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From Hofstede to Machiavelli

*Deducting Machiavellianism from etic dimensions of culture*

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Abstract
When studying the research on cultural dimensions, it is a common assumption that values and characteristics that are shared on the cultural level do not directly reflect those of an individual of that culture. Despite this problem, this diploma thesis argues in favour of a positive relationship between Machiavellianism on the individual level and several etic cultural dimensions. This potential link between culture and Machiavellianism has been severely neglected by scholars until now. Reviews of selected characteristics of the different constructs are presented and an investigation of relations between the different dimensions and Machiavellianism is carried out. The developed hypotheses are tested with the help of a questionnaire and a sample of 108 students from different nationalities. In fact, the results imply a relationship between culture and Machiavellianism and further allow for the creation of a cultural profile, which seemingly enables the estimation of an individual’s level of Machiavellianism based on her or his cultural background. Implications and recommendations for future research are being discussed.

Keywords: Machiavellianism, culture, etic cultural dimension, level-of-analysis problem, Machiavelli, Hofstede, GLOBE, Schwartz, Gelfand

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1 Introduction

Much research has been done by using cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004). Hofstede’s (2001) seminal work identified a set of cultural dimensions and prompted other scholars to follow up with their own dimensions in an attempt to better understand culture. However, Hofstede (2001; 2011) and other researchers (e.g. Noorderhaven & Koen, 2005) assert that the values of these dimensions lose their predictive value for the individual. When trying to link the cultural and the individual level, a phenomenon which is known as the level-of-analysis problem (Noorderhaven & Koen, 2005) surfaces. This means that the levels do not correspond adequately, which is pertinent whenever a culture-level construct is directly applied to the individual level.

Even so, while this direct approach of attributing culture-level characteristics to individuals is ostensibly filled with various obstacles, it seems possible that cultural values might indirectly favour the development of certain individual-level properties of cultural members. This latter possibility is what this thesis sets out to explore. More specifically, the relationship between etic cultural dimensions, which obviously operate at the cultural level, and Machiavellianism, which is an individual-level construct, will be investigated in order to see whether there is a link between the two. Thus, the question which underlies this thesis is the following:

What is the relationship between etic dimensions of culture and Machiavellianism?

In short, Machiavellianism is characterized by affectless rationality and self-centredness (Christie & Geis, 1970a). People scoring high in Machiavellianism willingly employ deceptive and manipulative tactics in pursuit of their goals. They further prefer structure over ambiguity and exhibit a negative perception of the world (Christie & Geis, 1970a).

When comparing Machiavellianism to different cultural dimensions, there seem to be several similarities between these constructs. This leads to the assumption that certain cultures may socialize characteristics which are also part of Machiavellianism. Accordingly, Machiavellianism might be more prevalent or stronger amongst cultural members that come from cultures that support Machiavellian values. This in turn may allow for the estimation of a person’s level of Machiavellianism based on his or her cultural background. Being able to do so could be potentially useful for negotiations (Al-Khatib et al., 2005) and other undertakings.
This speculation of a link between culture and Machiavellianism requires empirical evaluation. Therefore, this thesis will provide indicative empirical research, which will shed light on this issue. A cross-cultural sample of students will deliver the required results.

The following chapters will provide literature reviews of pertinent characteristics of selected etic cultural dimensions (i.e. the concepts of Hofstede, GLOBE, Schwartz, and Gelfand and colleagues) and Machiavellianism. The thesis will then proceed by showing how culture and Machiavellianism might be linked. Subsequent to that, the different dimensions and Machiavellianism will be compared on the basis of their characteristics in order to derive justifiable, verifiable hypotheses. These will then be tested in the empirical part, which is followed by a discussion and further implications. The limitations, suggestions for further research, and the conclusion will pose the end of this thesis.
I. LITERATURE PART

2 The ever elusive concept – What is culture?

Culture surrounds us. It is the social fabric which allows interactional understanding amongst its members. At the same time it is often blamed for breakdowns of communication between members of different cultural backgrounds (e.g. Hofstede, 2001). Even now, it may influence how readers perceive these very lines.

Culture matters. Its influence may well extend to every aspect of life that is touched by human beings. For instance, culture gives rise to different negotiation styles (Adler, 2008; Faure & Sjöstedt, 1993; Fisher et al., 1991; Sergey, 1999; Zhao, 2000). Thus, international negotiations are heavily influenced by the cultural properties of each negotiation partner.

However, international negotiations are by no means the only aspect of international business conduct that calls for attention to cultural peculiarities. Especially multinational companies (MNC) will face cultural challenges more often as they deliberately cross cultural boundaries. To name just a few areas, workforce motivation (d'Iribarne, 2002), conflict management (Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001), and leadership (Dorfman et al., 2004; House et al., 2002; Javidan et al., 2006) are all concepts that will suffer from maladjustment if the person in charge is oblivious of cultural undercurrents.

While being sensitive to culture is important in today’s world, chances are that this capability will be even more essential in the future since Javidan et al. (2004b) conclude that contact between cultures will be an even more common phenomenon then. Even so, some may argue that globalization will eventually create a world where all cultures converge and differences become either negligible or non-existent. This has, however, been identified as a myth (Schneider & Barsoux, 2003). Furthermore, Hofstede (2001) asserts that cultural change is happening at a slow rate at best. Besides, even the influence of industrial sectors cannot outmatch the impact of culture on organisations (Brodbeck et al., 2004).

Yet, what is culture? It seems that different authors have different answers to this question (House & Javidan, 2004). Thus, it appears to be reasonable to look at how this elusive construct can be defined before approaching the subsequent sections.

2.1 Defining culture

Culture has attracted a lot of research interest from around the globe. An unavoidable consequence of this was that several researchers crafted their own definition of culture (House &
Javidan, 2004). Reviewing and presenting all of them would be an extensive task and certainly beyond the scope of this thesis. The focus shall, therefore, be on a few selected definitions. This seems to be reasonable as the different definitions do overlap to a notable extent.

Fischer (2009) describes culture as a system of shared meanings among the members of the respective culture. He states that the diffusion of certain values leads to the creation of the commonly held meanings within a culture. Thus, shared values and meanings seem to be the building blocks of culture.

Hofstede (2001) also considers value systems as important for explaining culture but additionally mentions common attitudes and beliefs. More specifically, he refers to culture as the “…collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another.” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 9). Henceforth, Hofstede (2001) highlights values as well but further emphasises acculturation (i.e. “programming”). Later, he also explains that culture is not something one has been born with but a concept that has been learned. Further, Hofstede (2001) points to culture as a distinguishing feature between different peoples. This also implies the acknowledgement of different cultures.

Another definition of culture is offered by the GLOBE associates (House & Javidan, 2004). They viewed culture as “…shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of members of collectives that are transmitted across generations.” (House & Javidan, 2004, p. 15). Again, values and similar notions are considered pertinent to capturing the concept of culture. Additionally, the collective reappears as the vehicle for these values. A noticeable similarity with Hofstede’s (2001) take on culture is the idea of learning culture. This is implied by rendering culture the product of experiences. An element that has not yet been mentioned is the transmission of culture. The GLOBE associates explicitly point out that culture is inherited from former generations and will be imprinted onto future generations.

Schwartz’s (1994) definition underlined the complexity of culture by pointing to its multidimensionality. Yet, he also points out that culture might not be an internal element inside someone’s mind but might be rather an external element found in institutions which then influence individuals (Schwartz, 2014). Schwartz further focused on values as a means to describe culture and noted that these values were either of conflicting or complementing nature (Schwartz, 1994; 1999). Overall, Schwartz perceives culture on the basis of values but states that these values interact with each other.

After having examined some of the existing definitions of culture, it is now possible to create the working definition of culture for this thesis. Culture will be treated as a **collectively**
shared set of values which is socialized across generations and shapes its member cognition, behaviour, and social environment. It appears that this definition of culture will be most appropriate for what this thesis aims to undertake.

One more issue to settle is to determine which kind of culture will be considered in the following sections. Hofstede (2001) describes culture as lying between the universal level of human nature and the individual level. Thus, collectives which possess a certain culture are comprised of more than one individual but not the entirety of all human beings. However, this allows for different kinds of collectives to develop culture. For instance, there can be family cultures, professional cultures, organisational cultures, and also national cultures (Hofstede, 2001). For this study, societies will be the target of culture. These can be equivalent to national cultures, but can also be sufficiently large sub-groups within a nation, especially in vast countries. To name just one example, China is one nation, yet it is called home by dozens of ethnicities, which all have their own cultural heritage and societies. Since the focus is on the culture of societies, the following sections will use the terms culture and society interchangeably.

2.2 Emic vs. Etic: The different approaches towards culture

Having discussed the definition-related issues of culture, it remains to determine the approach which will be applied by this thesis. In general, the field of cultural research distinguishes between emic and etic approaches with regard to research and theories about culture.

Drawing on the definitions employed by Jahoda (1977, p. 129), emic research looks at factors within specific cultures that can most likely not be applied to other cultures. The obtained knowledge is valid for this one culture but probably not for others. This is in line with the notion of cultural relativism, which means that the principles of one culture shall not be applied in an attempt to understand a different culture (Hofstede, 2001). In contrast, etic research looks at factors that are similar between different cultures and, thus, allow researchers to compare cultures on the basis of the same standards. However, these standards have been created outside the respective culture, which is why they can be applied to more than just this one culture.

An example for emic research would be the case studies undertaken by d’Iribarne (2002). He examined two successful subsidiaries of MNCs in emerging countries. More specifically, he focused on how the overall organisational culture had been adapted to local, cultural norms in order to facilitate high workforce motivation. The main result of this investigation was the
identification of success factors for the respective MNCs within these two countries (i.e. Morocco and Mexico).

The character of etic research might be best exemplified by drawing on the work of Hofstede (2001). He used cross-national data from IBM employees and extracted factors from it which seemed to appear in every culture. These factors were called cultural dimensions and can be used for creating a profile for every culture. Depending on how the cultures score on the different dimensions, varying profiles will emerge. These dimensions can be called external standards as they have not been developed within the constraints of a single culture but by utilizing data from various cultures.

There is some criticism concerning the usefulness of the distinction between etic research and its counterpart emic research (Jahoda, 1977). Peterson and Pike (2002) perceive both methods as valuable and imply the importance of a complementary use of the two concepts in order to gain a better understanding of a specific culture. In contrast, Jahoda (1977) argues that combining emics with etics will most likely not become a prevailing concept. Instead, he presumes that emic research will be replaced by a stronger focus on etic research.

Since the subsequent chapters will mainly draw on cultural dimensions, this thesis will follow an etic approach though the emic perspective is also acknowledged as important for research in general. The etic method simply appears to be more suited for the attempted research.

3 Geert Hofstede

Geert Hofstede is a Dutch scholar who took particular interest in researching culture. He was the first to identify a valid set of etic dimensions of culture (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede et al., 2010). He did so by conducting two rounds of surveys with the local employees of the multinational company IBM. While he was criticised for drawing on a specific group of people, which could have been subject to socializing by organisational culture (i.e. IBM) within a certain culture, Hofstede (2001) pointed to the importance of matched samples for conducting research in culture. He saw a matched sample approach as favourable means to being able to attribute the differences in evaluation to culture. All other factors would be stable between the samples, meaning that they could not be responsible for the variation. In addition to this, other research supported Hofstede’s (2001) findings, although they used other sample groups (Hofstede, 2001).

For Hofstede (2001; 2011) the etic cultural dimensions gave an insight to how different cultures tackle the bigger problems of every society – the dependence on superiors, the need for
predictability and rules, the balance between dependence and individual goals, and the balance between social and ego values (Hofstede 2011, p. 7). However, the dimensions look at the collective as a unit for measurement and application. Hofstede (2011) explains that he was only able to find clear patterns when he moved from the individual to the cultural levels. Also he mentions that the levels must not be confounded. A scholar should neither apply a cultural level value directly to an individual (ecological fallacy), nor should he or she treat an individual level value as representative for an entire culture (reverse ecological fallacy).

Nonetheless, as mentioned above, Hofstede has been criticised for many issues by various authors. For instance, he insisted that cultural values have a long history and, therefore, need decades to change in a significant manner (Hofstede, 2001). Others (e.g. Fernandez et al., 1997) argue that the dimensional values do show change within shorter time periods. It also appears that these changes are not all going in the same direction as Hofstede (2001) originally expected (Taras et al., 2012).

Another point of criticism concerns the soundness of Hofstede’s empirical approach. It appears that Hofstede used a few items in more than one dimension (Fernandez et al., 1997). On the other hand, House et al. (2004) argue that some of Hofstede’s (2001) dimensions (e.g. masculinity-femininity) actually measure different elements and combine them in one index.

This was only some of the criticism which the Hofstede dimensions encountered. An exhaustive list would go beyond the scope of this thesis. Overall there is profound support for Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 2001). In fact, several other cultural dimension systems are related to the set of dimensions as presented by Hofstede (Leung et al., 2005; House et al., 2004).

At the moment, Hofstede’s set of dimensions accounts for six culture-level constructs (Hofstede, 2011), which he claims to be statistically mostly unrelated (Hofstede, 2001). These are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, long-term vs. short-term orientation, and indulgence vs. restraint. According to Hofstede (2011), they can appear in every possible configuration. The first four dimensions – power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism-collectivism and masculinity-femininity – were established by Hofstede (2001) in 1980. Over the course of the 1980s he included another dimension – long-term vs. short-term orientation – which is based on research undertaken in the Far East (Chinese Culture Connection, 1987). Finally, the dimension indulgence vs. restraint was added in the 2000s and came together with a revision of the long-term vs. short-term orientation dimension (Hofstede, 2011). A brief review of the different dimensions can be found below. The particular review will focus on the most pertinent elements for this thesis.
A perfect and exhaustive review of every dimension with their related characteristics would be far beyond the scope of this thesis. For a fairly exhaustive review of the single dimensions the reader can refer to the comprehensive books written by Hofstede (2001) or Hofstede et al. (2010).

### 3.1 Power distance

Hofstede’s power distance index (PDI) refers to how a culture handles inequalities (Hofstede, 2001). Power is the most pertinent factor here. Note that gender inequalities are specifically included in another one of Hofstede’s dimensions: masculinity-femininity.

A culture high in PDI accepts differences in power positions (Hofstede, 2001). The powerful strive for increasing their power (Mulder, 1977) and openly enjoy privileges. A (social) hierarchy is established which bestows a sense of order on a high PDI society. In contrast, a culture ranking low in PDI will favour equality over hierarchy and inequalities (Hofstede, 2001).

High PDI cultures value tradition (based on Hofstede’s (2001) analysis of World Value Survey (WVS) data) and the use of power does not need to be justified, whereas low PDI cultures rely more on authority based on rationality and legitimized power use (Hofstede, 2001). Additionally, Hofstede (2001) mentions that members of a high PDI culture are afraid of disagreeing with their managers. Thus, a propensity to agree is rather prevalent.

Power distance has an impact on how the environment and other people are perceived. Hofstede (2001) states that members of high PDI cultures share a basic mistrust towards other people and appear to think that lying is an option. He also mentions that they take bribes more often. Based on data from Transparency International (1998), Hofstede (2001) argues that corruption appears to be a more serious issue in high PDI cultures. Not surprisingly, he concludes, on the basis of data provided by Halman’s doctoral thesis (1991, p. 302 as cited in Hofstede, 2001, p. 99), that civil morality seems to be held dearer in low PDI cultures. In addition to this, members of societies rating high in PDI tend to agree that humans have an in-born dislike of work and, therefore, will try to avoid it whenever possible (Hofstede, 2001). Paradoxically, Hofstede (2001) also found a positive correlation between PDI and manager benevolence as perceived by the managers.

The level of influence on personal independence is another point. In high PDI cultures, there appears to be more reliance on rules than on personal experience or subordinates (Smith et al., 1994 as cited in Hofstede, 2001, p. 103). However, by referring to Arbose’s (1980 as cited in Hofstede, 2001, p. 106) data, Hofstede (2001) revealed a negative correlation between PDI
and perceived control at the workplace. This is supported by a negative correlation with independence, as also discovered by Hofstede (2001). In contrast, low PDI cultures display a tendency towards flexibility and practical approaches.

Intriguingly, while the very idea of power distance is about accepting differences in power distribution, Hofstede (2001) refers to data from Inglehart (1990) and suggests that high PDI cultures appear to put a higher emphasis on the idea of revolution. In addition to this, Hofstede (2001) discovered the apparent effect of education on PDI, meaning that PDI decreases with the increase of a person’s education. Nevertheless, he states that high PDI cultures are still promoting the notion of power struggle. Thus, it seems that certain individuals may try to overthrow existing structures in order to improve their power position in high PDI societies. Interestingly, Hofstede (2001, p. 114) explicitly refers to Niccolò Machiavelli when writing about PDI because of the elitist ideas that are prevalent in high PDI societies. A further point here is the view of power distribution as a zero-sum game, meaning that if one person gains power, another person will lose power.

### 3.2 Uncertainty avoidance

The core element of Hofstede’s (2001) uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) is the tolerance towards uncertainty or ambiguity. Members of high UAI cultures feel uncomfortable with ambiguity and try to avoid it. Consequently, Hofstede (2001) argues that high UAI is accompanied by a call for structure. Since change is closely linked to ambiguous situations, resistance to change is displayed by high UAI cultures. Interest in new things is rather low in these cultures (Hofstede, 2001).

According to Hofstede (2001), perceived power is possessed by those who are able to control uncertainty. In contrast, members of low UAI cultures display more comfort in the face of ambiguity and chaos.

In order to safeguard against uncertainty, high UAI cultures resort to rules as a means of alleviation (Perrow, 1972, pp. 24, 29, 30 as cited in Hofstede, 2001, p. 147). One of the questionnaire items that measure UAI gauges how readily people would break company rules if they deemed it reasonable for the organisation (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2013).

Hence, adhering to rules is of paramount importance. Hofstede (2001) even implies that the authority of rules outranks personal authority. Interestingly, based on data by Gibson and Caldeira (1996), Hofstede (2001) argues that high UAI cultures seem to tolerate the breaking of unjust laws.
A further point is anxiety. The evaluation of UAI includes a measure of nervousness (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2013). Hofstede (2001) mentioned that members of a high UAI culture feel an urge to actively reduce uncertainty. People in these cultures might even take risks in their efforts to counter ambiguity and establish a more structured environment. These efforts may cause higher anxiety levels.

Regarding the perception of the world, high UAI cultures offer a rather pessimistic worldview. Members of such cultures share a negative view regarding their company’s motives and perceive the world as a hostile place for children (Hofstede, 2001). Based on data from the WVS, Hofstede (2001) found UAI to positively correlate with mistrust towards others. Moreover, task-orientation is higher (Hofstede, 2001) and the ability to correctly analyse others’ facial expressions is lower (Schimmack, 1996 as cited in Hofstede, 2001, p. 157). This means that people are less likely to read the emotional states of other individuals around them. Moreover, on the basis of Veenhoven’s (1993) data, Hofstede (2001) discovered a negative correlation between UAI and happiness.

Hofstede (2001) further mentioned that members of high UAI cultures feel rather powerless regarding their environment. For instance, he uncovered a correlation implying that they feel less able to participate in local politics. This worldview might explain the inconvenience related to uncertainty as surprises will most likely be dangerous.

### 3.3 Individualism-collectivism

Individualism-collectivism (IDV) looks at what can be considered the smallest unit in a culture (Hofstede, 2001) as well as the relationship between the single person and the collective. In individualistic countries, this is clearly the individual person, whereas in collective countries the smallest unit is the group and a person is rather treated as a part of a group instead of an independent individual. While individualism and collectivism seem to be distinct concepts on the individual level, they are related on the aggregated cultural level (Hofstede, 2001). Hofstede (2001) draws on Blumberg and Winch’s (1972) findings to assert that even the nuclear family tends to disintegrate in cultures high in IDV. Interpersonal connections are mostly loose. The dominant self-concept is one of independence instead of interdependence (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Thus, other people are not judged by their group status but by their individual characteristics. According to Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) review, intra- and not interpersonal factors are essential for individualists. Even so, Hofstede (2001) argues that a high ranking in IDV comes with a higher need for affiliation by drawing on McClel-
land’s (1961) research. In contrast, collectivism includes an unquestionable loyalty towards one’s in-group from which an individual derives its identity (Hofstede, 2001).

The communication patterns of a society are also affected. Hofstede (2001) points out that in cultures low in IDV, a direct confrontation is considered to be rude and the tendency towards conformism is higher (Smith, 1996 as cited in Hofstede, 2001). Members are inclined to speak to each other if they have something to share, whilst cultures high in IDV feel that there is a general need to communicate (Hofstede, 2001). Besides, Hofstede’s (2001) review shows that an individual openly sharing feelings about another person at the workplace with that very person is considered to potentially augment productivity.

According to Hofstede’s (2001) analysis, members of high IDV cultures appear to be extraverted and engage much more often in activities which they initiated themselves. In addition to this, Hofstede’s (2001) analysis unveils that they are rather prone to embrace hedonism compared to their low IDV counterparts.

The way in which societies strive for success is a further noteworthy point. People coming from a low IDV culture are more likely to give priority to interests of their in-group even if that runs against their individual interests (Hofstede, 2001). Moreover, they are less likely to perceive the withholding of information as a path to success and include others for decision making and the forging of alliances (Bass & Franke, 1971 as cited in Hofstede, 2001). Yet, as mentioned by Hofstede (2001), data from Williams et al. (1966) suggests that mistrust is felt towards out-groups in rather collectivistic societies, while in-groups are perceived as an extended family. Hence, nepotism is used as a means of reducing risk (Hofstede, 2001). At the same time, Hofstede’s (2001) review implies that there is a lower sense of control over one’s job and working conditions in low IDV cultures.

In cultures rating high in IDV, there is a stronger sense of inventiveness (Shane, 1992). Hofstede (2001) states that compared to members of low IDV cultures, members of high IDV cultures are better informed about technological facts and are less traditionalist. Hofstede’s (2001) review also showed that self-initiative is expected. In his review, Hofstede (2001) was also able to discover a positive correlation between IDV and education.

The way that other people and emotions are handled is also worth mentioning. Referring to Etzioni (1975), Hofstede (2001) argues that relationships in high IDV societies are calculative instead of being grounded in morality. In cultures high in IDV, self-sufficiency is the predominant factor (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Moreover, the dominant coping style for stress is focused on the problem instead of coping by focusing on emotions, as is the case in low IDV.
cultures (Olah, 1995). In high IDV cultures, the emphasis is on universalism, whereas in low IDV cultures particularism is highlighted (Hofstede, 2001).

Finally, Hofstede (2001) points to the positive relationship between IDV and wealth. He expects an increase in individualism in the future.

### 3.4 Masculinity-femininity

The masculinity-femininity dimension (MAS) from Hofstede (2001) is composed of several components. First, it evaluates whether the members (of both genders) of a culture endorse values that are considered to be masculine (e.g. competitive, assertive) or values that are feminine (e.g. tender, caring). Second, MAS gives indications about the current state of equality (or inequality) regarding the two genders. Finally, it looks at how separate the roles are, or in other words, how distinctively the masculine and feminine values are attributed to their respective gender roles.

Hofstede (2001) points to differences concerning education, occupation and age. For instance, older people seem to move to the feminine pole of the continuum by valuing the related values more. This shift happens between the ages of 25 to 50 years (Hofstede, 2001).

MAS has a profound influence on how members of a society pursue their goals. Cultures rating high in MAS mostly pursue ego-driven goals (in contrast to relationship-oriented goals; Hofstede, 2001). Therefore, individual decisions rank higher in importance than collective ones. Members of high MAS cultures further favour rewards (rather advancement than earnings) over interpersonal elements and generally concentrate more on their jobs than on non-work-related factors (Hofstede, 2001). A positive relationship with an emphasis on achievement was found. For instance, Vunderink and Hofstede (1998) imply that students of high MAS cultures are prone to making extensive plans for their future careers. Furthermore, excellence is an important driving-factor (Vunderink & Hofstede, 1998).

The role of family is also related to the MAS values of a culture. Based on WVS data, Hofstede (2001) concludes that members of a high MAS culture appear to hold favourable attitudes of their families at home but attribute less importance to friends. Besides, by referring to WVS data, Hofstede (2001) concludes that building groups for a shared purpose is less common in masculine cultures.

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1 Socialization seems to start at a very early age, as differences of gender roles are already present in infants (Otaki et al., 1986).
High MAS gives rise to specific perceptions of the world and its inhabitants. Hofstede (2001) compares MAS to Witkin and Goodenough’s (1977) concept of field-independence. This implies that member of high MAS cultures have a propensity to evaluate objects and subjects in an impersonal manner without including the social context (as opposed to field-dependence which focuses more on the social aspects). Hence, it appears reasonable that depersonalization is more common in high MAS than in low MAS cultures. Moreover, Hofstede (2001) contradicts Furnham’s (1993) original findings and suggests that views of the world are rather pessimistic. According to Hofstede’s (2001) analysis, it also seems that employees are perceived as sharing an inherent dislike of work. His analysis further uncovers that in high MAS societies poverty is attributed to the laziness of the ones struck by it. Intriguingly, there seems to be a positive correlation between MAS and the importance bestowed on religion (Verweij et al., 1997).

Work life is another sphere which is affected by a culture’s MAS values. Employees in high MAS cultures appear to live to work rather than work to live (Hofstede, 2001). There is an emphasis on performance-based remuneration as found by Hofstede (2001) as well as a positive correlation of MAS with job security (Harpaz, 1990). Further, results from Van Oudenhoven et al. (1998) imply a preference for confrontation over negotiation in masculine cultures. This latter aspect might be one reason why, according to Hofstede’s (2001) review, high MAS is linked with a heightened level of job stress.

Since the notions of femininity and masculinity carry sexual connotations, it is probably no surprise that this area is also influenced by this dimension. Based on WVS data, Hofstede (2001) asserts that in high MAS cultures there is a disposition to see sexual intercourse as a matter of “scoring”. This ego-driven point of view leads to the objectification of the partner. By looking at Schwartz’s (1993) research, Hofstede (2001) indicates that girls are, therefore, more likely to feel exploited in these societies.

3.5 Long-term vs. short-term orientation

Hofstede’s (2001) long-term vs. short-term Orientation (LTO) has undergone several iterations since its discovery. The original concept was identified in the Far East about three decades ago by using what is known as the Chinese Value Survey (CVS) (Chinese Culture Connection, 1987). The initial term for the dimension was Confucian Dynamism since it showed a remarkable relationship with some of the values taught by Confucius (e.g. thrift, unequal relationships, moderation) a long time ago (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). However, as it showed a
significant relationship with economic growth, it was rebaptised to its current name. Unfortunately, data acquisition was slow and values were only available for a small selection of countries. It was then that a correlation between LTO and Minkov’s *monumentalism-flexumility* dimension was discovered (Hofstede, 2011). The monumentalism-flexumility dimension found support in the WVS and, thus, led to a recalculation of Hofstede’s LTO dimension. Thanks to the extensive application of the WVS, values for the new LTO dimension are available for many different cultures.

In its present form, the LTO dimension states on which time frame a culture focuses, which would be either future or present and past (Hofstede et al., 2010; Hofstede, 2011). It still correlates with economic growth but not to the same extent as the CVS-based LTO. Hofstede et al. (2010) highlight that the CVS-based LTO and the WVS-based LTO are similar yet not entirely identical. Nonetheless, the cultural rankings achieved with both LTO versions are still similar.

LTO has an undeniable effect on social life. For instance, Hofstede et al.’s (2010) analysis revealed that high LTO cultures favour equality over meritocracy. The essentiality of relationships is supported which also includes a higher tendency to offer bribes (Yeung & Tung, 1996). In general, Hofstede’s (2001) review reveals a higher satisfaction regarding social contributions in members of high LTO societies. On the other hand, in low LTO cultures even family ties appear to be less important, since there is, for example, less of an influence of mothers on their daughters’ ideal of beauty as suggested by Hofstede et al. (2010; based on Etcoff et al., 2006).

The approach to work is another important area which is influenced by a culture’s LTO score. Data from Wirthlin Worldwide (1996 as cited in Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 244) suggests that societies which rank high in LTO emphasise the importance of hard work, self-discipline and openness towards new ideas. Based on Redding’s (1980) observations, Hofstede et al. (2010) conclude that high LTO is further accompanied by a focus on practical solutions. On the opposite spectrum, in low LTO cultures, tradition, which is past-oriented, is more highly valued (Hofstede et al., 2010; Hofstede, 2001). Moreover, in their review, Hofstede et al. (2010) conclude that students coming from low LTO cultures are prone to turn to luck as an explanation for success and failure.

There is also an impact on cognition. In cultures that display low LTO, a tendency towards self-centredness can be observed (Wirthlin Worldwide, 1996 as cited in Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 244). Hofstede (2001) further explains that truth is favoured over virtue. His analysis also reports the importance of abstract rationality, analytical thinking and cognitive consistency in
low LTO cultures. Even so, fundamentalism and fanaticism are more likely to be present on the very end of the short-term pole (Hofstede et al., 2010). In contrast, there is less of a belief in absolute norms of good and evil in high LTO cultures (Hofstede, 2001).

3.6 Indulgence vs. restraint

Indulgence vs. restraint (IVR) is the one dimension that was solely discovered by Minkov (Hofstede et al., 2010). It is based on the WVS and is grounded in happiness as a central theme. Choosing happiness made sense as Rice and Steel (2004) mentioned that there are differences between countries regarding the level of subjective well-being (which is closely related to happiness), which even endure several generations of residence in another nation. IVR is not only composed of happiness but also includes the perceived level of life control and the importance of leisure time (Hofstede et al., 2010; p. 280). Accordingly, an indulgent society is one in which people are happy, feel that they are in control over what they want to do, and attribute high importance to leisure time. Life in a restrained society would resemble the opposite of this scenario. Hofstede and his colleagues (2010) also point to the similarity of the IVR dimension and the tight-loose distinction between cultures, where an indulgent society would show similarities to loose societies, which display less rigidity regarding social norms (Gelfand et al., 2011).

Another facet that is related to IVR is the importance of having friends and family. This is more essential in indulgent cultures (Hofstede et al., 2010). Further, these cultures are more likely to remember positive feelings (Kuppens et al., 2006) and to be satisfied with one’s family (Hofstede et al., 2010).

Further evidence focuses on the personality characteristics which accompany IVR. Based on McCrae’s (2002) data, Hofstede et al. (2010) add a positive correlation with extraversion and a negative correlation with neuroticism. Hofstede and his colleagues (2010) also derived a higher level of optimism and perceived health from the 2007 data from the Pew research centre. Additionally, indulgent societies place seemingly less value on thrift as a characteristic for children (Hofstede et al., 2010). Hence, it comes as no surprise that a negative correlation between IVR and LTO (new WVS-version) was found.

There are also implications when it comes to sexuality. By drawing on the data from Schmitt (2005), Hofstede et al. (2010) found that indulgent cultures rate higher in Sociosexuality, which means that members of those cultures are more prone to engage in casual and unrestricted sexual behaviours (Simpson & Gangestad, 1991).
Restraint cultures display the opposite of the attitudes mentioned above. They put a higher emphasis on moral discipline (Hofstede et al., 2010), yet they also display a higher degree of social cynicism (based on data from Bond et al., 2004). In addition to this, Hofstede et al. (2010) discovered a positive correlation between restraint societies and the perceived importance of maintaining political order. At the same time, they found a lower appreciation of freedom of speech in these same cultures.

4 The GLOBE research program

The GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness) research program is a large scale international programme, which includes researchers from several societies (House et al., 2004). Similar to Hofstede, the GLOBE associates try to enhance the understanding of culture with the creation of their etic dimensions of culture. These dimensions were derived from existing literature (House, 2004).

Even so, the GLOBE project adopted a particular perspective for this task. There was a special interest in leadership and the organisational level (House, 2004). Apart from the etic cultural dimensions, GLOBE also introduced six “culturally endorsed implicit leadership theories” (CLT; House, 2004, p. 14), which are charismatic/value-based leadership, team-oriented leadership, participative leadership, humane-oriented leadership, autonomous leadership and self-protective leadership. As with the different cultural dimensions, every society is supposed to have its particular preferences for some of these six behaviours. These preferences, in turn, determine how a leader needs to act in a society in order to be perceived as effective (Dorfman & House, 2004). GLOBE’s justification for this cultural perspective on leadership behaviour is that leaders are usually under the influence of the cultural values held by their society (House, 2004).

To justify the focus on organisations, GLOBE asserts that organisations lie within the boundaries of their society’s culture (House, 2004). This means that organisations should reflect the cultural properties of the respective society at least to some extent (Dickson et al., 2004). Reference has, amongst others, been made to Shane et al. (1995), who discovered that an organisation’s favoured championing approaches reflect the cultural norms of the society in which the organisation operates.

Data has been collected for cultural practices and values (Dickson et al., 2004). Cultural practices refer to how a society acts in reality. In contrast, cultural values are the ideals held by a society concerning certain matters (House, 2004). GLOBE’s empirical analysis has demon-
strated that the practices and values do interact to some extent, but that they are unique at the same time (Hanges & Dickson, 2004).

