members think that their own group thinks particular groups.

In the social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1982), prejudice is understood as a result of ingroup – outgroup categorization process. Group members which put their group as an important source of pride and self-esteem will thrive to enhance and maintain positive images of their group, thus as a consequence outgroup may be derogated. Often, the ingroup will always be viewed as better than outgroup. This notion, however, has critics. Given the consequence of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation, it seems that group identification or group membership is an inevitable condition which creates prejudice and ignores the issue of intergroup tolerance (Billig, 1985). In truly social context, how group members justify outgroups varied; it can be either positive or negative depending on the context. To this matter, the present study may help to explain how group members are able to engage with prejudice and intergroup friendship. It depends on how group members perceive
their ingroup-outgroup relationship, their own group think about an outgroup, and outgroup members think about ingroup.

Now let us look at the comparison of the level of prejudice and social rejection in Sunni Muslim and Christian samples. In Sunni Muslim sample, the results demonstrated that Sunni Muslims are prejudicing and rejecting Ahmadiyya higher than Christians. Some evidences inform that there is a belief by Muslim that the enemy within is thought to be more dangerous than outsiders. For example, Alam’s (2008) study regarding Muslim identity in North India revealed how Muslims place enemy from within as far more dangerous than enemy from outside (i.e. non-Muslim). According to Alam, the reason why the enemy from within is considered more dangerous is because the identity as a Muslim is considered just as a cover to lead the Muslims astray. It is clearly stated by a respondent of Alam’ study saying, “they claim to be Muslims and yet are leading the Muslims astray. They are the greatest enemy of Islam” (p. 605). In Indonesia, the idea about the enemy from within is far more dangerous is also found. One of those is coming from Rizieq Syihab (2013), an Islamic cleric in Indonesia and the leader of Front Pembela Islam (FPI; i.e. fundamentalist and radical group) in which he argued that Islam cannot tolerate Muslims who are believed to have tainted the Islamic values. In his book, He states that “Ahmadiyya consider themselves Muslims, but they distorted Islamic teachings, thus they have attacked, disrupted, and undermined Islam. It is religious desecration. Therefore, they must be fought and eliminated to protect the purity of Islamic teachings” (p. 160). These findings likely confirm that there exist individuals who believe that enemies within the ingroup are more dangerous than outgroups.

In Christians sample, it appears that Ahmadiyya is also perceived more negatively than Muslims (i.e. in Indonesia a representation of Sunni Muslims) in terms of the level of prejudice and social rejection. This result, however, is beyond our expectation. As tension
between Muslim-Christian in Indonesia is most likely between Sunni Muslim and Christian and not between Ahmadiyya and Christian, we expected that Christians would prejudice Muslims higher than Ahmadiyya, but the social rejection would actually be scored higher on Ahmadiyya compared to Muslims. What we can suggest here is that the labeling of Ahmadiyya as blasphemous, heretic, and deviant (Yogaswara, 2008; Syihab, 2013) have supposedly spread to influence Christian’ description about Ahmadiyya. It is possible since many media in Indonesia had exposed news related to Ahmadiyya (Yogaswara, 2008). However, due to our limited evidence, we are not in a position to justify Christian perception toward Ahmadiyya and Muslim. It is also possible that there are two or more representations about Ahmadiyya existing in Christian group, which lead to different level of prejudice. Accordingly, further research is needed to explore this possibility.

On the other hand, as expected, among Ahmadiyya participants prejudice only leads to relate with social rejection toward Christian but not toward Sunni Muslim. What we can obtain from these findings is that for minority Ahmadiyya since their position is weaker compared to Sunni Muslim, they then need to suppress their intention to reject Majority Sunni in any condition. Otherwise, as Ahmadis posits equal status to Christians, that is as minority, thus the need to suppress prejudice’ expression is lesser than that of majority. Hence, expressing prejudice for minority Ahmadiyya is understandably relevant to other minority members, where in this study refers to minority Christians.

Crandall and colleagues (Crandall et al., 2002) have shown that the condition where individuals have to suppress their prejudice is relative. The findings implicate that individuals holding high general prejudice suppression may support prejudice toward certain group when it is considered appropriate according to their group norms. Our study expanded this work to draw and test prejudice expression in majority-minority context. We found that even after the group members believe that their own group negatively think about an outgroup, through
which it can increase prejudicing toward outgroup, it might not influence social rejection when the situation is considered irrelevant for them to express their rejection. This situation is described in the present study for the relation between “inferior” minority group (i.e. Ahmadiyya) to “dominant” majority group (i.e. Sunni Muslims).

Other limitations of the present study need to be addressed. Samples from minority participants were considered small for mediation analysis. However, using small samples (i.e. < 150) for mediation analysis is not unique to our study. There are studies which tested mediation analysis with small samples (see e.g. Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Regarding this issue, we consider that obtaining the findings from three studies (or three samples in our study) where each have a smaller sample, are considered stronger and more adequate in terms consistency and reliability than obtaining the findings from 1 study with a large sample. However, we suggest for future research to use mediation analysis with a large “enough” data sample.

Our study limited the context of the analysis to inter-religious groups in Indonesia. Nevertheless, there are three types of group identification which play important roles in intergroup interactions in Indonesia. Those are ethnic, religious, and national identity. As individuals may engage with multiple identities (Brewer & Pierce, 2005), future studies should examine how these ethnic, religious, and national identities relate with prejudice and meta-prejudice.

5.4.1. Conclusion

The present research has revealed that the perception of intergroup relations, ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice, and majority-minority context may affect the expression of prejudice. Our study provides evidence that prejudice is not exclusive to majority groups alone. Indeed, the impact of prejudice may be caused by both majority and minority groups. What we can obtain from the present study is that prejudice expression is linked to situation
whether or not it is relevant to be expressed. As the existence of majority and minority do exist in many society, its role which relate to power status are needed to draw the situation clearly in certain context.

End notes

1 The descriptions of educational level for Muslim participants were 7 with a junior-high school degree, 36 with a high school degree, 6 students of associate degree, 9 with an associate degree, 131 students of bachelor degree (mostly students of university of Indonesia), 39 with a bachelor degree, 8 students of master degree, 8 with a master degree, and 1 with a doctoral degree; for Ahmadiyya participants were 3 with a junior-high school degree, 28 with a high school degree, 2 students of associate degree, 9 with an associate degree, 25 students of bachelor degree (mostly students of university of Indonesia), 14 with a bachelor degree, 3 students of master degree, 2 with a master degree, and 1 did not report his/her educational background; for Christian participants were 1 with a junior-high school degree, 14 with a high school degree, 40 students of associate degree, 8 with an associate degree, 50 students of bachelor degree (mostly students of university of Indonesia), 26 with a bachelor degree, 2 students of master degree, 2 with a master degree, and 2 did not report their educational background.

2 Social identity scale was developed by modifying items used by Verkuyten (2007). It consists of 5 items (e.g. “For me becoming part of [an ingroup] is very important” and “I feel a strong bond with other members of [the ingroup]”). It was used to confirm participants engaging a certain religious group. The measures obtained good reliability; $\alpha = .916$ for Muslims; $\alpha = .882$ for Ahmadiyya; $\alpha = .912$ for Christians.

3 We realize that items such as slothful-industrious and stupid-clever are specific in nature. For example, groups that have high intelligence are usually associated with Jews while groups that have low intelligence are usually associated with Blacks. However, having
a positive label does not mean that Jews are regarded as good or positive. On the contrary, it is possible that Jews are viewed as an evil or negative group when they are believed to use their intellectual ability to threaten the existence of ingroup. However, in this study, items associated with evil and threatening are stupid and slothful. Since the scores of the corrected item-total correlations were very good (> .5), our decision to include slothful-industrious and stupid-clever as part of the measurement was acceptable.

4 Here, in the present study, the use of Muslim refers to majority Sunni Muslims. Using comparison of Sunni versus Catholic is uncommon in Indonesia. We assume, such comparison also uncommon in places other than Indonesia.

5 In regard to Ahmadiyya participants, we used the word “Muslim non-Ahmadiyya” refering to majority Muslim as the targets.

6 In addition, we assessed convergent validity and discriminant validity using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) in order to get results for good fits of intergroup relationship, ingroup/outgroup meta-prejudice, and prejudice on all three samples. We used RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation) to assess absolute fit and CFI (Comparative Fit Index) to assess comparative fit as suggested by Kelloway (1998). As a rule of thumb, RMSEA with a value less than .10 indicated a good absolute fit whereas CFI with values greater than .90 indicated a good comparative fit (Kelloway, 1998). Across three samples, LISREL version 8.8 revealed a good absolute fit (RMSEA < .10) and good comparative fit (CFI > .90) of the data indicating the items comprise distinct factors where each item of the variables do not overlap one another.

7 Using LISREL version 8.8, we also checked the fit indices of the model for prejudice as the outcome (Y) and intergroup relationship as the predictor (X) when outgroup meta-prejudice (M1) did and did not set to relate with ingroup meta-prejudice (M2). Across three samples of Muslims, Ahmadiyya, and Christians, when we eliminated outgroup meta-
prejudice pathway to ingroup meta-prejudice, the model did not fit the data \((RMSEA > .10, p < .05)\); in exception for Ahmadiyya targeting Muslims, the model was fit, but not perfect, \((RMSEA < .05, p = .552)\). However, when we set the pathway from outgroup meta-prejudice to ingroup meta-prejudice, the model was saturated, thus fit was necessarily perfect \((RMSEA = .000, p = 1.000)\). These findings thus show superiority of our model.
6. TAKING SERIOUSLY INGROUP SELF-EVALUATION AND META-PREJUDICE IN UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AND FRIENDSHIP DISCRIMINATION

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Abstract

Extending the idea about group evaluations, the present study aims to understand when and how prejudice and friendship discriminations can be predicted. The present study also examined how Ahmadiyya, a minority sub-group of Islam, which frequently became victims of violence was evaluated by majority (Sunni) Muslims and outgroup Christians. Results of a survey among Muslims and Christian participants (N = 362) living in Maumere, Flores Island, Indonesia, where Christians are the major populations showed that either Muslims or Christians evaluated Ahmadiyya less positive than the other targeted group (i.e. Muslim to Christians, Christians to Muslims). Across two samples, prejudice was found to mediate the effect of ingroup/outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination, where such mediation was reported to be moderated by ingroup self-evaluation. The results suggest that it is important to consider how group members evaluate their own group, ingroup’s perceptions toward an outgroup, and outgroup’s perceptions toward ingroup in the study pertaining intergroup relations.

*Keywords:* Meta-knowledge, Prejudice, Intergroup Relations, Group Evaluations
I don’t like Arabs, I don’t trust them. I think that by nature they don’t want peace with us (An interview with Ana, Jewish woman from Tel Aviv, in Salinas, 2007, p. 17).

[...] I can see the hate and anger in their eyes, [...] Our only alternative is to fight them [...]. (An interview with Soha, a Palestinian woman from Jenin, in Salinas, 2007, p. 22-23).

6.1. Introduction

Why do people hate and have prejudice toward an outgroup? Recent studies have provided explanations and evidence that people perception and behavior are often influenced by what they think that other people think (Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011; Vorauer, 2006). In this view, Putra (2014; Putra & Wagner, 2014) pointed out that prejudice may increase because of two models of thinking: first, it is because how group members think that their own group think negatively about an outgroup; and second, it is because how an ingroup member thinks that his or her ingroup is negatively viewed by outgroup members. Pertaining to prejudice study, those two models of thinking is called as ingroup meta-prejudice for the former and outgroup meta-prejudice for the latter. In the study, it appears that ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice demonstrated to be predictors of prejudice.

In social life, prejudice can be expressed in different levels. It can be expressed from the least energetic such as antilocution and avoidance to the most energetic such as physical attack and extermination (Allport, 1955). To some extent, prejudice expression is affected by social norms (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) through which, how, and when the level of prejudice expression is considered acceptable. In the US, for example, overt prejudicing against Blacks by Whites is considered improper and violates the law (Duckitt, 2001; O’Brien, Crandall, Horstman-Reser, & Warner, 2010). However, in terms of discriminations, at least prejudice may become a boundary for people in making a
friend or intimate relationship in any context. Some findings explain that it is because prejudice is more tolerated in friendship (Killen, Henning, Kelly, Crystal, & Ruck, 2007; Ruck, Park, Killen, & Crystal, 2011; see also Holtz, Dahinden, & Wagner, 2013; Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005) and intimate relationship (Crandall et al. 2002). The present study seeks to explore the role of ingroup self-evaluation, ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice, and prejudice in influencing friendship discrimination in the context of interreligious relations.

6.1.1. Meta-prejudice and Prejudice

In psychology, research on thinking of what others are thinking is relatively not a new. In general, the definition of this model of thinking is called as meta-cognition, meta-knowledge, or meta-perception. For information, the addition of “meta” in front of “knowledge” in meta-knowledge, for example, means knowledge about knowledge. In addition, previous studies have shown that meta-cognition activities can influence self-cognition in which one of those activities is guiding the perceiver in dealing with certain situations. (Nickerson, 1999; Verplanken, Friborg, Wang, Trafimow, & Woolf, 2007). In terms of negative-positive traits of groups, the conception about “meta” is called as meta-stereotypes in which it is developed by Vorauer and colleagues (Vorauer, 2006; Vorauer, Hunter, Main, & Roy, 2000; Vorauer, Main, & O’Connel, 1998).

Studies about meta-stereotypes focus on how the perceiver views his/her own group is viewed by outgroup members based on stereotype traits. The findings of the studies have demonstrated that when minority aboriginal Blacks are thought to have negative stereotypes toward Whites, the Whites tend to evaluate those aboriginal Blacks more negatively (Vorauer et al., 1998), which presumably may increase their prejudice. In the context of believers and non-believers perceptions, study conducted by Saroglou, Yzerbyt, and Kaschten (2011) showed that the more these two opposite religious groups perceive the outgroup members as
having negative stereotypes, the more their stereotypes are increased. It will, then, disrupt believers and non-believers relations.

Although many evidence have explained the relationship between meta-stereotypes and negative implications such as prejudice, the idea about “meta” in the subject of stereotypes is narrowed to study about how perceivers perceive their own group is viewed by outgroup. This study limitation, then, seems to neglect other “meta” process in the context of intergroup relations. That is, how group members think that their own group think about an outgroup.

Nonetheless, Putra (2014) has considered research limitation on meta-stereotypes. Instead of focusing the study on stereotype traits, Putra’ (2014) study tends to emphasize on how group (ingroup and outgroup) is evaluated, whether it is negative or positive. In this view, the negative direction of evaluation links to the term of prejudice. Here, the term of prejudice is defined as negative qualities about others as part of group (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Reicher, 2012), which in particular, it relates to negative belief, thinking, or feeling. Examples of this prejudice are “I believe Jews are Evil” or “I believe Indonesians are a threat to our group.”

Likewise, since the “meta” research conducted by Putra and colleagues (Putra, 2014; Putra & Wagner, 2014) is about group evaluations, he, thus, developed and introduced the term ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice. The former refers to how individuals as members of the groups perceive the evaluations of their group regarding outgroup and the latter refers to how outgroup evaluated of their group. The studies showed that both ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice play a central role in influencing prejudice. However, since the research was conducted primarily in a place where Muslims are the majority, further study needs to be applied in a different context such as in places where Muslims are the minority in order to strengthen the finding.
6.1.2. Religious Group and Justification

According to Pew Research Center (2012) report and CIA the world-fact book (2013), there are more than 80% of the populations who identify themselves with a religious group. This is evidence that globally religion is an important identity (Verkuyten, 2007). In particular, religion has been reported to be of great importance in non-western societies (Sen, Wagner, & Howarth, 2014) or cultures (Verkuyten, 2007).

Often, people affiliated with one religious group justify their own group as more positive than others (Verkuyten, 2007; Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005). It is because their religion provided meaning and guidance for their lives (Van Tongeren, Hook, & Davis, 2013). Study conducted by Verkuyten (2007) has shown that Muslim participants in the Netherlands has the most positive feeling toward their own group members compared to Christians, Hindustanis, Jews, and non-believers. In some points, non-believers and Jews were more negatively reported than Hindutanis and Christians by Muslim participants (Verkuyten (2007). In fact, compared to non-believers, Jews were rated more negative. In the case of negative feeling toward non-believers, the finding is not at all surprising since believers and non-believers stand opposite of each other in their belief of God, making believers less likely to have positive feeling toward non-believers. Nonetheless, what is surprising from Verkuyten (2007) study is that Jews are rated even more negatively than non-believers. In this sense, he argued that the growing anti-Jews sentiments among Muslims are likely worsen by the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hence, in general, it can be understood that justification toward religious groups are influenced by certain circumstances.

In Indonesia, belief in God is placed as one of the states’ core ideology which clearly shows the importance of religion. Moreover, courses on religion are compulsory in schools and universities (for bachelor level). Each religious group studies its own religion with teachers from their own religion. Stating religion in identity cards is required for Indonesian
citizens which means being atheist or non-believers is considered unacceptable and violates Indonesia’s law (Anita, 2012). Given this fact, it is not surprising that religion influences many Indonesians in the way they think and behave in their daily life.

Officially, there are 5 religions which are recognized in Indonesia; those are Islam, Christians (Catholic and Protestant), Hindu, Buddha, and Confucius. In general, Muslims are the majority, whereas Christians are the largest of the minority religious groups. On the other side, however, in the eastern part of Indonesia, Christians are the majority while Muslims are the largest of the minority religious groups. Based on this information, inter-religious contact seems to happen between Muslim and Christians. As a consequence, both Muslims and Christians are more familiar with each other than to other religious groups.