However, there is criticism about GLOBE’s approach. For instance, Hofstede (2011) argues that despite having 18 etic cultural dimensions, nine for values and nine for practices, the GLOBE dimension would again produce meta-dimensions that closely resemble Hofstede’s own dimensions in the end. Another point of criticism is the scale development of GLOBE. Peterson & Castro (2006) state that the GLOBE measures might have confounded the different levels of analysis.

Nonetheless, the GLOBE dimensions underwent a sound empirical analysis (e.g. Hanges & Dickson, 2004) and can, also due to their extent, be considered one of the more influential theories in conceptualizing cultures. Thus, the different dimensions will be explored in more detail below. The review of the individual etic dimensions will be limited to the aspects that are pertinent to this thesis. For a complete review, please refer to House et al.’s (2004) comprehensive publication. Moreover, the focus of the review will be on the cultural dimensions instead of the CLT-dimensions.

4.1 Performance orientation

Performance orientation is characterized by a culture’s positive emphasis on innovation, the amelioration of performance and the setting of challenging standards (Javidan, 2004). According to the related analysis, performance orientation values are the cultural values most esteemed compared to the other GLOBE dimensions. This means that every society which is part of the GLOBE research project would like to be even more performance-oriented than it currently is according to its practices (Javidan, 2004). However, it is pointed out that there are cultural differences in the perception of what constitutes successful performance. For example, when looking at national peculiarities of human resource management, Laurant (1986 as cited by Javidan, 2004, p. 242) mentions that different nations display different criteria for career success.

High performance orientation is related to several other kinds of characteristics. One of them is the relationship between performance orientation and social behaviour. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) investigated the structure of human values on a cross-cultural basis and discovered that achievement values are opposed to prosocial values. Prosocial values are defined by factors like helpfulness and forgiveness and are, therefore, close to GLOBE’s humane orientation dimension (Javidan, 2004), which will be presented later. The underlying argument is
that focusing on one’s own goals might lead to the negligence of other people’s concerns
(Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). Interestingly, there seems to be a positive relationship with hu-
mane-oriented leadership. Apart from that, Parsons and Shils (1962) stated that an individual
can judge another person based on that person’s situation-independent characteristics or per-
formance. Whenever the focus is on performance, the perceived person’s characteristics are of
less importance. They also assert that there are cultural preferences. Consequently, Javidan
(2004) states that there is a stronger focus on tasks and outcomes than on interpersonal bonds.
Hence, a strongly performance-oriented culture somewhat devalues the social aspects of soci-
ety.

Another point that merits attention is the implications of high performance-orientation on the
perception of the environment. Basically, high performance-orientation cultures are rather
prone to displaying an internal locus of control (Javidan, 2004; Rotter, 1966). This means that
the outcomes of a situation are rather attributed to the personal ability to perform instead of
higher external forces like luck. The latter would be more representative of an external locus
of control (Rotter, 1966). This means that members of high performance-orientation cultures
feel capable of influencing their environment and do not perceive themselves as mere toys of
unpredictable outside forces (Javidan, 2004).

A further factor is competitiveness (House et al., 1999; Javidan, 2004). As already described,
performance-orientation is accompanied by the setting of challenging goals and a constant
quest for improvement. Innovation is seen as a positive phenomenon. Moreover, there is em-
phasis on tasks and the ability to shape the environment. These are factors that can be seen as
conducive to higher levels of competitiveness. Indeed, Javidan (2004) points toward higher
country-level competitiveness for cultures that rate higher in performance orientation.

4.2 Future orientation

This dimension deals with the perception of time. By reviewing literature on the topic, Ash-
kanasy et al. (2004) state that there are three main different perspectives that can be applied
regarding time: past, present, and future. Future orientation describes the extent to which a
culture values and promotes future-oriented behaviour like planning and the ability to post-
pone gratification (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; House et al, 1999). On the contrary, a low score in
future orientation would reveal a tendency towards spontaneity and indulgence in short-term
pleasures, while not paying all too much attention to future events. For instance, Keogh et al.
(1999) found that the self-reported frequency of using alcohol, tobacco and drugs correlated
with a time-orientation focusing on the present. Those who focus more on the past than on present or future would be an extreme (Ashkanasy et al., 2004).

Planning and potentially strategizing are considered important in a society that rates high in future orientation. This is perceived as necessary to achieve future goals and is accompanied by an ability to exercise self-control (Ashkanasy et al., 2004). Past-oriented societies may also make plans, but, in contrast to future-oriented cultures, they evaluate the plans on the basis of criteria that are based in the past. Tradition and trying to avoid repeating mistakes are important, which leads to an emphasis on maintaining the current situational conditions, as long as they are deemed favourable (Ashkanasy et al., 2004). Only present-oriented societies seem to refrain from planning. Instead, they rely more heavily on other people (Ashkanasy et al., 2004).

When it comes to social life, a tendency towards future orientation includes a stronger inclination to build and maintain new social relationships (Ashkanasy et al., 2004). Even so, Öner (2000) argues that in the case of long-term relationships, people with higher future orientation experience less satisfaction in the relationship. Stronger concerns about future commitment are blamed for this as they call forth negative emotions. With regard to family, future orientation values positively correlate with rather appreciative attitudes towards one’s family and friends. On the other hand, future orientation practices appear to be negatively correlated with the same attitudes (Ashkanasy et al., 2004).

Another aspect which requires consideration is flexibility. As previously mentioned, past orientation and present orientation are predominantly concerned with the current state of affairs. Especially past orientation, with its appreciation of tradition, is interested in maintaining the given situational structure if it is perceived as positive. Future orientation, however, incurs a certain emphasis on the ability to adapt. Ashkanasy et al. (2004) found that research mentioned several characteristics which give a culture what they refer to as “adaptive capacity” (p. 299). In addition to this, they revealed that high future orientation values are related to a rejection of stability, at least at the political level. Moreover, high future orientation is seemingly related to optimism (Marko & Savickas, 1998), which is intuitively sensible as one might not be oriented towards the future if it is assumed to be mostly negative.

4.3 Gender egalitarianism

Gender egalitarianism deals with the roles of females and males. The dimension describes whether a culture ascribes largely different roles to men and women or whether role differ-
ences are reduced to a minimum (Emrich et al., 2004). Cultures which rate high in gender egalitarianism are those which follow the latter path (House et al., 1999). Accordingly, cultures which rate low in gender egalitarianism establish distinct roles for men and women. They avoid a convergence of the different personality characteristics of the two roles. In general, nurturing and affective qualities are attributed to the female gender role, whereas assertive qualities are part of the male gender role (Best et al., 1977; Emrich et al., 2004). Nonetheless, the natural differences between females and males are by far less dramatic than the constructed differences in gender roles suggest (Emrich et al., 2004).

Gender egalitarianism is related to a culture’s traditions. In particular, gender-role ideologies (Best & Williams, 1993) are important. They refer to what is perceived to be the correct relationship between women and men. Modern gender-role ideologies deem the equality of men and women to be correct (Best & Williams, 1993). This taps into the idea of gender egalitarianism. Traditional gender-role ideologies emphasise the difference between the two gender-roles, which predominantly leads to the male gender-role being seen as more important (Best & Williams, 1993). For example, the female gender-role includes the notions of weakness and submissiveness (Best et al., 1977). This traditional approach to gender-role ideology is associated with low gender egalitarianism.

Concerning the organisational level, gender egalitarianism is negatively related to the self-protective leadership style (Emrich et al., 2004). At least at the political level, there is a positive correlation between gender egalitarianism values and a call for empowerment.

4.4 Assertiveness

Assertiveness expresses the degree to which a culture rewards and promotes assertive behaviour (Den Hartog, 2004; House et al., 1999). This includes characteristics like (socially acceptable) aggressiveness, dominance and toughness. In contrast, a culture having a low score in assertiveness will favour non-assertive behaviours such as tenderness (Den Hartog, 2004). Assertiveness itself is considered to be a rather male trait (Den Hartog, 2004; Hofstede, 2001). Obviously, assertiveness has implications for the style of behaviour and communication. In his review, Den Hartog (2004) contrasts the assertive behavioural style with passive behaviour. Overall, assertive behaviour is demonstrated by rather direct communication. Openly communicating one’s mind and emotion as well as open disagreement are aspects of this. On the flip side, passive behaviour allows for compliance and being submissive to other people (Den Hartog, 2004). Besides this, assertive behaviour has a certain self-focus to it (Shoemaker
A further element which is pertinent to the assertive communication style is clear communication. Assertiveness is negatively related to the comfort felt with ambiguous language use (Holtgraves, 1992 as cited in Den Hartog, 2004). Another domain that is influenced by assertiveness is the social life. Assertiveness values were found to be positively correlated with respecting friends and family (Den Hartog, 2004). Regarding trust, Doney et al. (1998) argue that assertiveness (as a part of Hofstede’s (2001) masculinity-femininity dimension) favours the reliance on calculative trust. The idea is that assertiveness encourages opportunism. Indeed, assertiveness is accompanied by higher levels of competitiveness (Den Hartog, 2004). This might be the reason that calculative trust is in higher esteem in assertive cultures. Interestingly, at an economic level, national competitiveness levels are not significantly related to assertiveness (Den Hartog, 2004). Although the aspects mentioned in this paragraph draw a rather unsocial picture of assertive cultures, Den Hartog (2004) notes that assertiveness is also related to humane-oriented leadership.

The relationship between assertive cultures and their environment is another facet which requires attention. As indicated above, assertiveness includes a tendency to exert dominance. This applies to one’s external environment, as well. According to Rotter’s work (1966), assertive societies would display an internal locus of control, which means that they perceive themselves as able to control and transform their environment. Its counterpart, the external locus of control, would promote the fatalistic perception of being at the mercy of external forces without any noteworthy means of being able to change the environment (Rotter, 1966). Concerning the view of other people, assertive cultures believe that others are generally opportunistic (Doney et al., 1998), as was pointed out with regard to trust. Even so, the belief that the world is a predominantly just place prevails (Den Hartog, 2004).

High assertiveness is seemingly related to rationality (Rakos, 1991 as cited in Den Hartog, 2004). Den Hartog (2004) concludes that different rational processes underlie the expression of assertive behaviour, like situation-based decision making. Similar to rationality, pragmatism is another aspect which is tied to assertiveness (Den Hartog, 2004). Pragmatism is highlighted during assertiveness training and includes the idea that the specific person also needs to be able to restrain her- or himself from acting assertively if the situation deems other means to be more appropriate (Rakos, 1991 as cited in Den Hartog, 2004).
4.5 Institutional & in-group individualism–collectivism

The continuum of individualism and collectivism is a concept that has occupied researchers for a fair amount of time. In essence, it explains the relationships between individuals and groups (Gelfand et al., 2004). Gelfand et al.’s (2004) review reveals certain constant elements across the different articles. For instance, individualistic cultures perceive the individual as the smallest unit within their respective society. The single individual is supposed to be independent. In contrast, collectivistic cultures treat the group as the smallest unit within the culture. The single individual is interdependent. Gelfand et al. (2004) split this dimension in two: institutional individualism–collectivism and in-group individualism–collectivism. This was a novel move compared to most of the reviewed literature. Explaining these two subdimensions from the collectivistic pole, institutional collectivism describes the “degree to which institutions encourage and reward collective action and the collective distribution of resources” (Gelfand et al., 2004, p. 465). In-group collectivism expresses the loyalty, cohesiveness and pride displayed with concern to the particular in-group (e.g. organisation; Gelfand et al., 2004).

One point that is closely intertwined with individualism is autonomy. As already mentioned, in individualistic cultures, the individual is seen as independent whilst collective cultures think of the individual as interdependently embedded in the context of the group (Gelfand et al., 2004). This is also pertinent to the question of which goals will be pursued. While high individualism may prioritize the pursuit of individual goals in most cases, high collectivism means adhering to one’s groups’ goals, even at the expense of one’s individual ambitions. One example would be the empirical research undertaken by Davidson et al. (1976). While the assumingly more individualistic sample based decisions on their personal attitudes, the assumingly more collectivistic sample resorted to moral obligations as criteria for decision making. The former can be argued to be rather independent whereas the latter appears to stem from societal interdependence. Bond and Smith (1996) support this idea by asserting that collectivism is significantly related to conformity.

Another ideal that is strong in individualistic societies is the notion of equity. At least at the organisational layer, it is assumed that employees need to be paid according to their performance and skills. The idea of conducting a rational exchange is prevalent in individualistic cultures (Gelfand et al., 2004). If the organisation is unable to offer the respective employee what he needs or perceives as fair, the employee may leave the organisation to look for another employer elsewhere, given that the new employer would serve the employee’s needs better.
(Gelfand et al., 2004). Thus, the notion of equity and rationality prevails in individualistic societies.

The degree of how individualistic or collectivistic a culture is obviously has a profound impact on the way a culture deals with certain matters. Collectivism is by far more concerned with the importance of groups within a society and the importance of families. This is reasonable, as the items for measuring collectivism include exactly these aspects (Gelfand et al., 2004). In contrast, individualistic cultures favour rationality over the relatedness within groups. Collective cultures are much more likely to prioritize relationships even if these relationships offer little or no benefit to the particular individual (Kim et al., 1994 as cited in Gelfand et al., 2004). In addition to this and as already mentioned above, Bond and Smith (1996) confirmed that conformism was higher in collectivistic societies than in individualistic societies. In fact, people would even conform if they knew that their choice would not be brought to the attention of the group.

4.6 Power distance

Even though this dimension of GLOBE carries the same name as one of Hofstede’s (2001) dimensions, the authors emphasised slightly different elements and related factors of power distance. Power distance measures the degree of how willingly a culture accepts and promotes differences in power distribution in its society. This includes the acceptance and promotion of status privileges and of authority itself (Carl et al., 2004). This can apply to positions of power but also to more tangible assets, such as money. Thus, cultures rating high in power distance see no major issue in having power and related resources concentrated at the top of their hierarchy. Cultures rating low in power distance, on the other hand, do favour a more egalitarian approach to distributing power and related resources and dislike unjustifiable concentrations of power.

With regard to the social aspects of life, high power distance has a certain amount of influence. The existence of social classes is one aspect. Carl et al. (2004) assert that these can be maintained by the means of moral discipline and a lack of integration efforts. Concerning family, Carl et al. (2004) unveiled that a culture rating high in its use of power distance practices elicits more respect for friends and family. At least for families, this appears to be reasonable as the family itself may be seen as a hierarchical construct in these societies. This idea of family can also be applied to the realm of organisations. Carl et al. (2004) state that power distance correlates positively with the perceived effectiveness of self-protective and humane-oriented
leadership. While the first seems congruent, as it serves the preservation of power, the latter, despite its sole reliance on power distance values, seems to be somewhat counterintuitive. However, Carl et al. (2004) interpret this in the sense of paternalistic leadership styles, which is still a relatively hierarchical approach to humane-oriented leadership.

The darker side of high power distance is corruption, which Carl et al. (2004) did not fail to mention. Indeed, Veblen (2005) points to the confusion of business ends and politics which might as well lead to “corrupt politics” (p. 128). As cultures with high power distance scores generally appreciate power, one can conclude logically that one would increase his or her power if the opportunity to do so existed. This makes corruption a more likely phenomenon in societies with higher levels of power distance. Apart from corruption, competition is another way of increasing power. Competition behaviour varies depending on whether power distance values or power distance practices are strong in a culture. In the case of high power distance values, the social support for competition seems to be stronger, whereas in the case of high power practices, social discouragement appears to take place instead (Carl et al., 2004).

The perception of and interaction with the environment is a further element influenced by power distance. By drawing on Schwartz’s (1999) hierarchy dimension, Carl et al. (2004) state that cultures which score high in power distance tend to structure their environment by establishing hierarchies. This is supposed to provide order, as, according to Schwartz (1999), individuals are assigned certain roles and are expected to act as required by that particular role. Apart from the tendency to impose hierarchies, high power distance is accompanied by a relatively unflattering view of the environment. By comparing power distance with the other GLOBE dimensions, Carl et al. (2004) conclude that “…strong hierarchical power practices are associated with an environment in which self-interest is pursued without any emotional involvement in the group.” (p. 545). They also state that humanism cannot be expected.

4.7 Humane orientation

GLOBE’s humane orientation is composed of kindness, caring, generosity, friendliness, altruism, fairness and the degree to which a society rewards and promotes the expression of these characteristics (House et al., 1999; Kabasakal & Bodur, 2004). A culture rating high in humane orientation would favour these characteristics, whereas a culture which scores low in humane orientation would not.

Higher levels of humane orientation encourage a certain mode of interacting at a culture’s social level. Kabasakal and Bodur (2004) link high humane orientation to higher levels of
Güngör (1997 as cited in Kabasakal & Bodur, 2004) identified five forms of social support, which are instrumental support (e.g. financial resources), social companionship, emotional support, esteem support, and informational support. Despite this idea of a rather supportive society, Kabasakal and Bodur (2004) concluded, on the basis of related literature, that societies with a high humane orientation tolerated the fact that the organisations’ main focus was on accumulating profit. In contrast, societies with low humane orientation were reluctant to treat social life as if it were a mere assemblage of economic transactions. On the one hand, this seems controversial, especially as Kabasakal and Bodur (2004) also conclude that low humane orientation is accompanied by a focus on tasks. On the other hand, they also state that humane-orientation practices are positively correlated with liberal thinking (as opposed to a preference for socialism). Kabasakal and Bodur (2004) attempt to resolve this issue by arguing that socialist politics is necessary to support those living in cultures with low humane orientation since supportive behaviour cannot be expected from other people in the society.

Cultures which display high levels of humane orientation also demonstrate a lower emphasis on the self. One example would be Schwartz (1992) who contrasts self-transcendence values, which are close to the concept of GLOBE’s humane orientation, with self-enhancement values. The former endorses universalism and benevolence, whereas the latter promotes hedonism to a certain extent and encourages the endeavour for power and achievement (Schwartz, 1992). Another study by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) confirmed that prosocial values, which are again close to the elements comprising GLOBE’s humane orientation, are opposed by achievement and enjoyment. In addition to this, Kabasakal and Bodur (2004) mention that high humane orientation values and practices are positively related to the perceived effectiveness of humane-oriented leadership, while high humane orientation values are at the same time negatively linked to the perceived effectiveness of self-protective leadership. Overall, these findings offer the suggestion that helping and caring for others is more appreciated than developing one’s self and furthering one’s own causes in high humane-oriented cultures.

### 4.8 Uncertainty avoidance

Although this GLOBE dimension carries the same name as one of Hofstede’s (2001) dimensions, the authors highlighted slightly different facets and related aspects of uncertainty avoidance. Uncertainty avoidance as defined by GLOBE basically describes a culture’s level of comfort towards ambiguity and the degree to which it establishes laws and rules in order to
limit perceived uncertainty (Sully de Luque & Javidan, 2004). Thus, a culture with a high uncertainty avoidance score will try to escape ambiguity and cherish rules and laws. Low uncertainty avoidance would imply a society that tolerates ambiguity and attributes less importance to having an abundance of laws and rules.

The reliance of uncertainty avoidant cultures on rules merits further attention. On the basis of Budner’s (1962) research, Sully de Luque & Javidan (2004) point out that the emphasis on rules is not the offspring of uncertainty avoidance but rather a part of it. However, caution is necessary since Budner focuses on uncertainty avoidance as a personality trait on the individual level. Nevertheless, it appears to be reasonable to assume that uncertainty avoidance and rule orientation also correspond at the cultural level, at least as a coping mechanism. Furnham and Ribchester (1995) also expect the individual-level intolerance towards ambiguity to be related to the culture-level avoidance of uncertainty, though they do differentiate between ambiguity and uncertainty. Perrow (1972 as cited in Sully de Luque & Javidan, 2004, p. 606) suggests that rules within an organization serve the purpose of stabilizing an unpredictable organisational environment. In the end, this means that high uncertainty avoidance leads to structuring efforts by the means of rules to safeguard against uncertainty. This not only applies to the immediate situation but also to future undertakings. In reference to Zhao (2000), it was noted that societies rating high in uncertainty avoidance tend to focus on the long term (Sully de Luque & Javidan, 2004). This is done by focusing on long-term relationships in particular (Zhao, 2000). Further support for this idea comes from Doney et al. (1998), who suggest that trust is higher in high uncertainty avoidance cultures.

Another element of uncertainty avoidance is anxiety. Sully de Luque and Javidan (2004) criticize Hofstede’s (2001) uncertainty avoidance index for focusing on stress too much. They explicitly state that the GLOBE dimension is not identical with Hofstede’s index. Supportive empirical evidence in the form of correlations is provided (Sully de Luque & Javidan, 2004). Nonetheless, Sully de Luque and Javidan (2004) mention several studies (e.g. Lynn & Martin, 1995) which relate anxiety or neuroticism to (Hofstede’s) uncertainty avoidance. This might partially explain why secrecy is, at least in the financial sector, positively related to uncertainty avoidance (Salter & Niswander, 1995). If one is anxious and distrustful of the world, he or she might not want to be too visible to the outside world, leaving him or her open to attack.

Finally, the social implications of uncertainty avoidance need to be considered. A remarkable difference between uncertainty avoidance values and practices has to be noted here. According to Sully de Luque and Javidan (2004), uncertainty avoidance values relate negatively to competitiveness, whereas uncertainty avoidance practices demonstrate a positive correlation
with competitiveness. Similarly, from a political perspective, uncertainty avoidance values imply higher passiveness and a lack of voice, while uncertainty avoidance practices demonstrate the opposite. Based on data from Inglehart and Baker (2000), Sully de Luque and Javidan (2004) uncovered a negative correlation of uncertainty avoidance values with traditionalism and the inverse for uncertainty avoidance practices. Moreover, uncertainty avoidance values correlate positively with the perception that humane-oriented leadership style is effective (Sully de Luque & Javidan, 2004). Again, the opposite is true for uncertainty avoidance practices. Hence, uncertainty avoidance values emphasise rather passive facets, whilst uncertainty avoidance practices highlight facets that can be seen as more active. However, both values and practices of uncertainty avoidance are positively linked to a positive perception of self-protective leadership (Sully de Luque & Javidan, 2004). Although Stohl’s study (1993 as cited in Sully de Luque & Javidan, 2004, p. 613) suffers from insignificance, its findings further suggest a focus on formal aspects instead of inter-personal ones.

5 Shalom H. Schwartz and his cultural dimensions

Schwartz is a US-Israeli researcher with an active interest in culture and the concept of value. His work focuses on individual-level (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz, 1992) as well as culture-level values (Schwartz, 1994; 1999).

At the individual level, he identified a set of ten values which surface across different cultures. Attention was paid to the similar understanding of the used terms across cultures (Schwartz, 1994). These values were grouped in four higher level values, which in turn formed two dimensions with the four values representing one of the poles of these dimensions (e.g. Schwartz, 1992).

While Schwartz’s individual-level values are well-appreciated by research, the more important aspect of his work for this thesis is his conceptualization of the values at the cultural level. Similar to the values at the individual level, Schwartz identified seven values that are represented across cultures (Schwartz, 1994; 1999). Again, Schwartz (e.g. 2006) divided these values into three dimensions in which the different values posed the respective poles of the individual dimensions. Even though some of the culture value groups seem to be more reliable than others, there is overall support for Schwartz’s concept (Ralston et al., 2011).

What is most intriguing is that the same questionnaire can be used to assess both the individual-level and the culture-level values (Schwartz, 2009). The way in which the analytical evaluation of the questions is performed determines whether the values are computed for the indi-
vidual level or the cultural level. This idea of having the same values which may eventually carry different terms at different levels of analysis conforms to Fischer’s (2009) notion of *non-isomorphism*. 

Schwartz is further concerned with *value consensus* (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000), which he distinguishes from *value importance*. Value importance exhibits the overall significance attributed to a particular value at an aggregated level. In contrast, value consensus states how unanimously the particular group arrived at this rating of significance (i.e. Does everyone agree on the same importance or does the importance merely represent the average of a widespread array of different opinions on it?) (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000). This point of value consensus led Schwartz to alter his original definition of culture. Considering findings that demonstrate that values vary more within than across countries, he states that culture should be considered as a part of external institutions instead of being assumed to be part of the respective cultural members’ internal mindsets (Schwartz, 2014). Culture, thereby, is created by the influence which these institutions exert on the individual.

Having dealt with the basic ideas that underlie the overall concept of Schwartz’s etic cultural dimensions, the emphasis shall now be on the different dimensions themselves. Figure 1 as provided by Schwartz (2006) gives a brief insight into the configuration of Schwartz’s values. It is an exemplary overview of the concept and the exact position of its lines might slightly vary according to which culture it is applied.

*Figure 1: Schwartz’s concept of culture (Schwartz, 2006)*
The dimensions are formed by taking two opposing value groups (e.g. hierarchy and egalitarianism) which then become the two poles of the cultural dimension. Autonomy has been split into intellectual and affective autonomy but form one pole together. Apart from these antagonistic relationships, Schwartz (1994; 1999) emphasises the complementary nature of values. In Figure 1, this is represented by the proximity of different value groups. If they border each other, they can be considered complementary (e.g. hierarchy and mastery). In the following sections, the three arising dimensions will be explained in more detail.

5.1 Autonomy-embeddedness

This dimension deals with the issue of how the individual relates to the group (Schwartz, 1999). This includes two sub-issues. One is whether the interests of the individual or the interests of groups are considered more important with regard to a case of conflict of interests. The second sub-issue is the level of embeddedness of an individual within a group as opposed to his or her independence (Schwartz, 1994; 1999). Schwartz (1999) explicitly perceives the latter sub-issue as more essential.

The autonomy value group resides on one pole of this dimension. Cultures which favour autonomy allow individuals to pursue their own ambitions. They do not constrain an individual’s thoughts or feelings. Moreover, the identity of a cultural member is largely independent from that particular individual’s group membership (Schwartz, 1994; 1999). Group membership is mostly based on the self-interest of the respective individuals (Schwartz, 1994) and self-expression is encouraged (Schwartz, 1999). As pointed out in Chapter 5, autonomy can be split in two sub-groups, which are intellectual and affective autonomy. Intellectual autonomy describes how favourably the independent pursuit of individual ideas and intellectual interests is seen in a society (Schwartz, 1999). It is composed of the values of freedom, creativity, broadmindedness, and curiosity (Schwartz, 1995; 2009). Affective autonomy, in turn, focuses on a culture’s promotion of the individual pursuit of positive emotional experiences (Schwartz, 1999). The values of pleasure, exciting lifestyle, varied lifestyle, life enjoyment, and self-indulgence accompany affective autonomy (Schwartz, 1995; 2009). Affective autonomy is complementary to mastery, whereas intellectual autonomy is complementary to egalitarianism values (Schwartz, 1994).
Autonomy values have also been shown to influence workplace behaviour. Smith et al. (2002) revealed a positive link between autonomy and the likelihood of relying on participation-oriented sources of guidance (e.g. consulting someone who is not a superior) in several work situations. Their findings also include a negative correlation of autonomy with the choice of widespread national beliefs as sources of guidance. Schwartz (1999) further presumes a negative relationship between affective autonomy and the centrality of work in one’s life. He further suggests that intellectual autonomy might correlate with the view of work as entitlement (as opposed to obligation). In addition to this, he assumes both sub-types of autonomy to be positively related to intrinsic work values but only intellectual autonomy to be concurrently, negatively related to extrinsic work values.

On a nationwide basis, autonomy correlates positively with socioeconomic development, democratization, and women’s equality but exhibits a negative correlation with the average size of households (Schwartz, 2006). For intellectual autonomy in particular, Schwartz (2006) found a positive link with both membership in voluntary organizations and political activism. There is also an impact of autonomous values on family life. Schwartz (2006) reports that autonomous cultures perceive imagination as an important trait for children to learn but oppose obedience and hard work in this regard. In addition to this, he reports that societies ranking high in autonomy do not encourage respecting one’s parents without consideration of their qualities and flaws, nor do these societies emphasise the importance of religion.

Embeddedness, formerly known as conservatism (Schwartz, 1994) is on the opposite pole of this dimension. Societies which promote embeddedness values perceive a single cultural member first and foremost as a part of groups and society (Schwartz, 1994; 1999). Hence, individuals are not allowed to act as they wish but are usually restrained by the interests and rules of the group. Appropriateness of behaviour according to tradition as well as group order is stressed. Maintenance of the current situation and circumstances is perceived as important. The identity of the single cultural member derives from his or her belongingness to groups (Schwartz, 1994; 1999). Embedded cultures emphasise the values of social order and security, politeness and forgiveness, wisdom, respect for tradition as well as parents and elders, obedience and devoutness, reciprocation of favours, self-discipline and moderation, saving face, and cleanliness (Schwartz, 1995; 2009). Nonetheless, Knafo et al. (2009) further ascertained that high embeddedness correlates negatively with the propensity to help needy individuals outside one’s in-group. This holds true for wealthy as well as developing countries. They attribute this discovery to the predominant concern of members of embedded cultures with the welfare of the in-group, whereas there is little concern for out-group individuals. As for the
relationship with the other cultural value groups, embeddedness is complementary to harmony and hierarchy (Schwartz, 1994; 1999).

Embeddedness values can also prove influential in work situations. For instance, embeddedness seems to encourage reliance on hierarchical sources of guidance (e.g. consulting with one’s superior) for accomplishing work tasks (Smith et al., 2002). Furthermore, beliefs which are widespread within a nation seem to be a favoured source of guidance. Schwartz (1999) adds that the assumption of embeddedness is negatively linked to work centrality. Moreover, he presumes that embedded cultures perceive work more as an obligation than an entitlement. Additionally, he suggests a negative correlation of embeddedness with intrinsic work values and a positive correlation with extrinsic work values.

At a national level, embeddedness shows a strong, negative relationship with socioeconomic development, democratization as well as women’s equality, and a considerable positive relationship with the average size of households (Schwartz, 2006). Furthermore, there is a negative correlation with membership in voluntary organisations as well as political activism.

In the sphere of family, Schwartz (2006) implies that embeddedness correlates positively with the traits of hard work and obedience and negatively with imagination when it comes to the important characteristics a child should learn. Further, his results connote an encouragement to respect one’s parents without regard for their qualities and flaws. The importance of religion is also higher in embedded cultures.

5.2 Hierarchy-egalitarianism

The underlying issue of this dimension is how the different cultural members coordinate with each other. One aspect of this challenge is the handling of mutual dependencies. This includes the consideration of the other members’ wellbeing and responsibility to maintain social structures (Schwartz, 1999).

Hierarchy can be one method of managing the aforementioned issue. Cultures ranking high in hierarchical values utilize, as the name implies, hierarchical order to define relationships within society (Schwartz, 1994; 1999). Schwartz (1999) further mentions that this includes the ascription of roles, which are accompanied by certain requirements and rights. Cultural members are expected to live up to the requirements of their roles and are castigated if they fail to do so. Furthermore, he states that those cultures which adhere to hierarchy values tend to legitimize inequalities in the distribution of power, resources, and roles. A society designed by the means of hierarchical elements embraces the values of social power, wealth, authority,
humbleness, and influence (Schwartz, 1995; 2009). Hierarchy complements mastery and embeddedness (Schwartz, 1994; 1999).

Hierarchical values also shape the sphere of work. Smith et al. (2002) posit that members of hierarchical societies tend to rely on hierarchical sources of guidance when handling different work tasks. Further, their empirical results state a positive correlation between hierarchy and the employment of prevalent national beliefs as sources of guidance. Schwartz (1999) further suggests that hierarchy-oriented cultures may favour work centrality, while at the same time rendering work itself an obligation. He assumes that power and extrinsic work values are essential in such cultures, whereas there should be opposition towards social work values. Schwartz (2006) also points out that competitiveness is rather cherished in hierarchy-oriented societies.

Taking the analysis to the national level, Schwartz (2006) uncovered a negative link of hierarchy with socioeconomic development, democratization, and several elements of women’s equality but a positive link with the average size of a household. He also unveiled a negative correlation with political activism.

At the family level, hierarchy also has profound implications. Hierarchy implies concern for teaching children the value of hard work and ensuring the maintenance of respect towards parents regardless of their faults and merits (Schwartz, 2006). According to Schwartz (2006), religion is also seen as essential.

The opposing value within this dimension would be egalitarianism. Egalitarian cultures are concerned with promoting the equality of all their cultural members (Schwartz, 1994; 1999). Moreover, Schwartz (1994; 1999) delineates that there is an emphasis on the voluntary support of others’ welfare. Thus, there is a strong social element to egalitarianism, which includes the endorsement of cooperation (Schwartz, 1999). Self-centred interests need to be put aside in order to contribute to society as a whole. Values endorsed by egalitarian cultures are equality, social justice, loyalty, honesty, helpfulness, and responsibility (Schwartz, 1995; 2009). Egalitarianism is complementary to harmony and intellectual autonomy (Schwartz, 1994; 1999).

Egalitarian values also affect how work is approached in a culture. Smith et al. (2002) state that the use of participative sources of guidance is preferred when dealing with different work events. Their findings further predicate a negative correlation of egalitarianism and the use of widespread beliefs of a nation as sources of guidance. Apart from that, Schwartz (1999) presumes that egalitarian societies encourage the notion of work as an entitlement but also discourage work centrality. Considering different work values, Schwartz (1999) assumes power-
related work values to be shunned in favour of social work values in these societies. In line with this, competition is negatively related to egalitarianism (Schwartz, 2006).