Furthermore, it is common that every major religious group has sub-groups (even sub-sub groups). However each subgroups may perceive other sub-groups to be part of a common (religious) group when their substantial foundation and values are compatible (Sindic & Reicher, 2009). Islam, for example, has many sects and school of thoughts. However, there is a consensus among Muslims where such person or group can only be part of Islam when they accept Muhammad as the Prophet and the Quran along with the Sunnah (the living example of Muhammad) as their source of teaching (Nasr, 1990).

So what happens when a minority (sub-) group is accused by the majority for having incompatible or different core of values? By default, this minority group will not be considered as part of the common group. In the case of religious groups, however, the group accused to have different values is susceptible to be labeled as an astrayed group or heresy. Often, the accused astrayed group will be considered as the enemy from within (Alam, 2008).

In recent years, such accusation of astrayed group has occurred in Indonesia among majority Muslim toward minority Muslims of the Ahmadiyya group. The accusation is triggered by the belief that Ahmadiyya has accepted a prophet after Muhammad and another
sacred text other than the Quran (Yogaswara, 2008). Some Muslims who believe that Ahmadiyya is a heretic group were doing demonstrations demanding to disband Ahmadiyya (Desastian, 2011; Hanafi, 2011; Herudin, 2011; Yogaswara, 2008). In 2005, the demand was translated into statements by Indonesian Ulema (Clerics) Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/MUI, 2005) announcing Ahmadiyya as an astrayed Islamic group. On the other hand, in 2008, on behalf of Indonesian government, the Ministry of Religious Affair, the Ministry of Internal Affair, and the Attorney General had issued a decree announcing that Ahmadiyya’ activities are prohibited in Indonesia. These announcements can undoubtedly influence lay Muslims perception and even non-Muslims toward Ahmadiyya. For Muslims (non-Ahmadiyya), it is plausible that they will perceive Ahmadiyya in a negative way and even more negative than those of non-Muslims. On the other hand, for non-Muslims (i.e. Christians), since they tend to be familiar with the majority Muslims, Ahmadiyya group may potentially be justified as more negative than the majority Muslims. The present study aims to examine this assumption.

6.1.3. Intergroup Interaction

Shelton and Richeson (2005) study demonstrated that when group members perceive other group members of having negative feeling toward them, they tend to avoid interaction as well as contacts with those outgroup members. Such avoidance may inhibit groups from knowing each other, thus creating a distance or segregation in intergroup relations. At least, the creation of an intergroup distance may potentially influence how people opt their friend or dating partner. It is possible since there is no high suppression for people in society to decide which people they wanted to be friend or dating partner (Crandall et al., 2002).

In my view, Shelton and Richeson’ (2005) study of how people may avoid interacting with others whom they think have negative perception toward them is similar to the term of outgroup meta-prejudice that is used by Putra (2014). In this sense, since there is a strong
relation between ingroup meta-prejudice, outgroup meta-prejudice, and prejudice, I expect those factors to play a role in avoiding intergroup interaction. In this present study, I translate intergroup interactions avoidance into intergroup friendship discrimination. Nevertheless, even though group members incline to evaluate their own group more positive than other groups, there is evidence that group members may be diverse in evaluating their own group (Jaspars, & Warnaen, 1982; Verkuyten, 2007; Warnaen, 2002). In this regard, I expect that high and low positive evaluation regarding ingroup may influence the effect of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice, whereas prejudice is the mediator of the effect of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination.

6.1.4. The Present Study

The present study was conducted in the Flores Island located on the eastern part of Indonesia. The initial objective was to confirm of meta-prejudice and prejudice relationship whether its relationship prevail in different context. Previous study (Putra and Wagner, 2014) has shown that ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice play a role in different group status of majority and minority in the context where Muslim is the majority group. The present study tested the relationship between meta-prejudice and prejudice where Christians are the majority (i.e. ± 90% in Flores) and Muslims are the minority (i.e. ± 8% in Flores). On the other hand, I also examined and explored how ingroup self-evaluation might play a role as a moderator of the ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice.

A second objective was to understand how unfamiliar and familiar religious groups are evaluated. Previous study conducted by Verkuyten and Zaremba (2005) suggested that how group is perceived depends mostly on political and ideological circumstance. Compared to other Islamic groups, Ahmadiyya group is considered exclusive in terms of their religious practice. For example, in gatherings dissecting the Quran and in performing prayers in congregation, they can only do so among themselves. Thus, in order to be able to do their
congregation all activities, the Ahmadis (Ahmadiyya follower) build their own mosque in which all of their activities are organized. To the best of my knowledge, there is no report or information of Ahmadiyya mosque in Flores Island. Thus, I assume that Ahmadiyya group will be considered as unfamiliar group by people living in the Flores Island.

Based on theoretical and empirical explanations stated above, I summarize my proposed hypotheses, as follows:

Hypothesis 1. Ingroup members will be evaluated more positive than outgroup members, whereas outgroups members that is considered unfamiliar will be evaluated less positive than familiar outgroup.

Hypothesis 2. Ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice will be related to friendship discrimination through conditional indirect effects, such that its relationship with friendship discrimination will be moderated by ingroup self-evaluation and mediated by prejudice (see figure 6.1).

![Figure 6.1. Conceptual model for conditional indirect effect of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination.](image-url)
6.2. Method

6.2.1. Participants

One hundred ninety nine Christians living around Maumere, Flores Island, participated in the study. Twenty two were eliminated for poorly incomplete data. It left me with 68 males and 104 females (5 did report their gender) age between 18 and 45 ($M_{age} = 24.18$, 3 did not report their age). The descriptions of educational background were 11 with a high school degree, 4 students of associate degree, 3 with an associate degree, 160 students of bachelor degree (mostly from University of Nusa Nipa), and 5 with a bachelor degree (16 did not report their educational background). For Muslims, 196 Muslims living around Maumere, Flores Island, participated in the study. Fifteen were eliminated for poorly incomplete demographic data. In total, it left me with 185 Muslim participants ($Male = 81$, $Female = 104$) with age between 16 and 60 ($M_{age} = 26.75$, 6 did not report their age). The descriptions of educational background were 7 with a junior-high school degree, 57 with a high school degree, 10 students of associate degree, 6 with an associate degree, 63 students of bachelor degree (mostly from University of Muhammadiyah and Nusa Nipa), and 23 with a bachelor degree (19 did not report their educational background).

6.2.2. Procedures and Measures

 Muslims and Christians living in Maumere, Flores Island, were invited to voluntarily participate to fill questionnaire in the study introduced as research about interreligious relations. The research participation was in exchange of no rewards. The questionnaire consisted of several parts. The first part of the questionnaire was an inform consent with which to confirm participants’ agreement of voluntary involvement in this research. In second part, participants were asked to fill measures of 6-point scales. These measures were prejudice belief, Group negative/positive evaluation, friendship discrimination, and ingroup
self-evaluation. Prejudice belief was developed by Putra and Wagner (2014) which consists of six bipolar adjective items. The participants were asked to indicate their own perception about outgroup consisting threatening – trustworthy, hostile – friendly, slothful – industrious, evil – good, stupid – clever, and undignified – dignified. For Muslim participants, prejudice belief obtained a reliability of .956 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .825 and .890) toward Ahmadiyya and .930 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .735 and .857) toward Christians as the targets; For Christians, it was .956 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .832 and .889) toward Ahmadiyya and .926 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .704 and .855) toward Muslims as the targets.

The next measure was Group negative/positive evaluation developed by Putra (2014; Putra & Wagner, 2014) to indicate participant perceptions of their own group perception about outgroup and the outgroup perception about ingroup. The former was indicated to measure ingroup meta-prejudice and the latter was indicated to measure outgroup meta-prejudice. The items of the measures were six items of bipolar adjective scales similar to prejudice belief. Regarding ingroup meta-prejudice, Muslim participants obtained Cronbach’s alpha of .941 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .761 and .873) toward Ahmadiyya and of .926 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .722 and .822) toward Christians as the targets; Christians participants obtained .919 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .744 and .813) toward Muslims and .933 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .695 and .866) toward Ahmadiyya as the targets.

Regarding outgroup meta-prejudice, Muslims participants reported reliability of .965 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .868 and .932) toward Ahmadiyya and .961 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .838 and .939) toward Christians as the perceivers; Christian participants reported .959 (corrected item-total correlations ranged
between .821 and .935) toward Muslims and .963 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .871 and .922) toward Ahmadiyya as the perceivers.

Friendship discrimination was developed by the author in order to assess avoidance for befriending certain group (see appendix for detailed items of the scale). The measure consisted of 4 items of 6-point Likert scale (from strongly disagree to strongly agree). For Muslim participants, the measure obtained reliability of .801 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .319 and .717) toward Christians and .818 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .475 and 784) toward Ahmadiyya as the targets; for Christian participants, it was .813 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .368 and .768) toward Muslims and .816 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .499 and .773) toward Ahmadiyya as the targets.

The last measure was ingroup self-evaluation which was developed by the author in order to assess participant perceptions toward their ingroup members. The measure was six items of bipolar adjective scales similar to prejudice belief. For Muslim participants, the score of the reliability was .945 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .776 and .886); for Christian participants, it was .938 (corrected item-total correlations ranged between .711 and .876).

The third and the last part of the questionnaire was about demographic information including religion, gender, age, education, institution, and job. Upon finishing, participants were debriefed and thanked. In the following, the results from this study are presented in separate reports based on two samples: Christians targeting Muslims and Ahmadiyya, and Muslims targeting Christians and Ahmadiyya.
6.3. Results: Christian Sample

6.3.1. Preliminary Analysis

Independent sample t-test was used to examine sex differences in prejudice belief, ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice, ingroup self-evaluation, and friendship discrimination. Neither significant sex differences were found in all those main key variables. Moreover, bivariate correlation analyses were inspected to check the correlations between age and the main key variables. Except the correlation between age and prejudice toward Muslims which were marginally significant ($r = .148, p = .051$), none of the significant correlations were found between age and all other main key variables. Therefore all data were collapsed across ages and gender.

6.3.2. Group Evaluations

In this section, I report participant self-evaluations on ingroup Christians and outgroup Muslims and Ahmadiyya. To examine self-evaluations toward outgroup, I used bipolar adjective scale of prejudice belief. In addition, all scores were set at which the high scores corresponded to high positive evaluations.

In able to see differences in group evaluations, I conducted one way repeated-measures ANOVA. As expected, there was a significant self-evaluation of groups with Greenhouse-Geisser correction, ($F = 101.889, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .375$; Wilks’ Lambda $= .459$, $F (2, 69) = 99.603, p < .001$). It showed that participants evaluated their ingroup most positively ($M = 5.555, SD = .779$), followed Muslims ($M = 4.707, SD = 1.174$) and Ahmadiyya ($M = 3.916, SD = 1.512$) at the lowest scores of positive evaluations (see figure 6.2). Paired sample t-test then was used to see comparison between group evaluation scores. A first paired samples t-test indicated that there was a significant difference in the scores for ingroup Christians and Muslims ($t (175) = 9.108, p < .001$). A second paired samples t-test
showed that there was a significant difference in the scores for ingroup Christians and Ahmadiyya ($t(170) = 13.399, p < .001$). Next, a third paired samples t-test showed that there was a significant difference between Muslims and Ahmadiyya ($t(171) = 6.284, p < .001$) from Christian participants. These results suggest that Christians evaluate Muslims less negative than Ahmadiyya.

![Figure 6.2. Mean group evaluations by Christians](image)

6.3.3. Moderated Mediation Investigations

Moderated mediation investigations were performed to examine indirect effects of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice as the mediator and ingroup self-evaluation as the moderator. In particular, I treated ingroup self-evaluation as a moderator to the effect of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice. For information, the mean score of ingroup self-evaluation was 5.564 with standard deviation .771 from the basis of 6-point scale. The distribution was negatively skewed (-
3.029) and the mode was 6.0. Since I would treat ingroup self-evaluation as a moderator where it would need to split the score into high and low based on one standard deviation below and above the mean, in this case I replaced the high score with the maximum score.

### Table 6.1. Regression results among Christians targeting Muliims and Ahmadiyya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Target: Muslims</th>
<th>Target: Ahmadiyya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome: P</td>
<td>Outcome: FD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMP</td>
<td>(.539)</td>
<td>(8.769^{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>(.221)</td>
<td>(2.548^{*})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISE</td>
<td>(-.331)</td>
<td>(-2.749^{**})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMP(\times)ISE</td>
<td>(.237)</td>
<td>(3.135^{**})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMP</td>
<td>(.469)</td>
<td>(8.591^{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.375)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISE</td>
<td>(-.316)</td>
<td>(-2.218^{*})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMP(\times)ISE</td>
<td>(.175)</td>
<td>(3.120^{**})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* IMP = Ingroup Meta-prejudice; OMP = Outgroup Meta-prejudice; P = Prejudice; ISE = Ingroup Self-evaluation; FD = Friendship Discrimination; \(* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; \dagger = Marginally significant.*

In the examinations, to deal with heavily skewed variables and in order to get a good standard error and confidence intervals (95%) of indirect effect, I decided to use bootstrapping technique of 5000 times resampling data as suggested by Hayes and Matthes (2009).

Additionally, to avoid the effect of multicollinearity, all predictors were mean centered.

Before conducting the test, I set the bipolar adjective scores of prejudice, ingroup meta-prejudice, and outgroup meta-prejudice at which the high scores corresponded to high negative evaluation. On the other hand, the score levels of ingroup self-evaluation were set to correspond with high positive evaluation. In the following reports, I separate the results based on the targeted groups (see table 6.1. for detailed regression results).
6.3.4. Muslim as the Target

Using first ingroup meta-prejudice as predictor (see figure 6.3), the results demonstrated that there were no significant direct effects of ingroup meta-prejudice toward friendship discrimination either in total effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination ($b = .120, SE = .068, p = .082, CI [-.015, .254]$) or in controlling for prejudice ($b = -.010, SE = .084, p = .908, CI [-.176, .156]$). However, it showed that the mediation of the effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice was significant ($b = .130, Boot SE = .067, Z = 2.455, p < .05, Boot CI [.013, .282]$). Moreover, as the relation between ingroup meta-prejudice and prejudice was significantly moderated by the level of ingroup self-evaluation ($b = .231, SE = .076, p < .01, CI [.088, .387]$), the indirect effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice was higher ($b = .142, Boot SE = .075, Boot CI [.014, .304]$) at high level of ingroup self-evaluation (i.e. the maximum score) than at low level of ingroup self-evaluation (i.e. 1 SD below the mean; $b = .079, Boot SE = .055, Boot CI [.003, .213]$).

In addition, in the case of the moderating role of ingroup self-evaluation to the effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on prejudice, I retested a simple slope analysis based on the scores’ level of ingroup self-evaluation on 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. It reported that the effects of ingroup meta-prejudice on prejudice were not significant in the condition when the values of ingroup self-evaluation were 1, 2, 3, or 4 (i.e. the low level). On the other hand, the significant effects were found at the values of 5 or 6 of ingroup self-evaluation. It suggests that at very low level of ingroup self-evaluation, the indirect effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice decreased.
Concerning outgroup meta-prejudice as sole predictor, the results showed that friendship discrimination was not significantly predicted by outgroup meta-prejudice ($b = -0.012, SE = .056, p = .825, CI [-.124, -.066]$). Surprisingly, when outgroup meta-prejudice was treated together with prejudice as predictors, outgroup meta-prejudice was negatively and significantly found to predict friendship discrimination ($b = -.200, SE = .069, p < .01, CI [-.336, -.065]$). Nonetheless, the indirect effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship
discrimination through prejudice was significant ($b = .188, \text{Boot } SE = .056, Z = 4.023, p < .001, \text{Boot } CI [.098, .320]$).

Furthermore, I found that ingroup self-evaluation moderated the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice ($b = .175, SE = .056, p < .01, CI [.064, .285]$). Hence, the results of the indirect effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice was greater ($b = .205, \text{Boot } SE = .062, \text{Boot } CI [.107, .355]$) at high level of ingroup self-evaluation (i.e. the maximum score) than at low level of ingroup self-evaluation (i.e. 1 SD below the mean; $b = .125, \text{Boot } SE = .058, \text{Boot } CI [.042, .265]$).

In addition, I retested a simple slope analysis with values of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of ingroup self-evaluation. Again, it showed that at values of 1, 2, 3, or 4 of ingroup self-evaluation, outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice was not significant. Otherwise, at values of 5 or 6, prejudice was strongly and significantly predicted by outgroup meta-prejudice. It is then to indicate that the indirect effect of outgroup meta-prejudice of friendship discrimination through prejudice would be decreased at the very low levels of ingroup self-evaluation.

6.3.5. Ahmadiyya as the Target

Focusing first ingroup meta-prejudice as predictor (see figure 6. 4), a total effect was found significantly associated to friendship discrimination toward Ahmadiyya ($b = 189, SE = .063, p < .01, CI [.064, .313]$). However, the effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination turned out to be non-significant ($b = .047, SE = .079, p = .601, CI [-.108, .203]$) after controlling for prejudice. The results of the analysis showed that the effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice was significant ($b = .140, \text{Boot } SE = .061, Z = 2.763, p < .01, \text{Boot } CI [.040, .284]$).
Nevertheless, the results in moderated examination showed that the effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on prejudice was significantly moderated by ingroup self-evaluation ($b = .303, SE = .069, p < .001, CI [.166, .440]$). It was then, the indirect effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice was higher from zero at high level of ingroup self-evaluation ($b = .164, Boot SE = .067, Boot CI [.043, .303]$) than at low level of ingroup self-evaluation ($b = .085, Boot SE = .054, Boot CI [.011, .248]$). I predicted that at the low values such as 1, 2, or 3 from 6 point-scale of ingroup self-evaluation, the indirect effects of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination would be weaker. It is because, at the values of 2 or 3 of ingroup self-evaluation, the effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on prejudice was not significant. Instead, at the value of 1, the effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on prejudice was negatively significant ($b = - .737, SE = .328, p < .05, CI [-1.384, -.090]$).