At a national level, egalitarianism relates positively to socioeconomic development, democratization, and several aspects of women’s equality, as well as negatively to average household size (Schwartz, 2006). Schwartz (2006) further mentions membership in voluntary organisations and political activism as positively correlated to egalitarianism.

Egalitarian values do not leave the realm of family untouched. Schwartz (2006) disseminates that egalitarianism deemphasises the characteristic of hard work in child rearing and further correlates negatively with paying respect to one’s parents while disregarding their flaws and merits. However, according to his findings, religion is of low essentiality.

5.3 Mastery-harmony

The last major issue that Schwartz (1999) conceives as challenging for cultures is how their members deal with their social and natural environments. More specifically, this implies the question of how extensively cultural members willingly attempt to change their environment in order to serve their causes.

One of the dimensional poles is occupied by mastery values. As hinted by the name, cultures tending towards the mastery end of this dimension are prone to altering their social and natural environments (Schwartz, 1994; 1999). Schwartz postulates that this is done in an assertive, active, and exploitative manner. According to him, this exploitation of one’s surroundings does occur for the sake of the group, but especially for individual goals. This cultural acceptance of single cultural members furthering their own causes leads to the individual quest of surpassing other people (Schwartz, 1994; 1999). The values espoused by mastery-oriented cultures are social recognition, independence, ambitiousness, daringness, influence, autonomous choice of goals, capability and competence, and success (Schwartz, 1995; 2009). Mastery may complement affective autonomy and hierarchy (Schwartz, 1994; 1999).

There exist several implications for work life. Intriguingly, the mastery values tend to lead cultural members to refer to hierarchical sources of guidance when handling different work tasks (Smith et al., 2002). There also seems to be a negative correlation with mastery and the utilization of specialists as sources of guidance (Smith et al., 2002). Moreover, Schwartz (1999) assumes that mastery stresses work centrality and power-related work values, while relating negatively to the adoption of social work values. Additionally, Schwartz’s (2006) findings indicate a favourable attitude of mastery-oriented societies towards competition.
Mastery values also incur effects at the national level. Schwartz (2006) indicates a negative relationship with democratization as well as some factors of women’s equality. He further discovered a positive relationship between mastery and average household size.

An impact on family life can also be observed. Regarding the upbringing of children, mastery-oriented cultures seemingly advocate the value of hard work and selfishness (Schwartz, 2006). Moreover, parents are treated with respect in spite of their flaws and qualities and religion is seen as important.

The harmony value group lies at the diametrical pole of this dimension. Instead of exploiting the environment, the focus of harmonic societies is on adapting to the environment and leaving it as it is (Schwartz, 1994; 1999). As explained by Schwartz (1994), this is valid for the natural environment but also applies to the social environment. Unsurprisingly, he mentions that peace becomes important in these societies. In spite of the lack of cultural prescriptions regarding the independence of the individual, harmonious cultures demand their cultural members to go beyond the fulfilment of mere self-interests (Schwartz, 1994), which is reasonable as these might incur conflict in a society. Cultures which embrace harmony hold world peace, unity with nature, a beauty-focused perception of the world (e.g. beauty of nature), and environmental protection in high esteem (Schwartz, 1995; 2009). Apart from this, Knafo et al.’s (2009) research indicates a positive link between the cultural value group of harmony and the willingness to help strangers in need. Regarding the link with other cultural value groups, harmony might complement the embeddedness and egalitarianism value groups (Schwartz, 1994; 1999).

Concerning work-related issues, Smith et al. (2002) establish a relationship between harmony and the preferred use of participative sources of guidance for several work tasks. According to them, there is, furthermore, a more specific link to the use of specialists as sources of guidance. Schwartz (1999) also believes that harmonic cultures discourage work centrality and power-related work goals and instead prioritize social work goals. Competition is of marginal importance at best (Schwartz, 2006).

There are further effects for the nation as a whole. As indicated by Schwartz’s (2006) research, harmony is positively correlated with democratization and some facets of women’s equality. Yet, his findings simultaneously demonstrate that harmony is negatively correlated with the average size of households.

Concerning the family, Schwartz’s (2006) research suggests that, with regards to child rearing qualities, hard work is deemphasised while unselfishness is highlighted in harmonious socie-
ties. Further, it is reported that unconditional respect towards one’s parents and religion both remain relatively unappreciated.

6 Gelfand and colleagues – Tight & loose cultures

Apart from participating in the GLOBE study (House et al., 2004), Gelfand also tries to bring another etic cultural dimension back to the attention of researchers around the globe. Pelto (1968 as cited in Gelfand et al., 2011, p. 1100) has probably been the first to lay the empirical cornerstone for the establishment of this dimension. It distinguishes whether social norms of a culture can be considered to be tight or loose. A society, scoring high in tightness will have strong, clear norms in order to restrain its members and will enforce them with the threat of punishment for disobeying. In comparison, a loose society will have rather weak, ambiguous societal norms and is more tolerant towards deviations from these norms (Gelfand et al., 2011). These characteristics exhibit a noticeable overlap with Hofstede et al’s (2010) indulgence vs. restraint dimension. In this respect, tightness would be related to the restraint pole, whereas looseness displays a certain commonality with the indulgence pole.

It appears that external factors were pertinent to the development of a culture’s level of tightness. For example, Barry et al. (1959) found that cultures with subsistent economies tend to display tight values with regard to child rearing practices (e.g. obedience). In their review, Gelfand et al. (2011) argue that these kinds of findings indicate that higher need for social coordination spurs the formation of a tight society. They further suggest environmental threats as one potential driving force for the need of social coordination.

The impact of tightness-looseness appears to be pervasive. Higher latitude for members of loose cultures can be taken as one facet, which stems from the properties of this dimension. This is only reasonable since looseness is defined by relatively few social norms (Gelfand et al., 2011). Gelfand and her colleagues (2011) underscore this idea by drawing on Arnett’s (1995) theoretical considerations. Accordingly, tightness causes a narrow socialization, which means that cultural members are restricted in their way of behaving, thinking, and acting. In contrast, loose societies are accompanied by broad socialization and, thus, allow a broader array of options for the respective cultural member to conduct herself or himself. However, tight cultures also restrict latitude by the means of more autocratic governments, fewer political rights and civil liberties, a higher number of laws and punishments, and the like (Gelfand et al., 2011). Moreover, Gelfand and associates (2011) draw on research from Norenzayan
and Shariff (2008) and imply the presence of more religious norms in tight societies. Even so, the number of collective activities is lower in tight cultures (Gelfand et al., 2011).

The abundance of restrictions in tight societies obviously has implications for the sort of situation in which an individual needs to navigate in everyday life. Kitayama (2002) supports this by proposing that the consideration of situational and contextual factors is vital for the revelation of a culture’s properties. Gelfand et al. (2011) compare tightness and looseness to strong and weak everyday situations (Mischel, 1977). Tight cultures would incur a higher amount of strong situations, which are characterized by a lower amount of permissible behaviour, a high likelihood to encounter censoring, and constraints on free choice. Loose cultures would, consequently, coincide with weak situations, which resemble the opposite of what has been described as strong situations. This comparison receives additional support from Goffman (1963) and Boldt (1978). Constant confrontation with culturally constructed situations may, in turn, influence the individual’s psyche (Kitayama et al., 1997). Evidence provided by Higgins (1987) suggests that strong situations may cause higher levels of anxiety. Consequently, anxiety levels in tight societies might be elevated due to the prevalence of strong situations in everyday life. This is also implied by Gelfand et al. (2011), who state that a constant fear of punishment may arise as a result thereof.

Another point of interest is tight cultures’ concern with structuring the environment. Gelfand et al. (2011) draw on data from Neuberg & Newsom (1993) to assert that tightness is associated with a higher need for structure. They also refer to Baumeister and Heatherton (1996) in order to present a relationship between tightness and self-regulatory capability. Since self-monitoring is important for self-regulation, the former statement is underpinned by a relationship between tightness and higher levels of self-monitoring as perceived by Gelfand and her colleagues (2011) on the basis of Snyder’s (1974) research. Being able to withstand impulses might eventually consolidate the existing structures’ stability. Another factor which supports the social structures of tight cultures is their inclination towards dutifulness and conformism (Boldt, 1979).

7 Explaining Machiavellianism

While the cultural dimensions presented in Chapters 3 to 6 are obviously culture-level constructs, Machiavellianism is a psychological construct which operates at the individual level. Thus, the unit of analysis as chosen by research has been the individual so far.
Machiavellianism is comprised of several characteristics and implications, the most pertinent of which will be presented in the following sections. Christie and Geis (1970a) conceptualized Machiavellianism as a unidimensional construct, which, however, contains different aspects. Although there is criticism that these facets of Machiavellianism should be rendered multiple dimensions (Fehr et al., 1992; Nelson & Gilbertson, 1991), it appears to be most reasonable to adhere to Christie and Geis’s (1970a) original approach for this thesis’s purpose. However, the scope of this thesis is limited, which is why only some of the facets of Machiavellianism can be reviewed. For a more complete review, the reader may want to refer to Christie & Geis’s (1970a) book on the topic and the review articles by Fehr et al. (1992) as well as Jones and Paulhus (2009). Next, a definition of the construct, including a brief overview of the origins of Machiavellianism, will be presented. After that, different aspects of Machiavellianism will be discussed.

7.1 The definition and origins of Machiavellianism

“... [a prince] should not deviate from what is good, if that is possible, but he should know how to do evil, if that is necessary.” (Machiavelli, 1532, p. 57f)

Christie and Geis’s (1970c, p. 350) basic definition of Machiavellianism will be employed. Accordingly, an individual high in Machiavellianism is emotionally detached. He or she will follow self-chosen targets, while ignoring his or her own or other’s affective condition. When approaching a problem, a person rating high in Machiavellianism will use logical rationality and evaluate the different possibilities on the basis of their potential outcomes. The most promising action will be chosen, which could easily include manipulative tactics. Overall, the societal levels of Machiavellianism seem to increase over time, while an individual’s Mach score appears to decrease with ongoing age (Christie & Geis, 1970a). Machiavellianism is also one of the three characteristics which are part of what is called the Dark Triad of personalities (the other two traits being sub-clinical narcissism and sub-clinical psychopathology; Paulhus & Williams, 2002). For the sake of clarity, individuals scoring high in Machiavellianism will be referred to as high Machs, while their counterparts will be termed low Machs.

In order to better understand Machiavellianism, it is advisable to get at least a short glimpse of its origins. The construct is based on the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli (Christie & Geis, 1970a), a Florentine, political writer and former politician who lived during the turn of the 15th century (Belliotti, 1978).
When starting his career for the government of Florence, Machiavelli was one of the people in charge of foreign affairs, including matters of war. However, after a revolutionary change of Florentine political leadership he lost his occupation and was falsely accused of conspiring against the new government (Beavan, 2013). What followed was imprisonment, torture, and finally exile. He was not allowed to return to Florence’s political arena, which led him to write several books, some of which were political treatises. Machiavelli’s political writing was characterized by a utilitarian and disillusioned style which pushed morality aside. He stressed the ends, not the means, which he saw as constrained by necessity (Belliotti, 1978). This and public misconception of the underlying purpose of it were probably the main reason why he and his work were later demonized (Belliotti, 1978). Even so, it seems that Machiavelli himself was not particularly evil. Instead, his pessimistic view of the world presumably stemmed from his traumatizing experiences inside prison as well as his experience with the political environment of that time. Machiavelli was occupied with capturing the harsh reality rather than how reality should ideally be (Beavan, 2013; Belliotti, 1978). Moreover, a point that is often overlooked is that Machiavelli was concerned with the public welfare, which justifies deception and manipulation when seeking the greater good of the subjects (Belliotti, 1978; Leonard, 1984; Machiavelli, 1531; 1532). Indeed, it seems that politicians still perceive Machiavelli’s advice as applicable in today’s society (Beavan, 2013). His most famous books are *The Prince* and the *Discorsi*.

In the 20th century, Christie and Geis (1970a) created a questionnaire based on the two aforementioned books of Niccolò Machiavelli (Christie, 1970b). The items should help to gauge the propensity of subjects to agree with Machiavelli’s ideas and their likelihood of acting on them. This new psychological construct was named *Machiavellianism* (Christie & Geis, 1970a; Christie, 1970a). They revised the original questionnaire several times (Christie, 1970b). Eventually, the *Mach IV* and *Mach V* questionnaire were created, which were used by several researchers to measure Machiavellianism in their subjects from then on. Today, Machiavellianism is a well established concept in academic research (e.g. Jones & Paulhus, 2009).

Having briefly discussed the definition of Machiavellianism as well as its origin, there is but one more thing which still requires attention in order to avoid confusion. There is another concept named after Niccolò Machiavelli, called *Machiavellian intelligence*. Although Wilson et al. (1996) imply a link with Machiavellianism, Machiavellian intelligence is based on a different theory as well as a different field of research and constitutes, therefore, a distinct construct. Machiavellian intelligence tries to explain the reason for the development of the human brain and mentality. The theory is based on observations of grand apes. The underly-
ing argument is that living in groups required new social skills in order to survive, which exerted evolutionary pressure on our predecessors to develop this kind of intelligence, which concurrently resulted in the further development of our brains (Byrne, 1995; Byrne & Whiten, 1997). Accordingly, this form of co-habitation allowed and encouraged social manipulations and political demeanour (Byrne, 1995). For instance, Byrne reports that grand apes were found to engage in alliance formation and acts of revenge. However, the emergence and use of Machiavellian intelligence may not resolve all of the questions when it comes to the development of the human brain and survival success (Byrne, 1996; Byrne & Whiten, 1997; Schmitt & Grammer, 1997). To conclude, Machiavellian intelligence is concerned with the explanation of evolutionary processes and, thus, is part of evolutionary research, whereas Machiavellianism deals with the characteristics of human individuals and is part of psychological research. These characteristics will be further discussed in the sections below.

7.2 Establishing structure to counter ambiguity

“The main foundations of every state ... are good laws and good arms...”
(Machiavelli, 1532, p. 40)

Geis and Christie (1970) distilled that high Mach persons actively try to establish and control structure in different experiments. In a similar vein, Geis (1970b) conducted a game experiment in which high Mach persons even forewent power positions in order to lure another person into a more stable coalition. Additionally, Bogart et al. (1970) demonstrated that a high Mach individual’s willingness to cheat is lower in situations with higher risk (of being caught). Nonetheless, Geis (1970a) unveiled the superior performance of individuals displaying high levels of Machiavellianism compared to those rating lower in Machiavellianism in situations with a higher degree of uncertainty. Additional support is provided by Shultz (1993). Geis and Christie (1970) suppose that intrinsic motivation is higher for high Mach individuals in these situations, which explains why their performance is higher.

Based on research undertaken by Steiner and Spaulding (1966 as cited in Christie, 1970c, p. 51f) Christie (1970c) offered an intriguing suggestion. According to him, it might well be that high Mach individuals aim to superimpose their own structures, which is easier in ambiguous situations. This might explain why they rather display a preference for structure while at the same time they excel in situations that are marked by a lack thereof. Evidence for this is provided by Drory and Gluskinos (1980), who researched the leadership behaviour of high and low Machs under structured as well as unstructured conditions. Under unstructured conditions,
high Mach leaders gave significantly more orders than the low Mach leaders. This can be seen as an attempt to provide more structure to the situation.

### 7.3 Preferring emotionally detached rationality

“In every proceeding, therefore, men ought to consider the defects and perils which it (presents), and not to undertake it if it should be more dangerous than useful, notwithstanding the result should conform to their decision...” (Machiavell, 1531, p. 128)

Throughout Christie and Geis’ (1970a) whole book, persons high in Machiavellianism are described as being detached, cold, and rather free from emotional distractions. For instance, Geis (1970b) points to this factor in explaining high Mach individuals’ coalition breaking behaviour. In contrast, low Mach individuals tend to get emotionally entangled while their high Mach counterparts tend to rationally reason (Geis et al., 1970b). Durkin (1970) asserts that individuals low in Machiavellianism perceive other people as persons, whereas high Mach individuals objectify them.

Wolfson (1981) discovered that high Machs are less likely to aid in the case of an accident than middle or low Machs are during back-to-back and face-to-face co-location, though other factors in social dynamics might also have played a role. The same applies to situations in which people need to be punished for wrongdoing. In an experiment, Harrel (1980) found that low Mach individuals exerted more punishment to unremorseful thieves than to remorseful ones. In contrast, high Mach individuals delivered the same level of punishment to both.

Concerning empathy, Loftus and Glenwick (2001) delineate a negative correlation between Machiavellianism and empathy in adolescent subjects. In addition to this, Simon et al. (1990) describe a negative relationship between Machiavellianism and the ability to accurately recognize another person’s emotions based on facial expressions.

Moreover, Marušić et al.’s (1995) research indicates that, at least for their sample of young students, Machiavellianism is accompanied to a certain extent by impulsivity. This, however, is a contested proposition. For instance, even though high Machs have been shown to engage in opportunistic behaviour (Geis, 1970a, 1970b), it has also been disseminated that they only give in to their opportunistic tendencies in situations which resemble a single encounter with another individual and which determine retaliation by the other party to be unlikely (Christie et al., 1970; Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2002). Hence, they are very capable of controlling their opportunistic urges. In a similar vein, their cheating behaviour, which will be discussed in
Section 7.6, implies higher impulse control (Bogart et al., 1970). It is has also been proven that high Machs outperform low Machs in situations which provide behavioural latitude, face-to-face contact, and arousal of emotions (Christie & Geis, 1970c; 1970b; Christie & Boehm, 1970). One factor for this difference in performance is that low Machs give in to their emotions, while high Machs can suppress their impulses and stay emotionally detached. This is corroborated by Jones and Paulhus’s (2009) review in which they argue that the high Machs’ superiority in these situations cannot be traced back to cognitive advantages but apparently emerges from their ability to control their impulses.

One reason for the high Machs’ emotional detachment could be that they tend to focus on themselves rather than on others during social interaction (Ickes et al., 1986). Thus, they will most likely not connect to the emotional states of other people, which in turn could have caused the high Machs to lose their emotional balance. This is corroborated by Geis and Levy (1970), who report that in order to evaluate others, high Machs tend to compare the respective individual to themselves. Even so, this focus on the self as displayed by high Machs does not reach the level of narcissism. Although Paulhus and Williams (2002) note that narcissism and Machiavellianism share a positive correlation, they also emphasise that they are not the same.

### 7.4 A heightened state of anxiety and dissatisfaction

“There are two things a prince must fear: internal subversion from his subjects; and external aggression by foreign powers.” (Machiavelli, 1532, p. 59)

After the former paragraphs, which render emotional detachedness an essential element of Machiavellianism, this link with anxiety and dissatisfaction might seem controversial at first sight. A positive correlation between anxiety and Machiavellianism has already been shown by Christie (1970c), who attributed it to measurement flaws. In 1992, Fehr et al. evaluated new articles investigating the mentioned link with anxiety in their review about Machiavellianism. They arrived at the conclusion that there is a stable yet low, positive relationship with anxiety. A more recent review, undertaken by Jones and Paulhus (2009), was unable to disconfirm this connection. Although the authors presented research that found no correlation, they also provided other findings that supported the Machiavellianism-anxiety link.

Bearing in mind that high Mach individuals are prone to behave in an emotionally detached manner, it is no wonder that this consistent correlation with anxiety is generally seen as paradoxical. A possible explanation could be that high Mach individuals suffer from anxiety due to a heightened state of vigilance directed at their surroundings. For example, Geis et al.
(1970a) report troubles in devising a working experimentation environment. The reason for this was the high Mach individuals’ higher likelihood to question the study setting and a display of great suspicion. An alternative explanation has been put forth by Fehr et al. (1992), who explain that this vigilance could be caused by actively searching for opportunities to manipulate others due to high Machs’ apparent perception of social interaction as a competitive situation, which they want to win. This may well be a source of anxiety in high Machs.

A similarly negative condition, which high Machs are apparently more prone to experience, is dissatisfaction. Fehr et al. (1992) reviewed several articles and point out the fact that high Machs usually experience lower job satisfaction and higher job tension. To give just one example, Corzine et al. (1999) examined a sample of US bankers and reported a negative relationship between Machiavellianism and job satisfaction as well as a positive association with the feeling of having hit a ceiling in one’s career. Other correlations which might be relevant to this are a negative relationship between Machiavellianism and a positive self-concept (Yong, 1994) and a negative correlation of Machiavellianism with both social interest and self-love (McHoskey, 1999).

When turning to evaluating this relationship between Machiavellianism and dissatisfaction, one may identify several potential causes for it. The higher levels of anxiety, as mentioned above, might lead to the high Machs’ heightened state of dissatisfaction. Another possible explanation might be found in the way high Machs interact with other people. As already pointed out, high Machs perceive social interaction as a struggle for power (Fehr et al., 1992). Furthermore, they are more distrustful (Geis & Christie, 1970) and tend to restrain their feelings in favour of rational reasoning (Bogart et al., 1970). Additionally, the high Machs’ higher tendency to employ manipulative tactics may backfire at times and ruin their reputation.

However, even without this detection of manipulative tactics, it seems that other people prefer low Machs over high Machs for affectionate relationships. High Machs are only chosen as alliance partners whenever opponents need to be confronted (Wilson et al., 1998). Consequently, social interactions might be a predominantly negative experience for high Machs.

7.5 Delving into the Machiavellian worldview

“This is the way things are: whenever one tries to escape one danger one runs into another. Prudence consists in being able to assess the nature of a particular threat and in accepting the lesser evil.” (Machiavelli, 1532, p. 73)
Based on data from Harris (1966 as cited in Christie, 1970c, p. 49f), Christie (1970c) concludes that high Mach persons perceive others as less favourable than people low in Machiavellianism. In their review, Jones and Paulhus (2009) compiled evidence that points towards a relatively cynical and negative view of the world and the people living in it (e.g. Sakalaki et al., 2007). This is mirrored by Niccolò Machiavelli’s original writing the measurement items of Machiavellianism are based on when he writes that “…because men are wretched creatures who would not keep their word to you, you need not keep your word to them” (Machiavelli, 1532, p. 57). High Machs even exhibit a negative perception of their parents (Christie, 1970d). The Machiavellian perception of the world also includes an element of fatalism. Individuals rating high in Machiavellianism display an external locus of control (Rotter, 1966), meaning they attribute misfortune to chance and see themselves as powerless towards it (Christie, 1970c). However, Fehr et al. (1992) and Jones and Paulhus (2009) elaborated on this fact and stated that this belief only applies to the socio-political sphere (Paulhus, 1983) but not to the personal or interpersonal spheres.

Another point that necessitates discussion is which time frame high Machs apply to the world. Oksenberg’s findings (1967 as cited in Christie, 1970d, p. 320f) postulate a negative correlation between Machiavellianism and traditionalism. As tradition itself represents to some extent the embodiment of the past, high Machs seem to have relatively less concern for the past. What is left to discuss is present and future, or in other words short-term and long-term. This aspect is rather polemical. On the one hand, there is the issue of the high Mach’s opportunism (Geis, 1970a; 1970b) and their willingness to engage in manipulative behaviour (Christie & Geis, 1970a; Fehr et al., 1992; Jones & Paulhus, 2009). Jones & Paulhus (2009) suggest that the latter might tarnish the high Mach’s reputation as soon as it has been detected. A further point is the discovered link between Machiavellianism and short-term focused sexual behaviour (Figueroedo et al., 2005). On the other hand, many of these short-term related factors are attenuated by the high Machs’ rationality and impulse regulation, such as their consideration of long-term effects in the case of opportunism (Christie et al., 1970; Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2002) or the avoidance of employing easily discernible manipulation (Fehr et al, 1992). Apart from this, Machiavelli’s writings, which formed the basis for the construct of Machiavellianism, mention strategic foresight as a reoccurring theme (Machiavelli, 1531; 1532). Therefore, it seems that high Machs have the ability to behave in a short-term as well as a long-term oriented manner. This assumption of situational flexibility is supported by Drory and Gluskinos (1980). Accordingly, Jones and Paulhus’ suggestion (2009) that high Machs are capable of
adapting a short-term as well as a long-term perspective seems to be most fit to adequately resolve this issue.

7.6 Propensity to break rules and manipulate

“... it is recognized openly how foolish and little prudent it is to ask for a thing, and to say at first, I want to do evil with it: for one ought not to show his mind, but to want in every way to seek to obtain that which he desires.” (Machiavelli, 1531, p. 112)

One would expect a Machiavellian to break rules more often. However, research suggests that high Mach individuals do not cheat more often than low Mach individuals. The difference, though, is that the former cheat in situations that are low in perceived risk, whereas the latter do not differentiate here (Bogart et al., 1970). High Mach people still stay within the given system and would not go as far as to overthrow it (Christie & Geis, 1970c).

Indeed, there are other tactics within the repertoire of high Mach individuals, which are regularly applied (Geis et al., 1970a). For example, Fehr et al. (1992) mention lying, persuasion, ingratiation, and self-disclosure. Jones and Paulhus (2009) further add tactics like guilt induction, thought manipulation, or impression management. Additionally, Sakalaki et al. (2007) exposed a willingness to withhold information in order to gain financially. Further, high Machs even proved capable of employing influence tactics which are based on positive emotions like friendliness (Grams & Rogers, 1999). In addition to this, Hogue et al. (2013) point out that Machiavellianism can also indirectly influence the use of deceptive tactics.

While being more willing to engage in manipulative and deceptive tactics (e.g. Ross & Robertson, 2000), high Machs further appear to be more adept in utilizing them. In the case of lying, Exline et al. (1970) unveiled that high Machs are able to maintain eye contact longer when trying to maintain a lie during an interrogation. Moreover, Geis and Moon (1981) found high Machs to be more convincing when lying. High Machs also seem to adapt their lying behaviour to their current environment (e.g. incentives; Ross & Robertson, 2000). Overall, high Machs prove to be better liars than low Machs (Fehr et al., 1992). Similarly, high Machs display elevated persuasive abilities (Fehr et al., 1992).

Apart from direct evidence which suggests that high Machs are more likely to employ manipulative tactics (Christie & Geis, 1970a), there are other facets which might be linked to this behavioural style. One point is the high Machs’ belief that others are basically manipulable (Geis, 1970a). This is accompanied by high Machs’ situation-dependent opportunism (as
mentioned in Section 7.5; Geis, 1970a; 1970b; Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2002) as well as higher inventiveness when it comes to devising manipulative tactics (Geis et al., 1970a). In addition to this, high Machs apparently have notably less concern for ethics (Mudrack, 1993), altruism (Christie, 1970c; Rada et al., 2004), and society (McHoskey, 1999). Moreover, high Machs exhibit a tendency towards corruption (Hegarty, 1995 as cited in Jones & Paulhus, 2009, p. 99).

7.7 Achievement and assertiveness

“There is no doubt that a prince’s greatness depends on his triumphing over difficulties and opposition.” (Machiavelli, 1532, p. 69)

Given the high Machs’ higher emotional detachedness and the repertoire of manipulative tactics at their disposal, it seems reasonable to expect that these individuals will use these means in order to achieve whatever goal they have in mind instead of deceiving their surroundings for mere amusement. At the outset, Christie (1970c) suggested that the relationship between Machiavellianism and achievement orientation required further clarification. However, Fehr et al.’s (1992) review reports that there was no relationship found between Machiavellianism and success in one’s occupation. Nevertheless, Stewart and Stewart (2006) disseminate that Machiavellianism is linked to the need to excel, which may also imply higher levels of materialism. This is further substantiated by another fact, as presented by Fehr et al. (1992), who state that high Machs seem to opt for business careers. They also state that high Machs are generally seen as rather ambitious. Empirical research even found a positive link between Machiavellianism and Hypercompetitiveness (Mudrack et al., 2012; Ryckman et al., 1994). This implicates that high Machs will attempt to succeed at any expense. Likewise, Machiavelli’s original writings contain competitive elements (Belliotti, 1978). In this aspect, research encounters a paradox. On the one hand, clear correlations between Machiavellianism and achievement are missing. On the other hand, the facets of Machiavellianism and indicative research strongly imply a positive relationship with achievement orientation.

The missing piece appears to be the inclusion of moderator variables, such as job involvement. Gable and Dangello (1994) discovered a positive relationship between Machiavellianism and job performance under the condition of high job involvement. In a similar vein, Geis & Christie (1970) point at the importance of intrinsically motivating situations (Geis & Christie, 1970, p. 310f) in order to activate a high Mach’s full potential. Situations which provide room for improvisation, face-to-face contact, and the potential to elicit emotional involvement are the
grounds on which high Machs surpass their low Mach counterparts. Another moderator variable may be education. Turner and Martinez (1977) revealed a positive correlation for males between socioeconomic achievement and a combination of high Machiavellianism and high educational level. Notwithstanding, this correlation becomes negative in the case of a combination of high Machiavellianism and low educational level. Consequently, high Machs display a drive for achievement if they are not discouraged by different moderating factors.

What remains to be discussed is the manner in which high Machs try to achieve. Christie (1970c) reviewed data provided by Wrightsman and Cook (1965 as cited in Christie, 1970c, p. 47) and indicates a positive relationship between Machiavellianism and hostility. Yet, he also argues that this might not be attributable to the higher hostility level of high Machs but rather to their greater willingness to reveal it compared low Machs’ socially desirable concealment. Jones and Paulhus’ (2009) review also found a low, positive relationship with aggression. Still, Christie et al. (1970) postulate that high Machs have a tendency to display at least counter-aggression in game experiments. Furthermore, high Machs are prone to possessing Type A personalities, which includes an inclination towards assertiveness (Rayburn & Rayburn, 1996). This relationship with assertiveness is further supported by the meta-analysis of Barbuto and Moss (2006). Geis and Christie (1970) interpret this notion of aggressiveness as part of the high Mach’s exploitative style instead of hostility and report that high Machs have not been found to demonstrate hostile behaviour.

Dominance is seemingly another facet of the Machiavellian approach towards meeting his or her goals. Fehr et al.’s (1992) review points out that Machiavellianism is positively linked to qualities of dominance but negatively related to qualities of nurturance. They also report that others generally perceive high Machs as embodying dominance and having other related characteristics. The behaviour of high Mach leaders fits these findings. For instance, high Mach leaders give more orders, initiate group interaction in difficult situations, and are less concerned with diminishing tensions within a group (Drory & Gluskinos, 1980). Interestingly, no noteworthy correlation was found between authoritarianism and Machiavellianism (Christie, 1970c; Fehr et al., 1992; Jones & Paulhus, 2009).

### 7.8 The effects of gender

“None the less, as [Alexander] was thought effeminate, and a man who let himself be ruled by his mother, he came to be scorned...” (Machiavelli, 1532, p. 63)
Finally, the topic of gender in combination with Machiavellianism merits attention. In general, men display higher levels of Machiavellianism than women (Christie & Geis, 1970a). Apart from that, it is a reoccurring phenomenon that some of the correlations discovered for Machiavellianism do not apply to female high Machs (Fehr et al., 1992; Jones & Paulhus, 2009). One example would be the previously mentioned study from Turner and Martinez (1977; see Section 7.7). They found that highly educated, high Mach males achieved higher socioeconomic success, while those with low levels of education exhibited inferior socioeconomic success. However, this relationship does not surface for female high Machs.

This gender effect of Machiavellianism also implicates different preferences for applied manipulation tactics. Researchers even suspect that a positive, though non-significant, correlation between Machiavellianism and suicide attempts in women (which is not present when referring to male high Machs; LaTorre & McLeod, 1978) may in fact not be driven by suicidal intentions. Instead, LaTorre and McLeod (1978) speculate that the very act of attempting to commit suicide serves the function of manipulating the female high Machs’ environment. Indeed, this is a somewhat extreme assumption, but it is not an entirely unreasonable one when looking at the properties of Machiavellianism. A less extreme example of how gender has an impact on the manipulation tactics used by high Machs is offered by Brown and Guy (1983). They discovered that high Mach males are less inclined to use self-disclosure, whereas high Mach females implemented this tactic more commonly.

Researchers have explored different explanations in order to account for this digression of female high Mach samples. One that is especially intriguing is the suggestion that gender role differences could explain this discrepancy (Fehr et al., 1992). This appears reasonable as the pragmatic attitude of high Machs has been highlighted several times (e.g. Bogart et al., 1970; Geis, 1970b). Moreover, high Machs have demonstrated that they are capable of exhibiting situational flexibility (Drory & Gluskinos, 1980). Thus, if female high Machs are confronted with other situational conditions due to their gender role it would only be reasonable for them to adapt their manipulative behaviour to their circumstances, choosing what best works for a certain situation.