Furthermore, using outgroup meta-prejudice as predictor, a total effect was found to be significant on friendship discrimination toward Ahmadiyya ($b = 151, SE = .056, p < .01, CI [.041, .261]$). However, the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination turned out to be not significant after controlling for prejudice ($b = - .041, SE = .079, p = .605, CI [-.196, .114]$). It appears that the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination via prejudice was significant ($b = .192, Boot SE = .070, Z = 3.267, p < .01, Boot CI [.064, .341]$).
As can be seen in figure 6.4., there was a significant effect of ingroup self-evaluation as moderator of the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice ($b = .194$, $SE = .063$, $p < .01$, $CI [.069, .319]$). To the result of this testing, the indirect effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice was greater at high level of ingroup self-evaluation (i.e. the maximum score; $b = .206$, $Boot SE = .073$, $Boot CI [.069, .355]$) than
at low level of ingroup self-evaluation (i.e. 1 SD below the mean; \( b = .141, \) Boot \( SE = .073, \) Boot CI [.027, .321]).

Subsequently, I rechecked the simple slope analysis under specific values of ingroup self-evaluation, that is, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The results reported that at values below 3 (i.e. \( \leq 3 \)) of ingroup self-evaluation, outgroup meta-prejudice did not significantly relate to prejudice. It is, then, at very low levels of ingroup self-evaluation, the indirect effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice would be weaker.

6.4. Results: Muslim Sample

6.4.1. Preliminary Analysis

Independent sample t-test was used to examine sex differences in prejudice belief, ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice, ingroup self-evaluation, and friendship discrimination. Other than prejudice toward Ahmadiyya where score from female participants where higher than male participants (\( t (159) = -2.430, p < .05, M_{Male} = 2.789, M_{female} = 3.363 \)), neither significant sex differences were found in all those main key variables. I, then, inspected bivariate correlation analyses to check the correlations between age and the main key variables. Except the correlation between age and friendship discrimination toward Ahmadiyya which were marginally and negatively significant (\( r = -.141, p = .061 \)), none of the significant correlations were found between age and all other main key variables. Therefore all data were collapsed across ages and gender.

6.4.2. Group evaluations

I conducted one way repeated-measures ANOVA to see comparisons of group evaluations targeting ingroup Muslims and outgroup Christians and Ahmadiyya (see figure 6.5). Before the test, all variables were set so that the high scores corresponded to positive
evaluation. As can be seen in figure 6.5., the results showed that participants evaluated their ingroup most positively ($M = 5.548, SD = .797$), followed by Christians ($M = 4.680, SD = 1.184$) and Ahmadiyya ($M = 3.895, SD = 1.519$) at the lowest scores of positive evaluations. The finding was also confirmed by a significant self-evaluation of groups with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction ($F = 121.209, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .371$; Wilks’ Lambda = .453, $F(2,157) = 94.819, p < .001$).

![Figure 6.5. Mean group evaluations by Muslims](image)

In order to be able to see comparison between group evaluation scores, paired sample t-test was used. A first paired samples t-test indicated that there was a significant difference in the scores for ingroup Muslims and Christians ($t (163) = 8.887, p < .001$). A second paired samples t-test showed that there was a significant difference in the scores for ingroup Muslims and Ahmadiyya ($t (159) = 13.035, p < .001$). Next, a third paired samples t-test showed that there was a significant difference between Christians and Ahmadiyya ($t (158) = \ldots$).
5.864, p < .001) from Muslim participants. These results suggest that (non-Ahmadiyya) Muslims evaluate Christians less negative than Ahmadiyya.

6.4.3. Moderated mediation investigations

In conducting the examination, I used the same treatment as it was done to data from Christian participants. Additionally, because I found a similar case with Christian participants where the high score based on one standard deviation above the mean were outside the range of the data (M = 5.567, SD = .783, Skewness = -3.057, Mode = 6.0). I then replaced the high score with the maximum score (see table 6.2. for regression results).

Table 6.2. Regression results among Muslims targeting Christians and Ahmadiyya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Target: Christians</th>
<th>Target: Ahmadiyya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome: P</td>
<td>Outcome: FD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMP</td>
<td>.549</td>
<td>8.794***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>.192</td>
<td>2.129*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISE</td>
<td>-.324</td>
<td>-2.656**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMP×ISE</td>
<td>.228</td>
<td>2.992**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMP</td>
<td>.461</td>
<td>8.210***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>.382</td>
<td>4.496***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISE</td>
<td>-.321</td>
<td>-2.131*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMP×ISE</td>
<td>.180</td>
<td>3.048**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. IMP = Ingroup Meta-prejudice; OMP = Outgroup Meta-prejudice; P = Prejudice; ISE = Ingroup Self-evaluation; FD = Friendship Discrimination; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; ns = non-significant; † = Marginally significant
6.4.4. Christians as the target

Using ingroup meta-prejudice as predictor (see figure 6. 6), the total effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination was marginally significant \( (b = .132, SE = .072, p = .067, CI [-.009, .274]) \). However, the effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination turned out to be not significant after controlling for prejudice \( (b = .003, SE = .087, p = .976, CI [-.168, .174]) \), whereas prejudice was found to be significant in mediating the effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination \( (b = .114, Boot SE = .067, Z = 2.070, p < .05, Boot CI [.001, .272]) \).

As expected, I did find significant effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination moderated by ingroup self-evaluation \( (b = .245, SE = .075, p < .01, CI [.097, .393]) \). Despite the indirect effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice was greater at high level of ingroup self-evaluation (i.e. the maximum score; \( b = .124, Boot SE = .073, Boot CI [.001, .298] \)) than at low level of ingroup self-evaluation (i.e. 1 SD below the mean; \( b = .071, Boot SE = .054, Boot CI [-.007, .207] \)), the indirect effect at high level of ingroup self-evaluation was closed to zero. In this invistiagtion, prejudice was the only variable which showed a significant effect \( (b = .192, SE = .090, p < .05, CI [.014, .369]) \). Given the weak influence of the indirect effect, what I can report here is that prejudice can be predicted by the interaction of ingroup meta-prejudice and ingroup self-evaluation, while it can lead to increase friendship discrimination in direct way.

Moreover, concerning outgroup meta-prejudice as predictor, surprisingly, it revealed that although the total effect was found to be non-significant on friendship discrimination toward Christians \( (b = -.056, SE = .058, p = .331, CI [-.170, .057]) \), yet, the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination turned out to be negatively significant after controlling for prejudice \( (b = -.244, SE = .069, p < .001, CI [-.379, -.109]) \). Nonetheless, prejudice was successfully significant to predict the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on
friendship discrimination \( (b = .188, \text{Boot SE} = .061, Z = 4.059, p < .001, \text{Boot CI} [.094, .335]) \).

\[ .701^{***} (.395^{***}) \]

\[ .192^{*} \]

\[ .543^{***} (.315^{***}) \]

\[ .382^{***} \]

**Figure 6.6.** Moderated mediation results by Muslim participants toward Christians as the target. (A) The role of ingroup self-evaluation in moderating the relationship between ingroup meta-prejudice and friendship discrimination through prejudice. (B) The role of ingroup self-evaluation in moderating the relationship between outgroup meta-prejudice and friendship discrimination through prejudice.

*Note:* \( p < .05,^{**} p < .01,^{***} p < .001, \text{ns} = \text{non-significant},^{†} p < .10 \). Figures in brackets represent effects from low level of ingroup self-evaluation condition and vice versa. Path coefficients are unstandardized estimates.

As expected, the results of the indirect effects of outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice was higher at high level of ingroup self-
evaluation \( (b = .207, \text{Boot SE} = .069, \text{Boot CI} [.101, .377]) \) than at low level of ingroup self-evaluation \( (b = .122, \text{Boot SE} = .064, \text{Boot CI} [.034, .280]) \). As can be seen in figure 6.6, the difference was influenced by the relation between outgroup meta-prejudice and prejudice through which it was significantly moderated by the level of ingroup self-evaluation \( (b = .180, SE = .059, p < .01, CI [.063, .296]) \). I checked a simple slope analysis based on the scores’ level of ingroup self-evaluation of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. In the condition when the level of ingroup self-evaluation is 1, 2, 3, or 4 (i.e. the low level), the effects of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice were not significant. The significant effects were reported at the level 5 and 6 of ingroup self-evaluation. It indicates that at very low level of ingroup self-evaluation, the indirect effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice was getting weaker.

6.4.5. Ahmadiyya as the Target

The results when ingroup meta-prejudice was treat as predictor (see figure 6.7) showed that a total effect was found significantly associated to friendship discrimination toward Ahmadiyya \( (b = .206, SE = .064, p < .01, CI [.079, .333]) \). However, when the effect of ingroup meta-prejudice was controlled by prejudice, it revealed that the effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination was non-significant \( (b = .089, SE = .082, p = .280, CI [-.073, .251]) \). The results of the analysis showed that the effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice was significant \( (b = .117, \text{Boot SE} = .064, Z = 2.183, p < .029, \text{Boot CI} [.022, .250]) \).

It was found that the effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on prejudice was significantly moderated by ingroup self-evaluation \( (b = .300, SE = .066, p < .001, CI [.168, .431]) \). Thus, the finding of the indirect effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice was greater at high level of ingroup self-evaluation (i.e. the maximum
score; $b = .135$, Boot $SE = .064$, Boot $CI [.020, .269]$) than at low level of ingroup self-evaluation (i.e. 1 SD below the mean; $b = .069$, Boot $SE = .049$, Boot $CI [.006, .215]$).

Figure 6.7. Moderated mediation results by Muslim participants toward Ahmadiyya as the target. (A) The role of ingroup self-evaluation in moderating the relationship between ingroup meta-prejudice and friendship discrimination through prejudice, (B) The role of ingroup self-evaluation in moderating the relationship between outgroup meta-prejudice and friendship discrimination through prejudice. Note: $^*p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$, ns. = non-significant, $^†p < .10$. Figures in brackets represent effects from low level of ingroup self-evaluation condition and vice versa. Path coefficients are unstandardized estimates.

Focusing the analysis to the moderation investigations, it showed that when the level of ingroup self-evaluation was 1, 2, 3, or 4 (i.e. the low level), the effects of outgroup meta-
prejudice on prejudice were not significant. It was reported to be significant at the level 5 and 6 of ingroup self-evaluation. Thus, it indicates that at very low level of ingroup self-evaluation, the indirect effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice was getting weaker.

Next, the results when outgroup meta-prejudice was treat as predictor showed that a total effect was found significantly associated to friendship discrimination toward Ahmadiyya \( (b = .140, SE = .057, p < .05, CI [.026, .253]) \). However, when the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice was controlling for prejudice, it revealed that the effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination was dropped to be non-significant \( (b = -.042, SE = .080, p = .606, CI [-.200, .117]) \). Indeed, the results of the analysis showed that the effect of ingroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice was significant \( (b = 181, Boot SE = .073, Z = 3.034, p < .01, Boot CI [.046, .331]) \).

As can be seen in figure 6.7., the results showed that the indirect effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice was found to be higher at level of ingroup self-evaluation \( (b = .196, Boot SE = .077, Boot CI [.054, .358]) \) than at low level of ingroup self-evaluation \( (b = .133, Boot SE = .076, Boot CI [.023, .330]) \). The different results of the indirect effects were influenced by the relation between outgroup meta-prejudice and prejudice at which it was significantly moderated by the level of ingroup self-evaluation \( (b = .193, SE = .064, p < .01, CI [.066, .320]) \). Again, I checked the moderation investigations using the score level of ingroup self-evaluation, that is, at 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. It revealed that at the score of 1, 2, or 3, (i.e. the low level), the effects of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice were found to be not significant. It was reported to be significant at the level 4, 5 and 6 of ingroup self-evaluation. Therefore, at very low levels of ingroup self-evaluation, the indirect effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on friendship discrimination through prejudice was getting weaker.
6.5. Discussion

In general, across two samples of religious groups, the results of the present study provide support for the hypotheses. As predicted, for Muslim and Christian participants living in Flores Island, Ahmadiyya group was found to be evaluated less positive than the other target group (i.e. targeting Muslims for Christian and targeting Christians for Muslim participants). Prejudice was also consistently found to be produced by ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice. The effects of ingroup/outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice would indeed be higher when the group members in the condition of high and positive evaluation toward their ingroup. In the high positive condition of ingroup self-evaluation, the indirect effect of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice toward friendship discrimination through prejudice was found to be powerful.

The findings showed that ingroup self-evaluation by Muslims and Christian participants were highly skewed with the mode on the highest score. It is not surprising since religion provides the believers with moral guidance and understanding of the world and how they should live their life (Baumeister, Bauer, & Lloyd, 2010; Verkuyten, 2007). Often, because religion is so meaningful for the followers, many of them have contempt toward death and eager to be a martyr for their religion (Putra & Sukabdi, 2013; Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek, 2009). In Indonesia where belief in God is placed as one of the five principle pillars (Mashuri, Supriyono, Khotimah, Sakdiah, Sukmawati, & Zaduqisti, 2014) is such evidence that Indonesian culture and traditions are so much influenced by religion. In addition, because being an atheist or non-believer is considered to violate the law, thus, it seems that to be engaged with a religious group is something that is non-negotiable in Indonesia. It is, then, why social conflicts so often occurred between two religious groups (Betrand, 2004) can be understood.
In 2005, Indonesian Ulama (clerics) council had announced that Ahmadiyya is an astrayed group of Islam. It was followed, in 2008, by three ministerial (Ministry of Religious Affairs, Attorney General, & Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2008) decrees, announcing that Ahmadiyya must stop their strayed activities and interpretations of Islamic principal core. After 2005, Human Right Watch (2012) reported that violence by majority (Sunni) Muslim against Ahmadiyya has increased. On the other hand, Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI; 2012), Indonesian private pollsters, in 2012 had conducted a national Survey related to intergroup tolerance. It was found that about 46.6 % (non-Ahmadiyya) respondents did not want to live next door to Ahmadiyya. Compared to 2005 LSI national survey, the rejection is 7.5% higher, whereas about 39.1% respondents reported to refuse Ahmadiyya living next door to them. This national survey report, however, does not give detailed information about respondent’ religious background, especially how other religions such as Christians, Hindu, or Buddha respond about Ahmadiyya group. Therefore, the present finding may fill this informational void. In the present study, Christians and Muslims were found to evaluate Ahmadiyya more negatively than other religious groups (i.e. Christian participants toward Muslims, Muslim participants toward Christians).

The finding is considered important. Most of violent accidents against Ahmadiyya occurred in area where Muslims are the major population. As a matter of fact, in Lombok Island (about 30 – 60 minute from Flores to west) in which the major population is Muslims, there are hundreds of Ahmadis being expelled from their home for years (Khafid, 2013). It is likely that the expelled group members move to the closest Islands where Sunni Muslims are not the majority asking for help and shelter. However, based on the finding of the present study, Ahmadiyya may also be rejected when they decided to move to Flores Island.

Despite accused as an astrayed group of Islam, Ahmadiyya is also accused as heretical group (Hanafi, 2011; Syihab, 2013; Yogaswara, 2008). Such terms of astray and heresy are
perceived negative in most major religions. Hence, such accusation may have strong
influential not just for Islamic groups but also for Christians. Considering that Ahmadiyya is
a novel and unfamiliar group to Christians in Indonesia, especially in Flores Island, how they
perceive Ahmadiyya group will potentially be reliant on how this minority group is viewed
by the majority dominant group of Islam. When a group is accused as astray or heresy by the
society, often this accused group ended up being perpetrated or excluded. Further study needs
to be conducted to find answer of how to prevent a group from easily accusing a certain
group as an astray or heresy in regard to its negative impact (LaMothe, 2010; Bailey, 2010).

Furthermore, focusing the findings to the notion about “meta” indicate that both
ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice play a role in how people justifying others. Conducted
in a different context with Putra and colleagues’ (Putra, 2014; Putra & Wagner, 2014) study,
the results seem consistent with Putra’ (2014) study at which prejudice can be predicted from
ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice. Previous studies have found that thinking how ingroup
is viewed by outgroup can affect ingroup members perceptions and behavior (e.g.
Owuamalam et al, 2013; Phelps, Ommundsen, Türken, & Ulleberg, 2013; Shelton &
Richeson, 2005; Shelton, Richeson, & Salvatore, 2005; Vorauer, Hunter, Main, Roy, 2000,
Vorauer, Main, & Connel, 1998). In terms of behavior, Shelton and Richeson (2005) study
implicate that group members tend to avoid interaction and contact to outgroup members
whom they considered to have negative perceptions toward ingroup. However, the present
results suggest that besides thinking of how ingroup is viewed by outgroup, thinking of how
ingroup view or evaluate outgroup may also influence people perceptions and behavior.

Instead, to some extend and in regard to ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice, in two
samples of religious groups, friendship discrimination was found to be predicted by ingroup
and outgroup meta-prejudice through prejudice and moderated by ingroup self-evaluation. It
suggests that individuals who highly evaluate their ingroup positively may increase their
prejudice, where as a consequence it may influence their intergroup friendship relations. Regardless of group status, minor or major, the more the group members are prejudiced toward outgroups, the more they will reject these outgroup members to be their friend. Hence, the present study has provided evidence for another possibility on how people justify others will depend on how they evaluate their ingroup, how their ingroup think about outgroup, and how the outgroup think about ingroup.