Notwithstanding this, Machiavellianism may also affect how high Machs perceive gender roles. Valentine and Fleischman (2003) unveiled a positive relationship between Machiavellianism and conservative gender outlook. More specifically, this indicates that high Machs perceive having a career as a male issue and are less tolerant towards women pursuing careers.
The link between culture and Machiavellianism

To reiterate, this thesis aims to investigate the relationship between cultural dimensions and Machiavellianism as a psychological construct of the individual level. Nevertheless, one of the most common assumptions in cross-cultural research is that culture level dimensions provide weak results when it comes to determining the mental features of individuals. This is referred to as the level-of-analysis problem (Noorderhaven & Koen, 2005).

Hofstede (2001) introduced the terms ecological fallacy and reverse ecological fallacy\(^2\) to explain the mistakes that can result from ignoring the distinct levels of analysis. A study is subject to ecological fallacy if it takes cultural values from etic dimensions and attributes them to a single member of that culture as if this person represents a perfect ideal of his or her culture. The opposite happens in the case of reverse ecological fallacy. Here, a study evaluates the dimensional values of a single individual and takes them as representative for that individual’s entire culture. Both fallacies might heavily distort research findings. Hofstede raises awareness to these issues not only in his book (Hofstede, 2001) but also in his manual (Hofstede & Minkov, 2013) for the 2013 version of his Value Survey Module (VSM). Hofstede (e.g. 2001) even goes as far as to state that values obtained at the cultural level can only provide explanatory value if set in relation with at least one other culture for which values had been evaluated.

Not only Hofstede but also the associates of the GLOBE research program point to the pitfalls of ignoring differences between the levels of analysis in their questionnaire manual (The GLOBE Foundation, 2006a). Schwartz (2009) also calls for a conscious choice for either the individual or the cultural level, depending on the respective research design and aim.

Therefore, it appears that drawing directly on etic dimensions of culture in order to explain the characteristics of a single member of that same culture has little to offer. However, even though it seems as if the cultural dimensions lack predictive qualities at the individual level, there are still indications, which suggest a potential link between the values of the two levels. One example of this is Fischer’s (2009) concept, which looks at culture as a system of shared meanings. He states that there could be isomorphic constructs, which display the same structure at the individual and the cultural levels. In addition to this, he mentions the potential of cultural antecedents to affect constructs at the individual level, which do not carry the same meaning as the original cultural antecedent. This would be non-isomorphism, which is highly

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\(^2\) Note that Hofstede (2001) referred to his cultural dimensions as ecological dimensions of culture to highlight their etic nature.
interesting since it suggests an indirect approach to how culture can be applied to the individual level, which circumvents the much criticised direct application. Further support is lent by Schwartz’s conceptualization of values. The items of his Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1995) can be used both to extract individual-level and culture-level values. The difference is made by the approach towards analysis (Schwartz, 2009). Thus, although they enter different categories at the two levels, essentially the same values apply to both levels.

It could well be then that certain cultures create an environment which may be conducive to certain constructs at the individual level by highlighting overlapping characteristics. When looking at Machiavellianism and the different cultural dimensions in the field, one can notice several similarities between certain poles of different dimensions and the features of Machiavellianism. It appears that these dimensions contain features that are also part of what it means to be Machiavellian. Therefore, there might be dimensions that nurture and favour the development of Machiavellianism. This, in turn, means that one may be able to tell the likelihood of encountering people with higher levels of Machiavellianism by looking at the respective culture’s dimensional values. Figure 2 attempts to visualize these basic assumptions.

Figure 2: Visualization of potential relationship between culture and Machiavellianism

This influence of culture on Machiavellianism is further supported by incorporating the role of socialization. Christie (1970d) suggests that Machiavellianism grows in an individual before that individual reaches adulthood, as different levels of Machiavellianism were found in pre-adolescent children. Touhey (1973) conducted further research and discovered that the development of Machiavellianism in children is due to non-familiar, socialization sources.
Similarly, Hofstede (2001) mentions that culture is not innate but learnt. Acculturation apparently relies on similar environmental factors for socialization. Schwartz (2007) corroborates this assumption by pointing out that different cultures give rise to different priorities regarding values at the individual level. As for the reliability of children-based samples, recent research suggests that children’s values are a reliable precursor for the value concepts of adults (Dörring et al., 2015). Since culture is more pervasive and resides on a higher level (Hofstede, 2001), it appears reasonable to presume that culture has an impact on the formation of Machiavellianism and not the other way around.

In order to determine whether there could be a relationship between a cultural dimension and Machiavellianism, the characteristics of the individual dimensions and Machiavellianism will be compared. The characteristics will be drawn from the review section of the respective construct. From this comparison, hypotheses will be deducted, which will then be tested by the means of a survey. Since it is not possible to test all the different dimensions for correlations with Machiavellianism, hypotheses will only be drawn where the assumption of either a positive or a negative relationship appears most reasonable.

### 8.1 Hofstede: Power distance & Machiavellianism

Hofstede’s PDI focuses on power. High PDI implies an active effort to increase one’s power as well as one’s possession of other resources. This implies a sense of achievement. Overall, Machiavellianism also includes this notion of achievement. High Machs appear to be ambitious, which applies to the willingness to excel but also to material goals. Moreover, Machiavelli’s original writings primarily deal with the acquisition and preservation of power. In addition to this, both constructs exhibit a rather competitive attitude towards competition. High PDI promotes the idea of power struggle. Competition in this sense is a zero-sum game in which someone has to lose. This is exemplified by the power inequalities in high PDI cultures. Machiavellianism might be even more extreme in this matter. High Machs show hypercompetitive attitudes which make them want to succeed at every cost. Their style of competition is marked by assertive effort without unnecessary cooperation.

From a tactical perspective, both constructs also display similarities. In order to avoid unfavourable situations, people in high PDI cultures tend to agree with their superiors. Similarly, high Machs agree that telling other people what they want to hear is a wise choice, as one of the Mach IV items suggests (Christie, 1970b). Another tactic which is considered at least an option in high PDI societies is lying. High Machs concur with this idea and even demonstrate
their superior capabilities in this area. PDI further correlates with corruption. Likewise, Machiavellianism is accompanied by an inclination towards corruptive behaviour.

Another remarkable overlap of characteristics takes place when comparing the entailing worldviews of both constructs. High PDI gives rise to a distrusting attitude towards the environment and other people. People are seen as unwilling to work unless they are incentivized to do so. Moreover, there is a negative relationship with civil morality and the feeling of having workplace control. However, there is also a link between high PDI and benevolence of managers. High Machs share this pessimistic worldview. They also mistrust others and have an unfavourable perception of them. Even the feeling of low workplace control compares well to the slight fatalism of high Machs. As for civil morality, high Machs have been discovered to possess little appreciation of altruism or social interests and also have low levels of empathy. However, this is slightly at odds with the relationship found between PDI and benevolence.

There are also signs which indicate that both PDI and Machiavellianism favour the same interpersonal style. People from high PDI cultures seem prone to rely on rules rather than personal experience or the opinion of subordinates. This exemplifies a rather impersonal style of dealing with other people, which is matched by the high Machs’ emotional detachedness. Alternatively, it could mean a stronger reliance on structures (i.e. the origin of the rules). This would be supported by the emphasis on social hierarchies, which are an inherent element of high PDI cultures and represent structures. In this case, this would still be in line with Machiavellianism, as it includes an emphasis on structures as well.

Nevertheless, there are contradicting aspects which also merit attention, the first of which is the positive correlation of PDI with revolutionary attitudes and traditionalism, which contradicts the properties of Machiavellianism. Another point is the negative link of PDI with both flexibility and pragmatism. Both aspects are important aspects of the utilitarian mindset of high Machs. A further disconcerting issue is the negative correlation between PDI and individual independence. Machiavellianism at least implies a focus on one’s self.

Thus, although there is a remarkably supportive overlap of characteristics, there are also some parts which are at odds with Machiavellianism. However, when examining the opposing elements, it soon becomes evident that a lot of them pertain to how people act (e.g. pragmatism). In contrast, many similarities arise from the values held by people (e.g. worldview). The diligent reader might remember that this distinction between practices and values of a single cultural dimension is the speciality of the GLOBE research program. Therefore, the case of power distance will be reconsidered farther below in Section 8.12. As for Hofstede’s measure of
power distance, there will be no hypothesis made, since other means of measuring are preferred.

**8.2 Hofstede: Uncertainty avoidance & Machiavellianism**

Machiavellianism entails a dislike for ambiguous situations, despite the better performance that is achieved by high Machs in these situations. It appears that this better performance originates from the initiated structure, which is easier established in unstructured situations. This discomfort felt towards ambiguity is shared by members of high UAI cultures, which also aim to structure uncertain situations.

The emotional detachment of Machiavellians is only partially supported by the characteristics of high UAI cultures. One shared aspect is the lower ability to recognize other people’s facial expressions. Furthermore, high UAI correlates with a preference for task-orientation and allocates more authority to rules than to people. Both can be argued to exemplify a shift from human beings to an impersonal, detached cognition of situations. Besides this, high UAI does not show a special preference for emotional detachedness.

With regard to anxiety, the case is clearer. Both Machiavellianism and UAI share a positive relationship with higher anxiety levels. As mentioned above in Sections 3.2 and 7.4, this heightened anxiety of high Machs and members of high UAI cultures might stem from factors related to the environment.

Similar to anxiety, both constructs’ worldviews exhibit remarkable similarities. Both offer an unfavourable evaluation of the world and other people. Mistrust is common to both, although the Machiavellian worldview also emphasises cynicism. Intriguingly, Machiavellianism, as well as UAI, additionally share a perceived powerlessness towards the environment. Consequently, there is almost a complete match of the two constructs’ worldviews.

While the first components of Machiavellianism seemed to fit the characteristics of UAI quite nicely, its propensity to break rules is strongly at odds. High UAI cultures are based on rules and the obedience towards them, while high Machs are not disinclined to break them if it is to their advantage. However, as pointed out in Section 7.6, high Machs apparently do not cheat or break rules more often than low Machs. Instead, they have several other tactics at hand that do not violate given rules. Machiavellians do not seem prone to overthrowing established systems, including their rules. Moreover, as previously mentioned in Section 3.2, even members of high UAI cultures acknowledge situations in which breaking rules is tolerated.
Although some aspects of Machiavellianism and UAI show a better match than others, it appears that overall the overlap of the two constructs’ characteristics is substantial. Therefore, it should be safe to argue that there is a link between high UAI at the cultural level and Machiavellianism at the individual level. Yet, due to the frictions in some areas, this relationship should only be moderate. Accordingly, members of high UAI cultures should be more likely to possess higher levels of Machiavellianism than members of low UAI cultures.

Hypothesis 1: Machiavellianism is moderately, positively correlated with Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance index.

8.3 Hofstede: Individualism-collectivism & Machiavellianism

The basis of Hofstede’s IDV is the focus on the self as compared to the group. It, therefore, deals with the relationship between single cultural members and groups. In this matter, Machiavellianism shows a certain focus on the self as an individual. It can be assumed that this matches the independent self-concept of high IDV cultures. Even so, societies scoring high in IDV tend to give precedence to individual interests over group interests in the case of a conflict of interest. Being critical, this is not necessarily required for Machiavellianism. As has been pointed out, high Machs perceive themselves as in control when it comes to the interpersonal sphere. Acknowledging the manipulative competence of high Machs, it seems likely that they are able to influence the interests of a group. As a result, it can be argued that the prioritization of individual interests is not a stringent requirement for Machiavellianism.

One point which lends some support for a relationship between IDV and Machiavellianism is the expected development of both. It seems that societal levels of individualism rise with time. In a similar manner, people are anticipated to become more Machiavellian in the future.

Another factor is the kind of emotional involvement which is prevalent in high IDV cultures. Here, a paradox is encountered. On the one hand, people in high IDV societies display a higher need for affiliation, whereas collectivistic societies call for unquestionable loyalty towards one’s in-group. Additionally, members of high IDV cultures perceive the sharing of feelings for another person at the workplace with that person to be acceptable and productivity enhancing. Also, hedonism is apparently more tolerated. On the other hand, high IDV nurtures loose and calculative relationships as well as self-sufficiency. This may even lead to the disintegration of nuclear families. Further, when handling stress, IDV-related coping strategies tend to focus on the problems but not emotions. Consequently, high IDV displays a search for
and expression of affection while at the same time favouring a rather impersonal and rational attitude. The former contradicts the concept of Machiavellianism, whereas the latter strongly overlaps with the emotionally detached approach of high Machs.

From a tactical perspective, there also exists mixed support for a link with Machiavellianism. It seems that withholding information is treated as a viable strategy for success in high IDV cultures. Similarly, inventiveness is related positively to IDV. High Machs are also considered to be deceptive and have been found to be more inventive than low Machs when devising novel manipulation tactics. Furthermore, taking initiative is related to both, IDV and Machiavellianism. High IDV also shows a relationship with extraverted behaviour, which may overlap with the apparent ambition of high Machs. Notwithstanding these factors, high IDV is accompanied by the perceived need to constantly talk during social interaction, which may eventually be an obstacle to deceptive intentions as pursued by high Machs. Moreover, the forging of alliances, which is one possible tactic of high Machs, is not a part of IDV but of collectivism and includes collective decision making. Again, some factors imply an overlap of Machiavellianism with high IDV, while others impede this relationship or even hint at an overlap with the lower pole of IDV.

Regarding the worldview provided by the two constructs, there seems to be more evidence for a link of Machiavellianism with low IDV. Members of low IDV cultures claim less control over their work life and mistrust at least those people belonging to out-groups. They evaluate others on the basis of their group membership and less by their individual personality. Hence, nepotism emerges as a means to avoid the ambiguity and risk which originates from employing unknown out-group members. Tradition is also of higher importance. Many aspects fit the concept of Machiavellianism relatively well. The lower claimed control over the work environment taps into the high Machs’ slight sense of fatalism. Even though Machiavellianism has not yet been found to differentiate between in- and out-groups, the felt mistrust poses another sign of overlap. Both constructs neglect the personality of individuals when evaluating them and tend to rely on other information instead. Yet, while low IDV as well as Machiavellianism feel a discomfort when encountering ambiguous situations, high Machs would most likely have recourse to other, more rationally based means of alleviation instead of nepotism. On top of that, Machiavellianism is negatively correlated with traditionalism, which is embraced by collective cultures.

Overall, there are overlaps of Machiavellianism with both poles of Hofstede’s IDV. Although Machiavellianism shows an emphasis on the individual as opposed to the group, formulating a
hypothesis for this dimension would require more substance. Other dimensions which will be considered later might be more suitable.

**8.4 Hofstede: Masculinity-femininity & Machiavellianism**

Several aspects compose Hofstede’s MAS dimension. One of them is the cherishment of what is considered to be masculine values. These values might be best described as assertive achievement orientation. This is validated by a positive relationship between MAS and achievement and the highly performance-oriented attitude towards work. In high MAS cultures, confrontation is preferred over negotiation at the work place. These aspects are mirrored in the attitudes of high Machs. Overall, they show an inclination towards achievement and exhibit highly competitive behaviours if not constrained by a necessity to behave otherwise.

It also appears that cultures embracing MAS are prone to engaging in depersonalization of others as well as to adopting an emotionally detached attitude. Evidence suggests that members of high MAS societies tend to evaluate others in an impersonal manner (e.g. with respect to sexual behaviour). They further focus on the job instead of non-work-related elements and discount interpersonal elements in favour of rewards. This is similar to the behaviour of high Machs, who pay little attention to personal factors and objectify other people.

There are further overlaps when considering the perception of the world and human beings in general. High MAS provides a rather pessimistic view of the world. Employees are presumed to bear a general dislike towards work and poverty is attributed to the laziness of the poor, which makes it their own fault. Though some elements of the Machiavellian worldview are not mentioned (e.g. fatalism, heightened mistrust), there is a reasonably good match. Moreover, high MAS as well as Machiavellianism result in higher levels of anxiety.

Focusing on the individual’s fondness of self-centred attitudes, it seems that the high pole of MAS and Machiavellianism compare well again. Cultures with a high score in MAS stress ego-driven goals instead of stressing more relationship friendly aims. This applies to sexual behaviour as well. Further, members of such societies put less emphasis on the establishment of groups for the sake of a common purpose. They also assign less importance to friendship, although they seem to appreciate their families. Apart from the appreciation for family, which is not implied by Machiavellianism, most attitudes could also be held by high Machs. They are evidently inclined to concentrate on themselves during interpersonal interaction and to have their own agenda.
When looking at the development of the two constructs over the time of an individual’s lifespan, similarities abound anew. The attitudes of MAS decline in a person as he or she grows older and are replaced by more feminine values. In a similar vein, an individual’s levels of Machiavellianism decline with ongoing age.

Nevertheless, there is an important component for which there is a dearth of evidence to justify the assumption of common ground. Defining aspects of Hofstede’s MAS are the equality between genders as well as the separation of gender roles. High MAS incurs the inequality of the genders in favour of the men and a clear separation of the gender roles. While there is evidence of gender-related variation within the concept of Machiavellianism, this cannot be linked to either role separation or inequality with certainty. Furthermore, from an evidence-based point of view, there are findings which suggest that high Machs opt for a traditional gender outlook. Even so, these findings are few. Therefore, Machiavellianism has little to offer with regard to this central part of the MAS dimension.

Evaluating the equality of MAS and Machiavellianism, it seems that there would be a good match with the high pole of MAS. However, the lack of support for some of the integral components of Hofstede’s MAS dimension is worrisome. It would be best to cut out this part of MAS to eventually achieve a clearer correlation between the two constructs. Fortunately, the GLOBE research program split the Hofstede MAS dimension into several distinct dimensions, which renders this approach possible. As a result of this, it seems reasonable to refrain from stating a hypothesis for Hofstede’s MAS and instead aiming for a better overall match with the help of the GLOBE dimensions.

8.5 Hofstede: Long-term vs. short-term orientation & Machiavellianism

The predominant element of Hofstede’s most current conceptualization of LTO is obviously the emphasised time frame: past, present, and future. Low LTO cultures hold tradition dear, which tends to deal with the past, whereas high LTO cultures tend to stress characteristics like thrift, which for instance delivers payoffs only in the future. It is clear that this results in challenges in finding a mutual basis. Machiavellianism is negatively related to traditionalism but encourages exploitative behaviour which could imply a short-term orientation. Simultaneously, Machiavelli himself mentioned the importance of strategic behaviour several times in his writings. Additionally, it is argued that high Machs have the propensity to employ a short-term as well as a long-term perspective. This, in turn, means that it cannot be clearly attributed to either pole of LTO.
When turning to the social implications of both concepts, new incompatibilities surface. High LTO is accompanied by a priority on equality over meritocracy. Machiavellianism, however, tries to gain an advantage over others, which violates the principle of equality. Nonetheless, high LTO also seems to encourage the maintenance of relationships by the means of bribing. This would be in accord with high Machs’ corruptive inclinations. In contrast, members of high LTO societies display high satisfaction with their social contributions. This fails to be in line with Machiavellianism, as high Machs rather experience dissatisfaction and, in addition to this, have little interest in social issues and acts of altruism. As for low LTO cultures, they seem to ascribe less importance to family ties, which basically adheres to the properties of Machiavellianism, but cannot provide further social correlations that may be related to Machiavellianism. Accordingly, the social implications of LTO provide a colourful mixture of overlapping and dissenting facets, which renders a clear link between Machiavellianism and either pole all but impossible.

When individual aspects are taken into consideration, the case improves somewhat. The members of high LTO societies espouse values of hard work and self-discipline. This overlaps to a certain extent with high Machs’ higher impulse control. High LTO is further accompanied by openness to new ideas. This is matched by high Machs’ inventiveness when engaging in manipulative behaviour. Yet, it is low LTO which provides its cultural members with a focus on the self, a feature which is also present in Machiavellianism. Likewise, the evaluation of the cognitive aspects of both constructs display a certain match, however this time mainly with low LTO. Cultures ranking low in LTO discount virtue in favour of truth. This can be argued to represent the Machiavellian focus on facts at the cost of more emotion-based factors. In the event of failure, members of low LTO societies turn to luck as an explanation. This mirrors the slight fatalism of high Machs. Low LTO also stresses the essentiality of abstract rationality, analytical thinking, and cognitive consistency, which are all in accord with the high Machs’ reliance on rationality. Even so, the higher propensity of low LTO to nurture fundamentalism and fanaticism seems to contravene the high Machs’ rational perception of matters. Apart from that, high Machs also apply whatever means seem to work. This accentuation of pragmatism is matched, however, by high LTO cultures, which highlight practical ideas over abstract ones. Concurrently, they advocate absolute norms of evil and good, which somewhat contradicts the Machiavellian utilitarian characteristics which indicate that the ends justify the means.

Having compared the pertinent elements of Hofstede’s LTO and Machiavellianism, a relationship between the two constructs cannot be extracted. Neither high nor low LTO appears to
provide a sufficient fit with Machiavellianism. Thence, there is no justifiable basis for stating a hypothesis here.

8.6 Hofstede: Indulgence vs. restraint & Machiavellianism

The last dimension of Hofstede’s concept is his and Minkov’s IVR. High IVR features happiness as a central theme, together with a high perceived level of life control and high importance of leisure time. Machiavellianism does not explicitly mention leisure time or any related aspect, however, the other two components conflict with the properties of Machiavellianism. Regarding happiness, high Machs are instead prone to experiencing dissatisfaction. In the case of life control, high Machs actually display a lack of it, at least when it comes to the socio-political sphere of life, which they perceive as outside of their direct control. Thus, in reference to the core elements of IVR, it seems that Machiavellianism is rather linked to the pole which represents restraint.

The way social interaction and relationships are approached delivers a slightly blurred picture. Cultures scoring high in IVR promote the importance of family and having friends. Members of such cultures also demonstrate more satisfaction with their family. Again, these factors are at odds with Machiavellianism. High Machs apparently do not appreciate social relationships but instead concentrate on impersonal matters and objectify others. Moreover, they possess an unfavourable perception of their family as well as an inverse relationship with satisfaction, as already pointed out in the Sections 7.4 and 7.5. Aside from that, members of high IVR societies appear to be extraverted and to remember mostly positive feelings. While extraverted behaviour in the shape of assertiveness indeed forms a part of Machiavellianism, the remembrance of positive feelings faces opposition by the cynical attitude and dissatisfaction of high Machs. Nonetheless, high IVR cultures give rise to high sociosexuality (i.e. casual and unrestricted sexual behaviours) which overlaps with high Machs’ ostensible preference for short-term oriented sexual behaviours. A last social factor which might contradict Machiavellianism is the low IVR cultures’ low appreciation of freedom of speech, which may contravene Machiavellianism, as this could imply an inhibition of self-centredness.

The worldview conveyed by restrained cultures shows strong resemblance with the Machiavellian view of the world. The link regarding low perceived life control has already been dealt with above. High IVR is related to low concern for the future and, therefore, high optimism and low levels of neuroticism. Not only is it suggested that Machiavellianism pays attention to the present as well as the future but it is also firmly postulated that high Machs are cynical.
and suffer from heightened anxiety. In contrast, low IVR societies evidently share this cynical view of the world.

Further indication for a positive relationship between Machiavellianism and restraint at the low end of the IVR dimension is provided by an examination of their inclination towards structure initiation. High IVR cultures impose less rigid norms, which can be argued to be representative of a low emphasis on structuring society. Low IVR cultures, on the contrary, seem to promote stability and structure, as they highlight moral discipline and the importance of maintaining political order. While high Machs are unlikely to embrace moral discipline, they share the basic intention of installing structure.

Altogether, Machiavellianism seems to achieve a good fit with the restraint pole of IVR. This is supported by Machiavelli’s (1531) acknowledgement of the need to restrain a society in order to lead it to great results. Therefore, it appears reasonable to hypothesize that Machiavellianism may be inversely related to IVR. Nonetheless, in order to account for the several incompatibilities, this relationship will be rendered moderate.

Hypothesis 2: Machiavellianism is moderately, negatively correlated with the indulgence pole of Hofstede and Minkov’s indulgence vs. restraint dimension.

8.7 GLOBE: Performance orientation & Machiavellianism

The key elements of GLOBE’s performance orientation are a focus on achievement, the setting of challenging standards, constant performance improvement, and innovativeness. Machiavellianism contains a good approximation of all of these features. It clearly matches the achievement focus. Moreover, high Machs seem to have a higher need to excel, which can be linked to the setting of challenging standards as well as the desire for constant improvement. Regarding innovativeness, high Machs have demonstrated a high potential to innovate when there is a need for manipulative tactics.

This match of high performance orientation with Machiavellianism is further substantiated by the way they influence social behaviour. The concentration on performance and achievement contrasts with prosocial values. Accordingly, high performance orientation cultures channel individual efforts in one’s own achievements while neglecting values like helpfulness and forgiveness. Machiavellianism encourages a similar type of behaviour and has been found to relate negatively to altruism and empathy. High Machs have also been found to concentrate more on the self than on other people during social interaction. At the managerial level, how-
ever, performance orientation exhibits a positive relationship with humane-oriented leadership. Even so, a possible explanation could be that humane-oriented leadership is merely a means to an end in order to make employees deliver higher performance. Leadership styles which neglect the needs of the employee might simply fail to extract the highest performance from a manager’s subordinates. In this case, this mindset would not contradict the conception of Machiavellianism but instead tap its stress on utilitarianism. Aside from that, members of high performance orientation cultures centre their attention on tasks and outcomes while discounting social factors like an individual’s characteristics. This again agrees with the traits of high Machs, who direct their focus on facts and tend to objectify a person.

As far as the perception of the environment is concerned, both constructs achieve a relatively reasonable match. What is partially worrisome in this matter is the internal locus of control as possessed by member of high performance orientation cultures. They ascribe the results of situations to their own actions instead of to fortune. This also holds true for high Machs, as long as the personal and interpersonal spheres of life are concerned. However, high Machs display an external locus of control as soon as it comes to the socio-political sphere. An offspring of the internal locus of control prevalent in high performance orientation societies may well be the higher competitiveness of these societies. Likewise, Machiavellianism has been demonstrated to correlate positively with hypercompetitiveness. High Machs are imbued with an urge to succeed and are willing to accept everything that is necessary in order to do so.

Having compared the important facets of the two constructs, it is sensible to presume a positive relationship between Machiavellianism and the high pole of GLOBE’s performance orientation. As there have not been any incongruities with respect to how high Machs practice and think about the above mentioned points, this assumption of a positive correlation extends to both the value and the practice scale of this dimension. Accordingly, two hypotheses will be formulated.

**Hypothesis 3:** Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the value scale of GLOBE’s performance orientation.

**Hypothesis 4:** Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the practice scale of GLOBE’s performance orientation.
8.8 GLOBE: Future orientation & Machiavellianism

The underlying idea of this dimension is similar to Hofstede’s LTO. Even so, Ashkanasy et al. (2004) assert that they are different and also highlight different correlations in their review, which is why this GLOBE dimension will be considered separately.

The basic premise of future orientation is that cultures prioritize and promote the adoption of a certain time frame. The choice is between past, present, and future. This elementary premise is already violated to some extent by Machiavellianism, which can be argued to focus on the present (i.e. short-term) and the future (i.e. long-term) simultaneously. To better delineate this, future orientation is concerned with planning and the delay of gratification. Machiavelli’s treatises also stress the consideration of future results. Moreover, high Machs appear to have higher impulse control, which may allow them to forego immediate gratification. In contrast, present orientation is related to indulgence and spontaneity. High Machs are often argued to engage in short-term oriented manipulation attempts, which may satisfy current needs but actually worsen their future prospects by tarnishing their reputation. Only the past can to some extent be excluded as past orientation implies traditionalism, which is rejected by Machiavellianism. Even so, there are some aspects which might also show an implied link with the past as will be mentioned in the next paragraph below.

The way the different time perspectives affect attitudes towards planning can also be compared to the facets of Machiavellianism. High future orientation emphasises the achievement of future goals and self-control, both important when devising a plan. This notion of achievement is in accord with the high Machs’ achievement orientation. The factor of self-control can be argued to be similar to the high Machs’ higher impulse control. On the flip side, low future orientation, which sees the past as essential, relies on traditions and aims to learn from past mistakes in order to avoid similar ones in the future. At the same time, the status quo needs to be conserved as long as it is experienced as favourable. As already discussed, an orientation towards tradition is at odds with Machiavellianism. Nevertheless, learning from the past in order to guide one’s behaviour in the future is constantly emphasised by Machiavelli’s Discourses (1531), in which he heavily draws on best practices of antiquity. Regarding the preservation of the status quo, it can be argued that high Machs indeed favour structured environments but also show an inclination towards inventiveness, which threatens conservation efforts. Only present-oriented cultures appear to abstain from any planning efforts whatsoever. Instead they display a strong reliance on others. This is not supported by Machiavellianism, which cannot promote the absolute reliance on others due to its inherent mistrust concerning other people.
There are also other implications on social life which merit comparison. Members of high future orientation cultures are prone to putting more effort into the building and maintenance of social relationships. Even so, they are less satisfied with their relationships. At first, this appears to contravene the idea of Machiavellianism. Nonetheless, bringing these two aspects together, it could well be that these relationships are built on a calculative basis as they are expected to provide future payoffs. These kinds of calculative relationships might lack the necessary affection to be satisfying. This would offer a possible explanation which can be linked to Machiavellianism. Whatever the case may be, the lack of satisfaction compares well with the high Machs’ higher dissatisfaction in any case. Regarding the appreciation of family and friends, it correlates positively with high future orientation values but negatively with high future orientation practices. Thus, the latter may better suit Machiavellianism, with its rather calculative approach to relationships.

A last point is flexibility. High future orientation highlights the ability to adapt. In essence, this fits the high Machs’ higher flexibility. However, this entails a rejection of stability at the political level of these cultures and further encourages optimism. The rejection of stability runs against the high Machs’ emphasis on structure as well as their disinclination when it comes to revolutionary acts. In addition to this, optimism is in diametric contradiction to the high Machs’ cynical and rather pessimistic view of the world.

In general, there seems to be only weak support for a link between Machiavellianism and GLOBE’s future orientation. Even when considering the separation of future orientation values and practices, alleviation is still distant. For instance, high Machs are shown to restrain and adapt their manipulative tactics whenever the situation, including the estimation of future outcomes, which necessitates this. This implies high future orientation values, but these values invade the rather low future-oriented practices and eventually render them more future-oriented but only depending on the situation. This makes a clear separation in the case of Machiavellianism difficult, which is why a formulation of hypotheses would not be grounded in reason.

8.9 GLOBE: Gender egalitarianism & Machiavellianism

GLOBE’s gender egalitarianism mainly permits an insight to how the distribution of gender roles is undertaken, which means that high gender egalitarianism allows the blurring of gender roles while low gender egalitarianism provides relatively distinct gender roles. Machiavellianism does not exert any influence on how the gender role distribution takes place, or at
least evidence has not yet been found. The only piece of evidence is one study which implies that high Machs favour a more conservative gender outlook. Apart from that, there is of course the gender effect of Machiavellianism, which means that several factors of Machiavellianism (e.g. repertoire of manipulation tactics) apply differently to female and male high Machs. Even so, it can be argued that this is merely an adaptation of high Machs to the already existing gender roles.

Another point of gender egalitarianism is that it depicts the convergence of female and male characteristics. This mergence is more likely in high gender egalitarian cultures. This potential convergence might indirectly contribute to Machiavellianism. High Machs have been found to be remarkably flexible and pragmatic. Although Machiavellianism seems to embrace rather male values (e.g. assertiveness), it is reasonable to assume that they will also make use of female characteristics if necessitated by situational circumstances. For example, if the situation deems submissive behaviour (a rather female trait) as conducive to success, high Machs will behave submissively. Thus, if a society tolerates or even encourages the display of male and female characteristics by both genders, this could potentially contribute to fostering Machiavellianism.

A further aspect, which may point to a link between Machiavellianism and high gender egalitarianism, is the role of tradition. Tradition is linked to low gender egalitarianism as it gives rise to a more conservative and separated distribution of the gender roles. In turn, Machiavellianism opposes traditionalism.

Disconfirming indications of the relationship between high gender egalitarianism and Machiavellianism comes from the spheres of leadership and politics. On a leadership level, research revealed a negative correlation of gender egalitarianism with self-protective leadership. In the arena of politics, gender egalitarianism relates positively to empowerment. Both are at odds with Machiavellianism. Some aspects of self-protective leadership appear to represent facets of Machiavellianism (e.g. self-centredness). Empowerment may not be the high Machs’ strategy of choice either, as it means sharing power with another person. While this by itself might already repulse high Machs, one shall not forget that high Machs distrust other people. Hence, they would not share power with someone unless they can assure themselves of the person in question.

In summary, Machiavellianism can hardly be argued to display a straightforward relationship with either pole of GLOBE’s gender egalitarianism dimension. Not only are there some contradictions, but the suggested links are of rather tentative and indirect nature. Instead, it seems that Machiavellianism is not at all concerned with the distribution of gender roles. The split in
practices and values does not seem able to resolve these issues. Accordingly, there is no substance on which hypotheses could be grounded.

8.10 GLOBE: Assertiveness & Machiavellianism

GLOBE’s assertiveness dimension is obviously concerned with the cultural advocacy of assertive behaviour. Notwithstanding this factor, it also promotes related traits like socially acceptable aggressiveness, dominance, and toughness. Overall, these characteristics are mirrored by the Machiavellian attitude. High Machs were found to be perceived as assertive and dominant. There is even a correlation of Machiavellianism with hostility which is very close to aggressiveness.

Members of assertive cultures display a certain behavioural and communicational style, which altogether seems to fit Machiavellianism. Assertive behaviour is opposed to passive behaviour, which allows for domination of the self by others. This disagreement with passive behaviour seems to be shared by high Machs through their hypercompetitive and dominant attitude. This means that they need to be at top and cannot allow another person to overtake and dominate them. Moreover, assertiveness bears a focus on the self. Similarly, high Machs concentrate on themselves during situations of social interaction. As for the communicational style, cultural members of assertive societies rely on direct communication, which includes the willingness to show disagreement openly. On the one hand, it can be argued that this may impede any deceptive and clandestine activity by high Machs. On the other hand, it taps into the negligence of other individuals’ emotional states as supported by the negative link of Machiavellianism with empathy. Direct communication implies less concern for the interlocutor’s feelings. Moreover, members of assertive cultures feel more comfortable with the use of clear communication instead of the use of ambiguous language. In a similar manner, high Machs feel discomfort when confronted with ambiguity.

Evaluating the match of the two constructs by referring to the area of social life shows some incongruities. For instance, assertive cultures support having respect for family and friends. This respect is not shared by high Machs, who in general harbour a negative perception of others, including their own families. Concurrently, assertiveness endorses humane-oriented leadership, which again contradicts the features of Machiavellianism. Nonetheless, assertiveness also favours calculative trust building, opportunism, and competitiveness. Every one of these characteristics is highly coherent with the concept of Machiavellianism.
The perception of the world and other people provides a slightly better match of Machiavellianism with the high pole of assertiveness. Assertiveness is related to the exertion of dominance on the environment, as well as the possession of an internal locus of control. This means that members of such cultures see themselves as in charge of their life and what is happening around them. For Machiavellianism this applies to the personal and the interpersonal sphere of life as well, but not to the wider socio-political sphere. Regarding the perception of others, members of high assertiveness cultures view other people as opportunistic. However, they still believe that the world is a just place. Machiavellianism agrees with the perception of other people as opportunistic beings. Yet, high Machs are unlikely to see the world as a just place and prefer a more pessimistic and cynical world view.

Both constructs further share a certain rational flexibility. In assertive cultures, members make their decisions depending on the situation. In addition to this, they exhibit a pragmatic attitude, since it is implied that they will restrain themselves from engaging in assertive behaviour whenever the situation deems it necessary. High Machs also display flexibility, pragmatism and the ability to restrain themselves, if demanded by the situation.

In summary, Machiavellianism seems to be positively related to GLOBE’s assertiveness dimension. This positive link should extend to the value as well as the practice scale of assertiveness. However, since there are some dissimilarities, it is suggested that the practice scale of assertiveness will only show a moderately positive correlation with Machiavellianism. Hence, two hypotheses will be stated.

**Hypothesis 5:** Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the value scale of GLOBE’s assertiveness.

**Hypothesis 6:** Machiavellianism is moderately, positively correlated with the practice scale of GLOBE’s assertiveness.

### 8.11 GLOBE: Institutional & in-group individualism–collectivism & Machiavellianism

This GLOBE dimension is very similar to Hofstede’s IDV. However, it has also been shown to not perfectly relate to Hofstede’s index. Moreover, the GLOBE authors highlight somewhat different factors in connection with this dimension than Hofstede does in his work. In addition
to this, GLOBE split this dimension into two sub-dimensions, which had not been undertaken by Hofstede. For these reasons it will be discussed separately.

The core component of GLOBE’s individualism-collectivism dimension is the perception of the smallest unit of a society. In the case of individualistic cultures this would be the individual, while collectivistic cultures treat the group as the smallest societal unit. This is exemplified by the higher importance attributed to groups and the family. High Machs do not attribute high importance to groups. In fact, their focus on the self seems to agree instead with the view of the individual as the smallest unit. Furthermore, they hold an unflattering perception of their families.

As mentioned above and in Section 4.5, this GLOBE dimension has been split into two sub-dimensions, which would be institutional individualism-collectivism and in-group individualism-collectivism. Nevertheless, both seem to be rather negatively linked to Machiavellianism. Institutional collectivism incorporates the encouragement and reward of collective action and collective resource distribution. This is mostly unrelated to Machiavellianism. High Machs do not seem fond of collective action, unless necessitated by the situation. In a similar manner, they would try to gain rewards for themselves instead of sharing them with others, as has been proven by game experiments. In-group collectivism, the collectivistic pole of GLOBE’s second sub-dimension, is comprised of loyalty, cohesiveness, and exhibited pride, all with concern to particular in-groups. This is not in agreement with the calculative and emotionally detached mindset of high Machs. Moreover, it can be argued that their mistrust and opportunism may undermine group cohesiveness and loyalty.

The issue of independence emerges from the tension between individualism and collectivism, where Machiavellianism again shows a good overlap with individualistic characteristics. Individualistic cultures promote the idea of independence and autonomy of the particular individual. In contrast, collectivistic cultures stress the interdependence of individuals, who are integrated in groups. Machiavellianism can be argued to rather emphasise the importance of individual autonomy. However, this does not mean that high Machs try to do everything in order to escape interdependencies. What stems from the collectivistic prioritization of groups and interdependencies is a higher inclination towards conformism. While high Machs are very capable of restraining themselves, they may still prefer to not conform unless necessary.

The way in which goals are pursued sheds further light on the relationship between Machiavellianism and individualism. Individualistic cultures tolerate and encourage individuals to set and follow their own goals. Collectivistic cultures highlight the importance of group goals instead. In such cultures, group goals prevail over the goals of an individual in the case of a
conflict of interest. Whereas high Machs prefer to pursue self-set goals, it must be acknowledged that there might not be a big difference here. It has been shown that high Machs see themselves as in control of interpersonal belongings and have a repertoire full of different manipulation tactics at their disposal. Therefore, they may be able to eventually influence the goals of a group.

Reward allocation is another factor, which shows that the potential relationship between individualism and Machiavellianism is not as clear as one would have assumed. The underlying notion in individualistic societies is equity. Rewards are allocated on the basis of skills and delivered performance. The emphasis of collectivistic societies lies on the equality of allocation. Both are apparently not related to Machiavellianism. High Machs will most likely disagree with an equality based distribution of benefits, which is at least indicated by their lower social interest and lacking altruism. However, it cannot be presumed that high Machs would, therefore, agree with equity. In fact, high Machs will most likely claim as much as possible without regard for fairness in the sense of skills or performance. If not supported, it is at least implied by the indication of higher levels of materialism in high Machs.

Another facet which provides support for a link between Machiavellianism and individualism is rationality. Rational exchange as one basis for need satisfaction is part of the mindset found in individualistic cultures. Likewise, these cultures give precedence to rationality over relationships. This is not the case in collectivistic cultures, where the focus is on relationships even if they do not provide any benefit to the particular individual. This outlook of collectivistic societies is at odds with the mentality of Machiavellianism, which is prone to render relationships calculative. No benefit would most likely mean no relationship. Instead, Machiavellianism shares the notion of emotionally detached rationality, as displayed by individualistic cultures.

To conclude, in relation to the GLOBE dimension of individualism-collectivism, it can be safely said that it shows better correlative properties with respect to Machiavellianism than Hofstede’s dimension, despite its few flaws. Nonetheless, the capacity of the resulting questionnaire concerning the amount of testable hypotheses is limited with respect to time and the attention span of participants. As the autonomy pole of one of Schwartz’s dimensions seems to be more promising, there will be no hypotheses for this dimension of GLOBE.
8.12 GLOBE: Power distance & Machiavellianism

GLOBE identified yet another dimension which was covered also by Hofstede. However, most of the arguments of Section 8.11 hold true for this section, as well. The dimension has been asserted not to be identical to Hofstede’s PDI and different aspects have been discussed by the respective authors. Moreover, when evaluating Hofstede’s PDI for a match with Machiavellianism, inconsistencies surfaced which can probably be alleviated by taking advantage of GLOBE’s distinction between value and practice scales for their dimensions.

The basic idea of power distance as defined by GLOBE is acceptance and encouragement of societal power differences. This includes authority and status privileges. The latter not only includes power itself but also more tangible resources (e.g. money). Obviously, high power distance opposes egalitarianism in these matters. The relationship of these premises with the elements of Machiavellianism is controversial. On the one hand, high Machs can be assumed to desire power and other benefits. After all, Machiavelli’s writings deal constantly with power, its acquisition, and retention. On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that high Machs are well prepared to neglect power positions if this is deemed reasonable by the situation. This, however, violates the idea of power distance.

Further controversies between the two constructs abound when considering the implications for social life. High power distance societies establish social classes, which can be maintained by moral discipline and a lack of integration efforts. While the establishment of classes may satisfy the high Machs’ need for structure, moral discipline is at odds with Machiavellianism, which does not offer much appreciation for morality. Additionally, high power distance practices promote respect for one’s family and friends. This is again in disaccord with Machiavellianism, which gives rise to a negative perception of the family and an objectification of other people including a disregard for emotions. On a leadership level, power distance practices and values lead to a favourable perception of self-protective leadership styles, some components of which overlap with Machiavellianism (e.g. self-centredness). Notwithstanding this, there is also a positive relationship between power distance values and an emphasis on humane-oriented leadership styles. Even though it is argued that this finds its expression in paternalistic leadership, it is still in conflict with several characteristics of Machiavellianism (e.g. lack of empathy).

One aspect that draws a more consistent picture of the potential relationship between Machiavellianism and power distance is the aspiration for power. It is argued that higher power distance leads to the societal encouragement of a quest for more power. Entailments of this are corruption and competition, which can both be argued to increase a person’s power and other
resources. In regard to corruption, there is evidence which ascertains that high Machs tend towards corruptive behaviour. As for competitiveness, Machiavellianism is positively linked to hypercompetitiveness, which is a rather extreme form of competitive demeanour. Yet, is has also been stated that only power distance values relate positively to competition, while power distance practices relate negatively to competition.

The environmental conditions of Machiavellianism and high power distance delineate, however, a rather flawless fit. Societies which score high in power distance impose structure on their environment by the use of hierarchies and roles (e.g. subordinate and superior). This corresponds with the high Machs’ preference of structure over ambiguity. The environment of high power distance societies is further depicted as low in emotionality and humanism, with a prevalence of self-interest. All these factors can be easily related to Machiavellianism. Low emotionality corresponds with the high Machs’ emotional detachment. Low humanism taps into the negative correlation of Machiavellianism with altruism and empathy as well as the de-emphasis of social interests. Self-interest finds its equivalent in the high Machs’ focus on the self.

Examining the features of Machiavellianism, it seems that there is once again the same controversy that materialized when evaluating Hofstede’s PDI in Section 8.1. Even so, this time the split between power distance values and practices can provide alleviation. Reconsidering all the arguments and overlaps mentioned above it seems that overall high Machs hold values of high power distance. However, their practices seem to digress from the precepts of high power distance. To name just a few examples, high power distance practices have been found to correlate with respecting family and friends, which is evidently in conflict with Machiavellianism. Another representation of incompatibility would be the negative relationship between power distance practices and competitiveness. Finally, it should be mentioned that high Machs are indeed able to ignore power positions if it suits them in the given situational circumstances. These aspects are all contrary to the practices of high power distance and imply a negative relationship. The split of values and practices with respect to Machiavellianism seems to be rather clean. Accordingly, the assumed correlations of Machiavellianism with values and practices will point in diverging directions.

Hypothesis 7: Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the value scale of GLOBE’s power distance.
Hypothesis 8: Machiavellianism is negatively correlated with the practice scale of GLOBE’s power distance.

8.13 GLOBE: Humane orientation & Machiavellianism

GLOBE’s humane orientation dimension is composed of several characteristics. These are kindness, caring, generosity, friendliness, altruism, and fairness. Although high Machs are capable of utilizing and displaying these characteristics during their manipulative endeavours, Machiavellianism opposes all of them. This is the logical conclusion grounded in the Machiavellian elements of emotional detachment, mistrust, cynicism, focus on the self, and de-emphasis of altruism.

The two constructs’ influence on social dynamics displays further dissimilarities. Humane orientation is accompanied by social support within society, which can take on many forms (e.g. financial support, companionship). In contrast, Machiavellianism has been found negatively linked to social interest and empathy. Additionally, the implied self-focus renders the unconditional provision of support unlikely. If high Machs were to deliver socially supportive acts, they would probably only do so whenever their utilitarian mind sees a chance to benefit from it. Remaining on the subject of social dynamics, humane-oriented cultures deem it acceptable for organisations to mainly focus on the maximization of profit. Moreover, especially for humane orientation practices, there exists a positive correlation with liberal thinking, which lies diametrical to socialism. While this appears to be counterintuitive, the suggested reason for this is that the humane-oriented everyday practices provide enough support to the people, which means that support from higher levels is no longer necessary. This would then relate negatively to Machiavellianism, which is suggested to favour exploitative activities. Apart from this matter, low humane orientation seems to be linked to a focus on tasks. This, in turn, would suit the attitude of high Machs.

Concerning the attitudes of the individual, the possible negative relationship between Machiavellianism and humane orientation is once again substantiated. In humane-oriented cultures there is a lower emphasis on the self. Cultural members are expected to transcend their self-interests for the sake of benevolence. This encompasses a discouragement of both hedonism and striving for power and achievement. Unsurprisingly, this contradicts the Machiavellian attributes. While hedonism is of rather little concern, power acquisition and achievement are rather important parts of Machiavellianism. Further, transcendence of self-interests cannot be expected from high Machs, as Machiavellianism demonstrates significant opportunism and
even a certain overlap with narcissism. As for the realm of leadership, humane orientation values provided appreciation for humane-oriented leadership styles and discounted self-protective leadership styles. Machiavellianism can be argued to oppose humane-oriented leadership while supporting self-protective leadership to some extent (e.g. self-centredness).

The case of GLOBE’s humane orientation dimension provides a rather clear case of an allegedly negative correlation with Machiavellianism. Given the consistency of opposing features, this negative correlation may extend to the value and practice scale of the humane orientation dimension. Thence, two hypotheses will be presented.

**Hypothesis 9:** Machiavellianism is negatively correlated with the value scale of GLOBE’s humane orientation.

**Hypothesis 10:** Machiavellianism is negatively correlated with the practice scale of GLOBE’s humane orientation.

### 8.14 GLOBE: Uncertainty avoidance & Machiavellianism

GLOBE’s uncertainty avoidance is another dimension which shares common ideas with one of Hofstede’s dimensions (i.e. UAI). Yet, this dimension will be separately examined due to the fact that the respective authors emphasised different facets and correlates. Additionally, the two constructs have been found to be statistically non-identical (see Section 4.8).

High uncertainty avoidance as defined by GLOBE describes a culture with low comfort towards ambiguity. This is in accord with Machiavellianism, which implies discomfort in the face of an ambiguous environment. Societies rating high in uncertainty avoidance tend to create laws and rules which are supposed to diminish the environmental uncertainty. This does also apply to organisations within such cultures. In order to stabilize and structure the organisational environment they have recourse to organisational rules. These structuring efforts are mirrored by Machiavellianism. High Machs dislike ambiguous situations and try to initiate structures in order to reduce uncertainty. However, though they might as well aim for the establishment of rules, high Machs see the breaking of rules as viable option if it provides an advantage to them. Even though high Machs do not seem to be extraordinarily fond of this tactic, it can be argued that the breaking of rules is highly discouraged in high uncertainty avoidant cultures.
A further aspect is the apparent long-term orientation prevalent in high uncertainty avoidance cultures. This can be matched by Machiavellianism, which not solely concentrates on the long-term but includes it into its considerations. Nevertheless, this cultural support of long-term orientation also encompasses relationships. With respect to Machiavellianism it can be argued that support for long-term relationships are relatively unlikely unless tactical evaluations deem it necessary.

High uncertainty avoidance also implies higher levels of anxiety and neuroticism. Even so, GLOBE’s uncertainty avoidance puts less emphasis on this aspect as compared to Hofstede’s UAI. In accordance with this, higher Machs consistently display higher levels of anxiety. The cultural nurturance of anxiety may also cause heightened secrecy (at least in the financial sector). Secrecy can be argued to tap into the deceptive nature of Machiavellianism.

Regarding uncertainty avoidance values, they tend to favour rather passive behaviour. There is a negative correlation with competitiveness, which disagrees with the properties of Machiavellianism. With respect to the political sphere, there is a positive correlation with passiveness and a negative correlation with political voice. It can be assumed that this antagonizes with Machiavellian assertiveness. However, it could also be that high Machs adopt an indifferent stance in this manner, as it might be perceived as part of the uncontrollable socio-political sphere of life. As for leadership styles, humane-oriented leadership is positively and self-protective leadership negatively related to uncertainty avoidance values. Machiavellianism, in contrast, seems to oppose humane-oriented leadership, whereas it shares some elements of self-protective leadership (e.g. self-centredness). Only the negative correlation with traditionalism fits the properties of Machiavellianism, which also show a negative link with traditionalism.

Uncertainty avoidance practices provide relationships quite different from those of the value scale. They are in favour of more active behaviour. A positive correlation exists with competitiveness, which agrees with the competitive elements of Machiavellianism. There is, furthermore, a negative correlation with political passiveness and a positive link with political voice. Both are in line with the more active facets of Machiavellianism (e.g. dominance) in as much as high Machs claim control over this societal layer as pointed out above. Aside from that, humane-oriented as well as self-protective leadership styles are negatively related to uncertainty avoidance practices. While the rejection of humane-oriented leadership follows the features of Machiavellianism, the negative relationship with self-protective leadership is rather disconfirming of a link with Machiavellianism, as this leadership style can be partially linked with it as mentioned in the former paragraph. Another opposing relationship is the positive
The link of uncertainty avoidance practices with traditionalism. This contradicts the high Machs’ low concern for traditions.

Overall, it seems that the overlap of the characteristics and entailments of GLOBE’s uncertainty avoidance with Machiavellianism is not flawless, but reasonable. However, it seems that Hofstede’s UAI delivers a better fit. As the survey can only contain a limited amount of hypotheses for testing, it does not appear sensible to include hypotheses for this GLOBE dimension. Therefore, no hypotheses will be stated here.

### 8.15 Schwartz: Autonomy-embeddedness & Machiavellianism

Hofstede’s and GLOBE’s dimensions which deal with the topic of individualism and collectivism have already been introduced and evaluated (see Sections 8.3 and 8.11). Even so, Schwartz’s concept differs from the etic dimensions of his colleagues, which is why it merits independent consideration.

Autonomous societies tend to give priority to individual interests when conflicting with the interests of groups. Moreover, individuals are rather independent with their identity being separate from their group memberships, which are usually based on self-interest. High Machs might be indifferent when it comes to a conflict of interests, as they can be argued to have manipulative capabilities which may help in shaping group goals according to their interests. However, independence is in line with Machiavellianism, which stresses the centrality of the self during social interaction. Thus, there is a basic fit of Machiavellianism with autonomy.

Autonomy is further subdivided into affective and intellectual autonomy. Affective autonomy encourages the pursuance of individual, positive, affective experiences. This encompasses values that highlight pleasure, excitement, and indulgence. This is at odds with Machiavellianism, which prefers emotional detachment as well as impulse control and, therefore, can be argued to place only little emphasis on affective experiences. Regarding intellectual autonomy, the unrestrained pursuit of individual ideas and intellectual interests are stimulated. Supporting values underscore creativity and openness to new matters. Machiavellianism may well be promoted by giving it intellectual room for developing plans and machinations. In addition to this, the high Machs’ inventiveness with respect to the devising of manipulation tactics shares the notions of openness and creativity.

The embeddedness pole lies in stark contrast with these properties. Instead, individuals are restrained by the group and integrated into them. It is comprised of many different values which deal with providing order (e.g. social order, tradition), self-restraint (e.g. obedience, self-
discipline), and social enhancement (e.g. reciprocation of favours, forgiveness). Some of these values appear to agree with the Machiavellian features, such as order, which can be related to structure and self-restraint which might resemble impulse control. However, it must be kept in mind that these originate from the needs of groups, not from individual ambition. Aside from that, social enhancement is contrary to the opportunistic attitude and interests of high Machs. Accordingly, the basic premises of embeddedness display a rather questionable fit with Machiavellianism.

The workplace behaviours indicated by autonomy and embeddedness shed further light on the possible relationship with Machiavellianism. In their decision making, members of autonomous societies refer to participative instead of hierarchical sources of guidance and antagonize widespread beliefs as sources of guidance. The inverse is true for embedded cultures. In this context, high Machs might not draw on hierarchical nor participative sources of guidance but instead rely on themselves for making decisions. The underlying argument is the distrust felt towards other people, which does not differentiate between superiors or peers. Yet, as widespread beliefs may be related to a culture’s traditional heritage, high Machs may oppose them as sources of guidance, which is in accord with autonomy. Affective autonomy is further implied to discourage work-centrality, though intellectual autonomy potentially advocates the view of work as entitlement instead of an obligation. The opposite is true for embedded cultures. Work-centrality may constitute a part of achievement orientation and could potentially correspond with Machiavellianism. This would indicate that Machiavellianism tends towards the intellectual sphere of autonomy. Concerning work values, autonomy is presumed to correlate positively with intrinsic work values, while intellectual autonomy might be negatively related to extrinsic work values. The implied essentiality of intrinsic work values (i.e. intrinsic motivation) can be seen as an important component of the high Machs’ achievement orientation. Yet, extrinsic motivation may also be important to high Machs as there is an implied link of Machiavellianism with materialism. Embeddedness, in contrast, highlights extrinsic work values at the expense of intrinsic work values. Thence, the opposite arguments from those of autonomy apply.

The implications for the societal layer seem to lend at least weak support to a potential relationship between Machiavellianism and autonomy. Autonomous cultures favour women’s equality, democratization, and correlate negatively with the size of the average household. In the case of women’s equality, there might be different attitudes with respect to the gender of the high Machs. While there is indicative evidence which suggests that high Machs have a more conservative gender outlook, female high Machs might actually favour women’s equali-
ty, as this may ameliorate their situation in different spheres of life. The assumed split in attitudes may be reasonable, as there is a noteworthy variation between male and female high Machs in some areas. The relationship with democratization is also ambiguous. On the one hand, higher democratization may provide high Machs with more political rights, a basically favourable development. On the other hand, since high Machs are cynical and feel less in control regarding the socio-political sphere of life, they might be indifferent in this matter. Nonetheless, the smaller average household size may correspond with the high Machs’ low appreciation of their families. Moreover, the de-emphasis of religion in autonomous cultures may be in accord with Machiavellianism, as far as morality-based tenets are concerned.

Embedded societies display the opposite regarding the relationships mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Accordingly, they rather contradict the properties of Machiavellianism. However, they are also less inclined to help strangers (i.e. out-group members) in need. In spite of the lack of differentiation between in-group and out-group, this agrees with the negative correlation of Machiavellianism with altruism. Moreover, there is a negative relationship between embeddedness and membership in voluntary organisations and political activism. The first aspect can only be linked with Machiavellianism as long as organisations with altruistic purposes are concerned. Yet, the lower levels of political activism may contravene the assertive attitude of high Machs. However, there is always the possibility that high Machs will be indifferent towards political activism, as it may be perceived as part of the socio-political sphere and, therefore, seemingly uncontrollable.

The impacts on family life render a relationship between Machiavellianism and autonomy possible. Autonomous cultures de-emphasise hard work and obedience as desirable traits for children to learn, whereas imagination is espoused. On the one hand, hard work might be conducive to achievement orientation, which means that this negative relationship could contradict Machiavellianism. On the other hand, the depreciation of obedience overlaps with the high Machs’ focus on the self in interactional situations. Furthermore, imagination can be argued to coincide with the higher inventiveness of high Machs. The inverse relationships appear for embeddedness. Autonomy also correlates negatively with the requirement of unconditional respect for one’s parents. Again, this is in accord with Machiavellianism, which implies a rather negative perception of one’s family.

In total, there is a fairly good overlap of Machiavellianism with autonomy. However, there are still several issues that could impede a positive relationship. Nevertheless, on closer examination, it seems that this can be resolved by concentrating on intellectual autonomy. Most, if not all, of the disconcerting issues can be imputed to affective autonomy. To name just one exam-
ple, autonomous cultures discount the value of hard work during childrearing, which might be important for achievement orientation, as shared by Machiavellianism. This may be because hard work, almost by definition, meets opposition from the pleasure seeking nature of affective autonomy values. Moreover, affectivity is of little importance to the emotionally detached and rational high Mach. Therefore, a hypothesis will only be formulated in favour of a positive relationship between Machiavellianism and intellectual autonomy.

Hypothesis 11: Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the intellectual autonomy pole of Schwartz’s autonomy-embeddedness dimension.

8.16 Schwartz: Hierarchy-egalitarianism & Machiavellianism

This dimension bears some resemblance with Hofstede’s PDI and GLOBE’s power distance. However, it is not identical and is conceptualized in a different manner, which is reason enough to examine it as an individual dimension.

Hierarchical cultures try to manage societal coordination by the means of hierarchical order and role ascription, which are enforced with punishment. Emerging inequalities in power, resources, and rights are legitimized. Values of power and wealth are dominating, despite a concurrent stress on humbleness. The employment of hierarchical order and role distribution represents structuring efforts, which are familiar to high Machs. Also, the pending threat of punishments might hint at a link with Machiavellianism as it can spur the development of punishment. Since high Machs strive for power and might also possess materialist attitudes, legitimized inequalities in the control of both of these concur with the properties of Machiavellianism. Power and wealth can both be reasoned to be represented by Machiavellian attitudes as well. Humbleness, however, lies in stark contrast with Machiavellian assertiveness and exploitation. Even so, it must be acknowledged that high Machs are well prepared to forego power positions whenever necessitated by situational requirements.

Egalitarianism shows a significantly worse fit with Machiavellianism. Egalitarian cultures work on the basis of equality and bear a strong social component. Cooperation and voluntary support of others’ welfare are expected. In order to contribute to society, the single individual is required to transcend his or her self-centred interests. Other values, apart from equality, which are cherished centre on moral justice and concern for society. Most of these aspects strongly disagree with Machiavellian attitudes. Equality may not be of interest, as high Machs focus on obtaining more for themselves instead of worrying about fair and equal distribution.
This is also a precursor to why social involvement is not at the heart of high Machs. They further depreciate altruism and interest for societal matters including a lack of empathy. From their utilitarian point of view, promoting the well-being of others instead of their own might seem unreasonable. They would most likely stick to their self-centred attitude and serve themselves. Moral justice is also of little concern for high Machs. Otherwise they would not be fond of manipulative demeanour and opportunism.

The implications for work further support a potential relationship between Machiavellianism and hierarchy. Managers of hierarchical cultures have recourse to hierarchical sources of guidance when making decisions, as opposed to participative sources of guidance. They further adhere to widespread, national beliefs as a guiding source. As high Machs distrust others, it is reasonable to presume that they refer to neither hierarchical nor participative sources of guidance but instead rely on themselves when making decisions. They might also neglect prevalent national beliefs as they may stem from a culture’s tradition, which is held in low esteem by high Machs. In hierarchical cultures, work-centrality is high and work is deemed an obligation and not an entitlement. As work-centrality might be an element of achievement orientation, it agrees with Machiavellianism. Regarding work values, power-related and extrinsic work values are supposedly espoused while social work values should be discounted. As has already been pointed out, power is important to high Machs as might be extrinsic work values due to an implied relationship between Machiavellianism and materialism. The opposition of social work values fits in as well. Furthermore, hierarchical societies nurture stronger competitiveness, which taps into the high Machs’ hypercompetitive attitude. Every facet mentioned in this paragraph is reversed when considering egalitarianism, which is why Machiavellianism and egalitarianism might be antagonists. Only the link with extrinsic work values is not reversed but simply not assumed existent for egalitarianism.

A more ambiguous picture is drawn on a societal layer. Hierarchical societies relate negatively to democratization, political activism, and some elements of women’s equality. A positive link exists for the average household size. Machiavellianism might not be in favour of lower democratization and political activism. The former could provide additional political rights to the high Mach, whereas the latter might overlap with the assertiveness and dominance exhibited by high Machs. Nevertheless, it could well be that high Machs care little about these, as they could be viewed as pertaining to the socio-political sphere of life, over which high Machs claim no control. Women’s equality will probably be perceived differently by high Machs depending on their gender. Although high Machs appear to favour a conservative gender role distribution, female high Machs might endorse women’s equality as it could enhance
their position and options in different situations. Aside from that, hierarchical cultures impute higher importance to religion. This may contravene Machiavellianism in as much as principles of morality are imposed since the manipulative and cynical high Mach has ostensibly little appreciation for common morality. This has already been exemplified by Machiavelli’s original treatises. Once more, egalitarian societies share the same relationships stated within this paragraph but with inverse directions. Hence, Machiavellianism might this time be in better accord with egalitarianism than hierarchy.

Regarding the family life, the potential relationship between hierarchy and Machiavellianism is further blurred. During child rearing, hierarchical cultures stress an attitude of hard work as an essential trait to learn. Since hard work might support a higher achievement orientation, it seems to follow the concept of Machiavellianism. However, hierarchical societies also underscore the importance of unconditional respect for one’s parents. This can hardly be assumed to correspond with Machiavellianism, as high Machs display a rather uncomplimentary view of their families. Again, egalitarian cultures exhibit the reversed relationships, as stated in this paragraph. Following the employed line of argumentation, this, however, means that there is also no clear relationship between egalitarianism and Machiavellianism.

In summary, there appears to be a positive relationship between Machiavellianism and hierarchy and a negative relationship with egalitarianism. Even so, due to several incongruities, it can be argued that this relationship is more unstable than the hypothesized link of Machiavellianism with GLOBE’s power distance dimension in Section 8.12, which was able to offer alleviation for most incompatibilities. Since power distance covers a similar social phenomenon to Schwartz’s hierarchy-egalitarianism dimension and the survey has limitations to its capabilities, there will be no hypotheses for this dimension from Schwartz.

8.17 Schwartz: Mastery-harmony & Machiavellianism

Cultures rating high in mastery values are apt to attempt to change their natural and social environment for their own purposes. Cultural members do so in an assertive and exploitative manner, mostly for their individual benefit. This individual pursuit of one’s own goals is tolerated by society and incurs the desire to surmount others. Culturally emphasised values revolve around status, assertiveness, and independent individuality. High Machs also seem prone to changing their environment. Either they do so when it is ambiguous and they impose structure or they employ manipulative tactics in order to change the situation to their favour. Additionally, the motives and approach utilized by high Machs concur with the mastery-
related procedures. High Machs are also driven by personal benefit and use exploitation and assertiveness, including the wish to surpass other people (i.e. hypercompetitiveness). This already taps into the essential values of mastery. Assertiveness and independent individuality both match Machiavellian attitudes. Status does so in as much as it can be related to the high Machs’ achievement orientation.

Harmonious cultures appear to be rather at odds with Machiavellianism. They shun exploitation but highlight adaptation to the social and natural environment without significant changes. For the individual cultural member, there are not many requirements with respect to interdependency besides the expectation to set aside self-interest. Values which predominate in such societies centre on peacefulness and the protection and cherishment of nature. While high Machs demonstrate heightened flexibility in their conduct, the antagonism with exploitation disaccords with the properties of Machiavellianism, which ostensibly recommend exploitative means and the exertion of dominance. In addition to this, high Machs usually concentrate on themselves during interaction, which renders the transcendence of self-interest unlikely. Peacefulness is opposed by Machiavelli himself, who commends the preparation for war even in times of peace (Machiavelli, 1532; 1521). Moreover, the high Machs’ assertiveness and opportunism may eventually violate situational peace and harmony. Aside from that, the protection of nature might be objected by the utilitarian high Machs, as this may require the use of resources, which does not provide sufficient individual return for the high Mach.

When examining the resulting circumstances for work, the potential relationship between Machiavellianism and mastery seems to experience further corroboration. The cultural preference for mastery incurs managers’ appreciation for hierarchical sources of guidance as opposed to participative sources of guidance for decision making. This extends to the perceived unimportance of specialists as a source of guidance. As has already been stated in Sections 8.15 and 8.16, high Machs might not draw on hierarchical nor participative guidance sources since they mistrust other people. Therefore, they can be presumed to rely primarily on themselves when making decisions. The depreciation of specialists as sources of guidance is in line with this conjecture. Further, mastery-oriented cultures place more weight on work-centrality. This might contribute as one factor to the achievement orientation of Machiavellianism. With respect to work values, power-related values are favoured in cultures scoring high in mastery, whereas social values are rejected. Likewise, high Machs seem to strive for power, as indicated by Machiavelli’s original writings, while disregarding social values and attitudes. The latter is exemplified by the opposition towards altruism and the absence of empathy as well as low interest in social issues. The high Machs’ opportunistic attitude is also noteworthy here.
A further overlapping characteristic is the mastery embracing cultures’ support for competitiveness. In this matter, high Machs exhibit a hypercompetitive attitude. All of the relationships mentioned in this paragraph are reversed in their direction when being applied to harmonious cultures. As a logical consequence, there is an antagonistic link between Machiavellianism and harmony.