Nevertheless, the findings also revealed that there were negative effects on friendship discrimination from outgroup meta-prejudice (in exception for the effect from Muslim participants targeting Ahmadiyya) when put together with prejudice, ingroup self-evaluation, and interaction variable of prejudice and ingroup self-evaluation as predictors. These findings may provide an explanation that in certain condition, ingroup members may have intention to build a positive relationship with outgroup members whom they think to have a negative perception about ingroup. The reason can be triggered as a strategic way for ingroup members to disconfirm their negative attributes from outgroup. At this point, study conducted by Hopkins, Reicher, Harrison, Cassidy, Bull, and Levine (2007) have provided evidence to support my argument. Focusing the study to intergroup helping, they found that when ingroup members believe that helping the outgroup may change outgroup perception about ingroup, the ingroup members may strongly involve in activities pertaining intergroup helping. On the other hand, the findings from Van Leeuwen and Mashuri’ (2013) study bring an understanding that intergroup helping may also be done by majority group to minority separatist groups. It appears that when the existing minority separatists are considered as being part of common national identity, the majority group tends to support government to enhance the quality of education, healthcare, and public infrastructure. This support is plausible since they want to change the separatists’s negative perception in order to engage them as part of a common national identity.
What is also important to note here is that the present results have showed consistent positive effects of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice toward prejudice, at which prejudice may lead to increase friendship discrimination. As an effect, outgroup meta-prejudice have a potential to strongly support, instead of to reject friendship discrimination. It seems that a good way in building positive intergroup relations is by shaping group members’ perceptions where ingroup and outgroup is perceived to have positive perceptions on other groups. In doing so, further study need to be conducted in order to understand conditions of when and how group members perceive and behave outgroup members in positive way.

Nevertheless, some other limitations of the present study need to be addressed. The present study was aimed to extend study from Putra and Wagner in the different context of interreligious groups in Indonesia. It showed that either in the context where Muslims are the majority and Christians are the minority or Muslims are the minority and Christians are the majority, ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice positively predict prejudice, where such effect will be higher in the condition when group members highly and positively evaluate their ingroup. These findings, however, need to be confirmed in the different context of intergroup relations. On the other hand, since individuals are engaged with more than one group identities, research in ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice by considering the complexity of multiple group identifications (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Roccas & Brewer, 2002) is also needed to be conducted. It may provide better understandings and insight in searching for a solution to develop intergroup harmony.

In conclusion, the present study has demonstrated research analyzing types of group evaluations. Those are ingroup self-evaluation, ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice, and prejudice. To my knowledge, very few studies have investigated group members’ perceptions and responses based on types of evaluations which I investigated. In the case of meta-stereotype research for example, most of the research was concentrated to one type of “meta”
process. That is, how ingroup is viewed by the outgroup. Whilst, study about “meta” in intergroup relations can also link to the condition where group member think how their group think about outgroup. In relation to prejudice, the present findings indicate the importance of studying the role of ingroup/outgroup meta-prejudice and ingroup self-evaluation. The findings also indicate that prejudice can directly relate to friendship discrimination either to majority or minority group. However, there is also a possibility that in certain conditions the effect of prejudice on friendship discrimination can be suppressed. Future studies should contribute to further understanding of how prejudice is suppressed and how it is related to ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice.

End notes

1The examinations toward prejudice belief, ingroup meta-prejudice, and outgroup meta-prejudice were performed after the scores were reversed so that high scores corresponded to high negative evaluation.
7. GENERAL DISCUSSION
7.1. Theme 1: Religious Fundamentalism and Terrorism in Indonesia

Through focus group discussions and interviews to the so call “Jihadist” or Islamist activists, paper 1 of theme 1 has revealed that when the situation in Indonesia is interpreted as being in a state of war, then the type of attack to be used (e.g. bombing or killing by targeting the West) is considered merely as a combatant technique or strategy. Moreover, paper 2 of theme 1 showed that the relationship between Islamic Fundamentalism and support for terrorism acts was positively related to a low belief in establishing Islam peacefully and high level of rationalization of violence.

A study conducted by Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, and Orehek (2009) yielded that the underlying motive for Muslims in performing suicide bombing is because of the significant losses (e.g. family or group members killed by an outgroup) that trigger trauma, frustrations, and feeling threatened. This trauma, then, triggers ideological reasons assumed to justify the act of terrorism in order to gain symbolic restorations. Otherwise, feeling threatened triggers ideological reasons to justify acts terrorism as a matter to prevent losses. Another study conducted by Henry, Sidanius, Levin, and Pratto (2005) demonstrated that support for terrorism in Middle East is a project of counter-dominance. America or the West is considered to dominate Muslim countries, which prompts counter reactions to Western dominance.

Nevertheless, the findings from Kruglanski et al. (2009) and Henry et al. (2005) do not portray the emergence of terrorism in Indonesia very well. On one hand, it is true that trauma, frustration, or feeling threatened can be influenced or triggered by the experience of loss. On the other hand, a suppressive and powerful outgroup dominating and controlling an ingroup causes feelings of anger and hostility, thus it can trigger anti-dominance action. However, all aspects which can generate trauma, threat, anger, or hostility can potentially
lead to terrorism when the situation is seen as a state of undeclared or declared war. Terrorist acts are the weapons of the less powerful.

The findings of the two papers (i.e. paper 1 and 2 of theme 1) give implications for a new way of counter-terrorism. Previous studies have shown that the acts of terrorism were related to Islamic fundamentalist groups. Hence, the way to alleviate Muslim terrorism is countering the ideas maintained by Islamic fundamentalists. However, it will require a considerable effort because Muslims tend to have high scores of religious fundamentalism in general (see e.g. Rothschild, Abdollahi, Pyszczynski, 2009; Muluk, Sumaktoyo, & Ruth, 2013; and paper 2 of theme 1 in the present thesis). It seems to indicate that being a religious fundamentalist is a shared ideology among Muslims. At this point, the effective way in counter-terrorism is by addressing issues that Indonesia is not in a state of war. To obtain a positive impact, I also suggest that the issue being raised is presented by those ulamas (Islamic cleric) who are viewed as respected religious authorities. I believe that if the issues is continuously presented and given by respected ulamas then this effort can counter acts of terrorism and it can even restrain those people with trauma or hatred toward other groups from performing acts of terrorism.

7.2. Theme 2: Meta-prejudice and Prejudice in Religious Groups in Indonesia

Paper 1 of theme 2 provides a support that ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice play a key role in predicting prejudice. Ingroup meta-prejudice showed to mediate the effect of outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice. It indicates that ingroup meta-prejudice is a powerful factor to predict prejudice compared to outgroup meta-prejudice. Further, the results of paper 2 of theme 2 have given evidence the way how group members think of others are thinking is considered a strong predictor in comparison to the way how group members think of the quality of intergroup relationship. Expressing prejudice was found to be related with group
status (majority or minority status). Paper 3 of theme 2 showed the effect of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice on prejudice was moderated by high and low level of ingroup self-evaluation. Prejudice was found to mediate the effect of ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice on discrimination of intergroup friendship.

Across three papers, the findings have indicated that how group members think of others are thinking is an important factor to understand prejudice. To the best of my knowledge, the findings are crucial for research in prejudice. It is because there are no studies found that seriously investigate to the way how religious group members think of their ingroup is thinking and think of outgroup members are thinking.

Let us now go back and see the model that was developed by Duckitt (2001), which is called as dual process model or DPM. For instance, the focus of DPM is to depict the underlying motive and process behind the prejudiced people. In short, there are two motives which trigger people to have prejudice on outgroup members, either threat-control motivated or competitive-dominance motivated. According to Duckitt (2001), this is the underlying motives which can be found either in the level of individual or group. In my perspective, however, Duckitt’s model has a serious problem.

First, it is good to know that Duckitt’ DPM is a model that able to explain the causal process of prejudice based on personal and group dimensions. However, the individual formation process and group formation process in the model developed by Duckitt are still placed in a separate process. The processes that he developed illustrate that the individual process and the group process are unique processes where the similarity found between both processes is in its motive and ideology. In explaining the underlying process for individual/personal dimensions, Duckitt has neglected the fact that prejudice can be influenced by the way how individuals reflect their self as a group member.
In individual process, Duckitt only explains how people as individuals are able to have prejudice toward other people is merely based on personal experience. On the other side, when Duckitt describes the way how prejudice can be explained based on group dimension, group members are considered as a unit with a system of thinking called as group thinking. Here, individuals are understood solely as a group member, in which their private space or thinking as individual seems to be neglected. The causal process of prejudice based on group dimensions are concentrated to explain group categorization, motives, and ideology without considering the way how group members think about their group are thinking. As individuals are part of their group with their own experience, I am on the opinion that to understand prejudice, it is better if we consider the reflection of individual group members as how they as individuals view their group and also how they view the surrounding social situation especially those related with inter-group relations.