From a societal perspective, the support for an alleged correlation between Machiavellianism and mastery is not as strong as with the preceding subjects. Mastery relates negatively to democratization and some elements of women’s equality but positively to the average size of households. As was already pointed out in the Sections 8.15 and 8.16, democratization might be perceived as beneficial by high Machs, as they incur an increase in political rights. Nonetheless, it could as well be that high Machs feel little concern for levels of democratization, as it might be viewed as part of the socio-political sphere over which high Machs claim no control. The discounting of some aspects of women’s equality seem to be in line with evidence indicative of the high Machs’ preference for conservative gender role distribution. However, it can be argued that this may be heavily affected by the gender of high Machs. Female high Machs might actually welcome enforced women’s equality as it may elevate their status in several areas of society. Concerning the high size of average households, it can be stated that this may disagree with the high Machs’ unfavourable perception of their families. Similarly, mastery ascribes higher importance to religion. Since religions most likely include moral principles, they can be presumed to meet opposition from the cynical and manipulative attitude of high Machs. As has been the case before, harmonious societies share these same relationships, but with inverse directions. There is, however, one point that is idiosyncratic to harmony. It has been implied that harmony relates positively to helping needy strangers. This arguably conflicts with Machiavellianism, which displays distrust for others and correlates negatively with altruism.

The sphere of family provides ambiguous support anew for a positive link between mastery and Machiavellianism. Mastery espousing cultures ascribe hard work and a certain selfishness as important characteristics for children to learn. Hard work might be conducive to achievement orientation and, thereby, contribute to Machiavellianism. Selfishness corresponds with the Machiavellian facets of self-centredness, low altruism, dominance, opportunism, and exploitation. What causes friction, though, is the unconditional respect towards one’s parents as expected in mastery-oriented cultures. Instead, high Machs tend to hold rather unflattering views of their parents. Harmonic cultures demonstrate the opposite directions for the relation-
ships of this paragraph. Consequently, the relationship between harmony and Machiavellianism is also uncertain regarding the matter of family.

To conclude on this dimension of Schwartz, it appears sensible to assume a positive relationship between Machiavellianism and the mastery pole. There are a few flaws, but these can mostly be traced back to a difference with regard to family perception. This is neither for mastery nor Machiavellianism a core element. Thus, a hypothesis will be stated.

*Hypothesis 12: Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the mastery pole of Schwartz’s mastery-harmony dimension.*

**8.18 Gelfand and colleagues: Tightness-looseness & Machiavellianism**

Tight cultures impose strong and clear norms on their members, which restrain them in their behaviour, thinking, and activities. Loose societies are also equipped with norms, but these are feeble and ambiguous in their nature and transgressions are tolerated. This, of course, leaves more latitude to members of loose cultures. It has been proven many times that latitude is one situational ingredient required for high Machs to outperform others ranking lower in Machiavellianism. Even so, it is also acknowledged that high Machs still opt for less ambiguous situations, which are ostensibly provided by the norms of tight cultures. Notwithstanding this reduction of uncertainty, the flip side of tight norms is the impact on one’s attitudes and even thinking patterns, as stated in Chapter 6. In fact, a culture’s tightness not only acts on a political level by favouring autocratic governments, fewer political rights and civil liberties, or the establishment of more laws, but it also influences the day-to-day life of its members. The narrow socialization of tight societies offers only a limited set of appropriate behaviours in every situation. If this reaches a degree to which it affects the high Mach’s cognitive plotting activities, it could interfere with the manipulative properties of Machiavellianism. Apart from this, tight cultures seem to give rise to a higher number of religious norms. As they regard the promotion of morality, they would be at odds with Machiavellianism to a certain extent.

As has already been hinted, tight cultures are inclined to counter environmental ambiguity by the use of norms. This can be linked to the imposition of structure on the environment, which is strongly related to Machiavellianism. The higher need for structure in tight cultures has already been confirmed. Therefore, it can be argued that the abundance of rules and norms serve this purpose. High Machs also initiate structure in order to forestall ambiguity.
Anxiety is another theme which unites tightness and Machiavellianism. In order to maintain their web of laws and norms, tight cultures resort to punishment more commonly than loose societies, the latter of which are more prone to tolerating a breach from rules. This also applies to the strong everyday situations in tight societies, which means that the failing to adhere to the expected norms incurs social sanctions. Consequently, anxiety levels of members of tight cultures are higher due to the fear of punishment. Moreover, the fact that the social coordination of tight societies is supposed to have its origin in external threats could potentially contribute to increased anxiety. Machiavellianism co-occurs with a heightened state of anxiety, as well. While the cause of this phenomenon is not absolutely certain, it can be assumed that it originates from factors belonging to the environment. As a result, the elevated anxiety of both constructs can be imputed to the influence of external factors.

A further factor which is shared by tightness as well as Machiavellianism is the tendency towards self-control. Tightness has been demonstrated to imbue its cultural members with a more developed self-regulatory capability. Similarly, high Machs exhibit superior impulse control. However, in tight societies dutifulness and conformism also emerge as potential offshoots of this sense of self-regulation. It may be reasonable to suggest that high Machs would pay little attention to dutifulness and conformism unless these behaviours could provide a benefit from a utilitarian point of view.

Looking at the big picture, it appears that there is a relatively good fit of tightness with Machiavellianism. Even so, there are several flaws. Although they are of non-central importance, they still merit consideration. Consequently, the link between the two constructs should be of moderate nature. As a result, a hypothesis will be formulated.

*Hypothesis 13: Machiavellianism is moderately positively correlated with the tightness pole of Gelfand et al.’s tightness-looseness dimension.*

Table 1 is intended to provide an overview of all the hypotheses stated. There are 13 hypotheses in total, which require testing by the means of a survey.
Table 1: Overview of the hypotheses formulated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Machiavellianism is moderately, positively correlated with Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Machiavellianism is moderately, negatively correlated with the indulgence pole of Hofstede and Minkov’s indulgence vs. restraint dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the value scale of GLOBE’s performance orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the practice scale of GLOBE’s performance orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the value scale of GLOBE’s assertiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Machiavellianism is moderately, positively correlated with the practice scale of GLOBE’s assertiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the value scale of GLOBE’s power distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Machiavellianism is negatively correlated with the practice scale of GLOBE’s power distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Machiavellianism is negatively correlated with the value scale of GLOBE’s humane orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Machiavellianism is negatively correlated with the practice scale of GLOBE’s humane orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the intellectual autonomy pole of Schwartz’s autonomy-embeddedness dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the mastery pole of Schwartz’s mastery-harmony dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Machiavellianism is moderately, positively correlated with the tightness pole of Gelfand et al.’s tightness-looseness dimension</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.19 Extending the research question: Cultural profiles

Having reached a set of 13 testable hypotheses, it seems reasonable to alter the research question. To reiterate, the original research question was: **What is the relationship between etic dimensions of culture and Machiavellianism?** However, relying on only one cultural dimension in order to attempt to conjecture levels of Machiavellianism on the individual level may be flawed due to individual variation. According to Schneider and Barsoux (2003), it is better to think about the values of etic dimensions of culture in terms of a bell curve. The di-
mensional value is set in the middle of the curve and people socialized in that culture vary either to the left or the right of it. While one of the principles of the bell curve is that it is rare that single entities lie far astray of its mean, it is also necessary to notice the rarity of entities exactly hitting the mean.

Nonetheless, even if there is a connection between Machiavellianism and certain cultural dimensions, an individual of that culture does not necessarily have to match that dimensional value. This is what was pointed to when introducing the bell curve argument (Schneider & Barsoux, 2003) in the former paragraph. Moreover, it is what Hofstede (2001) cautions against when introducing his ecological and reverse-ecological fallacies (as described in chapter 3). To solve this problem, which is the bell-curve-like variation on a single dimension, this thesis suggests that the bundling of a set of cultural dimensions could be a solution. While it might be that a person socialized in a specific culture varies on one dimension, on some occasions even to an extreme extent, it may be less likely that that same person would vary on several of his or her cultural dimensions. From an optimistic point of view, it could even be that the different variations in the different dimensions cancel each other out when it comes to the directions which are conducive to the development of Machiavellianism. Gauging the likelihood of Machiavellianism for individuals should, therefore, be more reliable if using a bundle of dimensions instead of a single one.

Consequently, an extension to the original research question arises, a sub-question so to speak:

**What set of cultural dimensions can predict the likelihood of Machiavellianism?** Again, the underlying assumption is that simultaneously drawing on a set of cultural dimensions may provide a combined relationship between Machiavellianism and this cultural profile, which should be stronger in its predictive power and also more reliable. In order for this to be possible, at least two dimensions need to be found to correlate with Machiavellianism. This will be tackled by the means of the empirical evaluation below.

**Research question:** What is the relationship between etic dimensions of culture and Machiavellianism?

**Sub-question:** What set of cultural dimensions can predict the likelihood of Machiavellianism?
II. EMPIRICAL PART

9 Method

There are several different opinions and recommendations for the ideal conduction of cross-cultural empirical research, which overlap in many aspects. Hofstede (2001; Hofstede & Minkov, 2013) for instance mentions a sample size of 20 to 50 subjects per investigated culture as appropriate. These would ideally be matched samples, meaning that they do not differ in any other characteristic than their cultural background. He also cautions against the application of etic cultural dimension on a single individual or on organisations. In a similar vein, the GLOBE associates recommend a sample size of about 45 subjects (Javidan et al., 2004a), and they render the use of their dimensions for the single individual problematic (The GLOBE Foundation, 2006a) but deem the application at the organisational level possible (The GLOBE Foundation, 2006a; Dorfman et al., 2004). Schwartz also advises not to use his cultural value scales and the related analysis for single individuals (Schwartz, 2009). He further mentions statistical analysis tools, which are necessary to replicate his original research. Another commonality between several researchers is the statistical consideration of cultural response bias (e.g. Schwartz, 2009; Hofstede & Minkov, 2013).

Nevertheless, it needs to be remarked that the study conducted by this thesis is different in nature than most of the major studies with cross-cultural background. These usually try to investigate an array of single cultures. In contrast, the primary interest of this thesis concerns the exploration and analysis of correlations between an individual-level construct and several culture-level constructs. Thus, many of the recommendations made for the conduction of major cross-cultural research projects are not applicable to this thesis’ empirical study.

The following chapters and sections will describe the sample, the questionnaire, and other basic conditions of the survey, as well as the procedures applied. This leads to the statistical analysis of the gathered data and the verification or falsification of the different hypotheses. A discussion of the results and the entailing implications for research and practice follow. Finally, the limitations of this study, as well as recommendations for future research, will be presented before concluding the entire thesis.

9.1 Introducing the sample

The sample consists of 108 students, 61 of whom are female and 47 male. In percentages, this means that approximately 56.6 % of the subjects are female, whereas about 43.4 % are male.
The average age of the sample is 23.1, the youngest subject being 20 and the oldest subject being 37. The national division of the subjects can be found in Table 2.

Table 2: Division of original survey group by the means of citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, subjects of 22 countries and five continents are part of the sample of this thesis’s research. The three most represented nations are Austria, the USA, and Taiwan, in this order. Eight countries are represented by only one subject.

The first reason for the choice of this sample was, of course, its availability. What made this sample even more attractive was its cross-cultural value due to its inclusion of exchange students. Keeping in mind that the research of this thesis bears a predominantly cross-cultural perspective, this mix of cultures is a favourable aspect. Moreover, as they are students, it is reasonable to presume that they have not yet been able to spend enough time within a single organisation or work in a specific profession for long enough to suffer from organisational or professional bias. The fact that factors like these can have an impact on cultural ratings is demonstrated by Merritt (2000). Only the subjects’ fields of studies (e.g. technical, managerial) might become the source of bias in this sense for this survey. Another potential bias could result from being an exchange student, which is the case for several subjects and may be attributable to self-selection and which might make them a special kind of student. However, apart from these few potential sources of bias, only the cultural background should be accountable for variations in responses.

Another factor is the common use of student samples in empirical research (e.g. Bond et al., 2004; Furnham, 1994; Kuppens et al., 2006). Schwartz (1994) even points at the usefulness of student samples when it comes to current cultural trends. This way, analyses based on student
samples might be able to capture ongoing cultural development. Thus, the reliance on students as subjects might not become a limitation but prove to be an enhancement.

One more thing needs to be mentioned before leaving this section. It is of paramount importance to keep in mind that this is by no means a representative sample. Consequently, all the results obtained are of indicative nature and need to be treated as such.

9.2 Introducing the questionnaire

Instead of devising new items, the employed questionnaire has been composed of carefully tried and tested items from other questionnaires. They were extracted from already existing questionnaires from different authors. The cultural part of the questionnaire dominated. The respective cultural dimensions which are part of the hypotheses were drawn from four different sources. Hofstede’s UAI and Hofstede and Minkov’s IVR dimensions were tested with the items from the Value Survey Module 2013 (VSM 2013; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2013). The item key has been obtained from the corresponding manual (Hofstede & Minkov, 2013). The items for both the value and practice scales from GLOBE’s performance orientation, assertiveness, power distance, and humane orientation originated from the beta form of the GLOBE questionnaire (The GLOBE Foundation, 2006b). The evaluation key stemmed from GLOBE’s syntax manual (The GLOBE Foundation, 2006c). Regarding Schwartz’s dimensions, the items for his intellectual autonomy and mastery poles were extracted from the Schwartz Value Survey 57 (SVS 57; Schwartz, 1995), whereas the evaluation key was found in the respective manual (Schwartz, 2009). The tightness-looseness dimension was evaluated by using items from Gelfand et al.’s (2011) questionnaire, which was found in the respective article’s appendix. The key for tightness-looseness was grounded in the same article.

Before its application, the questionnaire underwent several revisions, the fifth version being the final one issued to the test subjects. Input for these reiterations came from a statistical coaching, several talks with the thesis supervisor, and a pilot survey with six subjects. This led to several changes in order to improve the questionnaire as much as possible.

One of the major changes was the restructuring of the questionnaire sections. As for the initial structure, it was divided into a cultural section and into a section inquiring Machiavellianism. In order to avoid confusion and to reduce the required time, it was finally divided into an individual section and a cultural section, whereas the latter was sub-divided into a section describing the current state of the respondent’s culture, as well as a part which investigated the
aspired state of one’s culture. This separation closely followed the division as employed by the GLOBE associates (The GLOBE Foundation, 2006b). Most changes, however, were required on the detail-level. These mainly included issues of rewording, additions, and section setting. An example for rewording would be the replacement of “teen-aged students” with “young people” as it was not exactly clear which age group “teen-aged” refers to or what the potential of cultural variation concerning this perception was. Additions can be exemplified by the question of whether people should be encouraged to be aggressive. “Aggressive” could have many meanings, which is why “(excluding physical violence)” was added in order to emphasise the mental component of aggressiveness, which is in accord with the dimension to which this item pertains.

The final questionnaire was in English with a total of 78 items. The different Likert scales of the different dimensions were converted into a 7-point Likert scale for every item, ranging from 1 to 7. The content of the different parts will be described in more detail in the following sections.

9.2.1 The individual section

This is the first part of the questionnaire. It consists of 37 items and is, thereby, relatively seen, the largest part of the questionnaire. Most of the wording changes applied to this part. The essence of this part is the 20 Machiavellianism items. This is the only part of the questionnaire which measures this construct. Having examined various articles which deal with the gauging of Machiavellianism, it seemed that the choice was essentially between the Mach IV and the Mach V questionnaire. The former was designed on the basis of a 7-point Likert scale, while the latter used a forced choice format, which aimed at eliminating problems with social desirability (Christie, 1970b). However, Fehr et al. (1992) delineate several weaknesses of the Mach V questionnaire in their review. One of them is the inappropriateness for intercultural application, as social desirability depends on the respective culture. Hofstede (2001) also mentions this phenomenon of culture-dependent, social desirability. This was the main reason that the Mach IV questionnaire had been chosen for the research which this thesis aims to conduct. According to Fehr et al. (1992), the Mach IV questionnaire seems to be a good choice, as it, therefore, proves superior to its sequel in this, among others. Their review further asserts the sufficient internal reliability and no dramatic effects of social desirability regarding the Mach IV questionnaire, which supports the suitability of this format for this research. In addition to this, the Mach V’s conceptualization with the help of the forced choice format could have been unnecessarily difficult for the test subjects, especially as the question-
naire was issued in English, whereas the mother tongue of several subjects is another lan-
guage.

The first draft of the questionnaire included the 20 Mach IV items. Nonetheless, the revision
process of the questionnaire deemed the replacement of the Mach IV with the Kiddie Mach
scale to be more favourable. The reasons for this change were the complicated language and
the inappropriateness in terms of gender-conscious wording. Both can be argued to stem from
the fact that the Mach IV was devised in the late 1960s (Christie & Geis, 1970a). The Kiddie
Mach was drafted in order to evaluate Machiavellian attitudes in children (Nachamie, 1969 as
cited in Christie, 1970d, p. 326). Accordingly, the vocabulary was simplified and one item
concerning euthanasia was exchanged due to its topical inappropriateness (Christie, 1970d).
To better depict this simplification, an item from the original Mach IV and the related, simpli-
fied item of the Kiddie Mach (see Christie, 1970b, p. 17 and Christie, 1970d, p. 327) can be
seen below.

**Original Mach IV:** It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come
out when they are given a chance.

**Kiddie Mach:** It is smartest to believe that all people will be mean if they have a chance.

Because of efforts to reduce the total number of pages of the single questionnaire, the 20
Machiavellianism items were grouped together at the beginning of this section of the ques-
tionnaire. This reduction of page count was mainly because many pages might have discour-
gaged the subjects from answering in a considerate and concentrated manner.

Of the remaining 17 items, two measure Hofstede’s UAI and another three focus on IVR. This
part also includes the complete set of items for Schwartz’s intellectual autonomy (four items)
and mastery (eight items). The different items were mixed in a random manner.

**9.2.2 The current cultural state**

This part of the questionnaire is composed of 25 items. It represents the second largest part of
the questionnaire.

There are, in total, three items used to gauge Hofstede’s dimensions, two for his UAI and one
for IVR. Six more items measure Gelfand and her colleagues’ tightness-looseness dimension.
The remaining 16 items are part of the GLOBE scales. Yet, they only include the practice
scale items of the several selected dimensions. As previously mentioned at the beginning of
Chapter 9, this is due to the separation within the questionnaire into a part which describes
culture as it currently is and another part which focuses on the ideal state of one’s culture, like the GLOBE associates also had in their own questionnaire (The GLOBE Foundation, 2006b). There are three items for GLOBE’s performance orientation, three for GLOBE’s assertiveness, five for GLOBE’s power distance, and finally five for GLOBE’s humane orientation. All these items were distributed randomly.

9.2.3 The ideal cultural state

The final part of the questionnaire encompasses the last 16 items of the questionnaire. Thus, it is the smallest part of the employed questionnaire. Since the GLOBE associates are the only ones of the authors selected for this questionnaire who distinguished a culture’s current state from its ideal state in their scale construction, only their items are represented in this part of the questionnaire. Four items measure GLOBE’s performance orientation. Three items gauge GLOBE’s assertiveness. Another five items are used to calculate GLOBE’s power distance. The last four items are devoted to GLOBE’s humane orientation. These 16 items were shuffled in a random manner.

The questionnaire ends with questions about age, gender, country of birth, citizenship, and first language. The answers to these questions could prove useful in sorting out potentially unusable questionnaires. The full version of the employed questionnaire as well as the key for calculating the different dimensions are located in Appendix A and B of this thesis.

9.3 Survey procedure

The data was collected in two rounds. In the first round the subject group consisted of 61 students from Johannes Kepler University (JKU), including many exchange students, who were surveyed with a pen and paper test. The survey was conducted as part of their cross-cultural management seminar, which was held in English. In total, three different classes were surveyed. Due to the absence of some students, the effective number of returned questionnaires dropped to 49. The first survey round was conducted on the 5th of December, 2015 at JKU in Linz, Austria.

As the number of 49 returned questionnaires was deemed problematic regarding reliable empirical analyses, a second survey round took place one semester later. Again, both JKU exchange and local students from three cross-cultural management classes posed as subjects. The initial group of 71 students yielded another 64 returned questionnaires. The second sur-
vey round was carried out in the same manner as the first round. The date of the second round was 16\textsuperscript{th} April, 2015. The survey location was again JKU in Linz, Austria. In total, a group of 132 initial students returned 113 questionnaires for analysis.

Subjects were sorted out by the means of two criteria. The first criterion was concerned with dual citizenship. It can be argued that subjects with ambiguous cultural backgrounds might distort the empirical results. Amongst the 113 questionnaires, there were four subjects who disclosed dual citizenship and were, therefore, excluded from the final set of questionnaires.

The second criterion for elimination excluded every questionnaire which had more than two missing values for any of the dimensions. This was deemed necessary since some cultural dimensions, like GLOBE’s assertiveness practice scale, contained only three items in total. Only one questionnaire fell into this category and has consequently been excluded. This led to the final amount of 108 questionnaires for the sample.

### 10 Results

Before tackling the correlation analysis, it is necessary to evaluate the different scales tested by the questionnaire. It is for this reason that, prior to the calculation of correlations, a descriptive analysis and a reliability analysis for all the scales, as well as a factor analysis for the Machiavellianism scale in particular, were conducted.

#### 10.1 Descriptive analysis

In order to gain an overview of the statistical properties of the different dimensions, the calculation of the descriptive values for each dimension appeared sensible. Table 3 offers a quick overview, which includes the underlying sample size, the minimum and maximum values, the average value, and the standard deviation.

Regarding the calculation of the scales, the Machiavellianism scale relies on the addition of the values obtained from the 20 Machiavellianism items. Accordingly, the theoretical minimum of Machiavellianism lies at 20 while the theoretical maximum is 180, with the middle being 80. This approach was chosen since most, if not all, of the studies concerning Machiavellianism applied this method of calculating Machiavellianism (e.g. Christie & Geis, 1970a).

On the contrary, the cultural dimensions were calculated by using the arithmetic mean of their respective items. Hence, the theoretical minimum for each dimension is 1 and its theoretical maximum 7, having their middle at 4.
Table 3: Descriptive analysis for all employed scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construct scale</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>138.00</td>
<td>74.57</td>
<td>12.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance index</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>0.788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofstede and Minkov’s indulgence vs. restraint</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>0.606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s performance orientation – value scale</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>0.732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s performance orientation – practice scale</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>0.872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s assertiveness – value scale</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>1.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s assertiveness – practice scale</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>0.861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s power distance – value scale</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>0.923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s power distance – practice scale</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>0.954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s humane orientation – value scale</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>0.741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s humane orientation – practice scale</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>0.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwartz’s intellectual autonomy</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td>0.652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwartz’s mastery</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>0.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelfand et al.’s tightness-looseness</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>0.732</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the Machiavellianism scale, it can be observed that the average value is approximately 74.5, which is close to the theoretical middle of 80. Thus, there is no danger for the later analyses that they are distorted by an atypically high or low amount of high Machs in the sample. This could have been the case, since more than 50% of the sample is female (see Section 9.1). Since female respondents tend to exhibit lower levels of Machiavellianism than men, as explained in Section 7.8, this could have introduced some kind of bias. For instance, for the sample of this thesis, the average Machiavellianism score for females is about 72.0, whereas it is approximately 77.9 for males.
10.2 Reliability analysis

First, it needs to be determined whether the different dimensions are reliable in terms of the construct they attempt to measure. In order to test the reliability of the different scales, Cronbach’s Alpha was used. The results of this analysis for all the 14 scales employed can be found in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construct scale</th>
<th>Cronbach’s Alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance index</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofstede and Minkov’s indulgence vs. restraint</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s performance orientation – value scale</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s performance orientation – practice scale</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s assertiveness – value scale</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s assertiveness – practice scale</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s power distance – value scale</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s power distance – practice scale</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s humane orientation – value scale</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s humane orientation – practice scale</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwartz’s intellectual autonomy</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwartz’s mastery</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelfand et al.’s tightness-looseness</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Usually, a value of 0.5 and above can be deemed acceptable. Of course, the higher the level, the more reliable the scale is in its ability to measure the respective construct. As can be seen above, the majority of the selected scales surpass the threshold value of 0.5. The highest value, and therefore the best reliability, is displayed by the Machiavellianism scale. This is highly encouraging given that it is probably the most important scale for the correlation analysis in Section 10.4.

What is rather disappointing is the low values for the two dimensions of Hofstede’s concept, namely UAI and IVR, and GLOBE’s practice scale of performance orientation. Regarding Hofstede’s dimensions, it was pointed out in Chapter 3 that the criticism towards his concept includes the questioning of the composition of his dimensions. This may be related to the low obtained alpha values for UAI and IVR. Whatever the case may be, every empirical assumption from here on which draws on these two dimensions needs to be treated with special care.

As for the GLOBE dimensions, there is also some criticism concerning the construction of
their scales, as mentioned in Chapter 4. However, the low value of GLOBE’s practice scale of performance orientation is rather disconcerting, since all the other GLOBE dimensions deliver acceptable reliability values, including the value scale of performance orientation. This difference in reliability of the value and practice scale of performance orientation is intriguing. Nonetheless, whatever the reason for this circumstance may be, all deductions including the practice scale of GLOBE’s performance orientation within the confines of this thesis require that one keeps its insufficient reliability in mind.

10.3 Factor analysis of Machiavellianism scale

Although Table 4 indicates a favourable value for Cronbach’s Alpha regarding the utilized Machiavellianism scale, literature suggests that the construct of Machiavellianism encompasses several different components. This has sometimes been the cause for criticism (Fehr et al., 1992). Yet, what is often neglected is that Machiavellianism is based on the treatises of Niccolò Machiavelli, which comprise several different principles. Consequently, in order to measure Machiavellianism, a multifaceted construct is of utmost necessity (Fehr et al., 1992). The creators of the Mach IV questionnaire were well aware of this issue and, therefore, consciously chose to develop the Machiavellianism scale as a scale composed of several components (Christie, 1970b). These components are three in number and have been termed tactics, views, and morality (Christie, 1970b). The tactics component is concerned with interpersonal attitudes and behaviour. The views component tries to capture the subject’s perception of human nature. Finally, the morality component deals with the respective person’s moral principles (Christie, 1970b). According to Fehr et al.’s (1992) review, the tactics and views components are quite well-supported, while the morality concept appears weak in its robustness. Nonetheless, they further imply that using different components separately for research conduction might be a commendable research approach. This thesis will follow this recommendation.

The Machiavellianism scale employed for this thesis stems from Nachamie’s (1969 as cited in Christie, 1970d, p. 326) Kiddie Mach scale. It was explained in Section 9.2.1 that the Kiddie Mach differs from the original Mach IV in a few aspects, and that further changes with particular respect to this thesis were undertaken. However, the employed items are still based on the Mach IV with its multiple components, which is why they should also produce usable factors. Therefore, in order to obtain different components for further analysis, factor analysis was deemed necessary. Table 5 displays the results of the conducted factor analysis.
Table 5: Results of factor analysis with three factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Dishonesty</th>
<th>Cynicism</th>
<th>Non-morality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-19</td>
<td>0.786</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-6</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-7</td>
<td>0.554</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-9</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.335</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-18</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-3</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-15</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-5</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-20</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.647</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-12</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-13</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.622</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-8</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.513</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-10</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The method chosen was principal component analysis with Varimax rotation. Item loadings were considered pertinent whenever they reached a value above 0.3, which is why values below 0.3 are not included in Table 5. The coefficient matrix, along with all the respective values, can be found in Appendix C.

There are two reasons for the limitation to a set of three factors. The first reason is related to the construction of the Mach IV, as explained above. Since the original Mach IV includes three sub-components, it was reasonable to expect three factors in the Kiddie Mach, which is based on the Mach IV. The second reason surfaced during the initial factor analysis itself. On a basis of trial and error, it became evident that every attempt to extract more than three factors provided a more ambiguous composition of the different factors in terms of the related item loadings. Three factors, however, offered a relatively clear-cut picture, which included all 20 Machiavellianism items, demonstrated no extraordinarily strong negative loadings, and had few items loading simultaneously on several factors in a considerable manner.
The first factor will be termed *dishonesty*. By looking at the seven items which primarily load on this factor, it becomes evident that they revolve around the question of whether it is necessary to be honest and truthful or not. Even the Mach item 1-10, despite its main loading on the second factor, is to some extent concerned with dishonesty. It can also be reasoned that the dishonesty factor somewhat resembles the tactical component of the original Machiavellianism scale. The following two reverse-coded items (see Appendix A for all items), which load mainly on the dishonesty factor, exemplify the emphasis on dishonest conduct:

**Mach 1-19:** It is never right to tell a lie.
**Mach 1-6:** You should always be honest, no matter what.

The only item which appears to go somewhat astray from this topic is Mach 1-7. This item states that hurting people is sometimes necessary to get what one desires. Even so, this can be rectified by keeping in mind that dishonest behaviour towards other people might in fact lead to the other person being hurt. Following this line of thought, where lying is accompanied by hurting other people, Mach 1-7 seems to eventually fit into the topical frame of the dishonesty factor. This first factor can by itself explain approximately 13.4% of the total variance.

The second factor will be named *cynicism*. It could be argued that many of the items loading primarily on this factor might as well evaluate the views of subjects, similar to the views component of the original Machiavellianism scale. This may be true, but on closer examination it becomes obvious that all the items are particularly focused on the cynical aspects of one’s worldview. This sense of suspicious pessimism permeates all seven items of this second factor. Therefore, cynicism seems to be a more appropriate term for this factor. The two items below (see Appendix A for all items) will demonstrate this notion of cynicism.

**Mach 1-5:** It is smartest to believe that all people will behave badly towards other people if they have a chance.
**Mach 1-12:** Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.

The items Mach 1-1 and Mach 1-10 could be argued to focus on honesty and not on cynicism. This might be true on the surface, especially as Mach 1-10 also relates to the dishonesty factor. However, these two items also deal with whether being truthful will be beneficial for a person or not. The underlying message of these two items is that hiding the true reasons for a certain course of action or a request will deliver better results than disclosing one’s true motivations.
This appears to be a rather cynical perception and, therefore, suits the cynicism theme. By itself, the cynicism factor is able to explain about 13.4 % of the total variance, similar to the dishonesty factor.

The last of the three factors will be called non-morality. Naming it immorality would be misleading since scoring towards the Machiavellian end of the different items does not necessarily imply unethical behaviour, but simply a lack of moral attitude and behaviour in certain situations. In contrast to the other two factors, the six items which primarily load on the non-morality factor are rather loosely related to their common topic of morality. It seems to include a few items which are almost more concerned with the perception of the world and people than with morality itself. Even so, the factors loading only secondarily on the non-morality factor support the concern with morality. Furthermore, this notion of non-morality conforms to one of the original three components of which the Mach IV is composed, namely the morality component. The following two reverse-coded items (see Appendix A for all items) may delineate the core topic of non-morality:

**Mach 1-4:** You should do something only when you are sure it is right.

**Mach 1-16:** It is possible to be ethically good in everything one does.

The items which seem to be most out of line are Mach 1-11, Mach 1-14 and Mach 1-17. The first of these three reverse-coded items deals with whether successful people are mainly good and honest or not. This lays open the assumption of personal success being related to moral behaviour. Thus, rejecting the thought that moral behaviour will lead to personal success means that moral conduct might be discounted. In this case, this item might well provide an indication of the value a person attaches to moral principles. However, this assumption may seem slightly farfetched, as people could potentially believe that success creates ethical conduct and not vice versa.

Mach 1-14 and Mach 1-17 deal respectively with whether people are generally brave and how easily they can be fooled. These generally provide a certain view of other people. Yet, it can also be reasoned that a person who espouses moral principles might refuse to view the majority of people as cowardly fools, since they may deem the mere act of having such beliefs as having a lack of morality. Recognizing this potential link, these items could contribute to evaluating non-morality.

The last factor, non-morality, accounts for approximately 11.7 % of the total variance and is, thereby, slightly weaker than the dishonesty and cynicism factor. Together, the three factors
explain about 38.6 % of the total variance. This is probably not a perfect value, but since the factor analysis was unable to provide better results for an equally meaningful set of factors, it shall suffice. The respective values for the three factors were calculated during the analysis and enter the correlation analysis side by side with the total Machiavellianism scale.

10.4 Correlation analysis

The values for the total Machiavellianism scale, as well as for its three sub-factors, were tested for two-tailed Pearson correlations with the different etic cultural dimensions. Due to statistical considerations, all dimensions were calculated on the basis of the arithmetic mean of their items. The results of this analysis can be found in Table 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural dimension</th>
<th>Machiavellianism total scale</th>
<th>Dishonesty factor</th>
<th>Cynicism factor</th>
<th>Non-morality factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hofstede’s UAI</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
<td>-0.138</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>-0.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofstede and Minkov’s IVR</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>-0.306**</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s performance orientation – value scale</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s performance orientation – practice scale</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>-0.248*</td>
<td>-0.196*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s assertiveness – value scale</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s assertiveness – practice scale</td>
<td>-0.184</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.261**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s power distance – value scale</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.214*</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s power distance – practice scale</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s humane orientation – value scale</td>
<td>-0.201*</td>
<td>-0.155</td>
<td>-0.207*</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s humane orientation – practice scale</td>
<td>-0.147</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.196*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwartz’s intellectual autonomy</td>
<td>-0.310**</td>
<td>-0.188</td>
<td>-0.219*</td>
<td>-0.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwartz’s mastery</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelfand et al.’s tightness-looseness</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)
* Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed)
Given several missing values, certain cases had to be excluded for different dimensions during the analysis. This is the reason that various N-values lie below the actual sample size of 108 subjects. Based on this analysis, it is possible to compare the actual results to the a priori formulated hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 1:** Machiavellianism is moderately, positively correlated with Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance index.

As can be seen in Table 6, neither the Machiavellianism scale nor any of the three sub-factors as extracted in Section 10.3 display a significant correlation with Hofstede’s UAI. Yet, even if any of the four Machiavellianism constructs provided a significant correlation, three of them would offer a negative correlation with UAI, whereas the hypothesis states a positive correlation. Only the cynicism factor offers an insignificant, weak, positive correlation with UAI. Even though it was discovered in Section 10.2 that Hofstede’s UAI scale suffers from low reliability values, it still does not change the fact that, at the moment, there is no support for Hypothesis 1. Hence, Hypothesis 1 has to be rejected.

**Hypothesis 2:** Machiavellianism is moderately, negatively correlated with the indulgence pole of Hofstede and Minkov’s indulgence vs. restraint dimension.

The case of Hofstede and Minkov’s IVR is a fascinating one. It is here that the value of the sub-factors’ inclusion in the analysis becomes evident for the first time. The Machiavellianism scale as a whole fails to demonstrate a significant relationship with IVR as do the dishonesty and non-morality factors. Nonetheless, the cynicism sub-factor shows a moderately negative correlation with the indulgence pole of IVR, just as anticipated in Hypothesis 2. This correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. It seems that the other two sub-factors diluted this significant, moderate correlation in such a way that the overall Machiavellianism scale displays a merely weak and insignificant, negative relationship with IVR. This means that Hypothesis 2 can be seen as at least partially supported, though one must bear in mind that these results are based on an IVR scale, which provided insufficient reliability values with respect to the sample of this thesis (compare Table 4).
**Hypothesis 3:** Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the value scale of GLOBE’s performance orientation.

Neither Machiavellianism nor its sub-factors correlate with the value scale of GLOBE’s performance orientation in a significant manner. Although most of the insignificant relationships would point towards a positive link, the cynicism factor seems to be negatively linked to performance orientation, though again insignificantly. Further, even in the case of significant results, the respective correlations are weak at best for all the four constructs. Consequently, there is no support whatsoever for a relationship between Machiavellianism and the value scale of performance orientation as presumed in Hypothesis 3.

**Hypothesis 4:** Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the practice scale of GLOBE’s performance orientation.

The practice scale of GLOBE’s performance orientation does not correlate significantly with Machiavellianism as a whole. Nevertheless, focusing on the sub-factors of Machiavellianism, Table 6 uncovers a weak, negative correlation of performance orientation practices with both the cynicism factor as well as the non-morality factor at the 0.05 level. These significant negative correlations seem to be attenuated by the insignificant positive correlation of the dishonesty factor in such a way that it eradicates the significance for the total Machiavellianism scale. Notwithstanding the existence of significant relationships, Hypothesis 4 has still been rejected by these empirical results. The relationship between Machiavellianism and the practice scale of performance orientation were predicted to be positive in nature. However, the cynicism factor, as well as the non-morality factor, both display negative correlations. Even so, it is important to recall that the practice scale of GLOBE’s performance orientation provided weak reliability values in Section 10.2, which in turn means that any deductions lack solid ground.

**Hypothesis 5:** Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the value scale of GLOBE’s assertiveness.

As for the value scale of GLOBE’s assertiveness, none of the Machiavellian constructs is able to provide a significant relationship. Yet, what is interesting is that all the four constructs offer unanimously an insignificant, positive link with assertiveness values, which is, however, ra-
ther weak overall. This would confirm the assumption of Hypothesis 5. Nonetheless, due to the lack of significance, Hypothesis 5 cannot be confirmed.

**Hypothesis 6:** Machiavellianism is moderately, positively correlated with the practice scale of GLOBE’s assertiveness.

The in Section 10.3 calculated relationships between Machiavellianism, as well as its three sub-factors, and the practice scale of GLOBE’s assertiveness is relatively similar to the case of Hypothesis 2. Again, the Machiavellianism scale itself fails to deliver significant values. Yet, this time it is the non-morality factor which shows a correlation with significance at the 0.01 level. It seems like the insignificant correlation values of the other two sub-factors dilute the significance of the non-morality factor’s correlation to such an extent that it also renders the correlation of the overarching Machiavellianism scale insignificant. Even though a significant correlation has been discovered, Hypothesis 6 was rejected, because the hypothesis anticipated a positive correlation of Machiavellianism and assertiveness practices, but Table 6 shows that non-morality relates negatively to this cultural dimension and even the correlations of the other constructs, though insignificant, point in this same direction.

**Hypothesis 7:** Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the value scale of GLOBE’s power distance.

As mentioned several times before in this chapter, the total Machiavellianism scale does not demonstrate a significant correlation with the value scale of GLOBE’s power distance. Nonetheless, the cynicism factor shows a weak, positive correlation with power distance values, which is significant at the 0.05 level. The reason for the failure of the actual Machiavellianism scale to reflect this relationship can probably be found in the insignificant correlations of the dishonesty factor and the non-morality factor, which are weak, negative and positive respectively. As a result, they seem to decrease both the strength of the correlation and its significance for the Machiavellianism scale. In spite of this circumstance, the empirical results still reveal that there is a significant correlation of power distance values with a part of Machiavellianism. In addition to this, this correlation is positive in nature, which underscores the assumptions made in Hypothesis 7. It is for this reason that Hypothesis 7 can be seen as partially supported.
Hypothesis 8: Machiavellianism is negatively correlated with the practice scale of GLOBE’s power distance.

Table 6 offers no significant relationship for any Machiavellian construct with the practice scale of GLOBE’s power distance. Furthermore, only the non-morality factor shows the hypothesized negative correlation. The dishonesty factor, the cynicism factor, and the total Machiavellianism scale present positive correlations with power distance practices. Moreover, the strength of these correlations can be called weak at best. As a consequence, Hypothesis 8 encounters no support and has, therefore, been rejected.

Hypothesis 9: Machiavellianism is negatively correlated with the value scale of GLOBE’s humane orientation.

The value scale of GLOBE’s humane orientation is one of the few cultural dimensions which exhibits a significant correlation with the overarching Machiavellianism scale itself (0.05 level). From the empirical results presented in Table 6, it appears as if this significant, negative, weak correlation stems mainly from the cynicism sub-factor of Machiavellianism. This sub-factor also demonstrates a weak negative correlation with humane orientation values, which is significant at the 0.05 level. The reason that one sub-factor was able to influence the correlation of the total Machiavellianism scale rather directly this time but was unable to do so in the case of the other cultural dimensions evaluated so far may lie in the properties of the other two sub-factors. Unlike many other times before in this section, the correlations of other two sub-factors point into the same statistical direction as the correlation of the significant cynicism factor, though the non-morality factor suffers from high insignificance. These results lend enough empirical support to claim that Hypothesis 9 has been fully validated.

Hypothesis 10: Machiavellianism is negatively correlated with the practice scale of GLOBE’s humane orientation.

According to Table 6, the Machiavellianism scale, the dishonesty sub-factor, and the cynicism sub-factor show no correlations of noteworthy significance regarding the practice scale of GLOBE’s humane orientation. Solely the non-morality factor correlates negatively with humane orientation practices in a weak fashion at a significance level of 0.05. The cause for the lack of similar correlation properties on the Machiavellianism scale may lie once more in the
nature of the other two factors’ correlations. The dishonesty factor offers a very weak, positive correlation, while the cynicism factor offers an equally weak, negative correlation. Both, however, experience insufficient significance. Despite these unfavourable effects, the weak, significant correlation of humane orientation practices with the non-morality factor suffices to partially support Hypothesis 10, given that this correlation is negative in nature.

**Hypothesis 11:** Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the intellectual autonomy pole of Schwartz’s autonomy-embeddedness dimension.

The empirical situation surrounding Schwartz’s intellectual autonomy is relatively intriguing, as it is the only case in this empirical analysis where the significance level of the total Machiavellianism scale’s correlation ranks higher than that of its sub-factors. The correlation of the total Machiavellianism scale is moderate, negative, and significant at the 0.01 level. The cynicism factor also presents a negative correlation with intellectual autonomy, though it is weak and significant only at the 0.05 level. The reasons for this phenomenon might be somewhat identical to the reasons mentioned when discussing Hypothesis 9 above. Notwithstanding their insignificance concerning their correlation with intellectual autonomy, the dishonesty and the non-morality factors both correlate negatively with this cultural dimension, although their correlation values are even weaker than that of the cynicism factor. What is disconcerting, however, is the direction of the significant correlations. They are negative, whereas Hypothesis 11 asserts a positive relationship between intellectual autonomy and Machiavellianism. Hence, Hypothesis 11 has been rejected.

**Hypothesis 12:** Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the mastery pole of Schwartz’s mastery-harmony dimension.

None of the Machiavellian constructs correlates significantly with Schwartz’s mastery. Even under the assumption of significance, the big picture of the different correlations would be incongruent at best. Two of the four constructs, namely the total Machiavellianism scale and the dishonesty factor, correlate positively with mastery, while the other two constructs, the cynicism factor and the non-morality factor, share a negative relationship with this cultural dimension. Additionally, the correlations of all four constructs are very weak. Overall, this means that there is no relationship with Machiavellianism or its sub-factors, as identified in Section 10.3, which entails a lack of support for Hypothesis 12.
Hypothesis 13: Machiavellianism is moderately, positively correlated with the tightness pole of Gelfand et al.’s tightness-looseness dimension.

Concerning the last dimension which merits attention, Table 6 shows that neither the Machiavellianism scale nor its sub-factors can claim a significant relationship with Gelfand et al.’s tightness-looseness. Moreover, most of these insignificant relationships are negative in nature, which is exactly the opposite of what is proposed by Hypothesis 13. Only the cynicism factor correlates positively, though still insignificantly, with tightness-looseness. However, it does so at a negligibly low strength. There is no empirical support for a link between Machiavellianism and tightness-looseness, which in turn leads to the rejection of Hypothesis 13.

Table 7 summarizes the results of the hypotheses evaluation based on the empirical results provided by this thesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1: Machiavellianism is moderately, positively correlated with Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance index</td>
<td>Rejected*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2: Machiavellianism is moderately, negatively correlated with the indulgence pole of Hofstede and Minkov’s indulgence vs. restraint dimension</td>
<td>Partially supported*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 3: Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the value scale of GLOBE’s performance orientation</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 4: Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the practice scale of GLOBE’s performance orientation</td>
<td>Rejected*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 5: Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the value scale of GLOBE’s assertiveness</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 6: Machiavellianism is moderately, positively correlated with the practice scale of GLOBE’s assertiveness</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 7: Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the value scale of GLOBE’s power distance</td>
<td>Partially supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 8: Machiavellianism is negatively correlated with the practice scale of GLOBE’s power distance</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 9: Machiavellianism is negatively correlated with the value scale of GLOBE’s humane orientation</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 10: Machiavellianism is negatively correlated with the practice scale of GLOBE’s humane orientation</td>
<td>Partially supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 11: Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the intellectual autonomy pole of Schwartz’s autonomy-embeddedness dimension</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 12: Machiavellianism is positively correlated with the mastery pole of Schwartz’s mastery-harmony dimension</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 13: Machiavellianism is moderately, positively correlated with the tightness pole of Gelfand et al.’s tightness-looseness dimension</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Cultural dimension possesses reliability value below 0.5 (compare Table 4)
11 Discussion and implications

This chapter constitutes the final important building block of this thesis. It attempts to give meaning to the empirical results of this thesis by trying to explain them and evaluating their utility for scholars and practitioners.

11.1 Discussion

At the end of Section 10.4 nine hypotheses were rejected, three more partially supported, and one hypothesis fully supported. While this may seem like a small number at first, it has to be kept in mind that there was a dearth of guiding literature with particular respect to the interplay of Machiavellianism and etic cultural dimensions. Consequently, it was no surprise to see some hypotheses disconfirmed. Nevertheless, the results are still encouraging. Now is the time to address the incompatibilities which surfaced when comparing the hypotheses with the actual empirical results.

First of all, a moderately positive link of Machiavellianism with Hofstede’s UAI had been anticipated. Yet, neither a positive nor a negative correlation of significant extent emerged during the empirical analysis. The easiest solution would be to reject the results in this special case due to the scale’s insufficient reliability values. This would not be unreasonable since the reliability values are the lowest for all employed scales, as can be seen in Table 4 in Section 10.2. Apart from this simplistic explanation, however, there might be other reasons for the lack of correlations. One of the more important reasons that the relationship was expected to be only moderate originates from the disparity concerning the topic of rule breaking, as pointed out in Section 8.2. In short, high UAI includes a stigma regarding the breaking of rules, whereas Machiavellianism perceives rule breaking as a viable option depending on the situation. Despite all the other converging characteristics of Machiavellianism and UAI, it may well be that the sacredness of rules occupies a disproportionately high status compared to the other facets. This assumption is supported by the correlation values of the sub-factors of the Machiavellianism scale as displayed in Table 6 in Section 10.4. Both the dishonesty factor as well as the non-morality factor relate negatively to UAI. These two factors may potentially indicate the breaking of rules. For instance, it is easy to imagine that dishonesty may eventually lead to a higher propensity to cheat if the situation allows for it, while non-morality may lead to the disregard of moral rules whenever they are experienced as unnecessary restraints.

In contrast, the cynicism factor, which is rather unrelated to the issue of rules, lives up to the originally hypothesized, positive relationship with UAI, though it is only weak in nature.
The correlation between Hofstede and Minkov’s IVR and Machiavellianism has been at least partially supported. It materialized as a highly significant relationship between the restraint pole and the cynicism factor of Machiavellianism. This seems to be sensible since indulgence acknowledges happiness and life control as central themes while restraint is accompanied by social cynicism (see Section 3.6). Machiavellianism, in turn, gives rise to notions of anxiety and dissatisfaction, as discussed in Section 7.4. In addition to this, Machiavellianism promotes a cynical worldview, which encompasses a felt lack of control regarding the socio-political sphere of life, as mentioned in Section 7.5. Thus, it is no surprise that the cynicism factor shows a negative correlation with IVR, which means that it correlates positively with the restraint pole in this dimension.

Why is it then that the other factors seem to correlate, tough insignificantly, with the indulgence pole of IVR? As for the dishonesty factor, an explanation could be that indulgence is linked to a more opportunistic lifestyle. Since opportunism may also include cheating, it would be in line with the dishonesty factor. Concerning the non-morality factor, it was explained in Section 8.6 that the emphasis on moral discipline, which is part of restraint cultures, may collide with the properties of Machiavellianism. This was one reason for assuming only a moderate overall correlation during the hypothesis creation. It could be that the importance of moral discipline was underestimated when extracting the respective hypothesis. Moreover, non-morality may also represent the short-term oriented sexual behaviour of high Machs, which again may violate the precepts of moral discipline as found in restraint societies, while at the same time matching a similar sexual attitude as preferred by indulgent societies.

From a statistical point of view, one explanation for the lack of a full-fledged correlation with the overarching Machiavellianism scale could be the low reliability value for the IVR dimension. The respective value can be examined in Table 4.

The anticipated relationship between Machiavellianism and the value scale of GLOBE’s performance orientation was another one which did not emerge. It was already acknowledged in Section 10.4 that the insignificant correlations of Machiavellianism and most of its sub-factors would be positive but at the same time remarkably weak. Accordingly, it may be more sensible in this case to base the discussion of the issues surrounding this cultural dimension on the overarching Machiavellianism scale. In Section 4.1 as well as in Section 8.7, it was mentioned that performance orientation is related to humane-oriented leadership. While instrumental reasons could lead high Machs to pursue a similar leadership approach, it is unlikely to be their default behaviour. This is underscored, for instance, by their emotional detachedness, as
presented in Section 7.3. Therefore, this might contribute to the ostensible lack of empirical support for the relationship at hand.

Another reason could be the matter of control. It has already been discussed in Section 8.7 that there is an incongruence regarding the perceived control of the outside world. While performance orientation seems to rely on a totally internal locus of control, Machiavellianism asserts possible life control only for the personal and interpersonal spheres of life but not the socio-political sphere. This last aspect might cause enough friction between the two constructs to inhibit a significant correlation.

The last potential antagonistic factor which may prevent a solid relationship from materializing might be found in the kind of competitive behaviour nurtured by both constructs. Performance orientation seems to highlight competition in a rather conventional format. In contrast, Machiavellianism gives rise to hypercompetitive attitudes, which leads to a “win by any sacrifice necessary” mentality (see Section 7.7). This could lead to sacrifices above the actual gain at the end of the competitive process, which would eventually hurt overall performance. While this is rather unlikely due to the calculative and impulse-controlling attitude of high Machs, the underlying difference in thinking about competition could still become an inhibitor of a stable link between Machiavellianism and performance orientation.

Concerning the practice scale of GLOBE’s performance orientation, there were significant correlations with the cynicism factor and the non-morality factor. However, the hypothesis had to be falsified as both correlations were negative, whereas a positive link had been hypothesized. Nonetheless, it has been pointed out in Section 8.7 that there is apparently no notable difference in high Machs’ values and practices with respect to performance orientation. In fact, the aforementioned arguments appear just as relevant here as they have been for the value scale of performance orientation. Thus, the same disparities as highlighted above regarding the value scale of performance orientation should apply here as well.

Apart from these arguments, another potential reason for the unexpected negative correlations with the two Machiavellian sub-factors may well be attributed to the nature of the GLOBE scales. House et al. (2004) reported that the value and the practice scale of several dimensions correlate with different external constructs in opposite directions. They stated that the possible reason could be that societies lacking sufficient practices with respect to one dimension would appreciate an increase in these practices and, consequently, hold higher values for this particular dimension. The opposite situation could also be true. Even though Javidan (2004) asserts that performance orientation is generally high esteemed, he further reports a significant, negative, weak correlation of performance orientation values with practices. When looking at Ta-
ble 6 in Section 10.4 it becomes clear that this could have affected the relationship with Machiavellianism. Most Machiavellian constructs correlate positively with the value scale of performance orientation, whereas the correlations turn mostly negative when looking at the practice scale of performance orientation. Even so, when investigating the same phenomenon by drawing on this thesis’s empirical data, a significant correlation failed to surface (compare Appendix D). Accordingly, it remains unclear as to how far this effect may have impacted the correlations at hand.

Another statistical reason for unexpected incongruities might be induced by the relatively low reliability value of the practice scale of performance orientation. The respective value can be found in Table 4.

The next unexpectedly unsupported relationship is that of Machiavellianism with the value scale of GLOBE’s assertiveness. Even though the insignificant correlations of all four Machiavellian constructs are consentaneously positive, they are at the same time relatively weak. On closer examination, some points similar to GLOBE’s performance orientation surface regarding the potentially responsible aspects for the lack of significance. First of all, assertiveness, like performance orientation, endorses humane-oriented leadership. It has already been remarked in this chapter that this is at odds with the traits and attitudes related to Machiavellianism. Additionally, it has been stated in Section 8.10 that assertive cultures hold the family and friends in high esteem, whereas high Machs hold rather negative or at least indifferent perceptions of both. Thus, it appears that assertiveness, despite its rather unsocial flavour as discussed in Sections 4.4 and 8.10, is still considerably more social than Machiavellianism. It might well be that these aspects’ weight has been underestimated when building the respective hypothesis.

Another issue, which also found mentioning with respect to performance orientation, is the perceived control over the outside world. Like performance orientation, assertiveness is grounded in an internal locus of control, which means people adhering to assertiveness believe that they can, in fact, subjugate or at least influence their social and natural environment (see Section 4.4). Machiavellianism shares this idea of control when it comes to the personal and interpersonal sphere of life, but not for the social-political sphere. Therefore, it could be that people socialized in highly assertive cultures may feel more enabled and entitled than high Machs to change every aspect of the external world whenever they deem it necessary. As before, it could be that this facet carries more weight than initially presumed at the time of hypothesis formulation.
As for the practice scale of GLOBE’s assertiveness, a negative, highly significant correlation with the non-morality sub-factor of Machiavellianism was found in Table 6. While certain flaws regarding the fit of Machiavellianism and assertiveness practices had already been acknowledged in Section 8.10 by rendering the hypothesized positive link only moderate, a negative correlation had not been expected. The arguments concerning the social side of assertiveness, as brought forward above when discussing assertiveness values, might also be valid for assertiveness practices. This possibility is underscored by the fact that it is the non-morality factor which correlates negatively with assertiveness practices. Evidently, there could be tension between the social aspects of assertiveness and the disregard for conventional morality as represented by the non-morality factor.

Another factor which may be especially interesting for assertiveness practices is the way communication is conducted in assertive cultures. As mentioned in Sections 4.4 and 8.10, assertiveness favours direct and unambiguous communication whenever possible. It has already been remarked in Section 8.10 that this communicational style may be counterproductive when applying deception or other clandestine tactics, which are, depending on the situation, important aspects of Machiavellianism. It is also of particular interest in this matter that it is only the non-morality factor which displays the negative correlation. It can be argued that non-morality is linked to attempts of deceptions and other surreptitious manoeuvres, which would explain why it relates negatively to assertiveness practices with their direct style of communication. In fact, this incongruity was one of the reasons that only a moderate relationship had been expected when constructing the hypothesis. The other potentially relevant sub-factor in this matter, the dishonesty factor, also exhibits a negative correlation, though not significant in nature.

An explanation drawing on statistics would be identical to the one already proposed for performance orientation above. Like several other GLOBE dimensions, the assertiveness dimension harbours a negative correlation of its value scale with its practice scale (Den Hartog, 2004). Cultures with weak assertiveness practices may esteem higher assertiveness, which may eventually lead them to maintain stronger assertiveness values and vice versa. This might be the case for this thesis, as can be derived from the fact that all the correlations, including the value scale of assertiveness, are positive, while those of the practice scale are all negative. However, when investigating this correlation by using the empirical data of this thesis, no significant correlation could be found between the practice and the value scales (compare Appendix D). Therefore, it could be that the negative correlation is merely an offspring of the mentioned statistical phenomenon, but it is rather uncertain.
The next point of discussion revolves around the value scale of GLOBE’s power distance and Machiavellianism. There is a positive correlation between power distance values and the cynicism sub-factor of Machiavellianism, which is in accord with the stated hypothesis. Nevertheless, as with several other cultural dimensions examined in Section 10.4, the overarching Machiavellianism scale fails to correlate significantly with the cultural dimension.

To commence with the cynicism factor, it has already been proposed in Section 8.12 that there is a significant overlap of the worldviews of Machiavellianism and power distance. Section 7.5 describes that cynicism is an important part of this worldview. Thus, this point may first and foremost lead to a correlation between the cynicism factor and power distance. Another reason for the particular link between the cynicism factor and power distance values may lie in the Machiavellian perception of other people. Given that high Machs are suspicious and hold negative, cynical views of other people, high Machs may well desire the power necessary to hold these “perceived evildoers” in check so that they cannot turn into a threat.

Regarding the dishonesty factor, the non-existence of a correlation is by no means surprising. When studying Section 4.6, the reader might come to notice that the construct of power distance does not contain much that could be related to honesty. Only the issue of corruption may touch the subject of honest conduct. Therefore, the weakness of the insignificant correlation with the dishonesty factor also appears to be reasonable.

Concerning the non-morality factor, Section 4.6 and Section 8.12 address several issues revolving around the topic of morality. For instance, power distance gives rise to societal class structures, which rely on moral discipline to maintain their stability. Furthermore, humane-oriented leadership is seen as effective in these societies. In contrast, corruption is prevalent. Furthermore, self-interest and low humanism prevail. Consequently, the weak and insignificant correlation provided by the non-morality factor might not be due to the absence of relevant factors, as was allegedly the case for the dishonesty factor, but rather to the opposition of seemingly equal forces which cancel each other out.

Turning to the practice scale of GLOBE’s power distance, one faces insignificant correlations for the Machiavellianism scale, as well as its three sub-factors, whereas a negative correlation had been expected. This expectation had been grounded in several different incongruities when comparing the characteristics of Machiavellianism and power distance practices (compare to Section 8.12). One such aspect is the positive attitude towards family and friends as found in cultures rating high in the power distance practice scale, which contrasts with Machiavellian attitudes. The high Machs’ foregoing of power positions, if necessary, is another contradicting facet. Hence, it appeared only logical to assume a negative relationship. Even so,
the results of Table 6 in Section 10.4 draw a slightly different picture. Instead of Machiavellianism being negatively linked to power distance practices, it seems that high Machs pay little attention to these practices and prefer to ignore, but not oppose, them. Given the utilitarian attitude of high Machs, this appears to be a possible explanation for the rejection of the corresponding hypothesis.

The correlation with the value scale of GLOBE’s humane orientation is the only one which fully adheres to the corresponding hypothesis (see Section 10.4). There is a negative and significant correlation of humane orientation values with the total Machiavellianism scale. Moreover, there is also a significant, negative correlation between the cynicism sub-factor and humane orientation values.

The justification for the negative link between the cynicism factor and humane orientation values may be found in the differing worldviews of Machiavellianism and humane orientation. High humane orientation stresses benevolence and requires cultural members to transcend their self-interest for the good of the whole society, as explained in Section 4.7. Machiavellianism, on the contrary, emphasises suspicion towards other people (see Section 7.5), which in part leads to the cynical attitude of high Machs. It appears to be a reasonable assumption that high Machs would perceive this benevolent environment as set up for failure and even naïve.

This would then explain the significant, negative relationship between the cynicism factor and humane orientation values.

Even the other two sub-factors correlate negatively, although insignificantly, with humane orientation values. It is difficult to explain the causes for the dishonesty factor correlating negatively. On the one hand, humane orientation does not explicitly highlight honesty as an essential factor. On the other hand, it may well be that the benevolent aspects which represent the essence of this cultural dimension (see Section 4.7) might lie relatively close to honesty. Following this latter line of thinking, the negative correlation with the dishonesty factor could be explained. In contrast, the non-morality factor’s negative correlation can be traced back to most of the aspects of humane orientation values. Many, if not all, of these aspects are based on a strong sense of morality, which is not supported by the non-morality factor. To name just one example, fairness is highly appreciated in cultures scoring high in humane orientation. However, high Machs are rather opportunistic, as pointed out in Sections 7.5 and 7.6, and may, therefore, forego morality in an attempt to enrich themselves beyond what can be deemed fair in the particular situation.

Regarding the practice scale of GLOBE’s humane orientation, the relationship with Machiavellianism is less striking. There is no correlation with the total Machiavellianism scale. Even
so, there still is a negative link with the non-morality sub-factor. This introduces the question of why humane orientation values correlate with the cynicism factor, but humane orientation practices do so with the non-morality factor. An explanation could be that cynicism is, at least for this cultural dimension, a trait most pertinent to how an individual perceives and judges its environment, whereas morality may be of more relevance to guiding a person’s actions. This could also serve as potential cause for the negative correlation of the non-morality factor with humane orientation practices. While the actions in societies which display high humane orientation may be predominantly based on moral principles, high Machs refrain from doing so. Instead, the opportunistic high Mach will most likely use rather selfish guiding principles, as implied in Sections 7.3 and 7.7.

With respect to the other two sub-factors, both offer only relatively feeble relationships in an insignificant manner. Whence, it is difficult to draw reliable conclusions on their basis. It has already been proposed above that honesty is not an integral part of humane orientation. This may also cause the weak, even positive, correlation with the dishonesty factor. Concerning the cynicism factor, the correlation is still negative, but weaker than the correlation of the value scale of humane orientation. The corresponding reason could be, as speculated above, that cynicism is more relevant for how a person views and evaluates its environment (i.e. values) than for how this person acts and behaves in it (i.e. practices).

In general, the high Machs’ ability to feign benevolent behaviours when required (see Sections 7.6 and 8.13) may be the reason that the overall relationship between Machiavellianism and humane orientation practices is weaker than the relationship with humane orientation values. As a result, high Machs may well act in accordance with humane orientation but simply with a different goal in mind.

The next cultural dimension, which is the second one that correlates significantly with the overarching Machiavellianism scale, is Schwartz’s intellectual autonomy. In spite of its significance, the negative correlation runs counter to the hypothesized positive correlation. There is a further significant, negative correlation of the cynicism factor with intellectual autonomy. Additionally, the other two sub-factors point in the same statistical direction.

There are several potential interpretations of the underlying causes. One would be to argue on the basis of complementary values. As pointed out in Section 5.1, egalitarian values are complementary to intellectual autonomy, while hierarchy values are complementary to embeddedness values, which is the opposite of intellectual autonomy. Keeping in mind that Schwartz’s hierarchy pole somewhat resembles GLOBE’s power distance and acknowledging that there is a significant, positive correlation of the cynicism sub-factor with power distance
values, it seems statistically understandable to find a negative correlation between autonomy and Machiavellianism. Interestingly, it is exactly the cynicism sub-factor which also appears to bear the main responsibility for the negative correlation with intellectual autonomy. Further, this may explain the few remaining commonalities between Machiavellianism and the embeddedness pole found in Section 8.15.

Another explanation could be that a person develops Machiavellianism in order to counter the social pressure exerted by societies ranking high in embeddedness. Individuals might start to look for ways to circumvent social obligations and rules in order to free themselves from unwanted imperatives that have been externally imposed on them. Nevertheless, this leads to an important question. People socialized in a culture with a high embeddedness score have most likely developed a value system which is in accord with the precepts of this culture. Why then should these people act against their own values and develop Machiavellianism in order to defy a social system which is so close to their own values? The potential answer can be found by looking at Table 6 in Section 10.4. It is the cynicism sub-factor which correlates negatively with intellectual autonomy, which implies that it might correlate positively with embeddedness. By adopting a cynical attitude towards one’s own culture and maybe even one’s own values, people could develop enough motivation to try to resist societal conventions and to work the system.

A further, related explanation could be that embedded societies offer more opportunities to practice Machiavellian behaviours than cultures adhering to any kind of autonomy. It has been stated in Section 5.1 that embedded cultures see the individual as part of a group, which leads to the almost automatic integration into groups. This in turn exposes an individual to rather more interpersonal contacts than would be the case in autonomous societies, where the individual is seen as such. As manipulation and deception usually require a dupe, they can be more easily practiced under the condition of a higher amount of interpersonal interaction. Nonetheless, this explanation again relies on cynicism as an initiating factor, which would tap into the significant correlation as delivered by the cynicism factor. The corresponding reason would be that a person devoid of cynicism would probably not try to sidestep the conventions of a group as she or he might think of them as legitimate, whereas cynical people may perceive them as rather questionable in this respect.

While the other two factors also correlate negatively with intellectual autonomy, their correlations are of insignificant nature. To begin with the honesty factor, it might be that cultures favouring autonomy of any kind may impose less social obligations. As a consequence, there is less need for lying and cheating in order to evade these. A similar conjecture can be drawn
for the non-morality factor. Autonomy-oriented societies may have fewer moral rules than embeddedness-oriented societies, which additionally need to take into consideration the organisation of group dynamics. Where there are less moral rules, the disregard for moral rules may eventually be less common.

Regarding mastery, the second Schwartz dimension tested, the hypothesized positive correlation was not clearly opposed, which was the case with intellectual autonomy. Yet, it failed to materialize. Re-examining Sections 5.3 and 8.17, it seems that some facets of mastery carried more weight than anticipated, which led to an underestimation of these aspects during the hypothesis creation. Accordingly, this might have caused a clash of characteristics. The result is a lack of significance. Likewise, this may have been the cause for the diverging directions of the Machiavellianism scale and its different sub-factors. Although feeble in nature, the insignificant correlation of the total Machiavellianism scale would point in the expected statistical direction. The dishonesty sub-factor shares this characteristic. It could be that this positive link is owed to achievement-related aspects of mastery (see Section 5.3) and Machiavellianism (see Section 7.5). Obviously, cheating and lying can be employed to obtain a desired good or achieve a desired end with relatively little effort. This may be a necessary tactic given that both constructs favour competitiveness, as discussed in Section 8.17. Moreover, dishonesty can be employed to alter the conditions of at least the social environment, one of the core tendencies of mastery.

At the same time, the cynicism factor demonstrates a negative, insignificant relationship with mastery. This may provide the contrast for the belief that the environment can be changed. While mastery views the natural and social environment as generally open for alteration, Machiavellianism includes slight fatalism with respect to the socio-political sphere of life, as described in Section 7.5. Thus, high Machs may react cynically to the belief that the entire environment can be changed and controlled by a person.

The non-morality factor also offers a negative, insignificant correlation for mastery. This weak link may be caused by the higher importance attached to family and religion as discussed in Section 5.3. The latter may further give rise to strong moral principles. While mastery does not contain many moral aspects, the aforementioned ones may have been of sufficient strength to turn this sub-factor’s correlation into a negative one.