Second, Duckitt’s model only describes the causal process of how individuals as a subject targeting other group members. Since individuals are aware that they may become a potential target of prejudice, then considering how individuals see outgroup members’ perceptions to ingroup seems to be important factor to understand prejudice. This is what is clearly neglected by Duckitt. Given all of the explanations above, then Duckitt’s model seem to fail in explaining prejudice.

On the other hand, a numbers of studies have conducted research on testing the way how group members perceive others are thinking. The research demonstrated that how ingroup is negatively viewed by outgroup is associated with prejudice (Vorauer, Hunter, Main, & Roy 2000; Vorauer, Main, & Connel, 1998; Owuamalam, Farrow, Tarrant, & Zagefka, 2013). Nonetheless, despite the consideration of the mechanism of how seeing others are thinking may influence perceptions and behaviors, the research is solely focused on testing how group members are viewed by outgroup members may influence (negative)
perceptions. Accordingly, previous studies have missed another aspect of “meta” in the context of intergroup relations, that is, how group members see their ingroup think of particular outgroups. In theme 2 of the present thesis, such mechanism of thinking has been reported to strongly relate to prejudice and is considered as the important factors in influencing prejudice. Thus, in my opinion, focusing the study to solely test how group members think outgroup members think of their own ingroup (Vorauer et al., 1998; Vorauer et al., 2000) by neglecting such factor of how group members think that their own group thinks particular groups, may mislead the way how individuals perceive others. It is because how group members see their own group think about outgroup can mediate the effect of how their group is viewed by outgroup members on predicting prejudice. Thus, the present studies of theme 2 have fulfilled the absence through which prejudice can be predicted by ingroup and outgroup meta-prejudice.

How about prejudice expression? Let us consider the study conducted by Crandall, Eshleman, and O’Brien (2002). The findings revealed that how prejudice is expressed depends with the prevailing social norms. The study demonstrated that when prejudicing toward a particular outgroup is normatively unacceptable, prejudice will be suppressed. For example, in their study (study 1), the participants who are undergraduate students from the University of Kansas reported of accepting more prejudice on Rapists, Terrorists, or Racists than Deaf or blind people. It suggests that expressing prejudice on deaf or blind people as normatively unacceptable. Nevertheless, in particular to paper 2 of theme 2 of the present thesis, the findings suggest that beside prevailing social norm, how prejudice is expressed can also be traced from group social status. Different to social norms where prejudice expression is understood as acceptable or unacceptable, by understanding group social status, prejudice expression can be explained whether it is relevant or not. For minority inferior group, for example, expressing prejudice will only be relevant targeting other minority groups instead of
dominant majority outgroup. In the case of minority Ahmadiyya participants, prejudice was found to only associate with social rejection targeting minority Christian, but not to Sunni Muslims. On the other hand, for majority Sunni, prejudice did significantly relate to social rejection on all target groups. It suggests that expressing social rejection toward majority Sunni Muslims for Ahmadiyya participants is not relevant in their current situation. On the other hand, for majority Sunni Muslims, expressing prejudice is likely relevant to all (minority) target groups. Thus, beside the prevailing social norms, understanding group status is likely important in order to understand prejudice expression.

7.3. Conclusion

In conclusion, theme 1 of the present thesis has explored the way when and how Islamic fundamentalist may potentially support terrorism. It seems that the findings are not only beneficial for Indonesia, but also for other Muslim countries where proviolence Islamic fundamentalist groups develop and strengthen their movement. For this matter, future research is needed to strengthen the present findings and implication.

Furthermore, theme 2 of the present thesis has demonstrated the important role of what group members think others are thinking in interreligious context. I argue that understanding this mechanism of thinking may help find the way to develop positive intergroup relations, as well as inter-subgroup relations. I suggest developing the idea that ingroup members to have positive perception toward outgroup members and outgroup members also have a positive perception toward ingroup members may boost group members to build positive intergroup perceptions. Therefore, further investigations using meta-prejudice to explain other negative impacts are needed to improve and strengthen the present findings. For example by examining the relation between ingroup meta-prejudice, outgroup meta-prejudice, and prejudice in groups other than religious groups.
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REFERENCES


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APPENDIX

Theme 1 Scales

A. Islamic fundamentalism

1. The Quran is the perfect guidance so no one should question any of its element.
2. The truth of the Quran is eternal so it should be applicable to all generations without the need to be re-interpreted.
3. The Quran and the Sunnah have set the ruling for the whole of human life so human beings do not need other additional laws because it will be a waste or bid'ah.
4. The Quran and the Sunnah is sufficient to provide answers for all human issues from economics, politics, to domestics.
5. The Quran is the only guidance if one wants to be saved.
6. Islamic religion brought by Muhammad is the only noble way of life.
7. There is only one guidance of truth, and that is the Quran, so those who are not guided by the Quran will not find the real truth.
8. The governmental system practiced by the prophet Muhammad can be implemented anytime and anywhere.
9. Only by applying the Prophet Muhammad's governmental system will people find prosperity.

B. Support for acts of terrorism

1. Violent act (i.e. suicide bombing) that has been done in Indonesia is legitimate jihad according to the Quran and the Sunnah.
2. The fights that have been done by some imprisoned figures such as Amrozi, Imam Samudra, and Ali Imran, is a form of Jihad that is needed now in Indonesia.
3. Indonesia remains as a physical war field, not a da`wah (missionary) field, so suicide bombing is legit.

C. Belief in establishing Islam peacefully

1. Establishing Islam can be done without violence.
2. Establishing Islam in Indonesia can be done without force.
Theme 2 Scales

A. Identity undermining
1. Building a relationship with (outgroup) in Indonesia will impact on the eroded and polluted values of Islam.
2. Building a relationship with (outgroup) in Indonesia will destroy the values of Islam
3. Becoming part of Islam, (outgroup) values will pollute the noble Islamic values.
4. (outgroup) will destroy the pure Islamic tradition if they become part of Islam

B. Muslim identity
1. For me becoming a Muslim is very important.
2. I feel a strong bond with other Muslims.
3. I am proud to be a Muslim.
4. Islam is my guidance in life.
5. I view myself as a Muslim.

C. Friendship discrimination
1. I am more comfortable associating with (ingroup) than with (outgroup).
2. I prefer being a good friend with (ingroup) than with (outgroup).
3. If I am getting acquainted with (outgroup), I will try to keep my distance.
4. I like to be good friends with (outgroup). (Reverse-scored)
Curriculum Vitae

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Education

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2015  Doctoral degree in Social Psychology at Johannes Kepler University (JKU) Linz, Austria
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2004  Bachelor degree on Theology-Philosophy at State Islamic University (UIN Syarif Hidayatullah), Jakarta
GPA : 3.47 (scale of 4.00)
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Topics: › Human Philosophy
 › Determinative Philosophy Books
 › Metropolis and Living Style Philosophy
 › Law Philosophy
 › Human Rights Philosophy

Research Interests

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- Prejudices
- Terrorism
- Intergroup relations
- Peace & Conflict
## Profesional Activities

### Editorial Position
- 2012-present: Jurnal Psikologi Ulayat: Indonesian Journal of Indigenous Psychology

### Reviewer for:
- Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology

## Working Experiences

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<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
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| Atma Jaya University             | Aug 14 - Present     | (part-time) Lecturer at the Faculty of Psychology in Social Psychology Master program, subject:  
                                       |                      | - Critical Social Psychology                                                            |
| Universitas Indonesia            | Jan 07 – Aug 12      | Research analyst at the Center of Psychology Research                                       |
|                                  | Aug 09 – Feb 2011    | Assistant lecturer at Psychology Master programs, subject:  
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|                                  |                      | - Contemporary social Psychology                                                             |
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                                       |                      | - Research Design                                                                           |
| Pancasila University             | Oct 09               | Substitute Lecturer at the Faculty of Psychology, subject:  
                                       |                      | - Social Psychology                                                                         |
| Bina Nusantara University        | Feb 08 – Jan 10      | Lecturer at the Faculty of Psychology, subject:  
                                       |                      | - Social Psychology                                                                         |
|                                  |                      | - Social Intervention                                                                      |
|                                  |                      | - Sociology & Anthropology                                                                   |
|                                  |                      | - Observation & Interview Method                                                             |
| PT. Daya Insani                 | Jun 07 – Aug 2012    | Associate for Psychology & Hypnotherapy Consultant (by project)                            |

## Publications (Journal Articles)

Putra, I. E. (2014). *We reject him because he is of Chinese descent or non-Muslim, or because of both? Identity project, mobilization, and indigenous - non-indigenous discourse among Muslims who refuse a non-Muslim Chinese candidate in 2012 Governor Election in Jakarta, Indonesia.* Manuscript submitted for publication.


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**Publications (Books & Book chapters)**


&Y. Ohtsubo (Eds.), *Individual, group, and cultural processes in changing societies* (pp. 23-42). New Delhi: Macmillan.


**Non academic Publication (Novel)**


**Conferences/Seminars**