The last relationship that merits attention is that of Machiavellianism with Gelfand et al.’s tightness-looseness. However, due to some incongruities, as discovered in Section 8.18, the relationship was expected to be of only moderate strength. Still, Machiavellianism opposes the hypothesized relationship and actually tends toward the looseness and not the tightness
pole, though only insignificantly so. When looking at Machiavellianism as a whole, it could be that the narrow socialization may indeed potentially hinder high Machs in developing their mental scheming capabilities, as mentioned in Section 8.18. Instead, the higher latitude of loose cultures might be a more fertile soil for Machiavellianism to sprout, despite all the other overlaps of tightness with Machiavellianism.

On the level of the sub-factors, this means that the higher tolerance of loose societies towards deviations from rules and norms may explain why the dishonesty factor and the non-morality factor correlate negatively, but still insignificantly, with the cultural dimension, which means that they relate positively to the looseness pole. After all, the breaking of rules and the disregard for moral norms encounters fewer consequences in loose cultures than in tight cultures, as stated in Chapter 6. The cynicism factor is the only one displaying a positive, insignificant correlation, even though it is weak enough to almost equal zero. This may be attributable to the more common use of punishments in tight cultures, which in turn may nurture cynicism.

Having discussed the results at length, the time to return to the original research question of this thesis and its sub-question has now come. To recall, the research question was “What is the relationship between etic dimensions of culture and Machiavellianism?” (compare Chapter 1). First of all, the empirical results underscore the existence of a relationship with culture. Table 6 presented several significant relationships with either the total Machiavellianism scale or at least one of its three sub-factors. Nonetheless, the supported relationships were weaker than expected. Originally, only those cultural dimensions were anticipated to provide a merely moderate relationship, which demonstrated slight flaws in their relationship with Machiavellianism, while the hypotheses for the other cultural dimensions were formulated without this limitation. Yet, the empirical results of Table 6 in Section 10.4 reveal that not a single correlation, whether significant or not, was able to exceed the level of a moderate relationship. Accordingly, there seems to be a relationship between Machiavellianism and culture, but it is of moderate nature at best.

Having answered the main research question, its sub-question shall now become the centre of attention: “What set of cultural dimensions can predict the likelihood of Machiavellianism?” (see Section 8.19). It was mentioned in Section 8.19 that this sub-question could only be addressed with more than one etic cultural dimension correlating significantly with Machiavellianism in order to circumvent the bell curve effect mentioned in Section 8.19. According to Table 6 in Section 10.4, this is the case. This raises the question of which cultural dimensions shall compose the profile. Without doubt, those which show a significant correlation with the
overarching Machiavellianism scale are viable candidates, whether correctly hypothesized or not. It also seems reasonable to include those cultural dimensions correlating with only the sub-factors of Machiavellianism. Although they do not have a direct relationship with Machiavellianism, it can be argued that in their aggregate, their relationships may translate into a strengthening of the overall Machiavellianism construct.

By drawing once more on Table 6 in Section 10.4, levels of Machiavellianism should be higher in cultures rating low in Hofstede and Minkov’s IVR, low in the practice scale of GLOBE’s performance orientation, low in the practice scale of GLOBE’s assertiveness, high in the value scale of GLOBE’s power distance, low in the value scale of GLOBE’s humane orientation, low in the practice scale of GLOBE’s humane orientation, and low in Schwartz’s intellectual autonomy. These seven cultural dimensions are summarized in Table 8.

Table 8: Cultural profile for estimating Machiavellianism levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Etic cultural dimension</th>
<th>Dimension score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hofstede and Minkov’s indulgence vs. restraint</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s performance orientation – practice scale</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s assertiveness – practice scale</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s power distance – value scale</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s humane orientation – value scale</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s humane orientation – practice scale</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwartz’s intellectual autonomy</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Miller (1956), the number of seven dimensions further seems to be well-chosen in order to facilitate users’ mental information processing. Even though Hofstede and Minkov’s IVR provided unacceptable reliability values, as pointed out in Section 10.2, it was at the same time widely used and is based on empirical evaluation (Hofstede et al., 2010). It has, therefore, been decided to include it into the profile. Nevertheless, it remains the decision of anyone wanting to apply the proposed profile to include IVR or not.

The more closely a culture fits this cultural profile, the more likely is it that the members of this culture possess an elevated level of Machiavellianism. Similarly, the more a society opposes this profile, the lower its members’ level of Machiavellianism should be. Consequently, the sub-question of the original research question has been sufficiently answered.

What remains to be added, however, is a note of caution. The intention of this thesis is not and has never been to label any culture as a “Machiavellian culture”. Even if a culture perfectly
fits the developed profile, it is highly unreasonable to assume that every cultural member may deliver high scores on the Machiavellianism scale. Table 6 in Section 10.4 clearly depicts this assertion by showing that correlations are either of a weak or moderate nature. Aside from that, Chapter 7 with Sections 7.1 to 7.8 should have made it clear that high Machs are by no means evil people. In fact, they cheat as often as low Machs, are not prone to overthrowing established systems, and, when dealing with a shared opponent, may actually become formidable allies. Admittedly, they might not pose the most benevolent characters, but this does not justify their defamation.

The following sections will deal with the implications for the academic world and practitioners. The implications for the latter may be manifold, which is why they will be limited to intercultural negotiations and international joint venture formation. Subsequent to that, limitations and recommendations for future research will be presented before presenting a conclusion.

11.2 Academic implications

Overall, this thesis tried to link cultural dimensions to an individual-level construct. As already pointed out at the beginning of Chapters 3 and 8, scholars of culture assert the necessity of a separation of the cultural and the individual level. Although this carefulness is justified, research seems to fall short of providing bridges by means of which these two levels could correspond and fruitfully interact. Some researchers already demonstrated that cultural and individual levels might be linked to each other. Two notable examples are Schwartz (e.g. 2009), who shows that the same values can be used to calculate individual as well as cultural dimensions, and Fischer (2009), who states that cultural dimensions might carry a different meaning at the individual level, which he refers to as non-isomorphism.

When looking at Machiavellianism in particular, a dearth of attempts regarding a linkage with culture becomes evident. Neither cultural researchers nor Machiavellianism researchers invested much effort in this respect. Not even anecdotal evidence can be found in most of the relevant publications. The recent study of Wilson and Hartley (2015) is the only one found during the work on this thesis, which looks at the relationship between Machiavellianism as part of the Dark Triad of personality (see Section 7.1) and culture (i.e. individualism-collectivism). Unfortunately, their study was discovered after the hypotheses creation and the conduction of the final survey round. For this reason, the study has not been mentioned before. It can only be speculated about the reasons for the general academic negligence of this topic.
Maybe researchers have felt discomfort towards the construct of Machiavellianism itself and the possibility of linking it to culture, thereby risking labelling cultures as Machiavellian. Another potential reason could be the inappropriateness of the Mach V instrument for cross-cultural measuring, as postulated in Section 9.2.1. Whatever the case may be, this thesis helped to build a bridge between Machiavellianism and culture by investigating correlations with different etic cultural dimensions. An offspring from this is the cultural profile, which can help estimate the Machiavellianism levels of other cultures. This means that cultural dimensions can indeed interact with the individual level, at least in an indirect manner. Regarding Machiavellianism itself, this thesis has demonstrated the usefulness of extracting sub-factors for side-by-side use with the total Machiavellianism scale during correlation analysis. It, therefore, builds on Fehr et al.’s (1992) suggestion to consider sub-scales of Machiavellianism for empirical research.

11.3 Practical implications: Intercultural negotiations

According to literature (e.g. Fisher et al., 1991; Sergey, 1999; Zhao, 2000), culture can have an immense impact on how negotiations are approached. This impact is of even higher criticalness as soon as negotiations are held in an intercultural context with one party coming from one culture while the other party may have a completely different cultural background (e.g. Adler, 2008; Faure & Sjöstedt, 1993). In spite of the potential difficulties, intercultural negotiations seem to be an increasingly important component of business due to globalization.

Knowing that culture can give indications about the Machiavellianism levels of its members, a practitioner may now be enabled to roughly estimate these with the help of the profile developed at the end of Chapter 11. This could be helpful since Machiavellianism, like culture, impacts a person’s negotiation behaviour. For instance, Kapoutsis et al. (2013) discovered that high Machs are more likely to take initiative and engage in a negotiation. Their study further suggests that high Machs do so even when they perceive themselves as having relatively low bargaining power. This may be due to the high Machs’ perceived control of the interpersonal sphere of life, as mentioned in Section 7.5. Thus, high Machs may be better initiators than the apparently more reticent low Machs. Consequently, if someone needs to recruit a person with this behavioural tendency, an individual coming from a culture which fits the cultural profile in Chapter 11 might be a suitable candidate. However, further evaluation of this candidate is still necessary, as the cultural profile does not denote that all members of a culture unanimously share high levels of Machiavellianism. It only signifies a certain likelihood that a cul-
tural member may score higher in Machiavellianism, which needs to be confirmed first by indicators other than solely the cultural background in order to reach certainty. In this sense, the cultural profile offers hints but not laws.

From the opposite point of view, it could be useful to have a first guess about the negotiation partner or team on the other side of the table. A study by Al-Khatib et al. (2005) unveiled the high Machs’ higher likelihood of engaging in ethically questionable negotiation behaviours. Some of the tactics mentioned in the study are the making of false promises, the intentional misrepresentation of information regarding their actual position, and the attacking of the other side’s network. Thus, whenever engaging in negotiations with unknown business partners whose cultural backgrounds match the cultural profile presented in Chapter 11, it would not be a mistake to look for signs of Machiavellianism. As already mentioned, the cultural profile merely hints that there is a higher chance that the respective cultural member will score higher in Machiavellianism. Should the negotiation partner’s behaviour indeed resemble that of a high Mach, then special care should be taken. She or he might use deceptive manoeuvres and eventually break oral promises. If possible at this point, increased legal assistance, an insistence on written and enforceable agreements, as well as the inclusion of third parties for control purposes should be utilized until more information about the ambitions of the other party becomes available.

11.4 Practical implications: International joint ventures

Like intercultural negotiations, international joint ventures (IJV) seem to be another proliferating phenomenon due to the effects of globalization. In accord with the definition employed by Fryxell et al. (2002), an IJV is an independent organisation formed by two or more organisational entities, which are from at least two different countries, for a cooperative undertaking. Obviously, at least one of the parent organisations will be a foreigner with respect to the IJV’s country of operations.

In this context, Fryxell et al. (2002) report the paramount importance of trust in order to raise and maintain perceived IJV performance at high levels. Their concept demonstrates that there is a negative relationship between formal control mechanisms and perceived IJV performance as the IJV grows older. To counter the reduction of IJV performance, they postulate that formal control mechanisms need to be replaced by social control mechanisms. However, to ensure that social control actually works, the involved partners need to move from calculative trust to affect-based trust (Fryxell et al., 2002). The former relies on the evaluation of facts
and logical conjecture, whereas the latter requires emotional ties. The underlying idea is that the dynamic environment of an IJV offers many opportunities for both parties to exploit their partners. Since social control mechanisms are not based on formal contracts and the like, they fall short in supporting calculative trust. Thus, affect-based trust needs to compensate for calculative trust.

From Fryxell et al.’s (2002) description of the mechanism, it becomes evident that high Machs, given sufficient decision-making power, could cause much havoc in IJV. First of all, the notion of calculative trust would fit the high Machs’ preference for emotionally detached rationality, while affect-based trust appears to be strongly at odds with it (see Section 7.3). Apart from that, the combination of social control mechanism and affect-based trust was designed to avoid the engagement in opportunistic behaviours by any of the partners. However, it was posited in Section 7.3 that Machiavellianism contains strong opportunistic tendencies. In fact, Jones & Paulhus (2009) even suggest that cooperative tactics, regardless of if they are short-term or long-term oriented, are not based on a high Mach’s true intentions of cooperation but are merely tools employed to eventually achieve a less honourable goal. Hence, high Machs would most likely remain opportunistic and, thereby, endanger the perceived overall IJV performance unless other situational conditions deem opportunism unfavourable.

In order to prevent this from happening, the cultural profile developed at the end of Chapter 11 could potentially be of help. When attempting to set up an IJV, individuals with a cultural background close to the cultural profile should probably first be checked for their personal history before promoting them into positions with high decision-making discretion: How did they approach similar projects in the past? How do their co-workers and peers regard their interpersonal style? It is important to ask these and other questions, as the cultural profile offers only a first best guess about the possibility of elevated levels of Machiavellianism of a certain person. It is still possible for a member of a culture similar to the cultural profile to display average levels of Machiavellianism. Moreover, given that staffing-related discrimination on the basis of a person’s culture can entail legal and social consequences, further evidence is absolutely necessary. Having obtained hard evidence on the basis of the cultural profile’s suggestions, high Machs can be more easily identified. This can help avoid situations in which a high Mach ends up in a powerful position with respect to the IJV.

Of course, this preclusion is not always possible, since other factors, such as the candidates’ educational background and expertise, are also of essential importance for staffing decisions. Thus, if it is not possible to prevent an alleged high Mach from ascending into a high position of power within an IJV, where they could cause damage to the IJV, it can be attempted to...
align the respective high Mach’s aims with those of the IJV. One possibility would be to tie her or his compensation to the performance of the IJV. This should act as a disincentive for the suspected high Mach to act opportunistically at the expense of the IJV, since this would in the end hurt herself or himself.

12 Limitations, future research, and conclusion

The first point meriting attention is the non-representativeness of the sample. For absolutely clean, statistical results it would have been necessary to draw a random sample, which sufficiently represents the commonly held values of the respective society as a whole (Quatember, 2008). This was not possible for this thesis. For instance, a big part of the subjects are exchange students, which might already imply some sort of self-selection. It was, therefore, mentioned in Section 9.1 and shall be repeated here that the findings obtained by the reliance on this sample are to be understood as hints with respect to the hypotheses and not as representative results per se.

Remaining with the sample, another deterrent is the cultural composition thereof. Table 2 in Section 9.1 reveals that 67 of the 108 subjects come from three cultures, which accounts for about 62 % of the sample size. These are Austria with 42 subjects, the USA with 15 subjects, and Taiwan with 10 subjects. Austrian students alone are responsible for approximately 38.9 % of the total sample. In addition to this, there are eight countries which are represented by only a single subject. Additionally, the total sample size itself may be considered rather small in this context. Together, these issues might introduce a certain bias with respect to the research results.

As a consequence, replication would be a worthwhile undertaking. Since a similar study of this extent had seemingly not been attempted before, replications would help to consolidate the empirical results or expose unnoticed weaknesses. Ideally, a replication study should take the limitations listed above into consideration. Accordingly, the choice of another sample with representative status and a different and more well-balanced cultural mix would be recommended.

The employed questionnaire could also have been a cause for limitations. Most items derive from tested and tried questionnaires (e.g. The GLOBE Foundation, 2006b) and should, thus, not pose a problem. However, instead of applying the original Mach IV items, it became necessary to resort to the Kiddie Mach, which underwent further simplifications in order to avoid problems of incomprehension (see Section 9.2.1). Despite the unquestionable necessity for
this simplification, it could still be that this somewhat affected the results obtained for Machiavellianism. Accordingly, it would be interesting to investigate whether the results of this thesis replicate if the original Mach IV questionnaire is used instead.

Aside from the items of the employed questionnaire, the language used could also have caused unnoticed problems. By nature of cross-cultural studies, not every subject might call English her or his mother tongue. This was also the case with this study. Only a small portion of the subjects spoke English as their first language. Nonetheless, English was chosen uniformly as the language for this questionnaire, since the students participated in a course which was held in English, which implied a sufficient understanding of English. Even so, divergence in understanding regarding different questions and words might have arisen. Translation of the questionnaire into the different subjects’ native tongues could have alleviated this issue. Future studies might want to investigate if the results of this thesis remain valid after having surveyed the different subjects in their mother tongue.

A further possible drawback of the questionnaire could be its length. The completion of the questionnaire, which consists of seven pages, requires approximately 20 minutes. This might have challenged the subjects’ concentration as well as their willingness to consider every question in a sufficient manner, especially the ones at the end of the questionnaire.

Another factor is the feeble reliability values provided for some of the cultural dimensions (compare Table 4). Therefore, the correlations of these dimensions could be flawed.

As a result, a smaller study, which only replicates the part of the empirical study of this thesis that pertains to these specific dimensions, might be of value. This would also allow for a shorter questionnaire.

Aside from replication, explorative studies which cover other etic cultural dimensions would also contribute to the fields of Machiavellianism and cultural research. These dimensions could also stem from concepts from other authors that were not selected in this thesis. The respective results may help to develop a clearer and more coherent picture of the interplay of Machiavellianism and culture.

In spite of this thesis’s focus on the etic aspects of culture, emic cultural research may also help to shed light on the relationship between culture and Machiavellianism. It may well be that Machiavellianism entails different behaviours in different cultures. For instance, high Machs in one culture may prefer a certain set of tactics which is tailored to the precepts of that particular culture, whereas high Machs in another culture may favour a different range of tactics.
Finally, it would be useful to test the cultural profile in its ability to accurately predict differences in Machiavellianism on the basis of culture. Refinements of the profile would be most welcomed.

In order to conclude this thesis, it might be appropriate to return to the words of Niccolò Machiavelli one last time:

“But however it may be, I do not judge, or will ever judge, it to be a defect to defend any opinion with arguments, without wanting to employ either authority or force.” (Machiavelli, 1531, p. 142)

Despite the level-of-analysis problem, this thesis set out to investigate a potential link between the individual-level construct of Machiavellianism and etic cultural dimensions. Moreover, it tried to distil a profile which would enable researchers and practitioners alike to deduct an estimation of the level of Machiavellianism of individuals based on their cultural background. It was possible to cover both points in sufficient detail. By means of empirical analysis, it was possible to discover indications for the link between culture and Machiavellianism and also to find enough correlations to allow for the development of a cultural profile. Accordingly, the rather novel approach taken by this thesis helped to open up a new area into which researchers might want to invest their efforts. Other authors may find this thesis useful and utilize it as an orientation point when navigating their own hypothesis creation in this area. Indeed, further research, no matter whether etic or emic in nature, is strongly required in this area to better understand the interplay of Machiavellianism and culture.
Reference list


The GLOBE Foundation (2006a). Guidelines for the use of GLOBE culture and leadership scales.


The GLOBE Foundation (2006c). Syntax for GLOBE national culture, organizational culture and leadership scales.


Appendix A: Questionnaire

Student Survey

This survey is part of my diploma thesis on the topic of cultural differences, which I write with the Institute of International Management. It is split in two parts and will take about 20 minutes. This survey is absolutely anonymous. Some questions might look similar, but please answer all of them. Read the questions carefully and answer them intuitively. This is not a test, so there are no right or wrong answers. Many thanks in advance for answering all questions truthfully.

Individual Part

This part of the questionnaire is about you as an individual. Please answer the first twenty questions by inserting the number which most accurately describes how you feel about a statement. The meaning of the numbers is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>strongly agree</th>
<th>agree</th>
<th>somewhat agree</th>
<th>feeling neutral</th>
<th>somewhat disagree</th>
<th>disagree</th>
<th>strongly disagree</th>
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</table>

1-1 Never tell anyone why you did something unless it will help you.
1-2 Most people are good and kind.
1-3 The best way to get along with people is to tell them things that make them happy.
1-4 You should do something only when you are sure it is right.
1-5 It is smartest to believe that all people will behave badly towards other people if they have a chance.
1-6 You should always be honest, no matter what.
1-7 Sometimes you have to hurt other people to get what you want.
1-8 Most people won’t work hard unless you make them do it.
1-9 It is better to be ordinary and honest than famous and dishonest.
1-10 It’s better to tell someone why you want that person to help you than to make up a good story to get that person to do it.
1-11 Successful people are mostly honest and good.
1-12 Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.
1-13 A criminal is just like other people except that the criminal is stupid enough to get caught.
1-14 Most people are brave.
1-15 It is smart to be nice to important people even if you don’t really like them.
1-16 It is possible to be ethically good in everything one does.
1-17 Most people can not be easily cheated on.
1-18 Sometimes you have to cheat a little to get what you want.
1-19 It is never right to tell a lie.
1-20 It hurts more to lose money than to lose a friend.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1-21 How often do you feel nervous or tense?</th>
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<tr>
<td>always</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>1-22 How important is freedom (of action and thought) to you?</th>
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<td>of supreme importance</td>
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<th>1-23 How important is social recognition (respect, approval by others) to you?</th>
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<td>of supreme importance</td>
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<tr>
<th>1-24 How important is being independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient) as a guiding principle in your life to you?</th>
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<tr>
<th>1-25 All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days?</th>
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<td>very good</td>
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<th>1-26 How important is creativity (uniqueness, imagination) to you?</th>
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<td>of supreme importance</td>
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<tr>
<th>1-27 How important is being ambitious (hard-working, aspiring) as a guiding principle in your life to you?</th>
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<tr>
<td>of supreme importance</td>
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<tr>
<th>1-28 In your private life, how important is keeping time free for fun?</th>
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<tr>
<td>of utmost importance</td>
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<th>1-29 How important is being daring (seeking adventure, risk) as a guiding principle in your life to you?</th>
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<td>of supreme importance</td>
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<tr>
<th>1-30 How important is being influential (having an impact on people and events) as a guiding principle in your life to you?</th>
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<td>of supreme importance</td>
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<tr>
<th>1-31 How important is choosing own goals (selecting own purposes) as a guiding principle in your life to you?</th>
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<td>of supreme importance</td>
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<tr>
<th>1-32 Are you a happy person?</th>
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<tr>
<td>always</td>
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</table>
1-33 How important is being broadminded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs) as a guiding principle in your life to you?

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<tr>
<th>of supreme importance</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>neutral</th>
<th>not important</th>
<th>opposed to my values</th>
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1-34 How important is being capable (competent, effective, efficient) as a guiding principle in your life to you?

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<tr>
<th>of supreme importance</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>neutral</th>
<th>not important</th>
<th>opposed to my values</th>
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1-35 How important is being successful (achieving goals) as a guiding principle in your life to you?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>of supreme importance</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>neutral</th>
<th>not important</th>
<th>opposed to my values</th>
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1-36 How important is being curious (interested in everything, exploring) as a guiding principle in your life to you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>of supreme importance</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>neutral</th>
<th>not important</th>
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1-37 In your private life, how important is moderation (= having few desires)?

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<tr>
<th>of utmost importance</th>
<th>very important</th>
<th>of moderate importance</th>
<th>of little importance</th>
<th>of very little or no importance</th>
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Culture Part

This part of the questionnaire is about your culture. Please answer the questions by setting a cross at the point of the scale, which most accurately describes your opinion. Think of your most recent culture when answering.

- How things are in your most recent culture

For the following questions please think about how things are in your most recent culture and not how you think they should be.

2-1 There are many social norms that people are supposed to follow in my culture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>strongly agree</th>
<th>agree</th>
<th>somewhat agree</th>
<th>neutral</th>
<th>somewhat disagree</th>
<th>disagree</th>
<th>strongly disagree</th>
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</table>

2-2 One can be a good manager without having a precise answer to every question that a subordinate may raise about his or her work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>strongly agree</th>
<th>agree</th>
<th>undecided</th>
<th>disagree</th>
<th>strongly disagree</th>
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2-3 In my culture, young people are encouraged to aim for continuously improved performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>strongly agree</th>
<th>neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>strongly disagree</th>
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</table>
2-4 In my culture, there are very clear expectations for how people should act in most situations.

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<th>strongly agree</th>
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<th>somewhat agree</th>
<th>neutral</th>
<th>somewhat disagree</th>
<th>disagree</th>
<th>strongly disagree</th>
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<td>7</td>
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</table>

2-5 In my culture, people are generally:

assertive
non-assertive

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

2-6 In my culture, a person’s influence is based primarily on:

one’s ability and contribution to the society
the authority of one’s position

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

2-7 In my culture, people are generally:

very concerned about others
not at all concerned about others

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

2-8 Do other people or circumstances ever prevent you from doing what you really want to?

yes, always
yes, usually
sometimes
no, seldom
no, never

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

2-9 People agree upon what behaviours are appropriate versus inappropriate in most situations in my culture.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>strongly agree</th>
<th>agree</th>
<th>somewhat agree</th>
<th>neutral</th>
<th>somewhat disagree</th>
<th>disagree</th>
<th>strongly disagree</th>
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<td>7</td>
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</table>

2-10 In my culture, people are generally:

very generous
not at all generous

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

2-11 In my culture, major rewards are based on:

only performance effectiveness
performance effectiveness and other factors (for example, seniority or political connections)
Only factors other than performance effectiveness (for example, seniority or political connections)

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

2-12 In my culture, followers are expected to:

obey their leaders without question
question their leaders when in disagreement

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

2-13 In my culture, people are generally:

very sensitive toward others
not at all sensitive toward others

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

2-14 People in my culture have a great deal of freedom in deciding how they want to behave in most situations.

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<th>strongly agree</th>
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<th>neutral</th>
<th>somewhat disagree</th>
<th>disagree</th>
<th>strongly disagree</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Subcategory</td>
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<td>Value 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-15 In my culture, being innovative to improve performance is generally:</td>
<td>substantially rewarded</td>
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<td>somewhat rewarded</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not rewarded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-16 In my culture, people are generally:</td>
<td>tough</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tender</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-17 In my culture, people in positions of power try to:</td>
<td>increase their social distance from less powerful individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>decrease their social distance from less powerful people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-18 In my culture, people are generally:</td>
<td>very friendly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>very unfriendly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-19 In my culture, if someone acts in an inappropriate way, others will strongly disapprove.</td>
<td>strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>somewhat agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>neutral</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>somewhat disagree</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-20 In my culture, rank and position in the hierarchy have special privileges.</td>
<td>strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>neither agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nor disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-21 In my culture, people are generally:</td>
<td>very tolerant of mistakes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not at all tolerant of mistakes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-22 In my culture, people are generally:</td>
<td>dominant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>non-dominant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-23 A company’s or organization’s rules should not be broken – not even when the employee thinks breaking the rule would be in the organization’s best interest.</td>
<td>strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>undecided</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-24 In my culture, power is:</td>
<td>concentrated at the top</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>shared throughout the society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-25 People in my culture almost always comply with social norms.</td>
<td>strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>somewhat agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>somewhat disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**How things should be in your most recent culture**

For the following questions please think about how things should be in your most recent culture and not how you think they currently are.

### 3-1 I believe that young people should be encouraged to aim for continuously improved performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3-2 In my culture, when trying to reach a goal people should be encouraged to be:

- Aggressive *(excluding physical violence)*
- Non-aggressive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 3-3 In my culture, I believe that a person’s influence should be based primarily on:

- One’s ability and contribution to the society
- The authority of one’s position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 3-4 In my culture, people should be encouraged to be:

- Very concerned about others
- Very unconcerned about others

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 3-5 I believe that major rewards should be based on:

- Only performance effectiveness
- Performance effectiveness and other factors (for example, seniority or political connections)
- Only factors other than performance effectiveness (for example, seniority or political connections)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 3-6 I believe that people in positions of power should try to:

- Increase their social distance from less powerful individuals
- Decrease their social distance from less powerful people

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 3-7 I think being innovative to improve performance should be:

- Substantially rewarded
- Somewhat rewarded
- Not rewarded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 3-8 In my culture, people should be encouraged to be:

- Very sensitive toward others
- Not at all sensitive toward others

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 3-9 I believe that followers should:

- Obey their leader without question
- Question their leader when in disagreement

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
3-10 I believe that employees **should** set challenging goals for themselves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>strongly agree</th>
<th>neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-11 In my culture, people **should** be encouraged to be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>very friendly</th>
<th>very unfriendly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-12 In my culture, people **should** be encouraged to be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>dominant</th>
<th>non-dominant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-13 When in disagreement with adults, young people **should** defer to elders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>strongly agree</th>
<th>neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-14 In my culture, people **should** be encouraged to be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>very tolerant of mistakes</th>
<th>not at all tolerant of mistakes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-15 I believe that power **should** be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>concentrated at the top</th>
<th>shared throughout the organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-16 In my culture, people **should** be encouraged to be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>tough</th>
<th>tender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How old are you (in years)?

What is your gender (female/male)?

What country were you born in?

What is your country of citizenship?

What is your first language?

**Thank you very much for your participation in this survey**
Appendix B: Questionnaire key

**Reverse-coding:** Most of the items of the questionnaire are reverse-coded. This is signified by an “r” behind the respective item.

**Key:**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Christie &amp; Geis:</strong> Machiavellianism (20 items)</td>
<td>1-1r; 1-2; 1-3r; 1-4; 1-5r; 1-6; 1-7r; 1-8r; 1-9; 1-10; 1-11; 1-12r; 1-13r; 1-14; 1-15r; 1-16; 1-17; 1-18r; 1-19; 1-20r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hofstede:</strong> Uncertainty Avoidance / UAI (4 items)</td>
<td>1-21r; 1-25; 2-2; 2-23r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hofstede:</strong> Restraint-Indulgence / IVR (4 items)</td>
<td>1-28r; 1-32r; 1-37; 2-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GLOBE:</strong> Performance Orientation (3 + 4 items)</td>
<td>Practices: 2-3r; 2-11r; 2-15r Values: 3-1r; 3-5r; 3-7r; 3-10r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GLOBE:</strong> Assertiveness (3 + 3 items)</td>
<td>Practices: 2-5r; 2-16r; 2-22r Values: 3-2r; 3-12r; 3-16r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GLOBE:</strong> Power Distance (5 + 5 items)</td>
<td>Practices: 2-6; 2-12r; 2-17r; 2-20r; 2-24r Values: 3-3; 3-6r; 3-9r; 3-13r; 3-15r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GLOBE:</strong> Humane Orientation (5 + 4 items)</td>
<td>Practices: 2-7r; 2-10r; 2-13r; 2-18r; 2-21r Values: 3-4r; 3-8r; 3-11r; 3-14r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Schwartz:</strong> Intellectual Autonomy (4 items)</td>
<td>1-22r; 1-26r; 1-33r; 1-36r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Schwartz:</strong> Mastery (8 items)</td>
<td>1-23r; 1-24r; 1-27r; 1-29r; 1-30r; 1-31r; 1-34r; 1-35r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gelfand:</strong> Tight-Loose (6 items)</td>
<td>2-1r; 2-4r; 2-9r; 2-14; 2-19r; 2-25r</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix C: Coefficient matrix of factor analysis

The following table contains the coefficient matrix of all items, with respect to the three factors discussed in Section 10.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Dishonesty</th>
<th>Cynicism</th>
<th>Non-morality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-1</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-2</td>
<td>-0.138</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-3</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>-0.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-4</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>0.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-5</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-6</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-7</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-8</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-9</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-10</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-11</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-12</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-13</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-14</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-15</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-16</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-17</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
<td>0.287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-18</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-19</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mach 1-20</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D: Correlations of cultural dimensions

The following table displays the correlations among the different cultural dimensions employed in this thesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hofstede’s UAI</th>
<th>Hofstede and Minkov’s IVR</th>
<th>GLOBE’s performance orientation – value scale</th>
<th>GLOBE’s performance orientation – practice scale</th>
<th>GLOBE’s assertiveness – value scale</th>
<th>GLOBE’s assertiveness – practice scale</th>
<th>GLOBE’s power distance – value scale</th>
<th>GLOBE’s power distance – practice scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hofstede’s UAI</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>-0.198*</td>
<td>-0.163</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.070</td>
<td>0.205*</td>
<td>N: 108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofstede and Minkov’s IVR</td>
<td>-0.198*</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>0.212*</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>-0.224*</td>
<td>N: 108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s performance orientation – value scale</td>
<td>-0.163</td>
<td>0.212*</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>-0.517**</td>
<td>N: 108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s performance orientation – practice scale</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>0.210*</td>
<td>0.253**</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>N: 108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s assertiveness – value scale</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.210*</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.218*</td>
<td>N: 108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s assertiveness – practice scale</td>
<td>-0.070</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.253**</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>N: 108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s power distance – value scale</td>
<td>0.205*</td>
<td>-0.224*</td>
<td>-0.517**</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>0.218*</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>N: 108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s power distance – practice scale</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.304**</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>N: 108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s humane orientation – value scale</td>
<td>-0.254**</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.330**</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>-0.195*</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>-0.445**</td>
<td>N: 108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBE’s humane orientation – practice scale</td>
<td>0.114</td>
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<td>-0.042</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
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<td>-0.077</td>
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<td>Schwartz’s intellectual autonomy</td>
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<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.296**</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.292**</td>
<td>-0.204*</td>
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<td>Schwartz’s mastery</td>
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<td>0.190*</td>
<td>0.227*</td>
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<td>0.422**</td>
<td>0.203*</td>
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<td>GLOBE’s humane orientation – value scale</td>
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<td>Schwartz’s intellectual autonomy</td>
<td>Schwartz’s mastery</td>
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<td>Gelfand et al.’s tightness-looseness</td>
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** Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)
* Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed)